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chapter 1
Notes on the Translations and Acculturations
Dragos Calma
University College Dublin / Newman Centre for the Study of Religions,
Dublin
This is the second of three volumes publishing the proceedings of the Parisian
conference dedicated to the reception of the Elements of Theology and the
Book of Causes. This meeting was dedicated mostly to the translations and
various forms of acculturations of these two works in Byzantium, the Cau-
casus, the lands of Islam, the Latin West and the Jewish Western communit-
ies. I organised it in collaboration with the much-regretted Marc Geoffroy on
12–13 February 2016, within the framework of the project LIBER (ANR-13-PDOC-
0018–01). The preparation for publication took a long time indeed, and its last
stages were accomplished within the framework of a larger ERC project (Neo-
plAT_ERC_CoG_771640).
First and foremost, Iwish to thank all the collaborators for their patience and
their understanding during these years. I renewmy gratitude toward the fund-
ing bodies that supported the organisation of these meetings: École pratique
des hautes études, Équipe “Philosophie arabe” of the Centre “Jean Pépin”—
CNRS (UMR 8230), Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes—CNRS
(UMR 8584), Labex haStec (Laboratoire européen d’histoire et anthropolo-
gie des savoirs, des techniques et des croyances), Institut de recherche et
d’histoire des textes—CNRS, Centre “Pierre Abélard”—Université Paris Sor-
bonne. Equally, I wish to thank again Evan King and Liz Curry for their help in
preparing this volume, Robert M. Berchman and John F. Finamore for accept-
ing the publication of these volumes in their series; Jennifer Pavelko for her
support; and the peer-reviewers for their effort and comments.
As for the first volume,minor rearrangements (compared to the original pro-
gram) seemed necessary in order to strengthen the thematic coherence of the
volume. Hence, Michael Chase’s and Pascale Bermon’s papers were delivered
during the third meeting but are published in this volume, whereas Carlos
Steel’s paperwill be published in the third volume. I amhappy towelcome con-
tributors invited to collaborate for this volume: Victoria Arroche, Anna Giof-
freda, Sokrates-Athanasios Kiosoglou and Michele Trizio.
A summary of each section will provide more clarity.
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1 Byzantium
Frederick Lauritzen describes the multiple references to Proclus in Byzan-
tium, such as the 6th-century anecdotical (and historically inaccurate) milit-
ary advice allegedly provided to the emperor Anastasius, or the 10th-century
remarks describing him as a plagiarist of Dionysius ps.-Areopagite. More inter-
estingly, some of Maximus the Confessor’s language echoes Proclus’, notably
when describing the immoveable and incorporeal realm of the divine. Laur-
itzen equally gives a list of correspondences between the works of Michael
Psellos (published under the title Philosophica Minora) and Proclus’ Elements
of Theology. In the 14th century, Gregory Palamas, accused of being a Pla-
tonist by one of his adversaries, equally refers explicitly to Proclus (in Contra
Acyndinum). Lauritzen even argues that the contemplation of the divine ener-
gies described by Palamas have echoes of the Elements of Theology, and stresses
the continuity between Proclus, Maximus the Confessor, Michael Psellos and
Gregory Palamas.
Lauritzen advocates that Pagan philosophy was studied in Byzantium “by a
variety of thinkers rather than isolated circles of intellectuals” (p. 29). Proclus’
Elements of Theology would be an example of this widespread influence, and
Nicholas of Methone’s critique attests to the presence of a veritable trend in
the 12th century.
StephenGersh studies the influence of Proclus’Elements of Theology on Eustra-
tios’ theory of universals in the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and
in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Gersh identifies incongruities
between the ways Eustratios presents the universals in these two texts, with
the latter text introducing the idea that the universal before the parts is not
the Platonic transcendent form (like in the Commentary on the Ethics), but
rather recalls an “originative monad or an unparticipated term” (p. 37). As a
consequence, the two other universals (of parts and in the parts) have slightly
different definitions inasmuch as the concepts of parts andwhole are redefined
relative to this principle: the “whole of parts” is the entire collection of mon-
ads proceeding from the originative monad, and the “whole in parts” is each
individual monad within this collection.
Gersh identifies the sources in Proclus’ Elements of Theology and the two
prologues of the Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. Indeed,
in prop. 67 of the Elements of Theology, Proclus presents the same tripartite
distinction (before the parts, of parts, in the part), although not explicitly in
relation to universals but to wholeness (ὁλότης). In the Commentary on Euc-
lid’s Elements, Proclus explicitly discusses a threefold division of universals, in
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somewhat similar terms. Gersh shows that Eustratios does not simply combine
these analogous theories, inasmuch as, for example, thewhole of the parts does
not correspond to any of the three universals, but more to a relation (that of
genus and species). For Eustratios, mathematical and dialectical notions are
inextricably linked. Gersh contributes to the debate on the status of universals
in Eustratios (and Proclus) by underlying the role of cognitive faculties (intel-
lection, discursive reason and opinion) in grasping the universal. He equally
provides a close examination of themeaning of theword logos in Proclus’Com-
mentary on Euclid, concluding that even the Elements of Theology “consists of
propositions and proofs which exemplify the sense of logos as a combination
of thinking + the one and the many in syllogistic argument” (p. 47). Eustratios’
flexible use of logos seems, at times, similar to the Hellenic Neoplatonic tradi-
tion, but at other times more closely related to Christian Platonism.
JoshuaM. Robinson focuses on Psellos’ understanding of Proclus’ metaphysics
(mainly his views on emanation and on the unity of the One) in respect to the
Christian teachings on creation andTrinity. He does not exclude the possibility
that Nicholas of Methone wrote his Refutation as a reaction to Psellos’ abund-
ant use of Proclus. Robinson argues, contrary to Lauritzen, Gioffreda andTrizio,
that there is no direct evidence for any substantial interest in Proclus in the
12th century (with the exception of Ioane Petritsi). The comparisons between
the positions of Psellos and Nicholas are illuminating.
Robinson notes that one should not exaggerate the weight of Proclus in
Psellos (comprising both abundant compilation of citations and very specific
explanations) and mentions, for instance, that the number of references to
Aristotle and Plotinus exceed the number of references to Proclus. In some
cases, Proclus is simply the foremost representative of Hellenic thought and
stands for Pagan wisdom as such. One should not conclude that by citing Pro-
clus, Psellos intends to endorse all the views he reports, although in some cases
he finds astonishing degrees of compatibility with the Trinitarian dogma (e.g.
in prop. 35 of the Elements) or the Incarnation (e.g. in a quotation from De
sacrificio et magica). There are cases where Psellos intentionally modifies Pro-
clus’ argument in order to render it compatiblewithTrinitarian doctrine: when
dealing with prop. 7, he omits that, according to Proclus, within the hierarchy
of gods, one cannot produce another equal to itself.
For Psellos, as Robinson points out, reason (λόγος) is equally important for
Greeks (i.e. the Pagan Hellenic tradition) and Christians, yet the truth is rooted
in revelation and tradition. By contrast, Nicholas “regards Proclus’ entire pro-
ject as a presumptuous rationalism aiming to scale the heavens (like the Tower
of Babel) by the power of human thought” (p. 63). Robinson’s careful examin-
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ation of citations leads him to the conclusion that, contrary to a rather widely
shared view among scholars, there are not that many occasions where Psellos
agrees with Proclus, and “in some passages [he is] clearly conscious that philo-
sophy can lead into heresy” (p. 89).
Anna Gioffreda and Michele Trizio revisit the question of the authenticity of
Methone’s Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology: two 14th-century manu-
scripts attribute chapters 139 and 146 of the work to Procopius of Gaza (ca 465/
470–526/530). Indeed, there is a scholarly debate about the paternity of these
fragments that has been recently revived by E. Amato (2010, 2014). In 2012, the
same fragments have been ascribed to Ps-Procopius by I. Polemis in his edition
of treatises attributed to the 14th-century author Isaak Argyros.
Gioffreda and Trizio refute Amato’s arguments stating, as Lauritzen has in
his contribution, that Proclus’Elements of Theologywaswidely known and read
by 11th- and 12th-century Byzantine scholars. They equally recall the numer-
ous internal evidence pleading in favour of a middle Byzantine dating. Among
the external evidence, they mention the explicit references by Photios to Pro-
copius’ works (and Psellos’ remarks that are borrowed from these), and a
scholion to Lucian’s Philopseudes in relation to Procopius’Refutation of Proclus’
Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles.
Gioffreda and Trizio support Stiglmayr’s arguments against the Procopian
paternity of the chapters 139 and 146 by mentioning the anti-Filioquist reas-
oning on the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit, based on
a Byzantine tradition citing Gregory of Nazianzus. They equally show that the
topics discussed in the abovementioned chapters echo theological themes dis-
cussed by Nicholas elsewhere.
Their palaeographical examination adds further important elements:
chapters 139 and 146 have been copied more than once (and with differences!)
in Vat. gr. 1096 and Vat. gr. 604 by one and the same person: Isaak Argyros.
These two manuscripts, and others, are linked with anti-Palamite circles. The
two chapters appear in Argyros’ hand in his own Adversus Cantacuzenum, a
work thatmakes use of numerous Patristic quotations, and in a florilegium that
he prepared for subsequent anti-Palamite treatises. The attributions of these
chapters to Procopius are in Argyros’ hand, and they both serve the purpose
of the polemic, by providing arguments against the distinction between God’s
essence and his providential energies. The attributions to Procopius, therefore,
attest to a 14th-century polemic about God’s unity and the orthodox under-
standing of creation, and “in absence of new incontrovertible evidence, this
attribution must be regarded as highly dubious” (p. 129).
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2 The Caucasus
Tengiz Iremadze discusses the broader context of the reception of Proclus and
Neoplatonism in Caucasian philosophy. With its origins in the Byzantine tra-
dition, the Caucasian tradition of philosophy grew into an independent tradi-
tion of thought, equally influenced by other philosophical traditions. However,
within thisCaucasian tradition, Proclus’Elements of Theologyplayed an import-
ant role.
Ioane Petritsi’s famously translated into Georgian and commented on the
Elements of Theology, but one has to recall that he also translated the works
of Nemesius of Emesa. Summarizing Petritsi’s commentary and explaining his
intellectual project, Iremadze insists on thepedagogical role theGeorgian com-
mentator gave to the Elements: the ultimate goal of Proclus’ work, according
to Petritsi, was to train one’s intellect in the knowledge of the One in a sys-
tematic and syllogistic manner. Iremadze’s hypothesis is worth considering:
Petritsi’s commentary is often like a dialoguewith the reader, probably echoing
his discussions with the community of monks (or rather novices) of the Gelati
monastery. Highly considering Plato and the entire Platonic tradition, Petritsi
does seem to be influenced by the Aristotelian heritage.
Ioane Petritsi’s translation and commentary on Proclus is relatively famil-
iar to scholars, yet a wider scholarly interaction with the Armenian tradi-
tion (including commentaries and translations) is still yet to be considered.
Iremadze mentions some of them, such as the translation of the Elements into
Armenian in 1248 or the 1651 commentary in Armenian on the Elements by
Svimeon Dshughaezi, which was translated into Georgian in 1757. In the 18th
century, there were at least two commentaries on the Elements accessible in
Georgian.
Iremadze equally mentions other major figures that made a decisive con-
tribution to the assimilation of Proclean thought into Georgian, although not
through running commentaries. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani (1658–1726), a diplo-
mat, integrated propositions and references to Proclus in his Georgian Diction-
ary (an encyclopaedia and dictionary). Anton I of Georgia (1720–1788), Patri-
arch of the Orthodox Georgian Church, cited explicitly and commented upon
Petritsi’s commentary and Proclus in his work Spekali. Joane Bagrationi (1768–
1830) mainly relied on the Armenian commentaries on Proclus in his main
work, Kalmasoba, written in a Platonic dialogue form, where he explains 86
of the 211 propositions of the Elements. Iremadze concludes that “die kaukasis-
chen Philosophen nutzten daher gern seine [i.e. Proklos] Lehre bei der Bestim-
mung der Aufgabe der Philosophie und ihresWesens” (p. 150).
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3 The Lands of Islam
Michael Chase studies the sources and origins of the Theology of Aristotle,
and sheds new light on the first reception of Hellenic Neoplatonic thinking in
9th-century Baghdad in the circle of al-Kindī, where the Book of Causes ori-
ginated. Chase reopens the file regarding the attribution of a commentary on
the Enneads to Porphyry, which might have been translated into Arabic, and
which was used to compose the Theology of Aristotle under the supervision of
al-Kindī. Augustine in theWest or Gregory of Nyssa in the East knew Plotinus’
Enneads through Porphyry’s exegesis, which consists of three elements: head-
ings (abbreviations of contents), summaries of arguments and commentaries.
Chase argues that not only the headings (κεφάλαια) and the summaries (ἐπι-
χειρήματα) were translated into Arabic and used in the Theology of Aristotle, as
the recent work by C. D’Ancona has proved, but also the commentaries (ὑπο-
μνήματα), which are otherwise lost.
Leaving behind other scholarly exegesis, Chase studies some of the main
themes of the Theology of Aristotle, such as the identification of the First Prin-
ciple with pure being, the “typical confusion” of soul and intellect, the learned
ignorance, divine knowledge and providence, instantaneous creation and the
doctrine of action “by being alone”. Chase shows that all these doctrines were
defended by Porphyry, and that even though some of his works are lost, other
authors (e.g. Philoponus) ascribed these doctrines to him. In light of this evid-
ence, there is no need, argues Chase, to postulate that the Theology of Aristotle
was influenced by Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite. An intermediary cannot be
fully excluded, but it is more “economical” to postulate the influence of only
one author, i.e. Porphyry, notably because in the first paragraph of theTheology
of Aristotle he is explicitly mentioned as the main source. However, it must be
noted that Chase does not claim that the Theology is a translation into Arabic
of Porphyry’s lost commentary on the Enneads, inasmuch as he does not deny
the possibility of various interventions of the adaptor or editor, al-Kindī. But
the Porphyrian origin of the Theology of Aristotle should be reconsidered more
carefully.
Peter Adamson endorses F. Zimmermann’s hypothesis that the Theology of
Aristotle, a “partial Arabic translation of the last three Enneads” (p. 182),
together with other major translations fromGreek—notably Proclus’Elements
of Theology and writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias—, all produced within
the circle of al-Kindī, circulated in a “metaphysics file” with a preface deliber-
ately attributing them to Aristotle. In the Harmony of the Two Sages there are
allusions to propositions 1 to 5 (possibly even prop. 25) of the Elements of Theo-
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logy. Thus, as Adamson points out, al-Fārābī’s main difficulty is not to explain
the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, but the harmony between Aristotle
(of the Metaphysics) and Aristotle (of the Theology).
In a short section of the Harmony devoted to the question of the creation
of the universe, al-Fārābī shows that he is aware that a temporal beginning
of the universe is denied in On the Heavens. As a counterargument, he cites a
fragment from the Theology of Aristotle clearly dependent on the Arabic Pro-
clus. The harmony is explained through a complex set of arguments based
on the identity between Aristotle’s First Mover and the One as pure being,
exercising a specific type of causality (“without time”, hence in accordance
with On the Heavens), as creator of all things (a trademark of al-Kindī and his
circle).
Another section of the Harmony discusses the theory of Forms, on which
Aristotle notoriously criticised Plato. Yet, as Adamson shows, if “on Aristotle’s
interpretation the Platonic theorymakes Forms the objects of knowledge”, “the
Harmony is saying that therewill actually be a scienceor knowledge that is itself
a Form”, which the author of the Harmony dismisses as ridiculous (p. 193–194).
The contradiction between the Aristotle of the Metaphysics and the Aristotle
of theTheology is solved by al-Fārābī through a digression on divine knowledge
stating that, by an extended meaning of words (e.g. by applying synonym-
ous language to nobler realities), one can say that God “knew” the Forms of
things he created. This would enable to preserve within the Kindian concep-
tual framework the understanding of the Aristotelian First Mover as “maker”.
In both cases examined, Adamson notes that Plato is assimilated to Aristotle,
not vice-versa.
Elvira Wakelnig discusses the origins of the Book of Causes by examining the
10th-century work, Al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya by Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad
ibnYūsuf al-ʿĀmirī.Wakelnig compares itwith the version of the Bookof Causes
translated into Latin, and shows that themes and concepts from the first nine
chapters of the Book of Causes and from chapters 11(?), 12, 16, 18–26, 29–30, 31(?)
are tacitly borrowed by al-ʿĀmirī. Wakelnig equally indicates that al-ʿĀmirī’s
Al-Fuṣūl bares similarities with the 16th chapter of a different version of the
Book of Causes (= Book of Causes II), preserved only in Arabic and edited in
2002 by S. Oudaimah and P. Thillet. Wakelnig also identifies significant dif-
ferences between these two texts, differences that could come from the fact
that al-ʿĀmirī had access to a “Proto-Liber de causis”, that was earlier than the
two versions currently known (the Book of Causes translated into Latin and the
Book of Causes II). And it is this “Proto-Liber de causis” that al-Kindī might have
composed.Wakelnig compares the same Al-Fuṣūlwith a text entitled Kitāb al-
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ḥaraka (Book of Motion), a compilation of extracts from the Arabic translations
of Proclus’Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics. Some of the proposi-
tions translated from the Elements of Theology are preserved only in this Kitāb
al-ḥaraka, which, asWakelnig argues, wasmost probably composed before the
Liber de causis II.
Wakelnig concludes that this Proto-Liber de causis might be the source for
the four texts examined: the Book of Causes translated into Latin, the Book of
Causes II, the Kitāb al-ḥaraka and al-ʿĀmirī’s Al-Fuṣūl.
Richard Taylor notes that in the Middle Ages the Book of Causes was ascribed
to Aristotle, while modern scholarship often considers it as no more than
an abbreviated version of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. In his contribution,
Taylor intends to reassess this received view (originating inAquinas’ comment-
ary) and focuses mostly on propositions and themes present in the Arabic
De causis, but absent in Proclus. He examines mostly, but not exclusively, the
chapters 5, 8 and 21, and identifies similarities with the Theology of Aristotle,
Sayings of the Greek Wiseman and the ps.-Farabian Letter on Divine Intellect,
which are all dependent, to various degrees, on Plotinus’ Enneads. However,
as Taylor notes, the idea of a creator or Pure Good as transcendent creative
knowledge, present in the chapter 8 of the Theology of Aristotle, is rejected by
Plotinus in relation to the One and relegated to the level of Nous. In the Plotini-
ana Arabica there is certain Aristotelian reminiscence of a self-thinking First
Mover.
In order tomaintain coherence with this teaching from the Plotiniana Arab-
ica, the author of the Arabic Book of Causes deliberately modifies the themes
from the Procleanpropositions 11 and 123 in order to introduce, in chapter 5, the
doctrine of the illuminating light shed on the inferior intelligence by the First
Cause. Taylor considers that “the source” of this theme is found in the Sayings
of the GreekWiseman, depending on Plotinus’Enneads V 6,4.14–22. The theme
in chapter 21 of the First Cause as perfect, self-sufficient and beyond language
is similar to the 10th book of the Theology of Aristotle, dependent on Enneads
V 2,1. The rationale underpinning these transformations and the preference for
certain themes, such as the idea of a pure being creator of all things, consists in
al-Kindī’s agenda to present “philosophy as a companion to the religious teach-
ings of Islam” (p. 225). Taylor emphasizes the importance of connecting the
metaphysics of the Book of Causes to al-Kindī’s intellectual program as a way
to revise, onmore accurate and solid grounds, received views about the weight
and role of the Elements of theTheology. The Book of Causes is the expression of
a “new form of Aristotelianism developed through a transformed understand-
ing of texts from Plotinus” (p. 228).
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Jamal Rachak dedicates a contribution to Ibn Bāğğa (Avempace). Firstly,
Rachak shows that in Ibn Bāğğa’s works of undisputed authority, only Aristotle,
Plato, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Philoponus, Al-Fārābī and
Al-Ġazālī are explicitly cited. He endorses Endress’ argument that Ibn Bāğğa
uses, unwittingly, the Proclean concept of the hierarchy of “spiritual forms”
(from the Elements of Theology, prop. 15–17) based on a work falsely attrib-
uted to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Rachak identifies a certain number of Neo-
platonic themes in Ibn Bāğğa’s texts before discussing a series of letters, or
rather thirteen fragments, preserved only in onemanuscript (inOxford, Bodley
Pococke 206), which transmit works by his friend and disciple, Ibn al-Imām.
There is a dispute about the authenticity of these fragments. Some
scholars—such as the editor of these fragments, Ǧ. al-ʿAlawī—argued against
Ibn Bāğğa’s authorship, while others—such asM.I. Fayyūmī—argued in favour
of their authenticity. Rachak has argued elsewhere that these fragments echo
a correspondence between Ibn Bāğğa and Ibn al-Imām, the texts preserved
in Oxford being written by the latter. If this hypothesis is accepted, the frag-
ments acquire a major historical significance since they would be among the
first texts in the lands of Islam explicitly naming propositions of the Book of
Causes. Moreover, for the author of these letters, the Book of Causes has the
same authority as al-Fārābī, al-Ġazālī and the Qurʾan.
4 The LatinWest
On the basis of manuscript evidence and stylistic comparisons, Dag Nikolaus
Hasse provides a complex analysis of the translations (from Arabic into Latin)
of al-Kindī’s On the Intellect, al-Fārābī’s Enumeration of the Sciences, Isaac
Israeli’sOnDefinitions andDescriptions and the Bookof Causes. Although schol-
ars have taken it for granted that Gundisalvi translated the first three works,
none of the manuscripts consulted by Hasse mentions him explicitly. By com-
parison, at least five manuscripts and the well-known list of translations by
Gerard of Cremona’s sociimentionhimexplicitly in relationwith all these texts.
Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundisalvi were contemporaries, both
were active in Toledo and served as canons of its cathedral. There is some
scholarly debate over the chronology of their translations (assuming that Gun-
disalvi is indeed the translator). Using specially designed software, Hasse then
compared Gerard’s eight other translations and the seven other translations
by Gundisalvi, and then compared these results with the four previously men-
tioned works. Hasse’s philological and statistical analysis suggests that: in the
case of Isaac Israeli, On Definitions, Gerard’s version was prior to the other
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translation (or Gundisalvi’s revision). Al-Fārābī’s Enumeration of the Sciences
was first translated by Gerard, then Gundisalvi “revised the translation by
thoroughly rewriting some passages”, while leaving numerous other passages
untouched (p. 265). It is “highly probable” that Gerard was the (first) translator
of al-Kindī’sOn the Intellect, as is suggested by some characteristic translations
(e.g. cadere sub is typical for Gerard, whereas Gundisalvi prefers subicere).
The examination of Pattin’s Liber de causis is, tomymind, less decisive given
that the current state of the “edition” and the lack of a rich critical apparatus
do not allow such a subtle and nuanced philological analysis. However, Hasse’s
approach is instructive and it must be included in any upcoming study or edi-
tion. His conclusionmust also be retained: the current edition of De causis has
a distinctive “Gerardian sound”, and it is “very unlikely that Gundisalvi revised
the Liber de causis” (p. 272).
Jules Janssens discusses the same topic of the “double translation”, but his
research and methodology is different from the one provided by Hasse. More-
over, Janssens has a slightly different understanding of the syntagma “double
translation”, in that it does not apply to two largely different or almost new
translations of the same text (like in the cases of the works studies by Hasse),
but rather to minimal and limited variations made with the aim of providing a
more fluent, “Latinised” version of a first, more literal attempt. Janssens’ hypo-
thesis, based on his previous work on the manuscripts of Avicenna latinus, is
that the variants of such a “double translation” (made either by the first trans-
lator or by a copyist) were present in the same, original manuscript.
Janssens discusses several cases, but I mention here only two of them: one
is the expression non destruuntur nec permutantur in chap. X(XI) of the Book
of Causes, prop. 101, l. 55–56. Endorsing Vansteenkiste’s hypothesis that per-
mutantur perfectly renders the Arabic tastahīlu, Janssens argues that the trans-
lator firstly chose non destruuntur and then he opted for permutantur in order
to provide a more accurate translation. Indeed, some manuscripts have non
destruuntur vel permutantur, with vel indicating in fact an alternative solution
for the Latin translation and not a complementary explanation in the original.
From the critical apparatus provided by Pattin, one concludes that a branch
of the manuscript tradition transmitted the two variants and another branch
only the first variant (destruuntur), but none of themanuscripts seem to trans-
mit only the second, more accurate, variant (permutantur). It may be worth
discussing, taking a similar approach, the case of non patitur neque destruitur,
from II, 21, l. 78–79.
Another interesting example is the expression apponitur vel parificatur pro-
posed by Pattin in II, 25, l. 91. Janssens notes that numerous manuscripts
notes on the translations and acculturations 11
have opponitur, and that a copyist probably decided to modify it to appon-
itur in order to providemore coherencewith parificatur. Janssens suggests that
the translator hesitated between reading yuḥāḏī (opponitur) or yuğārī (pari-
ficatur): without diacritical points, the similar orthographies of these verbs can
generate confusion.
Janssens strongly emphasizes the importance of producing a solid critical
edition of the Arabic text (and the search for new Arabic manuscripts as the
basis for it) and a new, better Latin edition. The latter shouldmirror, on the one
hand, the Arabic archetype and, on the other hand, its diverse transmission in
the LatinWest.
Pascale Bermon addresses a question that, since the publication of the edition
of Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the Book of Causes in 1954, has been over-
looked by scholars: what is precisely the text that he knew and commented
upon?
This question might have seemed redundant inasmuch as everyone read in
the introduction (originally published in 1954 andpreserved in the “new revised
edition” from 2002): “J’ai imprimé un texte du Liber de causis qui suit celui
de Bardenhewer sauf chaque fois que saint Thomas, citant le Liber, présente
un autre texte. J’ai soigneusement noté dans l’apparat critique à l’endroit de
ces citations les divergences. Autrement dit, je me suis appliqué à reconstit-
uer, chaque fois que c’est possible, le manuscrit que saint Thomas avait sous
les yeux” (Introduction to Thomas d’Aquinas, Expositio super Librum de causis,
Paris, Vrin, 2002 p. LXXIII). In reality, the edition from 2002 is nothing but
a re-impression of the 1954 edition. The expression “new revised edition” is
regrettably inaccurate and misleading. Scholars should remember that in the
“new edition” of Aquinas’ commentary they will not find Pattin’s text (not even
in the bibliography!) and more generally nothing that has been published on
the topic since 1954. Andwith Bermon’s article, one realizes that even the Latin
edition does not respect its philological promises.
Carefully analysing Aquinas’ exegesis of the propositions with the famous
Arabic transliterations alachili / achili and yliathim, Bermon notes (p. 329–331,
332, 334) several cases where Saffrey does not indicate the differences between
the text commented by Aquinas and the edition published by Bardenhewer.
The first conclusion is obvious: the Latin text of the Book of Causes that one
reads in Saffrey’s edition is not what Aquinas had in front of his eyes. Bermon
reconstructs parts of the text that Aquinas might have known and concludes
that he read a version of the Book of Causeswithout the transliteration alachili
/ achili. But Aquinas knew and explained the term yliathim (form), which he
connects with hylè (matter), most probably influenced by the fake etymology
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proposed byAlbert theGreat. TheArabic original, ḥilya, derives from the Proto-
Liber de causis, as E. Wakelnig argues in her study, and is borrowed from the
Arabic translation of the Enneads.
Alessandra Beccarisi argues that Eckhart prefers Liber de causis to Proclus, and,
unlike Dietrich of Freiberg, cites them together only five times. Although over-
looked by scholarship, proposition XV is the most cited by Eckhart and has,
according to Beccarisi, a pivotal role in his thought. Beccarisi identifies and
discusses three main themes where Eckhart uses this proposition: in relation
to the concept of self-identity of the One (negatio negationis); in relation with
the terms istic and Isticheit; with reference to the metaphysics of the intellect
(self-determination).
Beccarisi argues that there is no distinction between Eckhart’s German and
Latin works in respect to his understanding of the One (as if it were tran-
scendently beyond Being in the German texts and ontological-transcendental
in the Latin texts). Beccarisi shows that “the One is […] the highest nega-
tion, because it is the Being without negations, or rather Being itself” (p. 357).
Eckhart builds his interpretation of the Neoplatonic One upon the divine self-
revelation of Exodus (ego sumqui sum). Understood as amanifestation of God’s
self-reflexivity, a returning to His own self, it is in accordance with the reditio
completa of the prop. XV of the Book of Causes. In his German sermons, Eck-
hart expresses the same idea through the terms istic and Isticheit. Analysing
the theory of self-determination, Beccarisi refers once more to the German
sermons and argues that the expression inwert würkende stands for the Latin
reflexio, and expresses the capacity of the intellect to “work inwardly”. Pursu-
ing the same careful philological and speculative analysis, Beccarisi endorses
Markus Vinzent’s hypothesis that Eckhart himself translated some fragments
of his commentary on the Book of Wisdom from Latin into German, and that
an overlooked citation and interpretation of prop. XVII of the Book of Causes is
complementary proof of this. One of Beccarisi’s final conclusions is that “Pro-
clus had (…) an importance certainly inferior to that which some scholars have
attributed to him” (p. 371).
Victoria Arroche considers that Dante used the Liber de causis to develop his
political theories in the Monarchia and Convivio. According to Arroche, two
concepts are crucial in this regard: potentia (or rather ultima potentia) and
virtus, inasmuch as they denote power and strength, but are also the same
words used to describe the flowing from the first causes through the second-
ary causes until the lowest levels of reality. This blending of metaphysical and
political concepts represents for Arroche one of the main characteristics of
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Dante’s political thought. In some significant paragraphs of theMonarchia and
theConvivio, Dante uses ultimumde potentia or potenza ultima in respect to the
intellectual virtue of the human being.
AsArrochenotes, in the Liberde causisoneequally reads the same syntagma:
intelligentia, completa et ultima in potentia et reliquis bonitatibus (IV.43). Intel-
lectual activity is not only the ultimate goal of each individual, but also the
ultimate goal of the human race. And politics, as the “specific relation between
the community and the Monarch […] stems from the exercise of that intellec-
tual capacity” (p. 383).
Arroche indicates that two more concepts are equally important in under-
standing Dante’s political view: ordinatio and reductio. For the latter, Arroche
argues that this concept establishes the monarch’s independence from any
spiritual authority. The former, mentioned in Book I of the Monarchia, indic-
ates “an alignment of the effects towards the cause ratione finis”, while the latter,
mentioned in Book III of the same text, “shows that the emperor’s authority
depends directly on God” (p. 383). It is in the same Book I that Dante cites the
Book of Causes in order to the provide a metaphysical proof that the emperor
can be considered a first cause that acts in the realm of time. As such, themon-
archy, as an autonomous political institution, orders all the levels of reality to
the ultimate end and “assures the causal connection between intermediaries
and effects” (p. 384).
Sokrates-Athanasios Kiosoglou considerably enriches the list of propositions
from the Elements of Theology in Ficino’s Commentary on Philebus providing
evidence for either (shorter / longer) literal citations or freely adapted para-
phrases from propositions 8, 9, 21, 26, 27, 31, 35, 43, 80, 134, 143, 186, 191, 199.
In all these cases, Moerbeke’s Latin translation seems to have been used and
preferred to Proclus’ Greek text. In a pioneering study, C. Steel observed the
presence of only propositions 1–4, 5, 20 in chapter IV, prop. 13 in chapter V and
prop. 12 in chapters V and XXX of Ficino’s Commentary on Philebus.
Kiosoglou deliberately avoids discussing the question of Ficino’s transla-
tion of Elements of Theology. In a letter to Poliziano from 1474, Ficino claims
that he translated the Elements of Theology and the Elements of Physics, yet in
the second catalogue sent to Prenninger in 1489, he does not mention them
among his translations and adds that he read them in the extant Latin transla-
tions (despite his knowledge of Greek). This topic has been recently examined
by D. Robichaud, and Kiosoglou’s contribution brings forth overlooked proofs
about Ficino’s knowledge and use of the Elements of Theology.
Kiosoglou endorses Steel’s thesis that these citations from Proclus’Elements
of Theology are not simple adornments, but have a doctrinal weight articu-
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lating from within Ficino’s own “conceptualization of felicity, and, by exten-
sion, of pleasure” (p. 398), the goal that we all try to reach. Moreover, Kioso-
glou concludes: “In grounding the whole commentary on Proclus’ axiomatic
formulations (and not so much as one might expect on Dionysius’ attract-
ive, but suspicion-arousing, eloquence), Ficino provided his audience with a
seemingly unquestionable and solid system of thought that, despite its pagan
character, could easily be presented as the basis of a Christian worldview”
(p. 402).
5 The Hebraic Tradition
Jean-Pierre Rothschild focuses on the hitherto partially unedited glosses and
commentaries of Hillel of Verona, the first translator of the Book of Causes into
Hebrew. An edition and French translation are provided in the appendix of the
article.
Rothschild firstly notes the remarkable interest for the Book of Causes
between the end of the 13th and the end of the 15th century: it was translated
five times after 1272, four times fromLatin, and once fromArabic. However, that
diffusion is limited to a restrained, privileged circle of learned scholars (often
from the same intellectual lineage) interested in the most influential texts of
theWestern tradition.
Hillel of Verona’s translation of the Book of Causes and original commentary
(assuming, with a degree of probability, that there is one and the same author)
are preserved in a unique manuscript at the Bodleian in Oxford. Rothschild
reassesses the chronology of this translation and places it after 1272, showing
thatHillel knew (at least partially)Aquinas’Deente et essentia and commentary
on the Liber de causis, as well as the Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, and probably even Giles of Rome’s commentary on the Liber de
causis. Hillel’s is the only Hebrew running commentary on the Book of Causes.
Juda Romano’s partial translation of Aquinas’Exposition on the Book of Causes,
or Moïse b. Sabbataï’s sporadic glosses in the margins of Juda’s translation do
not have the same importance in this respect. Moreover, Hillel is the first (and
probably the only) author who connects the Book of Causes to the Book of Prin-
ciples by al-Fārābī (not known to Latin authors), to whom he also attributes
(like other Latin authors) the secondary propositions of the Book of Causes.
Hillel’s commentary rejects, at times, the doctrines of the Book of Causes as
“contrary to faith”, but, as Rothschild observes, that may indicate the influence
from Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation (for example, in prop. X(XI)). The pos-
sible influence of Maimonides’ theory of the divine names can be observed
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in Hillel’s commentaries on prop. XVI(XVII) and XVII(XVIII). Another remark-
able aspect of Hillel’s commentary is his criticism of Neoplatonic principles
from the point of view of medieval medicine: Hillel was also a trained physi-
cian. Rothschild convincingly argues that “ce traducteur-critique, encore une
fois, tient dans l’histoire du Liber de causis une position singulière” (p. 427).
Saverio Campanini endorses Rothschild’s remarks about the vast diffusion of
the Book of Causes in Jewish Medieval thought, from (probably) lost transla-
tions to the “endless field of tacit” references. Campanini focuses on Kabbal-
istic literature. In some older sources, one finds the “classical” attribution to
Aristotle and the title Book of Causes: Moshe Botarel (15th c.) mentions this
reference in the Kevod ha-Shem attributed to El ʿazar ha-Qallir (6th–7th c.). A
more subtle and diffused influence of the Book of Causes, yet with an attribu-
tion to Plato, is to be found in Azri’el of Gerona’s Derek ha-emunah we-derek
ha-kefirah (12th–13th c.). These are some of the oldest references to the Book of
Causes outside the written tradition in Arabic.
The best-known reference to the Book of Causes is the passage quoted by
AbrahamAbulafia (second half of the 13th c.) in his Imre sheferwhere he expli-
citly cites prop. V(VI) of “the Book of the Highest Substances” written by Plato.
None of the knownHebrew translations of the Book of Causes could have been
the source for Abulafia, although he was a pupil of Hillel (which might explain
the reference to Plato, and also to al-Fārābī). The reference and citation are
found in the 16th century Shaʿar ha-chesheq by Jochanan Alemanno, a large
commentary on the Song of Songs. Campanini argues that JochananAlemanno
quotes Liber de causis “repeatedly in his unpublished works and notebooks”
and was aware of its Neoplatonic metaphysical background, referring expli-
citly to Proclus (p. 461). One can conclude that he was aware of the Latin tra-
dition originated in Aquinas’ commentary. From Alemanno, the reference to
“the Book of the Highest Substances” passed into Isaac Abravanel’s comment-
ary on the book of Exodus (40,34) written in Venice around 1506; and from
Abravanel into Joseph Del Medigo’s Sefer Novelot Chokmah, printed in Basel in
1631. Joseph Del Medigo stressed the similarities between the doctrines of the
De causis (attributed by Plato) with Proclus, Plotinus, Al-Ghazālī, the Kabbal-
ists, the Bible and the Jewish exegetes.
Campanini’s final remarks describe the role of the Book of Causes for Kab-
balists: “Kabbalah does not need the Liber de causis, and not even negative
theology, but is ready to use it for apologetic purposes, to defend ad extra its
ineffable contents” (p. 474).
∵
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This volume does not aim to exhaust the question of the diffusion of Proclus’
Elements of Theology: it is not a compendium and it should not be considered
as such. Its main goal is to gather studies that deepen questions that have been
freely chosen by each contributor. However, some common interests can be
identified within each of the five sections.
The studies of the first section isolate themes and citations (explicit and
implicit) attesting to the diffusion of Proclus in Byzantium, and address some
major questions about the authenticity of many of these works. This effort is
also carried on with the contribution on “Caucasian philosophy” inasmuch as
the first Georgianmonk, IoanePetritsi, who translated and commented the Ele-
ments of Theology, was probably a pupil of Michael Psellos and John Italos. The
section dedicated to the lands of Islam focuses mainly on the 9th-century his-
torical and cultural context that prepared and made possible the composition
of the Bookof Causes. The contributions study the circle of al-Kindī,where both
Plotinus and Proclus were translated and adapted to a monotheistic environ-
ment within the same “Aristotelised” intellectualmilieu. In a remarkable paper
entitled “Aristotélisation de la gnoséologie néoplatonicienne dans le Kalām fī
maḥḍ al-khair”, presented on April 16, 2016, Marc Geoffroy analysed in great
details the transformation and translation of proposition 123 from the Elements
of Theology into chapter V(VI) of the Bookof Causes, underlying someof thepre-
viously overlooked sources for the Book of Causes, such as Aristotle’s De anima
and De sensu et sensato, and the vocabulary borrowed from the Qurʾān. The
written text of this paper could not be found on Marc Geoffroy’s computer.
Fortunately, there is an audio-recording of his paper, in French, uploaded and
accessible at the following address: https://www.neoplat.eu/media/. The sec-
tion dedicated to the Latin West analyses mainly the reception of the Book of
Causes both in Latin and in vernacular, but also the tacit citations of the Ele-
ments of Theology in Ficino’s Commentary on the Philebus. The reception of the
Book of Causes in the Jewishmedieval thought (in both philosophical and Kab-
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chapter 2
An Orthodox and Byzantine Reception of the
Elements of Theology
Frederick Lauritzen
Scuola Grande di San Marco, Venezia
The question of the existence of Byzantine philosophy may be intellectually
interesting but remains fundamentally surreal.1 Regardless of whether one
defines the Byzantine Empire as beginning with Diocletian (284–305), Con-
stantine (306–337) or Theodosius (379–395), it is clear that Proclus (8th Febru-
ary 412–17th April 485) composed his text within an Empire whose capital was
Constantinople, and whose official religion was Christianity since 27th Febru-
ary 380.2While thismaybe obvious, it is interesting for the receptionof Proclus’
Elements of Theology, a text that was composedwithin a Byzantine background
and whose subsequent translations where done from originals copied within
the Byzantine Empire.
It is such an environment which gave rise to the anecdote that Proclus
advised the emperor Anastasius (491–518) on how to defeat an invading enemy
armywithGreek fire.3The story gives us a non-philosophical explanation to the
1 An overview of intellectual history is Kaldellis and Sinissioglou (2017).
2 Codex Theodosianus, xvi.1.2 = Codex Iustiniani 1.1.1. Cfr. Basilicorum libri LX, 1.1.1: Imppp. gra-
tianus,ValentinianusetTheodosiusaaa. edictumadpopulumurbisConstantinopolitanae. cunc-
tos populos, quos clementiae nostrae regit temperamentum, in tali volumus religione versari,
quam divinum Petrum apostolum tradidisse romanis religio usque ad nunc ab ipso insinuata
declarat quamque pontificem Damasum sequi claret et Petrum Alexandriae episcopum virum
apostolicae sanctitatis, hoc est, ut secundum apostolicam disciplinam evangelicamque doctri-
nam Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti unam deitatem sub parili maiestate et sub pia Trinitate
credamus. (380 febr. 27).
3 Iohannes Malalas, Chronographia, 16.16.22–37: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἀναστάσιος πρῴην μὲν ἦν μετα-
στειλάμενος διὰ Μαρίνου τὸν φιλόσοφον Πρόκλον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, ἄνδρα περιβόητον, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ
ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀναστάσιος· ‘τί ἔχω ποιῆσαι τῷ κυνὶ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὕτως ταράσσει με καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν,
φιλόσοφε;’ ὁ δὲ Πρόκλος εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ‘μὴ ἀθυμήσῃς, βασιλεῦ· φεύγει γὰρ καὶ ἀπέρχεται, ἢ μόνον
πέμψεις κατ’ αὐτοῦ τινας.’ καὶ εὐθέως ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀναστάσιος εἶπεν Μαρίνῳ τῷ Σύρῳ τῷ ἀπὸ ἐπάρ-
χων ἑστῶτι πλησίον, ὅτε διελέγετο ὁ βασιλεὺς τῷ φιλοσόφῳ Πρόκλῳ, ὁπλίσασθαι κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
Βιταλιανοῦ, ὄντι εἰς τὸ πέραν Κωνσταντινουπόλεως. καὶ λέγει Πρόκλος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ
βασιλέως Μαρίνῳ τῷ Σύρῳ· ‘ὃ δίδωμί σοι λάβε, καὶ ἔξελθε κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Βιταλιανοῦ.’ καὶ ἐκέλευ-
σεν ὁ αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος ἐνεχθῆναι τὸ λεγόμενον θεῖον ἄπυρον πολύ, εἰπὼν τριβῆναι αὐτὸ ὡς εἰς μῖγμα
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importance of Proclus and his philosophical research. The Elements of Theo-
logy employed a sort of scientific method, familiar from Euclid, which was
part of child’s education, and explained termswhichweremysteriously present
in such concise authors as Dionysius the Areopagite. The tenth-century Suda
refers to Proclus as a plagiarist of Dionysius:
ἰστέον δέ, ὥς τινες τῶν ἔξω σοφῶν καὶ μάλιστα Πρόκλος θεωρήμασι πολλάκις
τοῦ μακαρίου Διονυσίου κέχρηται καὶ αὐταῖς δὲ ξηραῖς ταῖς λέξεσι. καὶ ἔστιν
ὑπόνοιαν ἐκ τούτου λαβεῖν ὡς οἱ ἐνἈθήναις παλαιότεροι τῶν φιλοσόφων σφετε-
ρισάμενοι τὰς αὐτοῦ πραγματείας,ὧν αὐτὸς μνημονεύει πρὸςΤιμόθεον γράφων,
ἀπέκρυψαν, ἵνα πατέρες αὐτοὶ ὀφθῶσι τῶν θείων αὐτοῦ λόγων.
Suda Δ.1170.80–86
One should know that some pagan thinkers and especially Proclus often
employ ideas and even entire expressions [taken from] the blessed
Dionysius. One may suspect that they took them from him, since the
more ancient philosophers in Athens appropriated and hid his material,
as he himself reminds uswhen hewrites toTimotheos, so that theywould
appear as the authors of his divine words.
That a sixth century historian from Antioch or a tenth century encyclopaedia
could refer so easily to Proclus is simply because his philosophy was known
even to non-specialists. Indeed, Proclus permeates Byzantine thought every-
where. The result of this was that those western scholars who could read
Greek found Proclean ideas present in all forms of Byzantine manuscripts
both within the texts and the margins, and it was only recently that ancient
philosophers have been separated from such Proclean influence.4 The step
away from such a peculiar and Byzantine choice of philosophy to saying that
there is no such thing as Byzantine philosophy is as if an analytical thinker
said that Hegel (1770–1831) was not a philosopher since he did not share their
λεπτόν, καὶ δέδωκεν τῷ αὐτῷ Μαρίνῳ, εἰρηκὼς αὐτῷ, ὅτι· ‘ὅπου ῥίψεις ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἴτε εἰς οἶκον εἴτε
ἐν πλοίῳ μετὰ τὸ ἀνατεῖλαι τὸν ἥλιον, εὐθέως ἅπτεται ὁ οἶκος ἢ τὸ πλοῖον καὶ ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἀναλίσκε-
ται.’
4 Hegel himself claims that in the Phenomenology of Spirit that the best reading of Plato’s Par-
menideswas that of Proclus: “der Parmenides des Plato, wohl das größte Kunstwerk der alten
Dialektik, für die wahre Enthüllung und den positivenAusdruck des göttlichen Lebens gehal-
ten wurde” (Hegel 1807, p. 48) [“when the Parmenides of Plato—perhaps the greatest literary
product of ancient dialectic—has been taken to be the positive expression of the divine life,
the unveiling and disclosing of its inmost truth.”]
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methods and conclusions. One should remember that Hegel in his time had
been defined as the ‘German Proclus’.5
The history of philosophy is full of enlightened individuals who were not
understood in their time or their country and oftenmade a career of such com-
plaints. It is for this reason this paper focuses on the receptionof the Elements of
Theology in threemajor Byzantine authors: Maximus the Confessor (579–662),
Michael Psellos (1018–1081), Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). A brief word about
them will show that, with the eye of hindsight, they are not exceptional but
representative of Byzantine culture. Maximus the Confessor was regarded as a
Saint in the Byzantine church and the sixth ecumenical council of 680–681was
convened explicitly to confirm and support his ideas.6Michael Psellos could be
considered an eccentric thinker, except he was appointed consul of the philo-
sophers in 1047 by the emperor and his over 1000 works survive in ca 1700
manuscripts,7 which defines his success and clear reception, but almost exclus-
ively among Byzantines.8 Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century defined
Byzantine mysticism, known as hesychasm, and his ideas were endorsed offi-
cially in 1341, 1347 and 1351.9 Moreover his ideas were once more defended in
1368, the synod which condemned Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) and in which
Palamas was declared a Saint of the Orthodox Church.
The reception of the Elements of Theology in these authors is representative.
If one may start with the eleventh century the easiest case is that of Michael
Psellos who was directly interested in the Elements of Theology. Indeed, he
quotes the following propositions directly:
– in Philosophica Minora I, he cites the Elements of Theology 102, 110, 116, 140
– in PhilosophicaMinora II, he cites the Elements of Theology 20, 35, 39, 64, 81,
90, 103, 109, 110, 129, 166–168, 170–196, 198–202, 204–206, 208–211
Psellos openly refers to Proclus and uses his ideas to explain obscure points of
ancient philosophy, or as instruments to solvedilemmasof contemporary theo-
logy. Psellos also explains a point of orthodox mysticism employing directly
proposition 71 of the Elements of Theology in Theologica I essay 11 (uncreated
light of Mt Tabor).10 Psellos did not think it was problem to study a pagan
thinker like Proclus and it even made him popular at the imperial court where
5 L. Feuerbach, Grundsätze einer Philosophie der Zukunft, p. 87–171 paragraph 29.
6 COGD 1. 195–202.
7 Moore (2005).
8 One exception wasMarsilio Ficino who translated some of his works into Latin especially
on demonology.
9 COGD 4.133–152. COGD 4.155–170. COGD 4.171–218.
10 Lauritzen (2012a).
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he obtained the title of consul of philosophers (ὕπατος τῶν φιλοσόφων) in 1047.11
The peculiar status of Psellos, whatever one may think of him, is that he was
popular among contemporaries and was a well-read author for the next four
hundred years. He provided an acceptable method of reading Proclus which
reveals the Byzantine fascination with later Neoplatonism. Scholars tend to
emphasize his role as a teacher, often reflecting their own interests. More than
half of Psellos’ letters are written to members of the imperial bureaucracy and
specifically to judges (κριταί).12 Thesewere people familiarwith the Elements of
Euclid but interested in philosophy. There is even evidence of study of Proclus’
commentary on the Elements of Euclid in the eleventh century.13 Their duty
consisted of applying their notions of geometry to land measurement for tax
assessment.14 Thus the Elements of Theology may have appealed to the edu-
cated Byzantine bureaucrat specifically for this reason: the form was familiar
and useful, but the content was philosophical. If Psellos was not an original
thinker,15 which is possible but needs to be investigated, then he was able to
express correctly what intelligent readers wanted to hear. This is where Max-
imus the Confessor becomes important. In his letter to Patriarch Xiphilinos,
Psellos argues that he reads Plato correctly and especially since his reading cor-
responds to that given by Maximus the Confessor:
τὴν δέ γε φυσικὴν θεωρίαν καὶ ὁ κοινὸς Μάξιμος, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐμός—φιλόσοφος
γάρ—, δευτέραν μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν τίθησιν ἀρετήν, τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐσίαν μὴ
προσποιούμενος.
Michael Psellos, Ep. Xiphil. 72–75
Our, or rather,myMaximus, for he is a philosopher, considers natural con-
templation as the second virtue after praxis, without considering math-
ematical substance.
Psellos here argues succinctly that above the visible world, there is an incor-
poreal world which also exists. Indeed, the principles which define the visible
world also have a form of existence. These are the principles, or what Max-
imus calls theΛόγοι, whichmay be contemplated andmaybe even studied. This
11 Lefort (1976).
12 Jeffreys Lauxtermann (2017).
13 Heiberg (1929) p. 72–75. See Lauritzen (2016).
14 Dölger (1927).
15 Ioannou defined him asWeiblich in contrast with Italos (?) in Ioannou (1956) p. 16.
an orthodox and byzantine reception 23
becomes an important doctrine especially later on in such thinkers as Gregory
Sinaites and Gregory Palamas. We will return later to this question. One may
develop an aspect which is the notion of what is incorporeal. This had been
a problem specifically for Porphyry (234–305) as one may see from Sententia 1
and Sententia 2 which claimed that the incorporeal could be in no place. This
meant that demons could not exist since they are incorporeal but have a spe-
cific place:
‘Καὶ ὁ διάβολος’ φησί ‘μετ’ αὐτῶν’. ἀλλὰ τίς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὁ βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρη-
τος; φήσουσιν ἡμῖν ἴσως Ἕλληνες ὅτι ‘πᾶν μὲν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ’
αὑτὰ ἀσωμάτων, καθὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐστὶν ἐν τόπῳ’, καὶ ὅτι τὰ ‘καθ’ αὑτὰ ἀσώματα
πανταχῇ’ πεφύκασιν εἶναι, τόπῳ μὴ περιγραφόμενα. κἀντεῦθεν καὶ συλλογί-
σονται ὡς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ διάβολος ἀσώματος πάντῃ, καὶ ἀπερίγραπτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ
ἀπερίγραπτος, καὶ πανταχῇ· εἰ δὲ πανταχῇ, σταίη ἂν καὶ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ.
ληρώδης οὗτος ὁ λόγος καὶ τῆς Πορφυρίου πλάνης ἀμβλωθρίδιον ἀπογέννημα.
Michael Psellos, Theologica I.32.118–125
He says ‘And the devil is with them’. But what is this deep and mysteri-
ous idea? Maybe the Greeks will tell us that ‘each body is in a place, none
of the incorporeal beings, as such, are in a place’ and that ‘the incorpor-
eal beings in themselves are everywhere, not circumscribed in place’ and
therefore they will also argue that since the devil is incorporeal he is also
uncircumscribed. If he is uncircumscribed he is also everywhere. If he
is uncircumscribed he would stand also before God. This speech is blas-
phemous and an aborted offshoot of the madness of Porphyry.
The principle criticized by Psellos is that the incorporeal has a universal exist-
ence. Indeed, he indicates that the incorporeal must be understood as separ-
ated, as Proclus had done in the Elements of Theology proposition 82.Moreover,
the problem with Porphyry is connected with the fact that everything, includ-
ing the incorporeal, has some form of existence. This is clear from proposition
16 of the Elements of Theology. Proclus defines the incorporeal as something
which is capable of reverting to itself (proposition 15) and connects such
self-reversion with movement. Since all movement depends on a cause, the
incorporeal is part of the level of reality which holds existence. The argument
present in Ambigua 7 of Maximus the Confessor is the following:
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἀκίνητον,ὡς πάντων πληρωτικόν,πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων τὸ εἶναι
λαβὸν καὶ κινητόν.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7.3
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If, in the first place, we accept that the divine is immovable (since it fills
all things), whereas everything that has received it being ex nihilo is in
motion
tr. Constas
Before entering the question of the philosophy behind this passage, the Pro-
clean language is striking. The use of terms such as moving and moved and
the idea that existence is secondary and not universal. Moreover, the use of the
word ‘everything’ reminds one of the recurring expressions in the Elements of
Theology. To turn to thequestionof content, if one looks at the expression ‘since
it fills all things’ one may see the echo of the Elements of Theology, proposition
98.29–31:
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τὸ πληρωτικὸν τῶν μεταλαγχάνειν αὐτοῦ πεφυκότων
καὶ ἀρχικὸν τῶν δευτέρων πάντων καὶ παρὸν πᾶσι ταῖς τῶν ἐλλάμψεων γονί-
μοις προόδοις.
Proclus, Elements of Theology, 98.29–31
Wemean by cause that which fills all things naturally capable of particip-
ating it, which is the source of all secondary existences and by the fecund
outpouring of irradiations is present to them all.
tr. Dodds
The second point which echoes Proclus is the idea that being concerns the
realm of what is below the divine and that this is defined by movement. This
can be seen in the Elements of Theology, proposition 14 where being is defined
as moved or unmoved:
Πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἢ ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν ἢ κινούμενον·
Proclus, Elements of theology, 14
All that exists is either moved or unmoved.
tr. Dodds
These two passages from Proclus show how Maximus is employing principles
easily found in the Elements of Theology. This occurs rather often. In the pas-
sage of Maximus, one should also not neglect that the definition of the divine
and the creation ex nihilo are peculiar to a Christian thinker and find echoes of
language, but necessarily of content. One may find sources other than Proclus
as well, but these are qualified. For example:
an orthodox and byzantine reception 25
Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα γέγονε πάσχει τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὡς μὴ ὄντα αὐτοκίνησις ἢ αὐτοδύ-
ναμις.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7.9
For all things that have come to be passively experience being moved,
since they are neither motion itself nor power itself.
tr. Constas
Themoreusual form is αὐτοκινησία, but a peculiar confirmation canbe found in
John of Damascuswho usesMaximus’ expression.16 The expression αὐτοκίνησις
is found also in Plotinus 6.6.2 and 6.6.6. The expression αὐτοδύναμις is present
in Dionysius the Areopagite where he indicates clearly that the divine is above
self-power.17 Thus reflective movements are considered inferior to the Divine
itself. Indeed, the passage of Maximus is differentiating between what is and
what becomes.
Stepping back briefly one my notice that Maximus is discussing a question
of Christian exegesis by using the concepts of πάθος, κίνησις, ὄντα, αὐτοκίνησις
and αὐτοδύναμις. These notions can be found together only in Proclus. Onemay
present a passage from the Parmenides commentary where such notions are
explained:
οὐ κινεῖται τὸ ἓν καὶ ὅτι ἡ αὐτοκίνησις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἕστηκε τὸ ἓν καὶ ὅτι
στάσις οὐκ ἔστι·
Proclus, In Parmenidem, 1171.35–37
The One does not move and that selfmovement does not exist and that
the One does not rest and that rest does not exist.
The question of rest and motion in relation to the Divine is the aim of the
Ambiguum 7 in terms familiar from Proclus. Moreover, Maximus aims to say
that the soul is not essentially connected to the divine, since it is logical and
always connected to the body. This is the famous doctrine present in Plotinus
Enneads 4.8.8 where he says that against platonic doctrine, he believed the
upper part of the soul was unified with the one. Proclus thought it was wrong
and wrote proposition 211 of the Elements of Theology to prove it:
16 John Damascenus, Epositio fidei, 59.223.
17 Dionysius Areopagites, De Divinis Nominibus 201.16: ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν αὐτο-
δύναμιν εἶναι.
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Καὶ εἰ χρὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμῆσαι τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον,
οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ’ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδυ, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀεί·
Plotinus, Enneads, 4.8.8.1–3
And if onemust dare to speak rather openly against the opinion of others,
our soul did not descend entirely, but there is a part of it which is always
in the intelligible.
Πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ κατιοῦσα εἰς γένεσιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω
μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισιν.
Proclus, Elements of Theology, 211
Every particular soul, when it descends into temporal process, descends
entire: there is not a part of it which remains above and a part which des-
cends.
Maximus also thinks that it is impossible to separate the body and soul.
Ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν τοιγαροῦν ἡ σχέσις, ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος, ὡς ὅλου εἴδους
ἀνθρωπίνου μερῶν ἀναφαιρέτως νοουμένη,παρίστησι καὶ τὴν ἅμα τούτων γένε-
σιν.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 7.43.1–3
Thus the relation of the two, by which Imean soul and body, as the whole
human form whose parts can be separated only in thought, reveals that
both come into being simultaneously.
Thus, one can see that there are linguistic parallels with the Elements of Theo-
logy, namely philosophical principles are expressed in a manner similar to
Proclus’ book of Elements. There are also philosophical principles in com-
mon, namely the combination of movement being and the divine. Moreover,
the aims are similar. For example, the idea that the soul and body form a
unit without there being an intellectual unit with God as Plotinus had pro-
posed.
As Psellos had pointed out in the letter to patriarch Xiphilinos, what Max-
imus the Confessor did was to study the intermediary realm of reality between
God and Man. To provide application to the question of the divine λόγοι and
divine energies as applied to the physical world and therefore to allow their
contemplation in his famous φυσικὴ θεωρία. It is for this reason that the coun-
cil of 680–681 defined Maximus as correct and a saint.
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If one turns to Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century, one sees a further
development of Proclean influence. The hesychast theologian was accused of
being Platonic by one of his adversaries. He acknowledges the attack and gives
the following paragraph to describe it:
Ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον αὖ ὕστερον ἐπετείως ἄγοντος πλατώνεια καὶ σωκράτεια
Πρόκλου τοῦ Λυκίου, φῶς ὡράθη ποτὲ τοῖς συμμύσταις τὴν κεφαλὴν περιθέον.
Ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἔδειξεν ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς αὖθις, ὅθεν ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴν
ἤδη τελευτῶντος φανεὶς ἕρπων δράκων, καθάπερ οἱ παρατυχόντες ἱστόρησαν.
Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἀπηξίωσεν ἔτι περιὼν ἐξειπεῖν ὅθεν τὸ φῶς ἀνέλαμπεν ἐπ’
αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνο· ‘καθαρμοῖς γὰρ χαλδαϊκοῖς’, ὡς αὐτός φησι, ‘χρώμενος, ἑκατι-
κοῖς φάσμασι φωτοειδέσιν αὐτοπτουμένοις ὡμίλησε’, τῆς ‘δὲἙκάτης, σκοτεινά’,
φησὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς θεολόγος, ‘τὰ φάσματα’.
Gregory Palamas, Contra Acyndinum 7. 9.26
Beside Plotinus, Proclus of Lyciawas once leading yearly festivals for Plato
and Socrates and a light was seen by the initiated surrounding his head.
But he showed us the light another time. From it appeared a crawling
snake around his head while he was dying. While still alive, he did not
refrain from explaining where that light was shining from onto him: as he
says ‘After completing the Chaldean purifications, he was in touch with
enlightened self-revealing apparitions of Hecate’ the true theologian says
‘the dark apparitions of Hecate’
This explicit reference to Proclus reveals that Palamas was concerned with the
contemplation of the divine light within Neoplatonism, such as in proposition
143 of the Elements of Theology
Πάντα τὰ καταδεέστερα τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῶν θεῶν ὑπεξίσταται· κἂν ἐπιτήδειον ᾖ
τὸ μετέχον, πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἀλλότριον τοῦ θείου φωτὸς ἐκποδὼν γίνεται, καταλάμ-
πεται δὲ πάντα ἀθρόως ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν.
Proclus, Elements of Theology 143
All inferior principles retreat before the presence of the gods; and pro-
vided the participant be fit for it reception, whatever is alien makes way




Interestingly Palamas takes exception not with the theory but with the
object of the contemplation. Fromhis point of view, if the content was not true
to Christianity it was simply a false contemplation. The nature of such gazing
is complicated since the Divine for Palamas is beyond, ἐπέκεινα as onemay see
in the following passage:
Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ παντὸς νοεροῦ φωτὸς ἐπέκεινα Θεὸς καὶ πάσης οὐσίας ὑπερου-
σίως ἐκβεβηκώς·
Greogory Palamas, Triads 1.3.8.10
And God himself who is above all intelligible light and stepping beyond
all existence in a supra-essential way.
Such language is again familiar from Proclus, for example proposition 20
defines how the νοερός is below the level of the One.18 Since the noetic level
is connected with being, the divine is also beyond being as said here. Pala-
mas proposes that what is seen is not the divine, but his energies. These had
been first proposed by Maximus the Confessor in 634–638 and he had already
employed Proclus to develop the theory.19 Palamas explicitly quotes Maximus
the Confessor as source of such an idea. Because of the details he has to clarify,
the theory takes a whole new dimension. One may indicate here that the idea
is that the activities may be contemplated but not the Divine itself. Thus, the
divine light mentioned above would be considered by Palamas as being the
uncreated light seen during the transfiguration of Jesus on Mt. Tabor. Psellos
had already associated Proclus’ Elements with the study of such perception.20
Therefore one may see a direct link between the Proclus’Elements of Theology,
Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum ad Thomam 5 and Palamas.
Psellos makes it easier to understand the link between these three thinkers.
Within a Christian environment, one should not forget that when Saint Paul
went toAthens to speak about theἌγνωστος θεός, the unknownGod, he opened
a problem which Psellos solves with the theory of λόγοι of Maximus and what
would become the energies of Palamas:
18 Proclus, Elements of Theology, 20:Πάντων σωμάτων ἐπέκεινά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία, καὶ πασῶν
ψυχῶν ἐπέκεινα ἡ νοερὰ φύσις, καὶ πασῶν τῶν νοερῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐπέκεινα τὸ ἕν. [Beyond all
bodies is the soul’s essence; beyond all souls, the intellective principle; and beyond all intel-
lective substances, the One.—tr. Dodds].
19 Lauritzen (2012b).
20 Lauritzen (2012c).
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ὅθεν καὶ τὸν ἀμέθεκτον νοῦν νοερῶς νοεῖ—εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, ἀλλ’ ἐμφά-
σεις τινὰς δίδωσι τοῖς μετ’ αὐτὸν τῆς ἰδίας ὑπάρξεως·—καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ καὶ τὰ
φυσικὰ εἴδη νοερῶς οἶδεν.
Michael Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina 25.5–8
Therefore it perceives the intellect intelligibly, for if it is unparticipated,
nevertheless it gives manifestations of its own existence to those after it,
and it knows the soul and the physical forms intelligibly.
One should also not forget that for the Byzantines the person who listened
to Saint Paul was Dionysius the Areopagite, the first convert of Athens, and
alleged writer of the most important philosophical treatises for any orthodox
Byzantine of Psellos’ era.
Therefore, one may conclude that the φυσικὴ θεωρία of Maximus and the
contemplation of the divine energies described by Palamas have echoes of the
Elements of Theology. Both these theories were important for the formation of
Byzantine philosophy. The fact that the Byzantines used a pagan Neoplatonic
text to explore ideas within a Christian environment indicates their belief in a
single truth expressed by somepagans and someChristians. This brings us back
to the introduction and the question of the history of Byzantine philosophy. It
is essential to study texts such as the Elements of Theologywhichwere accepted
by a variety of thinkers rather than isolated circles of intellectuals. Nicholas of
Methone describes a veritable fashion for Proclus in the twelfth century.21 It is
also important to study ideas which were deemed acceptable by their contem-
poraries also at an official level. This does not endorse the dominant culture
but allows one to study those who are eccentric within their own context. It
is surprising how popular condemned thinkers are in the secondary literat-
ure. One may list a few here: John Philoponus (680),22 John Italos (1082),23
Barlaam of Calabria (1341),24 Gregory Acyndinos (1347),25 Nicephorus Gregoras
(1351),26 Prochoros27 andDemetriosCydones (1368)28 andeven cardinal Bessar-
21 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, Proem., p. 20–22: ὅπερ
ἵνα μὴ πάθωσι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὶ προνοούμενος, ὅσοι τὰ Πρόκλου τοῦ Λυκίου κεφάλαια σπουδῆς
ἄξια κρίνουσιν, ἅπερ αὐτῷ Θεολογικὴ Στοιχείωσις ἐπιγράφεται.
22 Concilium ConstantinopoitanumTertium, in Acta conciliorum 11.480.14–16.
23 Synodikon, p. 184–246.
24 Synodikon, p. 572–633.
25 Synodikon, p. 572–633.
26 Synodikon, p. 640–646.
27 Synodikon, p. 647–665.
28 Synodikon, p. 666–682.
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ion. These figures have becomemore popular inwestern scholarship than their
counterparts, who are often unpublished and unedited. This fact says much
about a certain lack of interest in such ideas that unify official thinkers. The
example presented here gives continuity between Proclus, Maximus the Con-
fessor, Michael Psellos and Gregory Palamas, philosophers who defined their
own times as well as Byzantine culture in subsequent generations and there-
fore have an essential role also in the opinions of thosewhodisagreewith them.
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chapter 3
Universals,Wholes, Logoi: Eustratios of Nicaea’s
Response to Proclus’Elements of Theology
Stephen Gersh
University of Notre Dame
Notmuch is known about the life of Eustratios of Nicaea (ca. 1050-ca. 1120). He
is mentioned in documents concerning the trial of the eleventh-century Byz-
antine philosopher John Italos as a pupil of the defendant, and he ismentioned
inAnnaComnena’s Alexiad as an expert in religious and secular letters and as a
master of dialectic.1 It has been suggested that hewas amember of Anna’s intel-
lectual équipe which had been assigned the task of writing commentaries on
Aristotle’s works that had not previously been commented upon.2We know at
least that hewas a prominent churchmanwho becameMetropolitan of Nicaea
in the early twelfth century andwas askedby emperorAlexios I to participate in
theological debates with the Latin church. However, he was finally condemned
for heresy in 1117 largely on account of his views on Christology.3
Our discussion of Eustratios will be centred on two texts that deal in a very
fundamental way with the relation between Aristotelianism and Platonism in
the mind of this twelfth-century Byzantine thinker. The first comes from his
Commentary onAristotle’s NicomacheanEthics and is embedded in a discussion
of Plato’s Idea of the Good, while the second occurs in his Commentary onAris-
totle’s Posterior Analytics and is concerned with the nature of genera and spe-
cies. These texts have been at the centre of numerous discussions amongmod-
ern scholars concerning the doctrine of universals held by Eustratios, although
the results of these discussions seem to have been for the most part inconclus-
ive.4 The present paper will attempt to cast some fresh light on this question
by reading the two texts perhaps for the first in the context of Proclus’ philo-
sophy as represented especially by the latter’s Elements of Theology. It is by now
well known that Proclus and Aristotle where the two Greek philosophers most
1 Anna Comnena, Alexiad, 14. 8.
2 Browning 1962, p. 1–12.
3 For a recent general introduction to Eustratios with extensive bibliography of earlier work
see Trizio 2014, p. 190–201.
4 Among the most important contributions are Giocarinis 1964 and Ierodiakonou 2005.
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extensively discussed by Byzantine thinkers beginning at least in the time of
Michael Psellos and continuing down to that of the Palamite controversies.5
1 Eustratios’ Theory of Universals and Proclus Elements of Theology
In the first section of the passage from the Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics,6 Eustratios contrasts Aristotle’s notion of an abstracted universal with
the Platonic notion of a transcendent form, in the language of the Neopla-
5 Although the Elements of Theology was by far Proclus’ most well-known work among Byz-
antine thinkers, it remained highly controversial. Having been introduced into circulation by
Psellos and discussed extensively by other writers taught by or influenced by Psellos such as
John Italos and Eustratios, the work subsequently gave rise to a forceful counter-attack in the
Refutation (Anaptyxis) of Proclus’ Elements of Theology by Nicholas of Methone (?–ca. 1166).
For a survey of its influence in Byzantium see Gersh 2014b, p. 5–22.
6 Eustratios, In Ethica Nicomachea, I. 4, 40. 18–34: “Now the universal is referred to not in the
sense employed in logical investigations, for in the latter case the universal is that which
is “upon the many” and “later-born,” whereas in the former case it is that which is “before
the many” as established prior to them while they receive their subsistence in relation to
it. This is what the Platonists were asserting when they introduced certain reason-principles
which are enhypostatic, divine, and intellectual and in relation towhich theymaintained that
all materiate things exist and come to be. They also called these reason-principles “forms,”
“ideas,” “wholes,” and “universals.” They held that these were established prior to those forms
in bodies, being transcendent above all of them and existing in the discursive thinking of the
divine craftsmanwho imprints certain other things in accordancewith them inmatter. These
reason-principles were said to be universals andwholes because each of them, being one, has
many things that come to be in body and are materiate as derived from it and in accordance
with it. In relation to themany things, each pre-existing reason-principle was said to be a uni-
versal and a whole not in a conceptual but in an intellectual manner, being universal in the
sense of existing as transcendent with respect to the many which have come to be in accord-
ance with it, and being whole in the sense of being in a proportional relation to the arranged
parts that are referred to it as a whole. It is neither compounded from the parts nor conceived
upon the parts, but exists prior to them and remains in itself, having the parts referred back
to it as though to their own proper wholeness.” (νῦν τὸ καθόλου οὐχ ὡς ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς θεωρίαις
λέγεται· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ὑστερογενές, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὀ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς πρου-
φεστηκὸς αὐτῶν κἀκείνων πρὸς αὐτὸ δεχομένων τὴν ὕπαρξιν. οὕτω γὰρ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα ἔλεγον,
λόγους τινὰς ἐπεισαγαγόντες ἐνυποστάτους θείους νοερούς, πρὸς οὓς ἔλεγον πάντα τὰ ἔνυλα εἶναι
καὶ γίνεσθαι, οὓς καὶ εἴδη καὶ ἰδέας ἐκάλουν καὶ ὅλα καὶ καθόλου, προυφεστηκότας μὲν τῶνδε τῶν
ἐν σώμασιν εἰδῶν, ἐξῃρημένους δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων, ἐν τῇ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ διανοίᾳ ὄντας, ἕτερά
τινα κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ χαράττοντoς. καθόλου δὲ καὶ ὅλα ταῦτα ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἒν
ὂν ἔχει πολλὰ ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο γινόμενα ἐν σώματι καὶ ἔνυλα, πρὸς ἃ ἐκεῖνο καθόλου καὶ
ὅλον ἐλέγετο οὐκ ἐννοηματικῶς ἀλλὰ νοερῶς· καθόλου μὲν ὡς ὑπάρχον πολλοῖς ἐξῃρημένον ἃ κατ’
ἐκεῖνο γεγένηται, ὅλον δὲ ὡς ἐν λόγῳ μερῶν τεταγμένων ἃ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀναφέρεται ὡς πρὸς ὅλον,
οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκείμενον οὐδ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἐννοούμενον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν μὲν ὄν καὶ μένον καθ’ αὑτό,
ἐκεῖνα δ’ ἔχον ἀναφερόμενα πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡς πρὸς οἰκείαν ὁλότητα).
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tonic commentators of late antiquity calling the former the universal “upon the
many” (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς)7 or the “later-born” (ὑστερογενές) universal and the lat-
ter the universal “before the many” (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν). Throughout this passage
he identifies a “universal” (καθόλου) with a “whole” (ὅλον). For themost part, he
concentrates on describing the Platonic universal or whole, characterizing this
as a reason-principle, form, or Ideawhich is enhypostatic, divine, transcendent,
and intellectual—being in the reasoning of the divine Craftsman. This tran-
scendent principle is called a “universal” because things come to be “according
to” it;8 it is called a “whole” because things are referred to it as though to their
own wholeness and according to a certain reason-principle. At the same time,
Eustratios seems to assume an identification of the Aristotelian abstracted uni-
versalwith aPlatonic immanent form.Thus, he contrasts the transcendent form
with a form instantiated inmatter or an embodied form, the latter acquiring its
subsistence “according to” (κατά) the former. He also explains the causal rela-
tion between the transcendent form and the embodied form by saying that the
divine Craftsman imprints the latter “according to” (κατά) the former.
In the course of describing the transcendent and embodied forms and the
relation between them, Eustratios introduces some further important ideas by
way of contrast. Thus, the transcendent form relates to the embodied form not
“conceptually” (ἐννοηματικῶς)—that is, as an Aristotelian abstracted universal
relates to a particular—but “intellectually” (νοερῶς)–presumably, as the divine
Craftsmen pre-contains his effects. Moreover, the “whole” represented by the
transcendent form relates to things called its “parts” not as conceived “upon”
(ἐπί) a number of items—that is, in the manner of an Aristotelian abstrac-
ted universal—nor as assembled “from” (ἐξ) a number of parts. In order to
understand this last point, Eustratios now introduces an important conceptual
distinction.9
7 The translation of the Greek preposition ἐπί is problematic in this context. The present
author’s reasons for settling upon the sense of “upon” will emerge in the discussion below.
8 An etymological connection κατὰ + καθόλου is implied.
9 Eustratios, InEthicaNicomachea, I. 4, 40. 34–41. 12: “They say that “whole” is referred to in three
ways: as “before the parts,” as “of the parts,” and as “in the parts.” The much-discussed forms
are said to be wholes before the parts because each of them has been established before the
many things that have come to be in accordance with it, these forms being most simple and
immaterial. Composite things and things divided intomany are said to bewholes of the parts,
whether they are homoeomerous as a stone in relation to stones is a whole in relation to the
parts intowhich the stone is divided—eachpart taking up the name and the reason-principle
of the whole—, or whether they are anomoeomerous as aman is divided into hands, feet, and
head—none of theman’s parts being similar to thewhole, inasmuch as it receives neither the
name nor the reason-principle of the whole. Those things that are also said to be “upon the
many” and “later-born,” as are conceptual things, are said to be wholes in the parts. These are
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According to the Platonists, there are three kinds of whole. The first kind
of whole is the whole before the parts and corresponds to the transcendent
Platonic form which has already been described in detail. The second kind of
whole is the whole of parts. Here, Eustratios gives two illustrations that are, at
first sight, easy enough to understand: namely, a homoeomerous whole whose
parts have the same reason-principle as the whole (for instance, stone with
parts that are stones) and an anomoeomerous whole whose parts do not have
the same reason-principle as the whole (for instance, man with parts that are
head and hand). The third kind of whole is the whole in the parts. It is here that
the problems of interpretation arise because of Eustratios’ apparent identifica-
tion of the whole in the partswith the universal upon themany discussed in the
previous paragraph, the former seeming to correspond more to the Platonic
embodied form and the latter more to the Aristotelian abstracted universal.
Undoubtedly, the explanation of the phrase “upon the many” as referring to
things that are substantialized in the soul with reference to the subsistence of
the many, of the phrase “later-born” as denoting the process in which the soul
contemplates particulars that are identical or similar in form and have been
previously10 established in bodies, and of the phrase “conceptual” as referring
“later-born” because the soulwhichhas contemplatedparticular things that have the same
or similar forms previously established in bodies, and which has in itself given substance
to that reason-principle that has been contemplated in its generality according to an
abstraction from matter, then refers this reason-principle suitably to itself: that is to say,
in a rational and cognitive manner. These wholes in the parts are “conceptual” because
such wholenesses have their substance up to the limit of conceptuality and are in no way
existent in actuality aside from the particulars fromwhich they have been taken. They are
“in the parts” because the things said about them appear in the particulars in relation to
which they are also said to be wholenesses. They are “upon the many” because the soul
has in itself given substance to them after the subsistence of the many.” (τριχῶς γάρ φασι
λέγεσθαι τὸ ὅλον, πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι. πρὸ τῶν μερῶν μὲν ἐκεῖνα
τὰ εἴδη, ὅτι πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ὑφέστηκεν ἃ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο γέγονεν, ἁπλούστατα
ὄντα καὶ ἄυλα· ἐκ τῶν μερῶν δὲ τὰ σύνθετα καὶ εἰς πολλὰ μεριζόμενα, εἴθ’ ὁμοιομερῆ ὡς λίθος εἰς
λίθους ὅλον ὂν πρὸς μέρη εἰς ἃ καὶ διαιρετός ἐστιν,ὧν ἕκαστον τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὅλου
ἐπιδέχεται, εἴτ’ ἀνομοιομερῆ ὡς ἄνθρωπος εἰς χεῖρας πόδας κεφαλήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου ὅμοιον τῷ ὅλῳ, ὡς μήτε τοὔνομα μήτε τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὅλου δεχόμενον· ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι δέ,
ὡς τὰ ἐννοηματικά, ἃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς πόλλοις καὶ ὑστερογενῆ λέγεται· ὑστερογενῆ μὲν ὃτι τὰ καθ’
ἕκαστα ὁμοειδῆ ἢ ὁμογενῆ ἡ ψυχὴ θεωρήσασα πρότερον ὑφεστηκότα ἐν σώμασι καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς
κοινῶς θεωρούμενον λόγον κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὑποστήσασα, ἐπιφέρε-
ται τοῦτον οἰκείως ἑαυτῇ, ἤγουν λογικῶς καὶ ἐπιστημονικῶς· ἐννοηματικὰ δέ, ὅτι μέχρις ἐννοίας
τἠν ὑπόστασιν αἱ τοιαῦται ὁλότητες ἔχουσι, μηδαμῇ χωρὶς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐλήφθη-
σαν ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσαι· ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι δέ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα, πρὸς ἃ καὶ ὁλότητες λέγονται, τὰ
περὶ αὐτῶν λεγόμενα ἀναφαίνεται· ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δέ, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὰ ἐν
ἑαυτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ ὑπεστήσατο.)
10 The temporal connotation of course emerges in the prefix of the term ὑστερογενές.
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to things that are substantialized to the extent that they are thought—all these
are consistent with the understanding of this whole as an Aristotelian abstrac-
ted universal. The suggestion that this whole is in no way actual aside from the
particulars from which it is taken perhaps indicates a nominalist shift in the
understanding of Aristotle. By contrast, the suggestion that the common ele-
ment substantialized by the soul is a reason-principle that can be brought into
agreement with the soul points—as we shall see below—to a kind of realism.
It is presumably because of Eustratios’ apparent combination of the Platonic
embodied form with the Aristotelian abstracted universal that this epistemo-
logical ambiguity or flexibility becomes possible.
We now turn from the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics to the Com-
mentary on the Posterior Analytics where there is another discussion of the
three kinds of whole.11 According to Eustratios’ explanation here the whole
11 Eustratios, In Analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum, B. 13, 195. 27–196. 16: “And the
whole is referred to in three ways: either as “before the parts” or as “of the parts” or as
“in the part.” The wholes that are before the parts, as the Platonists say, are the primal
monads from each of which the number coordinate with it is generated, the monad itself
being unparticipated, the many being generated from it according to a procession. These
many are also said to be parts of the monad in the sense that the latter is a cause prior to
them. They are said in their totality to divide up the subsistence derived from the monad
through its extension intomultiplicity and in their totality to refer back to the subsistence
as to something monadic, primal, and transcendent with respect to the things derived
from it. The collection of all these is a whole of parts as though assembled part by part
from those monads. Moreover, each of these monads from which the multiplicity arises
is a whole in the part, for a particular man being a part of man simpliciter, carries around
in himself the whole and integral reason-principle of man simpliciter, and is a whole in
the part as having the whole as a whole in the part of the whole according to the reason-
principle. A species is a whole as though compounded from the parts ranged under it, and
again the genus a whole as compounded from its species in the sense that, if a species is
lacking, the whole that is the genus is maimed, and if any of the particulars is lacking,
the whole that is the species is maimed. This will not occur according to its own proper
reason-principles, for “living creature” will not be maimed according to its being a sub-
stance, ensouled, and sensitive, if horse, ox, or some other of the species ranged under it
is missing, just as “man” will not be maimed according to his being a living creature, ter-
restrial, and bipedal, if Socrates or Plato ismissing. Rather, the genus or species ismaimed
because the things that are universal in thisway—that is, as conceptual—have their being
and their actuality in embracing the things ranged under them and being predicated of
them. If any of the things ranged under them is missing, the conceptual universals are
maimed according to themissing component, for they do not embrace it and are not pre-
dicated of it. Such wholes are also said to be in the parts as being contemplated as wholes
in the things ranged under them according to their own proper reason-principles. For the
genus is a whole in relation to the species and the species a whole in relation to the partic-
ulars not as a foot or a hand is awhole, but as imparting themselves aswholes to the things
ranged below them and as being contemplated as wholes in the latter.” (λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὸ
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before the parts is not the Platonic transcendent form as described in the
earlier passage but something apparently equivalent to it: namely, an originat-
ive monad or an unparticipated term. The nature of the “parts” with respect to
which this transcendent monad or form can be called a “whole” is explained in
the next stage of Eustratios’ explanation. Thus, the whole of parts is the entire
collection of the monads which proceed from the originative monad, stretch
out its subsistence, and are referred back to it whereas the whole in the part is
each individual monad within the entire collection proceeding from the ori-
ginative monad.12 The commentator provides as convenient examples of the
whole before the parts andwhole in the part “man simpliciter” and “a particular
man” respectively. However, it is when he shifts his attention from collections
of monads to genera and species that the passage becomes harder to interpret.
According to Eustratios, genera and species are both wholes of parts in that
these universals as conceptual have their being and activity in being predicated
of the things below them, and also wholes in the part in that they are contem-
plated as wholes according to a reason-principle in the things below them. As
in the earlier passage, the commentator is clearly thinking of genera and spe-
cies first in terms of the Aristotelian abstracted universals and then secondly
in terms of a Platonic embodied form.
ὅλον τριχῶς, ἢ ὡς πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἢ ὡς ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ μέρει. αἰ μὲν οὖν πρὸ τῶν μερῶν
ὀλοτήτες, ὡς οἰ περὶ Πλάτωνα λέγουσιν, αἰ ἀρχικαὶ μονάδες εἰσίν, ἐχ ὧν ἐκάστης ὁ σύστοιχος
αὐτῇ ἀριθμὸς ἀπογεννᾶται, μονάδος μἐν οὔσης αὐτῆς ἀμεθέκτου, πολλῶν δ’ ἐξ αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόο-
δον γεννωμένων, αἳ καὶ μέρη ἐκείνης λέγονται,ὡς ἐκείνης μὲν οὔσης αἰτίας πρὸ αὐτῶν. τούτων δἐ
πασῶν μεριζομένων τἠν ἐξ αὐτῆς ὕπαρξιν διὰ τὸ εἰς πλῆθος ἐκτείνεσθαι, καὶ πασῶν ἀναφερομέ-
νων εἰς ἐκείνην ὡς εἰς μοναδικήν τε καὶ ἀρχικὴν καὶ ὑπερκειμένην τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς. τὸ δὲ ἐκ πάντων
ἄθροισμα ὅλον ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ μερῶν τῶν κατὰ μέρος τούτων μονάδων συντεθειμένον. ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν
μονάδων τούτων, ἐξὧν τὸ πλῆθος, ὄλον ἐν τῷμέρει ἐστίν· ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος,μέροςὢν τοῦ ἁπλῶς
ἀνθρώπου, ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἀνελλιπῆ τὸν ἐκείνου περιφέρει λόγον, καὶ ὅλον ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐστίν
ὡς ἐν τῷ μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ὅλον ἔχων τὸ ὅλον κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὅλον ὡς ἐκ μερῶν τῶν ὑπ’
αὐτο συγκείμενον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὖθις ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν· ὡς εἰ εἰδος ἐπιλείπει, κολοβοῡσθαι τὸ ὡς γένος
ὅλον, καὶ εἰ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά τι, κολοβοῦσθαι τὸ ὡς εἶδος ὅλον οὐ κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους λὀγους (οὐ
γὰρ καθὸ οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητικὴ τὸ ζῷον κολοβωθήσεται, εἰ ἵππος ἐπιλείποι ἢ βοῦς ἤ τι τῶν
ὑπ’ αὐτὸ εἰδῶν ἕτερον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ᾖ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτους ἐπιλείποντος ἢ
Πλάτωνος), ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τἀ οὕτω καθόλου ὡς ἐννοηματικὰ ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, ἐν τῷ
περιέχειν τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ καὶ κατηγορεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, εἴ τι ἐπιλείποι τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτά, κεκολόβωται κατὰ
τὸ λεῖψαν, ἐκεῖνο μὴ περιέχοντα μήτε μὴν ἐκείνου κατηγορούμενα. λέγονται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅλα
καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑπ’αὐτὰ θεωρούμενα ὅλα κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν λόγους· οὐ γὰρ
ὡς ποὺς ἢ χείρ, οὕτω τὸ γένος ὅλον πρὸς τὸ εἶδος, ἤ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἀλλ’ ὥς ὅλων
ἑαυτῶν μεταδιδόντα τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅλα ἐν αὐτοῖς θεωρούμενα).
12 As the threefold classification of wholes is generally applied, there does not seem to be
any significant conceptual distinction between “whole in the parts” (plural)—as in the
earlier text—and “whole in the part” (singular)—as in the present instance.
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The threefold division of wholes into wholes before the parts, wholes of
the parts, and wholes in the parts that is foregrounded in Eustratios’ discus-
sions and the twofold division of universals into universals before the many
and universals in themany that is also suggested there can perhaps be usefully
compared with the classifications of wholes and universals proposed in cer-
tain propositions of Proclus’Elements of Theology and in the two-part prologue
to Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements that may strike
the reader as being quite similar. Comparison with the first text will provide
a more detailed account of the three kinds of whole and comparison with the
second the addition of a third kind of universal to the earlier two, both compar-
isons allowing us to envisage the possibility of merging the threefold divisions
of wholes and universals.
A proposition13 in the Elements of Theology states that every “wholeness”
(ὁλότης) is either a whole “before the parts” (πρὸ τῶν μερῶν), a whole “of parts”
(ἐκ τῶν μερῶν), or a whole “in the part” (ἐν τῷ μέρει). The proof adds that the
whole before the parts is the form of each thing “contemplated” (θεωρεῖσθαι) in
its cause or alternatively the form “pre-established” (προυποστάν) in its cause;
the whole of parts is the form contemplated in all the parts “together” (ὁμοῦ)—
withdrawal of any part diminishes thewhole—whereas thewhole in the part is
the form contemplated in each part—where even the part becomes awhole “in
a partial way” (μερικῶς). In the cases of both the whole of parts and the whole
in the part the parts participate in the whole before the parts. Further, the
whole before the parts is a whole “according to cause” (κατ’αἰτίαν), the whole
of parts is a whole “according to existence” (καθ’ὕπαρξιν), and the whole in the
part is a whole “according to participation” (κατὰ μέθεξιν). Finally, the whole
in the part “at the lowest level” (κατ’ἐσχάτην ὕφεσιν) is still a whole because it
“imitates” (μιμεῖται) the whole of parts. Although Eustratios in citing the same
doctrine only makes a vague attribution to Greek philosophy with the phrase
“they say” (φασι) and could therefore be referring to Proclus, an Aristotelian
commentator, or some other authority, there are good reasons for thinking that
he is depending directly on the first-mentioned.14 Apart from certain peculiar
phraseology that explicitly recalls the Athenian Successor, a more explicit con-
nection with Proclus’ Elements is made in a somewhat similar context by his
teacher John Italos.15
13 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 67, proof 64. 1–2.
14 Steel 2002 showed on the basis of precise textual parallels that Eustratios knew and used
Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides.
15 See Ierodiakonou 2009.
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Now it must be admitted that Proclus does not in the quoted proposition
and proof identify the threefold division of wholes with the threefold divi-
sion of universals. However, the propositions which immediately follow the
propositions dealing with the threefold division of wholes in the Elements of
Theology do connect wholes with universals in a general way. Here, Proclus
draws a series of distinctions with respect to causality between higher and
lower principles and with respect to participations between lower and higher
principles by speaking of terms that are “more whole / universal” (ὁλικώτερα)
and “more partial / particular” (μερικώτερα),16 and then goes on to show on the
assumption that every “form / species” (εἶδος) is a whole but not every whole is
a form/species that whole is a broader category within which universal is to be
placed.17 Moreover, in the prologue to his Commentary on Euclid’s Elements,18
Proclus explicitly invokes a threefold division of universals. Here, he states that
every “universal” (καθόλου)—defined as “a one that includes a many” (ἕν …
τῶν πολλῶν περιληπτικόν)–is either “in particulars” (ἐν τοῖς καθ’ἕκαστα), having
a “subsistence inseparable” (ὕπαρξις… ἀχώριστος) from them, andmoving or at
rest togetherwith them; or else “prior to themany” (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), producing
the latter by “offering its appearances” (ἔμφασεις…παρέχον) to them and “being
causalwith respect to their participations” (μεθέξεις… χορηγοῦν); or else formed
from the many “according to thought” (κατ’ἐπίνοιαν), having “subsistence gen-
erated upon them” (ὕπαρξις ἐπιγενηματική), and “gaining consistency upon the
many in a later-born manner” (ὑστερογενῶς ἐπισυνίστασθαι τοῖς πόλλοις).19
16 Proclus, Elements of Theology, props. 70–72.
17 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 74, 70. 15–16.
18 Proclus, In Euclidem, 50. 16–51. 9. In addition, the proof includes definitions of both
“whole” and of “form / species.”
19 The threefold division suggested in this passage seems to lie behind a standard gloss on
Porphyry’s Isagoge that is found in numerousAristotelian commentators fromAmmonius
onwards. See Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen, 39. 8–42. 26; 68. 25–69. 11; 104. 27–105. 14.
Cf. Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, 45. 26–48. 30; David, In Porphyrii Isagogen, 113. 11–116. 2;
Olympiodorus, Prolegomena 19. 31–34; Philoponus, InCategorias, 9. 3–12—this list of refer-
ences being not exhaustive. The passage in Ammonius’ Commentary on the Isagoge intro-
ducing the Proclean distinction (In Porphyrii Isagogen, 41. 10–20) is of particular interest
because of the illustration that it includes. The commentator asks us to imagine a ring
with a seal which can be pressed on different pieces of wax. If someone enters a room and
sees the imprints on the different pieces of wax, having realised [a] that these imprints
have common characteristics and [b] that they aremade by one and the same seal, he will
[c] retain the common characteristics in his mind. In this illustration, the imprints on the
different pieces of wax represent the universal in the many, the seal on the ring the uni-
versal before the many, and the image retained the universal upon the many. Given that
the observer connects the common characteristics [a] with the single seal [b], Ammonius
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Now, by combining these texts we can conclude that Proclus has shown that
there are three kinds of whole: before the parts, of the parts, and in the parts;
that the theory of wholes is closely related to the theory of universals; and that
there are three kinds of universals: before themany, upon themany, and in the
many.20 However, it is clearly not possible on this basis and without more ado
to combine the three kinds of wholes with the three kinds of universals and
present this combination as part of an interpretation of Eustratios’ doctrine in
the commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and the Posterior Analytics. In
Eustratios, although the whole before the parts is identifiable with the univer-
sal before the many, the whole of the parts does not correspond exactly to any
of the types of universal but rather to a relation—that of genus to species—
between different instances of one type of universal that is otherwise unspe-
cified, while the whole in the parts is identifiable with both the universal upon
the many (as an Aristotelian abstracted universal) and the universal in the
many (as a Platonic immanent form).
However, given that Eustratios’ arguments do exhibit striking similarities
with those of Proclus, is it possible to resolve some of the interpretative prob-
lems that we have seen in connection with the former by appealing to this late
antique antecedent? The remainder of this paper will be devoted to arguing
that this is the case and will thereby attempt to break some new ground in the
scholarly debate.
However, it is worth prefacing this discussion with some observations
regarding the epistemological basis of Proclus’ treatment of universals in his
understanding of psychology in the Commentary on the Timaeus. This is set
out in his lengthy explanation of the lemma dealing with Timaeus’ statement
that the realm of becoming is grasped by a combination of opinion and sensa-
tion,21 and especially in the passage explaining the application of the phrase:
“by opinion together with irrational sensation” (δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου).
According to Proclus, there is a “series” (σειρά) of cognitive faculties containing
three terms in descending metaphysical order: 1. intellection, which is “above
logos” (ὑπὲρ λόγον), 2. logos itself or discursive reason, and 3. opinion, which is
“knowledge of sensible things in accordance with logos” (κατὰ λόγον … γνῶσις
τῶν αἰσθητῶν).22The further characterization of the lastmember of this series is
particularly important, for Proclus here explains that opinion is partly accord-
account of the Aristotelian abstracted universal is already shifted in the direction of Pla-
tonism. In other words, it implies the application of logos theory to be discussed below.
20 Or at least words to that effect.
21 Proclus, In Timaeum, I. 240. 13–16.
22 For now, we will leave the word logos untranslated. See further below.
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ing to reason because it has “logoi cognitive of substances” (λόγοi γνωστικοὶ τῶν
οὐσιῶν) and partly irrational because it does not know “the causes” (αἱ αἰτίαι).
He also contrasts this last cognitive faculty with the lower non-cognitive fac-
ulty of sensation.Whereas each of the five senses constituting the latter grasps
“one aspect of its object” (ἕν τι τῶν περὶ αὐτό)–and even the common sense
merely distinguishes between these features—, opinion knows that “thewhole
object has a substance of such and such a kind” (τοιάνδε ἔχον ἐστὶν οὐσίαν τὸ
ὅλον) and also knows “the whole as though before the parts” (τὸ ὅλον … πρὸ
τῶν οἱονεὶ μερῶν).23 From this description, we can conclude that it is with the
faculty of opinion that the soul’s apprehension of the wholes or universals dis-
cussed in the texts considered earlier really begins. Given that he states with
careful qualification that opinion knows thewhole—as opposed tomerely dis-
connected sensory affections–as though before the parts, it is probably safe to
assume that Proclus is not rejecting themore obvious assumption that percep-
tionof wholes anduniversals by the faculty of opinionwouldbeginwithwholes
in the part, but is rather attempting to delineate the fundamental difference
between partial and holistic approaches to the external objects of perception
as such.
2 Proclus’ Theory of Universals and Logoi
To return to the philosophical problems that appeared in connection with
Eustratios’ account of wholes and universals, we can leave aside the relatively
unproblematic identification of the whole before the parts with the universal
before themany as representing the Platonic transcendent forms. However, the
problems of interpretation with respect to the second and third terms in the
threefold schemaof wholes clearly need further investigation.24Here, themain
difficulties are that, although the two types of whole are ostensibly to be associ-
ated simply with the two types of universal, Eustratios in the passage from the
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics apparently identified both the Aris-
totelian abstracted universal and the Platonic embodied form with the whole
in the part and the universal upon the many, whereas in the passage from the
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics he identified the Aristotelian abstrac-
ted universal—in the sense of genera and species—with both the whole of
23 Proclus, In Timaeum, I. 248. 29–249. 27.
24 Later we will turn to an analogous problem with the (metaphysically) higher part of the
threefold schema.
42 gersh
parts and the whole in the partswhile at the same time identifying a collection
of Platonic monads with the whole of parts and an individual monad with a
whole in the parts. Reading these two texts in conjunction leads to even greater
difficulties, since we now realize that the universal upon the many—the Aris-
totelian abstracted universal in the first instance—is to be identified with both
the whole of parts and the whole in the parts and further that the whole in
the parts—the Platonic embodied form in the first instance—is to be identi-
fied with both the universal upon the many and the universal in the many. The
relations between the two kinds of universal and the two kinds of wholemight
be represented by the following schema:
ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ⎫}}
⎬}}⎭
καθόλου ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ----------------- καθόλου ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς
ὅλον ἐν τῷ μέρει ὅλον ἐν τῷ μέρει
⎧{{
⎨{{⎩ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς
However, the approach of Eustratios can perhaps be justified on the basis of
Proclus’ own treatment of wholes and universals which seems to make three
important moves: first, it treats the universal in the many—Eustratios’ whole
in the parts—as the embodied Platonic form; second, it treats the universal
upon the many—still Eustratios’ whole in the parts—as a mediation of the
embodied Platonic form with an element not so far considered: an internal
reason-principle of the soul; third, it treats the universal upon themany—now
Eustratios’ whole of parts—as the “projection” of the reason-principle itself—,
thereby turning what would become for the Byzantine commentator a two-
fold division of whole in the parts and whole of parts into a threefold division
of whole in the parts, whole in the parts plus universal upon the many, and
whole of parts.25 The insertion of a mediating term is not only typical of the
Proclean metaphysical approach in general but also in this specific context
changes the Aristotelian later-born universal—which he henceforth treats as
amere phantasm—into a Platonic later-born universal—now underpinned by
the reality of a psychic reason-principle.
These developments are set out most clearly in Proclus’ Commentary on the
Parmenideswhere he comments on the lemma26 dealingwith Socrates’ sugges-
tion that a form is a “thought” (νόημα) coming to be in the soul. Proclus notes
initially that this agrees with the Peripatetics’ notion of a form as “later-born”
25 On Proclus’ epistemology one may now consult the studies by Helmig 2004, 2006, 2008,
2011.
26 Proclus, In Parmenidem, IV. 891–897.
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(τὸ ὑστερογενές) but that there is a difference between this and that which he
terms the “psychic reason-principle” (ὁ ψυχικὸς λόγος). This reason-principle
resides substantially in souls. By looking towards this the soul is all the forms
and is the place of the forms, is present not only potentially but actually (in the
first meaning of actuality), and is “substantial” (οὐσιῶδες) and “more substan-
tial” than the many (μᾶλλον). On the other hand, the later-born is dimmer than
the many inasmuch as it “arises from them” (ἐπ’αὐτοῖς), and is “less substantial
than the many” (ἧττον οὐσία τῶν πολλῶν).
Having stated the fundamental difference betweenAristotelian andPlatonic
approaches to universals, Proclus proceeds to expand the threefold division
of wholes or universals first, by tracing back the Platonic embodied form to the
notion of reason-principle. He does this by contrasting the manner in which
a physical reason-principle is a “basis of coherence of the many” (συνεκτικὸν
τῶν πόλλων) and that in which the later-born is “upon the many” (ἐπὶ τοῖς πόλ-
λοις), noting in the process that the former underlies the “form residing in
matter” (τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ κείμενον εἶδος) and that it is the latter which knows things
on a general level (κοινῶς). Thus, the embodied Platonic form is replaced by an
internal principle of coherence based on a reason-principle. In the course of
the samediscussion, Proclusnow treats theuniversalupon themanyas themedi-
ation of the embodied Platonic formwith the soul’s internal reason-principles. His
approach can be seen by noting his remark that the “universal in the many”
(τὸ καθόλου τὸ ἐν τοῖς πόλλοις) is less than each of the individuals since the lat-
ter are amplified by accidents, whereas the later-born—as the universal upon
themany is here characterized—must comprehend each of the many in being
predicated of them. This remark should be combined with his further com-
ment that the psychic generality just mentioned must be derived not from the
common quality in the many but from some other source of which it is an
“image” (εἰκὠν), coming into existence through “recollection of the causal prin-
ciple arousedwithin” (ἀνάμνησις… τῆς ἔνδον ἀνακινουμενης αἰτίας) on thebasis of
things appearing. In commenting on the same lemma, Proclus finally treats the
universal upon themanyas the “projection” of the soul’s internal reason-principles
themselves. Here, he notes that rational souls “generate these universals” (γεν-
νῶσι ταῦτα τὰ καθόλου) and progress from sensible things to opinable things by
having reason-principles of things, and that those who know things “on a gen-
eral level” (κοινῶς) contemplate their “generalities” (κοινότητες) through “pre-
embracing” (προειληφέναι) these reason-principles.27 Thus, prior to the so–
27 According to the faculty psychology of the Commentary on the Timaeus explained earlier,
in treating the universal upon the many as the projection of the reason-principles them-
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called later-born theremust be “substantial reason-principles” (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι)
which are “eternally projected” (ἀεὶ προβεβλημένοι) and efficacious in the divine
souls superior to us but are “sometimes” (ποτέ) obscured and sometimes active
in us.
It should be apparent by now that a major component in Proclus’ strategy
of handling the threefold division of wholes and universals (together with the
expansion suggested) is the introduction of something distinct from both the
wholes and theuniversals themselves: namely, the reason-principles.Whatpre-
cisely are these reason-principles and how do they function? These questions
are far too complicated to deal with adequately under the present restrictions
of space. However, it is at least possible to summarize the main points of Pro-
clus’ doctrine of the reason-principle that are relevant to the present discus-
sion of the theory of universals on the basis of some passages from the Ele-
ments of Theology and the Commentary on Euclid.28 These two texts have not
only already provided some essential background to the discussion of wholes
and universals in Eustratios but also most clearly exemplify the mathematical
understanding of the reason-principle which is probably its most important
feature. Indeed, Eustratios’ explanation of the threewholes in terms of monads
andnumbers in theCommentary on thePosteriorAnalytics shows thatmathem-
atical and dialectical notions are inextricably linked in his mind.
Now considered on its most fundamental level, logos is conceived by the
Neoplatonists as almost synonymous with relation: a fact which in itself helps
to explain the difficulty of coming to grips with it. Relation in its turn has a
peculiar status in their philosophy being conceived in different contexts both
as a hypostasis and not a hypostasis.29 This second problemmight be summar-
ized as follows: Given the existence of two existent principles x and y and the
relation between them R, we have to ask about the nature of R. If it is an exist-
ent, then there were really three principles to begin with. If it is not an existent,
then there was really no relation between the two original principles. This kind
of conundrum about relation explains why it is difficult to say whether the
world’s Logos in Plotinus’ Third Ennead is a hypostasis or not, and why Pro-
clus’ theological system seems like an endless multiplication of triads. At any
rate, from Plotinus onwards the notion of logos is predominantly associated if
not identified with the hypostasis of soul and especially with the nature that
selves, Proclus has here passed from considering the level of opinion to considering the
level of logos or discursive reason.
28 In this essay, we will discuss only certain features of the epistemology in Proclus’ Com-
mentary on Euclid. For a more general overview see MacIsaac 2010.
29 On the peculiarly Neoplatonic treatment of relation see Gersh 1996, p. 45–56.
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represents the lower phase of soul.30 It is against this background that Proclus
elaborates the notion of logos that we see in the two treatises named.31
Aside from this metaphysical ambivalence, the notion of logos is difficult
to grasp because of the polysemy of the word itself. Taking our cue from Por-
phyry who at one point stops to map the range of meanings implicit in the
term logos,32 we might perhaps here briefly sketch the semantic unfolding of
the term as it emerges from Proclus’ usage in the Commentary on Euclid’s Ele-
ments, taking account of the fact that there is no single English translation that
captures all the senses of the original Greek term.33 Thus, logos appears (1.) as
form. At one point, Proclus invites us to think of the universal in the many—
the example being the reason-principles of circularity, triangularity, or figure as
such—as being twofold: in the objects of sense and in the objects of imagina-
tion. Prior to these are the reason-principle in the discursive reasoning and the
reason-principle in nature, the former giving substance to imagined circles and
the single form in them and the latter giving support to sensory circles and the
single form in them.34 Turning to the various types of relation in which logos
manifests itself, of particular importance are (2.)mediation. Reason-principles
can mediate between intellect and soul, for example when Proclus explains
that the totality of forms in the soul is derived both from the prior intellect and
from the soul itself, and that the soul is therefore not a writing-tablet “empty of
logoi” (τῶν λόγῶν κενόν) but is itself always written upon by intellect and writ-
ing itself;35 and likewise reason-principles canmediate betweenunderstanding
and imagination, for examplewhenhe argues that the circle in the understand-
ing is simple and unextended whereas that in the imagination is divisible and
extended—both being instances of reason-principles36–and that thinking in
geometry takes place through the “projection” (προβολή) of the various figures
and their parts from understanding to the imagination.37 Also among the vari-
30 On the status of Logos in Plotinus see Armstrong 1940, p. 98–108; Rist 1967, p. 84–102;
Früchtel 1970; Turlot 1985; Couloubaritsis 1992; and Fattal 1998.
31 Also more extensively in his Commentary on the Timaeuswhich we will not discuss here.
32 For discussion of this passage see Gersh 1992, p. 152–153. For a more general discussion of
logos in Porphyry see Gersh 2017.
33 Accordingly, during the next few paragraphswewill employ—in addition to simple trans-
literation and theneutral expression “reason-principle”—themore specialized renderings
“ratio,” “proposition,” “reasoning,” etc. as required by the context.
34 Proclus, In Euclidem, 53. 18–25.
35 Proclus, In Euclidem, 16. 4–10. Cf. 16. 27–17. 4.
36 Proclus, In Euclidem, 54. 5–11+55. 6–7.
37 Proclus, In Euclidem, 13. 6–11. On the important role of imagination in Proclus’ theory of
geometry see Nikulin 2010.
46 gersh
ous types of relation represented by logos is (3.) proportion. In commenting on
Euclid’s geometry Proclus also takes the opportunity of summarizing Plato’s
teaching in theTimaeuswhere the latter authority constructs the soul out of all
themathematical forms, thendivides it according tonumbers, and finally binds
itwith “analogies andharmonic proportions” (ἀναλογίαι…ἁρμονικοὶ λόγοι).38Of
equal importance among the types of relation in which logos manifests itself
are (4.) that between the one and themany and (5.) that between the whole and
the part: two types of relation that are perhaps better exemplified in some pas-
sages of the Elements of Theology to be discussed below. Last but not least, logos
appears (6.) as thinking.
It is here that we must complete the semantic unfolding of the term logos
in the Commentary on Euclid by considering various conceptual combinations
in Proclus of the types of logos–form, mediation, proportion, whole-part, one-
many, and thinking—enumerated above. Thus, logos appears as a combination
of form (1) +mediation (2)where it corresponds tomathematical form asmedi-
ating between intelligible and sensible form. In one passage, Proclus explains
that the “mathematical entities” (τὰ μαθηματικά) are the offspring of limit and
infinity and hence there are “ratios proceeding to infinity but controlled by the
causal principle of limit” (προέρχονται μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον οἱ λόγοι, κρατοῦνται δὲ ὑπὸ
τῆς πέρατος αἰτίας).39 Logos also occurs as a combination of thinking (6) + the
oneand themany (5) in various cases of cognitive synthesis ranging fromsimple
abstraction—for example, where he considers whether mathematical genera
and species are derived from sensible things either according to “abstraction
from materiate things” (ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἐνύλων) or by “collection from particu-
lars to one common definition” (κατὰ ἄθροισιν τῶν μερικῶν εἰς ἕνα τὸν κοινὸν
λόγον)40—to the complexities of syllogistic deduction—for example, where he
explains how our knowledge of the common theorems in geometry is the prior
science from which the other sciences “receive their common propositions”
(τοὺς κοίνους ὑποδέχονται λόγους).41 Logos appears as a combination of thinking
(6) + mediation (2) in various accounts of psychic faculties where logos is situ-
38 Proclus, In Euclidem, 16. 16–19. Cf. 6. 7–15 (similar interpretation of the Philebus).
39 Proclus, In Euclidem, 6. 7–15. Cf. 20. 27–21. 2.
40 Proclus, In Euclidem, 12. 2–7+15. 16–18. As we have already seen in connection with the
Commentary on the Parmenides, Proclus considers these processes to represent only half
of the process of acquiring knowledge. In order to achieve the latter, it is necessary for
the logos of “definition” mentioned here to turn into / be combined with the logos projec-
ted on the basis of intellect. Proclus thus speaks of recollection and awakening of logoi.
See In Eucl. 18. 17–20 and 45. 2–15. Of course, the duality of this process is a quintessential
illustration of logos as mediation.
41 Proclus, In Euclidem, 9. 14–19. Cf. 32. 13–20 and 33. 21–24.
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ated on the level of the discursive thinking that operates between intellect and
sense—for examplewhere Proclus discusses the reasonswhy thePythagoreans
introduced the term mathematics in order to characterize “the science of dis-
cursive reasonings” (ἐπιστήμη τῶν διανοητικῶν λὀγων)42—or on the level of the
imagination operating between discursive resoning and sense—for example
in the passage considered above where the reason-principles of the psycholo-
gical faculties of discursive reasoning, imagination, and sense are arranged in
a hierarchy.43 Logos also appears as a combination of form (1) + the one and
the many (5) where it corresponds to the unfolding of the simplicity of intelli-
gible form into discursive multiplicity. At one point, Proclus explains that the
discursive reasoning is not motionless like the activity of intellect but “unfolds
and traverses the incorporeal world of the reason-principles” (ἀνελίσσεται καὶ
διέξεισι τὸν ἀσώματον τῶν λόγων διάκοσμον) now moving from first principles to
conclusions and nowmoving in the reverse direction.44
The term logos appears only occasionally in the Elements of Theology. How-
ever, the relative infrequency of the term itself should not lead us to conclude
that the notions underlying the term are less important in that text. On the
contrary, the entire work consists of propositions and proofs which exemplify
the sense of logos as a combination of thinking + the one and the many in
syllogistic argument as described earlier.45Moreover, the senses of logos as pro-
portion and as the relations between the whole and the part and between the
one and the many are indicated in the accounts of the numerous orders and
series of hypostases contained in the work’s propositions and proofs.46 The
most important points regarding these latter senses of logos may perhaps be
stated briefly as follows:
1. Logoi govern simple relationsbetweenpartsandwholes. Proclus argues that
in each order or causal chain there exists a single monad prior to the
manifold which determines for the members of the order their “unique
42 Proclus, In Euclidem, 45. 4–5. Cf. 53. 26–54. 1.
43 Proclus, In Euclidem, 53. 18–25.
44 Proclus, In Euclidem, 18. 17–19. 5. Cf. 4. 11–14, 11. 19–22, 16. 8–13, etc.
45 For logos as argument see Proclus, Elements of Theology, props. 59, proof 58. 2; 62, proof
58. 32; 145, proof. 128. 16; for logos as demonstration: prop. 111, proof 98. 31–32. Proclus
also restates his general view that logos is an aspect of cognition. As such it is a real thing
and relates to real things in prop. 123, proof 108. 29–31. All “knowledge through a reason-
principle” (διὰ λόγου γνῶσις), inasmuch as it grasps intelligible notions and subsists in acts
of intellections, is knowledge “of real existents” (τῶν ὄντων). Its power of apprehending
truth is “among real things” (ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν).
46 For the general structuring function of logos see Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 18,
proof 20. 14–16.
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proportional relation to one another and to the whole” (ἕνα λόγον πρός τε
ἀλλήλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον).47
2. Logoi are multiple relations. They govern sets of relations between one part
and another. One proposition states that every particular soul with
respect to the divine soul under which it is ranked “has the same propor-
tional relation” (τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον) as does its vehicle to the vehicle of
the divine soul.48
3. Logoi are multiple relations. They govern sets of relations not only between
one part and another but between parts and thewhole [monad].Within the
proof of another proposition, stating that the first members of a mon-
adic series are conjoined by community of nature with the members of
the supra-jacent series, whereas the last members of the series have no
contact with it, Proclus observes: “Such terms are not identical in their
proportional relation but in the relation whereby they are derived from
and referred back to a single term” (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶς ὀ λόγος, ἀλλ’ὡς ἀφ’ἐνὸς καὶ
πρὸς ἕν).49
4. Logoi are more universal and less universal + determine the status “accord-
ing to participation.” Another proposition states that all those characters
“having the proportional relation of a substratum in participants” (ἐν τοῖς
μετέχουσιν ὑποκέιμενον ἔχοντα λόγον) proceed frommore perfect andmore
universal causes.50
5. Logoi are more universal and less universal + they determine the status
“according to causality.” Within another proof, we read that fathers differ
as “more universal or less universal” (ὁλικώτεροι … μερικώτεροι)—as do
the divine orders themselves—according to the “proportional relation of
their causality” (κατὰ τὀν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον).51
6. A Logos determines the status of a monadic term as “monadic”. Within the
proof of a proposition stating that there are series of termsbeginningwith
a monad and proceeding to a coordinate multiplicity, Proclus introduces
the words: “For the monad, having the proportional relation of an origin-
ative principle …” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ μονάς, ἄρχῆς ἔχουσα λόγον…)52
47 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 21, proof 24. 15–18.
48 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 205, proof 180. 4–6. Cf. Prop. 164, proof 142. 19–22; 185,
proof 162. 6–9; 203, proof 178. 5–7. In these cases, logos = analogy.
49 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 110, proof 98. 12–14.
50 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 72, proof 68. 17–18. Further examples of the applica-
tion of the term logos in the next four cases can be found at prop. 195, proof 170. 10–13 and
prop. 194, proof 168. 31–170. 3.
51 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 151, proof. 132. 34–134. 1.
52 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 21, proof 24. 4.
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7. A logosdetermines the status of anunparticipated termas “unparticipated.”
Within the proof of a proposition stating that the first term in each series
must be unique, Proclus includes thewords: “For the unparticipated, hav-
ing the relative status of a monad (…)” (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέθεκτον, μονάδος ἔχον
λόγον (…)).53
Now the apparent concentration on a relatively limited selection of the senses
of logos in the Elements of Theology does not indicate that Proclus does not also
assume there the full range of meanings set out in the Commentary on Euclid,
any seeming difference of approach resulting from the fact that the latter work
theorizes regarding the methodology of geometry whereas the former exem-
plifies the application of this geometry to theology.
3 Eustratios’ Theory of Universals Revisited
The passage quoted earlier from the Commentary on the Parmenides showed
the role of logoi specifically in Proclus’ theory of universals and we have now
seen applications of the notion of logoi in a wide range of contexts by the same
author. Given that our initial review of Eustratios’ arguments in the Comment-
ary on the Nicomachean Ethics and the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics
had indicated that his approach paralleled that of Proclus, is it possible now
to find traces of the same logos theory in the Byzantine commentator’s discus-
sion of wholes and universals? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then
it will be reasonable to conclude more decisively that Eustratios’ approach to
these doctrines is in agreement with that of Proclus, and at the same time to
resolve some of the interpretative problems that originally arose in connection
with that theory.
In fact, both passages drawn from Eustratios’ commentaries refer to the
notion of logoi, and it is worth revisiting them briefly in order to bring these
references into greater relief. In the passage from the Commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios notes concerning the whole of the parts that
the notion of wholeness here refers to “compound things” (σύνθετα) and things
divided intomany parts.When these compound things are homoeomerous, he
adds, the whole is related to the parts in such a way that each part has “the
reason-principle and name” (τό τε ὄνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος) of the whole, as stone
is divided into stones. The commentator also notes concerning the whole in
the parts—which replaces, as we have seen, the Platonic embodied form—
53 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 23, proof 26. 25.
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that these wholenesses are called “later-born” because the soul contemplates
“particulars” (καθ’ἕκαστα) identical or similar in form which have been previ-
ously established in bodies and “substantializes in itself the reason-principle”
(λόγον … ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὑποστήσασα) seen in them as a common element through
abstraction from matter. In the passage from the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, Eustratios makes three references to reason-principles in connec-
tion with the wholes or universals. First, he connects the whole in the part to
the whole before the parts. Each of the monads from which the multiplicity
arises is a whole in the part, for an individual man is a part of what is “man
simpliciter” (ὁ ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος)—i.e. the whole before the parts—, since he
embraces inhimself thewhole “reason-principle” (λόγος) of what is simplyman
in an incomplete way. He is a whole in the part because he has in a part of the
whole “the whole according to the reason-principle” (τὸ ὅλον κατὰ τὸν λόγον)
as a whole. Second, Eustratios shows that the status of the whole of parts is
determined according to a reason-principle. If a species is lacking, the genus
as a whole is maimed, and if an individual is lacking, the species as a whole
is maimed. This occurs not “according to their appropriate reason-principles”
(κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους) but in that “such universals as conceptual” (τὰ οὕτω
καθόλου ὡς ἐννοηματικά) have their being or activity in embracing the things
below and being predicated of them. Third, Eustratios connects the whole in
the part to the whole of parts. Genus and species—i.e. the wholes of parts—
are said to be wholes in the part for they “are seen” (θεωρούμενα) as wholes in
the things below them “according to their appropriate reason-principles” (κατὰ
τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους). It is not as foot or hand that the genus is thus in the species
or the species in the individuals but as “imparting their own wholeness” (ὅλων
ἑαυτῶν μεταδιδόντα) to things below them and being seen as a whole in them.
There is one reference to logos in the materials quoted from the Byzantine
commentator that tells a slightly different story. In the passage from the Com-
mentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Eustratios observes in connection with the
transcendent forms that thePlatonists here speak of certain “reason-principles,
enhypostatic, divine, intellectual” (λόγοι… ἐνυπόστατοι θεῖοι νοεροί) “in relation”
(πρός) to which all things “instantiated in matter” (ἔνυλα) exist and become.
They call these reason-principles “forms, Ideas, wholes, and universal” (εἴδη,
ἰδέαι, ὅλα, καθόλου). To some extent, this usage can be explained in terms of
the Neoplatonic precedent whereby the notion of logos which is associated
primarily with the levels of soul and nature can sometimes be applied to the
level of intellect.54 However, Eustratios’ application of the term logos here to
54 See Früchtel 1970, p. 24–40.
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the transcendent forms situated within the divine Craftsman’s intellect may
rather indicate a shift from the Proclean intellectual milieu to that of a more
overtly Christian Platonism. Of course, both these explanations may be valid.
Now if it is granted that an understanding of the function of logoi is neces-
sary in order fully to grasp the theory of wholes and universals in Proclus and
Eustratios, many obscurities still remain surrounding the notion of logos itself.
As we have already argued, much of the difficulty in interpreting this notion
results from themetaphysical ambiguities inherent in its relational nature and
from the polysemy of the technical term logos itself. It is therefore perhaps not
unconnected with this situation that Proclus himself can argue in the Com-
mentary on Euclid’s Elements that the discursive part of the soul “has its sub-
stance in the reason-principles of mathematics” (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐσίωται τῶν
μαθημάτων) and pre-contains knowledge of those reason-principles “in a sub-
stantial and concealedmanner” (οὐσιωδῶς καὶ κρυφιῶς) even when it is not act-
ive in relation to them.55 But what precisely is the nature of this concealment?
In twopassages of theCommentary on the First Alcibiades, Proclus contrasts the
state in which the soul has its logoi concealed with the state in which they are
brought forth in cognitive activity. In the former case, the soul with respect to
the reason-principles “exhales knowledge of them, so to speak” (οἷον ἀποπνεῖν
τὰς τούτων γνώσεις) and again56 “has the reason-principles as though palpit-
ating” (οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων οἷον σφύζοντες) within it.57 The nature of the
concealmentof the logoi is here indicatedbymeansof metaphors. Since the lat-
ter are based on the notions of breathing or pulsation, this concealment of the
logoi seems primarily to have the features of dynamism and unconsciousness.
Given that the cognitive activity of soul as opposed to that of intellect is
understood as taking place primarily in time, the question next arises whether
the state in which the soul has its logoi concealed and unconscious and that
in which they are brought forth in conscious cognitive activities are related
as one temporal state to another or as an atemporal state to a temporal one.
On the basis of Proclus’ fundamental tenets stated in the Elements of Theology
that every participated soul has an eternal “substance” (οὐσία) but an activity in
time,58 that the soul has its logoi in a “substantial” (οὐσιώδεις) mode,59 and that
55 Proclus, In Euclidem, 45. 18–46. 3.
56 Proclus, In Alcibiadem, 192. 1–5.
57 Proclus, In Alcibiadem, 189. 4–10. The importance of these metaphors was first noted by
Steel 1997.
58 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 191, proof 166. 26–27.
59 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 194, proof 168. 33.
52 gersh
any effect which proceeds must also remain,60 it is necessary for the second
answer to be the correct one. However, this in its turn implies that the con-
scious cognitive activities of the soul that do take place in time are inseparable
from and simultaneous with the unconscious cognitive activities of the soul’s
internal logoi.
We can take the first steps in pursuing the implications of this last point
for an understanding of the role performed by the logoi in the structuring and
processing of the world of forms if we return briefly to the semantic unfold-
ing of the term logos sketched earlier. It is therefore now possible to argue
that the reason why logos is treated often as though it were simply equival-
ent to form and often treated as though it were simply equivalent to thinking
is not because it is metaphysically identifiable with either of these in the strict
sense—this would be impossible both because Proclus explicitly distinguishes
logos from form in certain contexts61 and because the notion of an unconscious
thinking is obviously self-contradictory. Rather, the logos functions as a kind of
concealed complement to the structuring and processing of the world of forms
by thinking and therefore does not need to be named and indeed cannot be
named independently. In different contexts, logos can represent the mediat-
ing relation between forms thought as x, y, z, etc., or the proportional relation
between given forms as thought determinately; it can also represent the rela-
tion between the one and themanywith respect to forms thought as x, y, z, etc.,
or the relation between whole and the part with respect to given forms. Most
importantly for the theory of universals, it represents the relations signified by
the prepositions “before” (πρό), “of” (ἐξ), “upon” (ἐπί), and “in” (ἐν) rather than
the meanings of the substantives to which the prepositions are attached.
If this interpretation is correct, then some light has indeed been shed on
the obscurities surrounding Proclus’ and Eustratios’ accounts of wholes and
universals. Our close analysis of the most relevant texts selected from the two
authors has perhaps been sufficient to show that some of the problems can be
resolved. However, themost important lesson to be taken away is undoubtedly
that the non-resolution of certain other problems has at least the justification
of methodological consistency.62
60 Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 35 and proof 38. 9–13.
61 For instance, there are logoi but not forms of artificial objects. See Proclus, In Parmenidem,
III. 827. 19–828. 14.
62 The author would like to thank members of the audience at the colloquium on the Ele-
ments of Theology formaking insightful comments at the oral presentationof the first draft
of this paper inNovember 2015. A particular debt is owed toMichael Chase for alerting the
writer to some of the irregularities in published English translations of the Neoplatonic
Aristotelian commentaries.
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chapter 4
‘A Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnedness’: Michael
Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of
Proclus’Elements of Theology
JoshuaM. Robinson
Dumbarton Oaks Library, Harvard University
This man [Origen] delved into our sacred courts from the perspective of
Platonic and Aristotelian idle talk and thus dragged in from there all sorts
of superfluous and pretentious discourse; and bywishing to seem to com-
prehend what is against and what is consistent with Christian teachings,
and for this to be considered clever by the many, he corrupted and con-
fused the holy Scripture in its entirety. I say this without accusing theman
in every respect; for occasionally he gently severs the letter and reveals the
spirit; however, inmost cases he is overtaken bywhateverwind is carrying
him and is thus led astray from the main road and falls into the ditches.
Don’t converse often with the man, but rather, if you wish to know divine
things clearly, then enter deeply into the words of Gregory the Theolo-
gian. Forhe alone inmyopinion introducedallwisdom intohis discourses
and prepared amixing cup of piety and learnedness, so that everyone can
drink without satiety, while his cup is never exhausted.1
Michael Psellos, Theologica II, 4
∵
1 Theologica II, 4.87–102: ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτελικῶν ἀδολεσχιῶν ἐς
τὰς ἱερὰς ἡμῶν παρακύψας αὐλὰς πᾶσαν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖθεν περιττολογίαν καὶ δεινότητα ἐπεσύρατο, καὶ
τῷ δόξαι βουληθῆναι συνιδεῖν τὸ μαχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον καὶ δεινὸς ἐντεῦθεν τοῖς πολλοῖς νομι-
σθῆναι πᾶσαν τὴν ἱερὰν γραφὴν ἐκαπήλευσε καὶ συνέχεε. λέγω δὲ οὐ πάντα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς κατηγορῶν·
ἔστι γὰρ ὅπῃ διασχίζει τὸ γράμμα ἠρέμα καὶ ἀνακαλύπτει τὸ πνεῦμα· ἀλλὰ τὰ πλείω τοῦ ἄγοντος
γινόμενος πνεύματος ἐς κρημνοὺς ἐκπίπτει τῆς λεωφόρου ἀποτρεπόμενος. μὴ σύ γε τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδρὶ
θαμὰ προσομίλει, ἀλλ’ εἴ γε βούλοιο σαφῶς εἰδέναι τὰ θεῖα, τοῖς τοῦ θεολόγου Γρηγορίου λόγοις ἐμβά-
θυνε. μόνος γὰρ οὗτος κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν πᾶσαν σοφίαν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συνεισήνεγκε λόγοις καὶ κρατῆρα
πᾶσιν ἐστήσατο θεοσεβείας καὶ λογιότητος, ὥστε πάντας μὲν ἀκορέστως πίνειν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ λήγειν
μηδέποτε. I am grateful to Stratis Papaioannou for help in translating this passage.
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1 Introduction2
In a well-known article by Gerhard Podskalsky,3 Nicholas of Methone’s Refut-
ation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology served as indirect evidence that the
interest in Proclus so abundantly evident in the works of Michael Psellos in
the eleventh century had in fact persisted into the time of Nicholas, who died
around 1166.4 Surely, the argument goes, such a refutation demonstrates a con-
temporary fashion for Proclus inByzantium;Nicholaswould scarcely have gone
to such lengths to refute Proclus had he not regarded his influence as a con-
tinuing and contemporary problem. Indeed, in his prologue to the Refutation,
Nicholas explains that he has chosen to write the work because he observes
that the attraction of Proclus for someof his fellowChristians has led them into
heresy. For this reason he has decided to show, chapter by chapter, the points
at which Proclus’ teaching and Christian doctrine are at odds.
However, the absence of direct evidence for any substantial interest in Pro-
clus’ works in Byzantium in the mid-twelfth century might lead one to recon-
sider.5 Could one instead account for Nicholas’Refutation as a reaction to Psel-
los’ use of Proclus in the previous century? Psellos’ writings circulated widely
in the twelfth century,6 and even if they had not, Nicholas would not be the
first to engage in polemic with a long-departed threat. Cyril of Alexandria, for
example, wrote his lengthy Contra Julianum more than half a century after
Julian’s death.7
Among Nicholas’ primary aims, some announced explicitly in his prologue
and some emerging only later in the Refutation, are to defend the doctrine of
the Trinity against Proclus’ unitary conception of the first principle, and to dis-
2 The research for this article was made possible through a COFUND Junior Research Fellow-
ship atDurhamUniversity,where Iwas generously hostedbyKrastuBanev in theDepartment
of Theology and Religion. I would like to thank Andrew Louth, Lewis Ayres and Krastu Banev
for helpful feedback in the early stages of this research.
3 Podskalsky 1976.
4 OnNicholas’Refutation, see Stiglmayr 1899; Angelou 1984; O’Meara 1989; Alexidse 2002; Trizio
2014; Robinson 2014; Robinson 2017a and 2017b.
5 Ioane Petritsi’s Georgian translation of and commentary on Proclus’ Elements are a notable
example of interest in Proclus in this era, which may reflect ongoing trends in the Greek-
speakingworld. SeeAlexidse andBergemann 2009; Gigineishvili 2007;Mtchedlidze 2009 and
various other articles by these scholars.
6 See Kaldellis 2007, p. 226–228.
7 See recent critical editions (Riedweg 2016; Kinzig and Brüggemann 2017), as well as text and
partial translation in Sources chrètiennes (Evieux et al 1985; Odile Boulnois et al 2016). Mat-
thew Crawford and Aaron Johnson are preparing a first English translation of the Contra
Julianum.
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tinguish strictly between the intra-trinitarian generations of the Son and the
Spirit from the Father, on the one hand, and the Trinity’s creative production
of everything else on the other hand. In Nicholas’ view, Proclus’ hierarchical
emanative structure cannot be applied to the persons of the Trinity, where
the Son and the Spirit, though causally derivative, are consubstantial with the
Father and thus equally divine.Nor is this emanative structure an adequateway
to understand God’s production of the world, since it seems to present a causal
continuum in which the first principle is not the unique metaphysical cause,
utterly distinct from its created effects. Instead, this causal continuum involves
a series of metaphysical causes that seem to operate in the samemanner as the
first cause, even if each successive cause is more restricted in scope. Proclus’
system is in Nicholas’ view irredeemably polytheistic, both with its theory of
henads and with its descending sequence of hypostases.
With these issues inmind, I propose in this article to examine Psellos’ use of
the Elements, in order to discoverwhether he regarded these aspects of Proclus’
thought with greater sympathy than Nicholas did, and thus whether Psellos’
writings might help to explain why Nicholas wrote his Refutation.
2 Michael Psellos and the Elements of Theology
It has been recognized for some time that Psellos had an affinity for the Neo-
platonists, and that Proclus in particular had a special significance for him.8 In
a famous autobiographical passage of his Chronographia, Psellos describes the
course of his own education and tells us how, starting fromAristotle and Plato,
I completed a cycle, so to speak, by coming down to Plotinus, Porphyry
and Iamblichus.Then, continuingmyvoyage, I put in at themightyharbor
of the admirable Proclus, drawing from him all science and conceptual
precision.9
8 On Psellos’ philosophical interests, see Zervos 1920; Joannou 1956; O’Meara 1989, 1998 and
2014; Duffy 2002; Kaldellis 2007; Papaioannou 2013; Jenkins 2006 and 2017; Panagopoulos
2014; Lauritzen 2017; Miles 2017; Walter 2017.
9 Chronographia, VI, 38.1–5: ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ὁρμηθεὶς αὖθις ὥσπερ περίοδον ἐκπληρῶν, ἐς Πλωτίνους
καὶ Πορφυρίους καὶ Ἰαμβλίχους κατῄειν. μεθ’ οὓς ὁδῷ προβαίνων εἰς τὸν θαυμασιώτατον Πρόκλον
ὡς ἐπὶ λιμένα μέγιστον κατασχὼν, πᾶσαν ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιστήμην τὲ καὶ νοήσεων ἀκρίβειαν ἔσπασα.
O’Meara translates the passage and discusses it in detail (2014, p. 166–168): “From there, as if
completing a cycle (periodon), I came to a Plotinus, a Porphyry and a Iamblichus, after which
I progressed to the most admirable Proclus, as if arriving in a great haven, where I sought
all science and accuracy of thoughts. After this, intending to ascend to first philosophy and
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Given the climactic position that Proclus occupied in the stages of Psellos’
education, it seems reasonable to conclude that he played an important role in
Psellos’ mature thought. I will not attempt here to determine the exact signific-
ance of this passage within the Chronographia. Much has been written on the
rhetorical dimensions of this work,10 and it is sometimes suggested that one
cannot always take Psellos’ writings at face value.11 For our purposes, however,
it suffices to recognize that Psellos here unambiguously affirms his admiration
for Proclus, and to take note of the specific benefit he derived from Proclus,
namely “all science and conceptual precision (νοήσεων ἀκρίβειαν).”12
Even so, one must not exaggerate the role of Proclus in Psellos’ texts, where
many other authors are also cited, some with great frequency. In the first
volume of the Theologica, for example, Psellos’ citations of Proclus, including
many from his commentary on the Timaeus, are nearly equalled in number by
those of Dionysius, and are exceeded by those of Aristotle, Plato andMaximus
the Confessor. Above all, Gregory of Nazianzus dominates the scene, and other
authors, including Proclus, are usually introduced in order to elucidate pas-
sages from Gregory.13 Proclus’ true significance for Psellos can only be judged
by examining the way that he is used in each case.14
While Psellos cites multiple works by Proclus (and especially his comment-
ary on the Timaeus), here we will consider only his use of the Elements of
to be initiated to pure science, I took up first the knowledge of incorporeals in what is
called mathematics, which have an intermediate rank between the nature that concerns
bodies and the thought that is free of relation to bodies.” Cf. Theologica I, 22 (84.38–39),
where Proclus is “chief of themost theological among theGreeks”: οἱ τοίνυν θεολογικώτατοι
τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὧν δὴ Πρόκλος κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τὸ κεφάλαιον.
10 See Lauritzen 2013.
11 See Kaldellis 1999.
12 See below [currently page 7].
13 InTheologica II, citations of Gregory,Maximos and Johnof Damascus exceed those of Pro-
clus; in Philosophica minora I, citations of Aristotle, Olympiodorus and Plotinus exceed
those of Proclus; in Philosophicaminora II, the citations of Proclus (mostly from the com-
mentary on the Timaeus) far exceed all other authors.
14 See Miles 2017, p. 81: “The immense complexity of the philosophical, literary, rhetorical
and religious traditions that Psellos, like other Byzantine thinkers, inherited, was such
that it offered great scope for choosing one’s own position, and for combining positions
and ideas from previous authors in newways. Of this kind of intellectual freedom, Psellos
made considerable and brilliant use. This is becoming increasingly apparent in the newer
scholarship on his work, and it may be said with some confidence that the way forward
in Psellan studies lies in detailed and careful readings of his many texts, in particular with
an eye to how these combinations, transformations and balancing acts are carried out in
the context of specific discussions.”
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Theology.15 It seems likely that citations of the Elements in Psellos’ writings
are indicative of Proclus’ role in general; in any case, a focus on Psellos’ use
of the Elements keeps our enquiry to a manageable scope and allows us to
consider what role if any Psellos may have played in provoking Nicholas’Refut-
ation.
There are a few scattered citations of the Elements of Theology in various
publishedworks of Psellos,16 butmost of his citations of the Elements are found
in five modern editions, namely the two volumes of the Philosophica minora,
theDe omnifaria doctrina, and the two volumes of theTheologica.Within these
five volumes we can usefully distinguish at least two broadly different ways in
which Psellos uses Proclus, namely in compilations or epitomes on the one
hand, in which he summarizes or ‘plagiarizes’ with little or no comment, and
in exegetical treatises on the other hand, in which he draws upon Proclus as
a tool for understanding some other author’s text. In the former genre, the
object of attention is Proclus’ text, sometimes simply recycled without com-
ment, sometimes introduced or followed by brief comments from Psellos. In
the latter genre, the object of attention is some other text (most often Gregory
the Theologian), and Psellos introduces Proclus’ teaching during the course of
his explanationof this other text.The followingdiscussion is structured accord-
ing to this broad division, which corresponds roughly to the division between
the De omnifaria doctrina and the two volumes of the Philosophica on the one
hand, and the two volumes of the Theologica on the other.
3 Proclus in Compilation (1): Philosophicaminora I and II
Within the two volumes of the Philosophica minora, the use of the Elements is
more frequent in the second volume. There, according to the indices, the Ele-
15 According to O’Meara (2014, p. 168–169), “The Elements of Theology is probably Psellos’
favourite Proclean text. He names the text by its title a number of times and uses it extens-
ively in his philosophical, theological and rhetorical works, citing propositions taken from
throughout the work. He sometimes uses the same propositions repeatedly and makes
considerable use of the book in composing the little encyclopedia, the De omnifaria doc-
trina, which, in various versions, he dedicated to his imperial patrons. This makes it likely
that Proclus’Elements of Theologywas not just a convenient source of philosophical know-
ledge for Psellos: he could also use it in his teaching, or at least as providing materials for
his teaching.”
16 Besides the five published volumes discussed here, citations of the Elements of Theology
can also be found inOratoriaminora 27 (9–10),Orationes Forenses et Acta 1 (502–503) and
Epistulae (ed. Papaioannou) 31 (42–43).
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mentsmakes an appearance in nine different treatises.17 Among these, perhaps
themost notable examples are found in Phil. min. 10 and 11, where Psellos com-
piles the propositions that concern intellect and soul respectively, and in Phil.
min. 35, where Psellos comments onmaterial from six different propositions.18
Other citations from the Philosophica minora will not be considered in depth
here.19
Phil. min. 10, On Intellect, provides us with a good example of pure compil-
ation. Here Psellos simply strings together, without any comment, seventeen
propositions from the extensive portion of the Elements of Theology that is
concerned with intellect. He includes all but two of the propositions in the
range beginning with Prop. 166 and ending with Prop. 183, and he introduces
this material by saying that he will “sum up in an epitome” the teachings on
intellect of “those who philosophize among the Greeks.” In the next line, he
refers to these teachings simply as “Hellenic opinions,” and only at the end of
thepassagedoes he tell us that all of thematerial comes fromProclus. Evidently
Proclus is here representative of Greek thought for Psellos.20
17 Michael Psellos, Philosophica minora II, 9–11, 15, 25, 34–36 and 38. See also Philosophica
minora I, 36.
18 As well as on four excerpts from Porphyry’s Sententiae, one of which also corresponds
closely to Proclean doctrine.
19 In Philosophica minora I, 36, which is an elaborate philosophical interpretation of the
meaning of the letters of the alphabet, there is an interesting passage (lines 481–506)
that I have not been able to examine thoroughly in context, in which Psellos summar-
izes various principles from the Elements of Theology (cf. Elements of Theology 117, 124,
125, 131 and 160) in answer to the question “what are the phenomena of the divine?” and
concludes the passage thus: “and the other things, so many as are not disregarded by the
theologians and especially Dionysius, who philosophized altogethermore precisely (ἀκρι-
βέστερον) concerning these things.” In II, 9 (19.15–19), Psellos accepts without reservation
Proclean principles concerning the substance and activity of intellect, soul and body as
they relate to division and motion (cf. Elements of Theology 20). In II, 25 (101.6–13) Psellos
endorses the Proclean principle of a mediating principle in the structure of participation
(Elements of Theology 64 and 129). In II, 34 (117.16–19), Psellos affirms the Proclean prin-
ciple of degrees of participation (cf. Elements of Theology 110). In II, 36 (121.18–19), Psellos
mentions, in the course of a lecture on Greek teachings concerning divine creation, the
principle that divine creation is through intellectual activity (Elements of Theology 174).
In II, 38 (142.21–26), Psellos distinguishes variousmodes of being and affirms the ultimate
derivation of all from one (Elements of Theology 39). O’Meara also cites Elements of Theo-
logy 209 as a parallel for the ideas discussed in II, 15 (76.8–9), but the connection is not
precise.
20 The same might be said for Nicholas. In the prologue to the Refutation (3.15–17), he
presents Proclus as the preeminent Greek thinker: “And not least in comparison to all,
yea perhaps even more than all, was this mighty Proclus, who was zealous not to be sur-
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Similarly, in Phil min. II, 11, a short treatise titled On Soul, Psellos simply
compiles twenty-four propositions from the last section of the Elements. In
this case, however, he also includes brief comments on the acceptability of
Proclus’ teaching from a Christian point of view. “Behold I provide you the
hellenic teachings concerning soul,” he begins, “some of which agree with our
scriptures,” and then cautioning: “but the bitter among them is more than
the sweet.”21 The first proposition to which he refers is Prop. 184, “They say
that every soul is either divine, or changes from intellect to non-intellect, or
is between these, always intellecting, but inferior to divine souls,” and then he
comments: “And while this teaching is most absurd, what comes after is more
mythological and sillier.”22 “What comes after” in Psellos’ compilation com-
prises all but one of the series of propositions ranging from Prop. 185 to Prop.
195. After quoting this series of propositions, he comments, “Perhaps then these
teachings are not altogether absurd, but it would be better to say that they are
ambiguous; the things that they say after these, however, are most laughable.”
The rest of the text, i.e. the material that he says is “most laughable,” is mostly
exact quotation fromall but two of the remaining propositions in the Elements.
Since a major topic of this section is Proclus’ teaching on the “vehicle of the
soul” or astral body, which might have struck Christian readers as particularly
fantastical, this may account in part for Psellos’ judgement here.23
Psellos’ compilation of this material clearly does not constitute an endorse-
ment of Proclus’ views on soul, nor can we conclude from his silence in the
previous text (on intellect) that he agreed with everything in it. Yet it is clear
that Psellos found this material interesting and useful—useful to himself per-
haps, as a kind of condensation of what he had read and as an aid to memory,
but probably also useful for his students.
In Phil. min. II, 35 Psellos takes a very different approach. In this text, rather
than simply compiling numerous propositions (without their proofs) into a
condensed presentation of Proclus’ teaching on a given topic, Psellos instead
quotes individual propositions with their proofs, commenting briefly on each.
passed in pagan wisdom by even the most preeminent.” Besides being a particular threat,
Proclus stands for Hellenic wisdom as such.
21 Philosophica minora II, 11 (22.1–3).
22 Following St. Paul, γραώδεις is frequently applied to myths (cf. ITimothy 4:7: βεβήλους καὶ
γραώδεις μύθους παραιτοῦ: refuse profane and old wives’ fables); cf. also Gregory of Nazian-
zus,Or. 28.8: ὃ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ἀτόμων ἀτοπώτερόν τε καὶ γραωδέστερον: “[the idea that
God could be mixed with bodies] is a more absurd old wives tale than even the atoms of
Epicurus.”
23 Cf. Philosophica minora II, 15, where Psellos associates Origenism with such ideas.
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The text is titled “OnTheology andon theDistinctions amongGreekDoctrines”
(Περὶ θεολογίας καὶ διακρίσεως δογμάτωνἙλληνικῶν). It is actually somewhat like
Nicholas’ Refutation in its form and aims, though much more modest in its
scope; in it Psellos considers individually only six propositions from the Ele-
ments (35, 39, 81, 90, 103 and 109), stating in each case whether he considers
the proposition in question to be acceptable from the standpoint of Christian
doctrine.
The first text quoted is Prop. 35: “every effect remains in its cause and pro-
ceeds from it and returns to it.” Psellos prefaces the text with the following
comment:
What is agreed upon by us concerning our theological teaching, i.e. the
trinitarian consubstantiality, does not need other proofs or the estab-
lishment of proofs foreign to the discourse. But among the wise Greeks,
reason (λόγος) is a highly productive component of their theological
proofs, and it also contributes no small part to our own discourse [i.e.,
Christian theology] as regards theunion anddistinctionof the Son in rela-
tion to the Father, where their union does not eliminate the distinction,
nor does their distinction break apart the union.24
Psellos here recognizes that trinitarian doctrine is not established by philo-
sophy, but belongs to a “discourse” rooted in revelation and tradition. He nev-
ertheless asserts the common utility or productivity of reason for both ‘Greek’
andChristian theology.While Nicholas of Methone also recognizes the value of
reason (implicitly if not explicitly), he regards Proclus’ entire project as a pre-
sumptuous rationalism aiming to scale the heavens (like the Tower of Babel)
by the power of human thought.25 Reason, for Nicholas, cannot grasp God in
his transcendence. By contrast, even though Psellos sometimes rejects Proclus’
particular conclusions, he here shows a fundamental sympathy with Proclus
regarding the role of reason in theological inquiry.26
24 Philosophica minora II, 35 (117.24–118.4): Τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς θεολογικοῦ δόγματος, φημὶ τῆς τρι-
αδικῆς ὁμοουσιότητος, ὁμολογούμενον παρ’ ἡμῶν τὸ [πᾶν] καὶ οὐ δεῖται πίστεων ἑτέρων οὐδὲ
τῆς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τοῦ λόγου συστάσεως. πλὴν ἔστι τε λόγος καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφοῖς
μέγα τι μέρος λυσιτελῶν αὐτοῖς εἰς θεολογίας ἀπόδειξιν, οὐ βραχεῖάν τινα καὶ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λόγῳ
συνεισφέρων μερίδα τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνώσεώς τε καὶ διακρίσεως, οὔτε τῆς ἑνώσεως
ἀφανιζούσης τὴν διάκρισιν οὔτε τῆς διακρίσεως διιστώσης τὴν ἕνωσιν. I am grateful to Anthony
Kaldellis for his help in understanding this passage.
25 See Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of the Elements of Theology, Prologue, 3.1–4.2.
26 See Panagopoulos 2014 on Psellos’ ‘rationalism’.
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Psellos continues by quoting the entire proof of Prop. 35, and he comments:
This chapter alone of the Greek theology seems to me to have some con-
tribution to our dogma; for in a manner involving neither time nor body,
the only-begotten Word proceeds from the Father and remains in the
Father and returns to the Begetter; although he has proceeded, he is not
distinguished according to the principle of divinity, nor in returning was
he separate, nor in remaining has he been confused with respect to the
personal (ὑποστατικὴν) perfection.27
As Dominic O’Meara has noted,28 Psellos’ application of Prop. 35 to the Trinity
implies a greater degree of compatibility with Christian doctrine than Nich-
olas of Methone will allow. In his own commentary on the same proposition,
Nicholas insists that onemust strictly distinguish between the “productive pro-
cession” by which all things go forth from God creatively, and the “natural” or
“supernatural procession,” which he even calls an “unproceeding procession”
(ἀπροΐτου προόδου).29
The consubstantially super-substantial persons, even if they proceed
from the cause insofar as they are other persons than it, nevertheless do
so without proceeding, since they do not differ at all from it in substance,
nor indeed are they separated from it. For this reason, they do not desire,
for how can they desire him with whom they are identical in substance?
Nor do they revert, for how can they revert to him from whom they did
not depart?30
27 Philosophicaminora II, 35 (118.17–23): τοῦτο δέ μοι καὶ μόνον τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς θεο-
λογίας φαίνεταί τινα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα ἔχειν συντέλειαν· ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς λόγος καὶ
πρόεισιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀσωμάτως καὶ μένει ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὸν
γεννήτορα, καὶ οὔτε προϊὼν διακέκριται κατὰ τὸν τῆς θεότητος λόγον οὔτε ἐπιστρέφων διέστη
οὔτε μένων συγκέχυται κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν τελειότητα.
28 O’Meara 1989, p. 475.OnPsellos’ trinitarian thought, see alsoGemeinhardt 2001. Papaioan-
nou (2013, p. 174) says of Psellos: “He was […] clearly self-involved in the use of philo-
sophical Hellenism and was indeed innovative in his approach; no one prior to him read
Gregory of Nazianzus’ Trinitarianism through Proklos’ Neoplatonicmetaphysics.” He adds
a note: “An aspect of Psellian writing that, in my opinion, still awaits its devoted student.”
29 Refutation of the Elements of Theology 35, 44.29.
30 Refutation of the Elements of Theology 35, 44.24–28: τὰ γὰρ ὁμοουσίως ὑπερούσια εἰ καὶ πρόει-
σιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, καθὸ καὶ ἕτερά εἰσι παρ’ ἐκεῖνο πρόσωπα, ἀλλ’ ἀπροΐτως, μηδὲν ἐκείνου κατ’
οὐσίαν διαφέροντα μήτε μὴν ὅλως ἐξιστάμενα· διὸ οὐδ’ ἐφίεται· πῶς γάρ του, ᾧπέρ εἰσι ταὐτὰ
κατ’ οὐσίαν; οὐδ’ ἐπιστρέφει· πῶς γὰρ οὗ οὐκ ἀπέστη;
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Psellos next considers Prop. 39: “And since mention was made of reversion
formerly,” he says, “one must treat of this in the following way.” He then quotes
the proposition: “all being reverts either substantially alone or also vitally or
also gnostically,” and after quoting additional text from the proof of this pro-
position, he makes this comment: “And this chapter was earlier interpreted in
a more extended way by Dionysius the Areopagite, and later was made precise
(ἠκρίβωται) by syllogistic method by the Lycian-born Proclus.”31
Note that the verbhere for “makeprecise” (ἀκριβόω) is cognatewith theword
Psellos employs in the passage of the Chronographia cited earlier, where he
stated that from Proclus he “drew all science and conceptual precision” (νοή-
σεων ἀκρίβειαν). As the passage from Phil. min. II, 35 shows, this “conceptual
precision” is closely linked with the “syllogistic method” of the Elements of
Theology. In comparing Proclus with Dionysius here, Psellos seems to imply
that Proclus’ writings offer an improvement on, or complement to, those of
Dionysius.32
31 Psellos, Philosophicaminora II, 35 (118.30–119.3): τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κεφάλαιον πρότερον μὲν τῷἈρε-
οπαγίτῃ Διονυσίῳ πλατύτερον διερμήνευται, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τῷΛυκογενεῖ Πρόκλῳ συλλογιστικῇ
μεθόδῳ ἠκρίβωται.
32 I have found one passage in Psellos, however, inwhich he appears to rankDionysius above
Proclus. See De οmnifaria doctrina 101, “Concerning the return of beings to the divine”:
“Among the things produced by God from not being into being, some are only beings,
such as the soulless bodies, some are both being and living things, such as the ensouled
bodies, and some are both being and living and intellecting things, such as souls and intel-
lects. Each therefore returns to God from whom it was produced according to its own
[mode of] existence. So being makes its return substantially, and what lives makes both a
substantial and vital return, and what intellects makes a substantial and vital and gnostic
return. For each is reverted in theway that it came forth. And the philosopher Proclus pos-
its and elucidates this philosophical principle in his chapters, and, before him, Dionysius
theAreopagite examines (διακριβοῖ) itmore clearly thanhim; and this principle (ὁ λόγος) is
among those entirely approved (σπουδαζομένων), being most true and most precise (ἀκρι-
βέστατος).” (Περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστροφῆς. Τῶν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραχθέντων τὰ μέν ἐστι μόνως ὄντα,ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα σώματα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα,
ὡς τὰ ἔμψυχα σώματα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ νοοῦντα,ὡς αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ οἱ νόες. ἕκαστον οὖν
πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ἀφ’ οὖ παρήχθη, κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὕπαρξιν ἐπιστρέφει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὂν οὐσιώδη ποιεῖ-
ται τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, τὸ δὲ ζῶν καὶ οὐσιώδη καὶ ζωτικήν, τὸ δὲ καὶ νοοῦν καὶ οὐσιώδη καὶ ζωτικὴν
καὶ γνωστικήν. ἕκαστον γὰρ ὡς προῆλθεν, οὕτως καὶ ἐπέστραπται. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ φιλοσόφημα καὶ
ὁ φιλόσοφος Πρόκλος ἐν τοῖς κεφαλαίοις αὐτοῦ τίθησι καὶ διευκρινεῖ, καὶ πρὸ τούτου ὁ Ἀρεο-
παγίτης Διονύσιος σαφέστερον τούτου διακριβοῖ· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος τῶν πάνυ σπουδαζομένων,
ἀληθέστατος τὲ καὶ ἀκριβέστατος ὤν.) Note the use of διακριβοῖ and ἀκριβέστατος, cognate
with ἀκρίβεια. Cf. also Theologica I, 59.113–117: “And so that we may pass by the discourses
of the Greeks (for the church does not in fact need these for the establishment of its own
teachings), we will receive the proofs from the theological teachings by Dionysius.” On
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How different this is from Nicholas of Methone’s reflections on the rela-
tionship between Dionysius and Proclus! In commenting on Prop. 122, which
concerns the compatibility of divine providence and divine transcendence,
Nicholas states that, apart from a few details, including a suggestion of poly-
theism, “this chapter is otherwise pious.” He continues:
For this reason, it seems to me that [Proclus] has stolen his lofty and in
thisway remarkablepropositions (τὰ ὑψηλὰκαὶ οὕτως ἐξαίρετα θεωρήματα)
from the theology of the great Dionysius, having come across this theo-
logy in Athens, and having mixed in the evil tares (i.e., the teachings of
godless polytheism) with the seeds of piety. And so, it should be better
rendered in this way […]33
Nicholas proceeds to paraphrase the entire proposition so as to bring it into
conformity with Christian belief.34
Both Psellos and Nicholas assume, of course, that Dionysius preceded Pro-
clus by several centuries, and both seem also to assume, because of certain
similarities between their works, that Proclus was acquainted with Dionysius’
writings.35 While Psellos gives this connection an entirely positive interpret-
Dionysius’ “precision” see also Philosophicaminora I, 36, 508 (note 19 above). Further study
of the relative value of Dionysius and Proclus for Psellos could prove illuminating.
33 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of the Elements of Theology 122, 117.23–29: Χωρὶς τοῦ πᾶν
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐμφάσεως τῆς πολυθεΐας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς οὐσίαν ἀφο-
ρίζεσθαι τῆς θεότητος, τἆλλα εὐσεβὲς τουτὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον. ὅθεν μοι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς θεολογίας τοῦ
μεγάλου Διονυσίου τὰ ὑψηλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἐξαίρετα κεκλοφέναι θεωρήματα, ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐντυχὼν
ταύτῃ καὶ τοῖς τῆς εὐσεβείας σπέρμασι τὰ πονηρὰ παραμίξας ζιζάνια, τὰ τῆς ἀθέου πολυθεΐας
δόγματα. οὕτως ἂν οὖν ἔχοι κάλλιον ἐκδίδοσθαι·
34 For an insightful discussion of this passage, see Alexidse 2002, p. 122–126.
35 The idea that pagan philosophers were dependent on Dionysius was not new. Psellos and
Nicholas were almost certainly familiar with this anonymous scholion, interpolated into
John of Scythopolis’ prologue to his own scholia on Dionysius’ works (PG 4, 21D): “One
must know that some of the non-Christian philosophers (τῶν ἐξω φιλοσοφῶν), especially
Proclus, have often employed certain concepts of the blessed Dionysius […] It is possible
to conjecture from this that the ancient philosophers of Athens usurped his works and
then hid them, so that they themselves might seem to be the progenitors of his divine
oracles […],” quoted in Rorem and Lamoreaux 1998, p. 106. For the possibility of attribut-
ing this scholion to John Philoponus, see Rorem and Lamoreaux 1998, p. 107 andOpsomer
and Steel 2003, p. 6. The 10th-century Suda, in its entry on Dionysius the Areopagite, also
shows awareness of similarities between Proclus and Dionysius. “We should know that
some of the pagan philosophers, and especially Proclus, often have used the theories of
the blessed Dionysius, and they did it also with his bare words. One might suppose from
that, that the earlierAthenianphilosophers, after havingusurpedhisworks—asDionysius
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ation, however, suggesting that Proclus took what he found in Dionysius and
usefully re-worked it with greater “conceptual precision,” Nicholas can only
regard Prop. 122 as an inferior copy, the result of Proclus’ theft and subsequent
corruption of Dionysius’ teaching.36
I will now summarize Psellos’ comments on the remaining four propositions
quoted in this treatise. Regarding Prop. 81, “everything separately participated
is present to the participant through some inseparable power that it gives,” he
states that it is “partly true according to our dogmatic conceptions, and partly
false,” and he gives a historical and christological interpretation in which John
the Baptist is, like Proclus’ “inseparable power,” “a forerunner of the union of
the Word with us, who proceeded as an illumination, preparing the soul for
the reception of the first light.”37 Psellos rejects, however, any notions of “an
himself mentions, writing to Timotheus—hid it, in order to be seen as the authors of his
divine books.” (ἰστέον δέ, ὥς τινες τῶν ἔξω σοφῶν καὶ μάλιστα Πρόκλος θεωρήμασι πολλάκις
τοῦ μακαρίου Διονυσίου κέχρηται καὶ αὐταῖς δὲ ξηραῖς ταῖς λέξεσι. καὶ ἔστιν ὑπόνοιαν ἐκ τούτου
λαβεῖν ὡς οἱ ἐν Ἀθήναις παλαιότεροι τῶν φιλοσόφων σφετερισάμενοι τὰς αὐτοῦ πραγματείας,ὧν
αὐτὸς μνημονεύει πρὸς Τιμόθεον γράφων, ἀπέκρυψαν, ἵνα πατέρες αὐτοὶ ὀφθῶσι τῶν θείων αὐτοῦ
λόγων.) Translation taken from the Suda On Line (https://www.cs.uky.edu/~raphael/sol/
sol‑html/).
36 Earlier in the RefutationNicholas had already disparaged Proclus in comparison to Diony-
sius: “This one, although composing an Elements of Theology, does not seem to have
dipped even the very tip of his pen into this most god-befitting theory concerning power,
which Dionysius, great and illustrious in divine things, investigatedmore thoroughly […]”
(Refutation of the Elements of Theology 78, 81.20–22).
37 See also Psellos’ discussion of receptive powers in Philosophicaminora II, 25, “On Illumin-
ation,” where he seems to have greater sympathy for the particular features of Proclus’
theory: “I perceive that you are always unreceptive of such contemplation, concerning
which you have again posed a problem. For although you receive the substances of beings,
you do not accept their illuminations and forms. Know, however, that nothing among sub-
stances had become akin to another substance, unless some forerunner, proceeding from
it as an illumination, became a sort of receptacle for the sending nature. Therefore, the
intellect never received God, if it had not participated in divinity, nor did the soul accom-
modate the substantial intellect, if it had not partaken of the intellectual property, nor did
the body, divisible, dissoluble, and filled for themost part with earth, become receptive of
the immaterial and incorporeal soul, if it had not received some formof it descending into
it, nor did the second and third henads receive the power of the first henad, if they were
not deemedworthy of somemore divine unification. For it is one thing for the soul to par-
ticipate in the all-perfect and super-substantial intellect, and another for it to commune
in the intellectual property; and, for the same reason, no rational soul is without intellect
(for all things after intellect that have come to be fromGod received from there [intellect]
certain intellectual illuminations to themselves), yet in comparison to the all-perfect and
super-substantial intellect, many of these subsist deprived of intellect. Therefore, both he
who says that every rational soul is intellectual and he who says, oppositely to this, that
it is without intellect, speak truth, the former concerning intellectual illumination, the
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intermediary between soul and body,” of an “inseparable actuality,” of “natural
hypostases in bodies,” of “conjecturing animals,” of “appetitive animals,” or of
“an individualizing hypostasis of irrational soul.” “Because of these things,” he
concludes, “I receive this Proclean chapter in part, and in part I dismiss it.”38
He has singled out the respect in which he can give the proposition a Christian
application, but he rejects various other details as contrary to “our discourse.”
On Prop. 90, where Proclus states that “the first limit in itself and the first
infinity exist before every subsistent limit and infinity,” Psellos comments,
I have learned fromour oracles [i.e. Christian scriptures] about the things
that are limited and infinite, and I have known the limits and infinities in
these limited and infinite things, but I havenot comprehended a limit and
an infinity that are separate from the things of which they are predicated,
for these do not have a nature to subsist in themselves.39
later concerning the substantial intellection. Do not be in doubt, therefore, concerning
the doctrine, which has coherence or cogent power for acceptance.” (Ἀπαράδεκτόν σε ἀεὶ
τοῦ τοιούτου κατανοῶ θεωρήματος περὶ οὗ καὶ αὖθις ἠπόρησας. τὰς γὰρ οὐσίας τῶν ὄντων δεχό-
μενος ἐλλάμψεις αὐτῶν καὶ ἰνδάλματα οὐ προσίεσαι. ἀλλ’ ἴσθι ὡς οὐδεμία τῶν οὐσιῶν προσφυὴς
ἑτέρᾳ ἂν ἐγεγόνει οὐσίᾳ, εἰ μή τις ἀφ’ ἑκάστης πρόδρομος προϊοῦσα ἔλλαμψις ὑποδοχή τις ὥσπερ
τῇ καταπεμψάσῃ φύσει ἐγίνετο. οὔτε οὖν ὁ νοῦς θεόν ποτε ἐδέξατο, εἰ μὴ μετεσχήκει θεότητος,
οὔτε τὸν οὐσιώδη νοῦν ἐχώρησεν ἡ ψυχή, εἰ μὴ μετειλήφει νοερᾶς ἰδιότητος, οὔτε τὸ μεριστὸν
σῶμα καὶ σκεδαστὸν καὶ γῆς κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀναπεπλησμένον δεκτικὸν ἂν ἐγεγόνει τῆς ἀύλου
καὶ ἀσωμάτου ψυχῆς, εἰ μή τι ἐκείνης ἴνδαλμα εἰς αὐτὸ καταβεβηκὸς ὑπεδέξατο, οὔτε τῆς πρώ-
της ἑνάδος αἱ δεύτεραι μετ’ ἐκείνην καὶ τρίται τὴν ἄρρητον ἐδέξαντο δύναμιν, εἰ μή τινος ἑνώσεως
θειοτέρας κατηξιώθησαν. ἄλλο γοῦν ἐστι τὸ μετασχεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντελείου καὶ ὑπερουσίου
νοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ κοινωνῆσαι νοερᾶς ἰδιότητος· καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταύτην οὐδεμία τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν
ἄνους ἐστί (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀπὸ θεοῦ μετὰ νοῦ γεννηθεῖσαι ἐλλάμψεις τινὰς ἐκεῖθεν εἰς ἑαυτὰς νοερὰς
κατεδέξαντο), κατὰ δὲ τὸνπαντέλειον καὶ ὑπερούσιον νοῦν πολλαὶ τούτων καθεστᾶσιν ἔρημοι νοῦ.
ὅ τε γοῦν πᾶσαν ψυχὴν λογικὴν ἔννουν εἰπὼν καὶ ὁ ἀντιθέτως τούτῳ ἄνουν ἀντειρηκὼς ἀληθεύε-
τον ἄμφω, ὁ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοερᾶς ἐλλάμψεως, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσιώδους ἀποφηναμένω νοήσεως. μὴ
οὖν ἀμφίβαλλε περὶ τοῦ δόγματος, ἀκολουθίαν ἢ ἀναγκαστικὴν δύναμιν εἰς παραδοχὴν ἔχοντος.)
38 Psellos, Philosophica minora II, 35 (119.4–13): Τὸ δὲ ‘πᾶν τὸ χωριστῶς μετεχόμενον διά τινος
ἀχωρίστου δυνάμεως, ἣν ἐνδίδωσι, τῷ μετέχοντι πάρεστι’, τῷ αὐτῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἀπεφασμένον, ἔστι
μὲν οὗ ἀληθές ἐστι κατὰ τὰς ἡμέτερας δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις, ἔστι δὲ οὗ ψεύδεται· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦ λόγου ἑνώσεως πρόδρ[ομος] προέρχεται ἔλλαμψις ἑτοιμάζουσα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς
ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ πρώτου φωτός, οὐδὲ ὁ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λόγος ἀγνοεῖ, ψυχῆς δὲ καὶ σώματος οὐκ οἶδε
μεσότητας, οὐκ ἀχωρίστους ἐντελεχείας, οὐ φυσικὰς ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποστάσεις, οὐ δοξαστικὰς
ζωάς, οὐκ ὀρεκτικάς, οὐδὲ ἀλόγου ψυχῆς ὑπόστασιν ἰδιάζουσαν. διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ μέρους μὲν δέχομαι
τὸ Πρόκλειον τουτὶ κεφάλαιον, ἐκ μέρους δὲ ἀποπέμπομαι.
39 Psellos, Philosophicaminora II, 35 (119.16–20): πεπερασμένας μὲν γὰρ οὔσας καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων λογίων μεμάθηκα καὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ τὰς ἀπειρίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πεπερασμέ-
νοις καὶ ἀπείροις ἔγνωκα, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν χωριστὰ ὧν ταῦτα λέγεται οὔπω συνείληφα,
ἐπεὶ μηδὲ φύσιν ἔχει ὑποστῆναι ταῦτα καθ’ ἑαυτά.
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Psellos’ reactionhere is similar towhat onemight callNicholas’ “Aristotelian”
critique of Proclus’ tendency (as Nicholas sees it) to give reality to abstractions:
Thedivine is first limit and first infinity, the former since the onebothuni-
fies and holds together and limits all things, the latter since it is beyond all
andneither boundednor circumscribed, either by a certain being or by all
at the same time; besides the divine there is no other limit or infinity that
subsists itself in itself, but only these mere relations of reason and non-
existent imaginations that have a by-being (παρυφιστάμενα) in beings, and
that tend more to non-being than to being. For the limit of something is
neither that whole thing nor a part of it, but what remains beyond the
whole, such as the point of the line and the line of the surface and the
surface of the body. And how does non-being give subsistence to being?
And infinity is the privation of limit, but no privation, qua privation, is
subsistence-giver of something.40
Thus, Limit and Infinity are for Nicholas either divine names or mere abstrac-
tions; they are emphatically not independent productive principles.
Regarding Prop. 103, “all things are in all, but in a suitable way in each” (e.g.
“in being are both life and intellect, and in life are being and knowing, but in
one case noetically, in another case vitally, and in another case substantially”),
Psellos states that he “accepts it as understood in the concept of the philo-
sopher, because, since it holds neither falsely nor truly with our scriptures, it
is cleansed from dirt.”41 In other words, this Proclean principle is compatible
with Christian teaching even though it is not stated in scripture. It is an aspect
of Proclus’ teaching that Psellos can appropriate without reservation, and (as
we will see shortly) he employs this very proposition in one of his exegetical
works.
Finally, Psellos rejects the last proposition in the treatise, Prop. 109, which
concerns the way in which particulars on one level of reality can participate in
the universal principle of the immediately superior level either through their
own universal principle or through a particular member of the immediately
superior level.42 “In our scriptures,” Psellos says, “neither a universal soul nor
40 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of the Elements of Theology 90, 90.24–91.2.
41 Psellos, Philosophica minora II, 35 (119.21–25): Τὸ δὲ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ
(‘καὶ’ γάρ φησιν ‘ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου μὲν
νοερῶς, ὅπου δὲ ζωτικῶς, ὅπου δὲ οὐσιωδῶς’) ὡς φιλοσόφου ἐννοίας ἐχόμενον ἀποδέχομαι, ἐπεὶ
οὐδὲ τοῖς ἡμετέροις λογίοις οὔτε ψευδῶς οὔτε ἀληθῶς ἔχον λυμαίνεται.
42 E.g. a particular soul can participate in the universal principle Intellect either through the
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a universal nature besides the particulars is taught. So I refuse this chapter as
shown tobemoreGreek than true.”43Here againwe see a convergencebetween
Christian teaching and the Aristotelian critique of the separate existence of
forms or universals.While Psellos does notmake this convergence explicit, and
indeed might himself be disinclined to oppose the Platonist position on this
point, Nicholas for his part cites Aristotle more than once for this very pur-
pose.44
4 Proclus in Compilation (2): DeOmnifaria Doctrina
Before we consider Psellos’ use of Proclus in the Theologica, I need to say
something about his didactic compilation known as the De omnifaria doctrina
(Διδασκαλία παντοδαπή).45 This work, which survives in several redactions, was
initially composed for Constantine IX Monomachos, but a later version was
dedicated to Psellos’ pupil Michael VII Dukas. In Westerink’s edition the text
comprises two hundred and one brief chapters on a variety of topics: theology,
psychology, ethics, physics, physiology, astronomy, meteorology and cosmo-
graphy. Like someof the short treatises in the Philosophicaminora II considered
above, the De omnifaria doctrina is in large part a compilation of material from
other authors, especially Plutarch, Olympiodorus, and Proclus. In all, eighteen
chapters of the De omnifaria doctrina use material from about forty different
propositions of the Elements of Theology.
In the case of the isolated short treatises discussed earlier, we saw that
Psellos’ compilation of Proclean doctrine did not necessarily indicate his full
endorsement: such treatises could be understood in terms of pedagogical util-
ity, without necessarily displaying Psellos’ own philosophical commitments.
For several reasons, however, it seemsmore difficult to argue for a non-commit-
ted use of Proclus in the case of Psellos’De omnifaria doctrina. First of all, the
very fact of inclusionwithin a larger set of chapters confers greater significance
on any chapter that contains Proclean material: this inclusion suggests both
that this Procleanmaterial is safe and that itmerits a certain pedagogical prom-
inence. Second, in certain chapters it is clear that Psellos definitely endorses
universal principle Soul (which itself directly participates Intellect) or through the partic-
ular intellect with which it corresponds (and which also directly participates Intellect).
43 Philosophica minora II, 35 (119.30–33): παρὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἡμετέροις λογίοις οὔτε ὅλη ψυχὴ οὔτε
τις ὅλη φύσις παρὰ τὰς μερικὰς δεδογμάτισται. παραιτοῦμαι γοῦν τουτὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὡς Ἑλλη-
νικώτερον ἢ ἀληθέστερον ἐκφανθέν.
44 See Refutation of the Elements of Theology 60 and 184.
45 Ed.Westerink 1948.
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the Proclean material that is quoted or paraphrased, or even that this material
serves as a hermeneutical framework for discussing Christian themes. The res-
ulting impression is that Psellos’ system, while simpler than that of Proclus, is
more elaborate than the general Christian teaching of his day.
5 “To Interpret theWise ThingsWisely”: Proclus as an Exegetical
Resource
We turn now to Psellos’ use of Proclus in the Theologica. Whereas Psellos’
approach to Proclus’ Elements in the passages from the Philosophica minora
that we have considered may be described as quotation or compilation, some-
times with brief commentary, where Proclus’ philosophy itself is the object of
attention, by contrast, in the works collected as Theologica Proclus is not the
focus, but is introduced into Psellos’ exegesis of something else, whether scrip-
ture, liturgical poetry or Gregory of Nazianzus’s orations. I turn now to several
of these exegetical texts.
The two volumes of the Theologica contain a total of one hundred and fifty-
nine treatises, in seventeen of which, according to the indices, the Elements
of Theology is quoted or paraphrased. Many of Psellos’ citations of Proclus are
quite brief and incidental, having an illustrative or corroborative function, but
introduced only in passing and not dwelt upon or developed.46 Among those
46 Here I will summarize those not discussed in the body of this article. In Theologica I, 22
Psellos refers (lines 38–49) to Proclus’ hierarchy of things eternal in both substance and
activity, things temporal in both substance and activity, and the mediating level of things
eternal in substance but temporal in activity (cf. Elements of Theology 29 and 55). In Theo-
logica I, 53 (147–148) he refers to the intermediate position of soul in this hierarchy (cf.
Elements of Theology 191), and in II, 4 (42–43) and II, 5 (79) Psellos invokes the Proclean
principle that the soul is a mean or mediator between divisible and indivisible substance
(cf. Elements of Theology 190). In I, 54 (132–136) Psellos cites Proclus by name in regard
to the simultaneity of remaining, procession and return, in I, 57 (95–96) he refers to the
presence of causes in effects, and in I, 75 (86–88) he refers to the simultaneity of cause
and effect (cf. Elements of Theology 35). In I, 59 (112–113) he refers to the Proclean prin-
ciple of mediation (cf. Elements of Theology 132). In I, 64 (78–89) he invokes the Proclean
principle of degrees of receptivity and participation (cf. Elements of Theology 122). In II,
3 (146–147) and II, 29 (7) Psellos refers to God as transcending and giving being, life and
intellect (cf. Elements of Theology 115). In II, 18 (34), citing Proclus and the Elements expli-
citly, Psellos states that the Good and the One are identical (cf. Elements of Theology 13).
Finally, in II, 33 (9–17) Psellos cites Proclus’ distinction between perpetuity and etern-
ity as correlated to the categories of being and life respectively (cf. Elements of Theology
105).
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citations that are not simply incidental, several different modes or functions
are apparent, and I will now present four examples to illustrate thesemodes or
functions. Some of these examples also contain Psellos’ explicit indications of
Proclus’ function and what value he sets on his thought.
In Theologica I, 7, an exegesis of the verse in Proverbs 9:1, “wisdom built for
herself a house and supported it with seven pillars,” Psellos brings in material
from Propositions 103 and 195 as a way of explaining how it is that this verse
in Proverbs, a book that Psellos regards as predominantly ethical, can never-
theless have cosmological and theological meanings as well. Thus, according
to Psellos, the house that wisdom built may be understood (1) “ethically,” as the
soul in the scientific state, which is supported by the pillars of the sciences and
arts, or (2) “naturally,” as the cosmos built by the divine Logos, with the pillars
symbolizing the quasi-perpetual stability of the cosmos, or (3) “theologically,”
as the human nature assumed by the divineWord and supported by the pillars
of the virtues. The point of mentioning Proclus in this context is to offer ameta-
physical principle with hermeneutical consequences, a principle that explains
how a predominantly ethical text can have cosmological and theological signi-
ficance as well. One the one hand, Psellos says, Solomon is a
theologian in the Song, a physiologue in Ecclesiastes and simply a
chastening teacher in the Proverbs. […] But on the other hand […] he
mixes in theological teachings with physiology, and he mixes in natural
contemplations with theology, since he adds to the Proverbs sometimes
naturally, sometimes theologically, because “all things are in all things”
according to Proclus’ Elements of Theology, but on one level paradigmat-
ically, on another iconically, and on another according to existence.47
The phrase “all things are in all things” is drawn from Proposition 103, while
the qualifications “paradigmatically,” “iconically” and “existentially” are drawn
from Prop. 195. The point here seems to be that a text that may be ethical
“according to existence” (καθ’ ὕπαρξιν) while nevertheless “iconically” contain-
ing cosmological and theological truths as well.
47 Psellos,Theologica I, 7.38–47: ἐν μὲν τῷἌισματι θεολόγος ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῷἘκκλησιαστῇ φυσιο-
λόγος καὶ ἐν ταῖς Παροιμίαις παιδαγωγὸς ἀτεχνῶς ἐστι σωφρονιστής, τὸν δὲ ‘ἐν ἡμῖν παῖδα’, ἤτοι
τὴν ἄλογον καὶ νηπιώδηψυχήν, τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ἡγεμονίᾳ ὑποτιθεὶς καὶ σωφρονίζων τούτου τὸ ἄτακτον.
ἔστι δὲ ὅπῃ τῇ μὲν φυσιολογίᾳ θεολογικὰ ἐγκαταμίγνυσι δόγματα, τῇ δὲ θεολογίᾳ φυσικὰ θεω-
ρήματα, ὣς δὲ καὶ ταῖς Παροιμίαις νῦν μὲν φυσικῶς, νῦν δὲ πρόσεισι θεολογικῶς, ὅτι καὶ ‘πάντα
ἐν πᾶσι’ κατὰ τὴν θεολογικὴν τοῦ Πρόκλου Στοιχείωσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου μὲν παραδειγματικῶς, ὅπου
δὲ εἰκονικῶς, ὅπου δὲ καθ’ ὕπαρξιν.
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Psellos’ use of Proclus here contributes relatively little to the treatise, most
of which is taken up with distinguishing the predominant qualities of the four
books of Solomon and then with elaborating the sense of the verse in question
on the three levels already mentioned. The principle from Proclus, “all things
are in all things,” serves as the hinge of the discourse at the transition to this lat-
ter task. Of course, it is a commonplace of the patristic tradition that a textmay
havemultiple levels of meaning, and so onemight reasonably wonder whether
Psellos really needed Proclus at all here, given that in the Byzantine tradition
the notion of multivalence in the scriptures is entirely standard. But in any case
the passage shows the importance that Psellos ascribes to Proclus as an exegete
and as a resource for hermeneutical principles.48
The next text to consider is Theol. I, 11,49 in which Psellos interprets a verse
composed by John of Damascus, from the fifth ode of the canon for the feast of
the Transfiguration: “O Christ, whowith invisible hands have fashionedman in
your image, youdisplayed your archetypal beauty in thebody (or “created form”
= πλάσματι), not as in an image, but as you yourself are according to substance,
being both God and man.”50 After quoting portions of this text, Psellos states:
It is fitting to inquire what is the archetypal beauty, and how this is
manifested in the created forms (πλάσμασι), sometimes being depicted
in images, sometimes being shown according to substance, and howhere,
although the paradigm has come to be in the image, it is not manifested
according to the existence of the image, but is shown according to the
property of its own nature.51
It seems that Psellos wishes to understand the difference between the mani-
festation of divine beauty “in images,” such as occurred in the Old Testament
48 See Papaioannou 2013, p. 35 and 55.
49 Cf. Lauritzen (2012), who asserts that Gautier hasmisidentified Psellos’ citation of Proclus
as Elements of Theology 103, whereas, according to Lauritzen, the better parallel would be
Elements of Theology 71, which contains the terms ὑπέρτερα and ὑφείμενα. In fact, however,
these particular terms are less relevant than the principle stated in Elements of Theology
103 that “All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature.” Cf. also
Proclus’ application of this principle to the soul in Elements of Theology 195.
50 From Ode 5 of the Canon for the Transfiguration; text is in the Menaion (6 Aug), discussed
in Louth 2002, p. 268–274.
51 Psellos,Theologica I, 11.7–11: καὶ ζητεῖται εἰκότως τί τὸ ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος, ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο ἐμφαί-
νεται ἐν τοῖς πλάσμασι, νῦν μὲν εἰκονιζόμενον, νῦν δὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν δεικνύμενον, καὶ πῶς ἐνταῦθα
ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γενόμενον τὸ παράδειγμα οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἰκόνος ἐμφαίνεται ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὴν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἰδιότητα δείκνυται.
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theophanies, and the manifestation of God in the Incarnation, the distinctive-
ness of which was made preeminently apparent in the transfiguration on Mt.
Tabor. Before attempting to answer the questions he has posed, Psellos intro-
duces what he calls “two canons of philosophy” as interpretive tools that will
aid in answering these questions. This passage thus involves explicit reflection
by Psellos on his own hermeneutical method.
And so that we do not grasp the discourse in a careless way,52 and so that
we interpret the wise things wisely, the discourse must be referred to the
canons of philosophy, and from theremust be contributed the solution to
the problems under investigation; and I do not mean the philosophy that
is involved in nature—nature with which place, time, body and motion
co-subsist, nor do I mean that philosophy which has as its object the
unmoved forms that lie in conceptual thinking, which they call mathem-
atical, but Imean this philosophyof what lies above,which is unhypothet-
ical and foundational,53 which exists in pure and unmoved and dimen-
sionless forms; to it we who have geometrized must go, according to the
divine inscription of Plato.54 But whereas he [Plato] sends the theolo-
gizer to it through themathematical objects, Proclus, who received Plato’s
teachings, goingbeyond themathematical itself,55 composedanother Ele-
ments pertaining to theology. So he says somewhere in his chapters [τὰ
κεφάλαια, i.e. the Elements of Theology] that the higher things are in the
lower things and the lower things are in the higher things;56 but again, in
the writings where he Chaldaizes, he speaks in another way, saying con-
cerning the same things that on the one hand, the heavenly things are in
the earth in an earthly way (on the one hand, the higher things are in the
lower things as paradigms, and on the other hand, the lower things are
in the higher things as images), but on the other hand, the earthly things
are in heaven in a heavenly way. So then, following these two canons, we
will show that the paradigms that come to be in the images show their
own reflections in one way in relation to the nature of those [images],
but subsist in another way according to their own substance.57
52 I.e., the opposite of ἀκρίβεια.
53 Or “dealing with first principles.”
54 The inscription over the Academy: “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter.”
55 E.g. Euclid’s Elements.
56 Cf. Elements of Theology 103 and 195.
57 Psellos, Theologica I, 11.12–31: Καὶ ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς τοῦ λόγου ἁψώμεθα, τὰ σοφὰ δὲ σοφῶς ἑρμη-
νεύσωμεν, ἐπὶ τοὺς τῆς φιλοσοφίας κανόνας ἀνακτέον τὸν λόγον κἀκεῖθεν τοῖς ζητήμασι τὴν λύσιν
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The “two canons” are the two statements from Proclus. They are not to be
taken as twodifferent principles, apparently, but as two statements (the second
more elaborated) of the same principle concerning how a higher reality can be
in a lower reality, and vice versa.
But the wording of the second “canon” requires several comments. First, I
have provided here a slightly corrected text on the basis of the manuscript,
changing Gautier’s τὰ [δὲ] ὑψηλότερα to τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα: “on the one hand, the
higher things.”58 With the μὲν in place, it becomes easier to see that the order
of the sentence is quite awkward. The first and last elements of the sentence
(“the heavenly things are in the earth in an earthly way” and “the earthly things
are in heaven in a heavenly way”) are together a close paraphrase of a line in
Proclus’De sacrificio et magica:
[…] θαυμάσαντες τῷ βλέπειν ἔν τε τοῖς πρώτοις τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις
τὰ πρώτιστα, ἐν οὐρανῷ μὲν τὰ χθόνια κατ’ αἰτίαν καὶ οὐρανίως, ἔν τε γῇ τὰ
οὐράνια γηΐνως.
[…] being astonished by seeing the last things in the first things and the
first things in the last things, the earthly things in heaven in a causalmode
and aheavenly fashion, the heavenly things in the earth in an earthly fash-
ion.59
ἐρανιστέον· φιλοσοφίας δέ φημι οὐ ταύτης δὴ τῆς περὶ τὴν φύσιν εἱλουμένης, ᾗ δὴ τόπος καὶ χρό-
νος καὶ σῶμα καὶ κίνησις παρυφίσταται, οὔτε αὖ ἐκείνης, ἥτις ἀκίνητα μὲν ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ
δὲ κείμενα, ἣν δὴ μαθηματικὴν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης ταύτην, τῆς ἀρχοειδοῦς καὶ
ἀνυποθέτου, τῆς ἐν καθαροῖς εἴδεσι καὶ ἀκινήτοις καὶ ἀδιαστάτοις· πρὸς ἣν δεῖ γεωμετρήσαντας
ἡμᾶς ἰέναι κατὰ τὸ θεῖον γράμμα τοῦ Πλάτωνος. ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπὶ ταύτην
παραπέμπει τὸν θεολογήσοντα, ὁ δέ γε τὰ ἐκείνου διαδεξάμενος Πρόκλος καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν μαθη-
ματικὴν ὑπερβάς, ἑτέραν Στοιχείωσιν πρὸς θεολογίαν συντίθησι. λέγει γοῦν που τῶν κεφαλαίων
αὐτοῦ ὡς καὶ τὰ ὑπέρτερα ἔνεισι τοῖς ὑφειμένοις καὶ τὰ ὑφειμένα τοῖς ὑπερτέροις· ἀλλὰ πάλιν
ἐν οἷς Χαλδαΐζει ἄλλον τρόπον φησί, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγων, ὡς τὰ μὲν οὐράνια ἐν γῇ χθονίως
εἰσί (τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα παραδειγματικῶς ἐν τοῖς καταδεεστέροις, τὰ δὲ ταπεινότερα εἰκονικῶς
ἐν τοῖς ὑπ[ερτέροις), τὰ δὲ] χθόνια ἐν οὐρανῷ οὐρανίως. τούτοις γοῦν τοῖς δυσὶ κανόσιν ἑπόμενοι
δείξομεν ὅπως τὰ παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι γινόμενα πῇ μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων φύσιν τὰς ἐμφά-
σεις ἑαυτῶν δεικνύουσι,πῇ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν ὑφίστανται. I have added parentheses and
made minor changes to Gautier’s text. See further discussion below.
58 At the end of a line, just after χθονίως εἰσί τὰ and just before ὑψηλότερα, there is a hole in
the parchment. Gautier has supplied the word δὲ here in brackets. It seems, however, that
the scribe wrote the text when the hole was already there (so that no text is missing), and
in addition, one can also discern a μὲν just after the hole. Hence, τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα etc. I
am grateful to Stratis Papaioannou for examining the manuscript with me and making
this clear.
59 Ed. Bidez 1928, 148.8–9. Bidez gives further references to Proclus in his apparatus. I am
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In Psellos’ citation, however, the material from De sacrificio is awkwardly
interrupted by the two middle elements: “on the one hand the higher things
are in the lower things as paradigms, and on the other hand, the lower things
are in the higher things as images.” I have added parentheses in the passage to
mark this as an interruption.
Furthermore, for those familiar with Proclus’ thought it is clear that the
middle two elements present Proclus as speaking in a way that he never speaks
elsewhere: in other Proclean texts, “paradigmatically” (παραδειγματικῶς)
always describes either how the lower “is in” the higher or how the higher
“is” the lower; likewise, “iconically” (εἰκονικῶς) always describes either how the
higher “is in” the lower or how the lower “is” the higher.60 In Psellos’ citation,
however, this usage has been inverted, and as a result, the passage gives the
impression that Proclus is speaking of four distinct modes, i.e. two ways in
which the higher can be in the lower, and two ways in which the lower can
be in the higher.
Howarewe to explain this inversion of Proclus’ terminology?Wemust reject
the supposition that Psellos intentionally confused the terms or failed to grasp
the distinction, for he is a careful student of Proclus. Either he overlooked the
mistake, or (perhaps more likely) the text was corrupted at a later date. In any
case, if we correct the middle two elements so that they conform to Proclus’
usual usage, and thenmove them to the end on the assumption that they func-
tion as a gloss interrupting the outer two elements, then the whole becomes
more comprehensible:
grateful to Dominic O’Meara for the identification of this source, and for additional help
in understanding this passage.
60 Cf. Elements of Theology 195, 170.4–5: “Every soul is all things, paradigmatically the things of
sense, and iconically the intelligible things” (Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδει-
γματικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά, εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά.). Note that here “paradigmatically” is used
to describe the way that the higher “is” (not “is in”) the lower, and “iconically” is used for
the way the lower “is” (not “is in”) the higher. On the other hand, when Proclus elsewhere
speaks of one thing being “in” another “paradigmatically,” he is speaking of the relation of
the lower to thehigher, andnot, as it seems inTheologica I, 11, of the higher to the lower. For
example, see In Tim. I, 8.19: “and in the mathematicals both exist, the firsts iconically, the
thirds paradigmatically” (καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἀμφότερά ἐστιν, εἰκονικῶς μὲν τὰ πρῶτα,
παραδειγματικῶς δὲ τὰ τρίτα), or again, see In Tim. I, 13.10: “the sensibles are in the intel-
ligibles paradigmatically and the intelligibles are in the sensibles iconically” (διότι καὶ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐστι παραδειγματικῶς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἰκονικῶς·). This
is the opposite of how he speaks in the passage in Theologica I, 11 that we are considering.
If one took Psellos’ citation here for a model, one would expect Proclus to put it the other
way round in his commentary on the Timaeus, and to say that “the intelligibles are in the
sensibles paradigmatically.”
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τὰ μὲν οὐράνια ἐν γῇ χθονίως εἰσί, [τὰ δὲ] χθόνια ἐν οὐρανῷ οὐρανίως. τὰ μὲν
ὑψηλότερα εἰκονικῶς ἐν τοῖς καταδεεστέροις, τὰ δὲ ταπεινότερα παραδειγμα-
τικῶς ἐν τοῖς ὑπ[ερτέροις].61
on the one hand, the heavenly things are in the earth in an earthly way,
and on the other hand, the earthly things are in heaven in a heavenly
way; [for] on the one hand, the higher things are in the lower things as
images, and on the other hand, the lower things are in the higher things
as paradigms.
Neither this postponement of the middle elements nor the transposition of
εἰκονικῶς and παραδειγματικῶς have any support in the manuscript; neverthe-
less this arrangement does seem to make the most sense of the text, and the
transposition at least is necessary if this citation is to be consistent with Pro-
clus’ known writings.
Fortunately for ourpurposes, Psellos’ exegesis doesnot seemtodependupon
the inversion of the two adverbs, nor, consequently, doesmy explanation of his
exegesis depend on my proposed emendation, so long as it is clear that the
second “canon,” while more elaborate, still only involves two modes, namely
that by which the higher is in the lower, and that by which the lower is in
the higher. While Psellos’ initial statement of the questions to be addressed
might lead one to expect that he will enlist Proclus to explain the difference
between manifestation “in an image” and manifestation “according to sub-
stance,” it turns out that Psellos seems to employ the Proclean canons only
in order to introduce the general principles of how archetypes or paradigms
(higher realities) are manifested in images (lower realities) according to the
mode or level of the images. Psellos uses Proclus’ canons (or canon) in order to
mark the distance between the paradigm and the image, so that, having done
so, he may put into stark relief the distinctiveness of the Incarnation as that
event in which the paradigm fully descends into the image.
Psellos wishes to show the difference between, on the one hand, the great
variety of ways in which God manifested himself prior to the Incarnation, and
on the other hand, the unique way in which he showed himself in the Incarn-
ation, and specifically in the Transfiguration. He explains the former category
61 I would like to thank Dominic O’Meara, Carlos Steel and Stratis Papaioannou for their
help with this passage. O’Meara identified the parallel in De sacrificio, Steel confirmedmy
conviction thatπαραδειγματικῶς and εἰκονικῶς are transposed and also noted the awkward
interruption of the two middle elements, and Papaioannou assisted me in examining the
manuscript and correcting aspects of Gautier’s reading.
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first of all in terms of the universality of creaturely participation in God. This
participation is diverse, according to the receptivity of the creature, and thus
Godmay bemanifest in oneway to the angels and in another to human beings:
For the illuminations sent from the One, being images of its substance,
appear in one way in the higher orders but in another in the lower
[orders]. And so, in all these the divine is beheld, not according to sub-
stance, but in certain images and in […] faint and obscure tracks, since
there is no generated nature that is able to contain God’s substance.62
Thus, if God is seen as shining amber or as a wheel (two of Psellos’ examples),
this is not because these images are adequate to God’s essence, but rather,
since the nature of the beholders was unable to contain the substance of
the divine, it appeared to them in those forms which in fact they were
able to see; for the diminishment of the images is not from the side of
the nature of the divine, but from the weakness of the beholders […].We
depict God in images because he is not embodied so that he might be
entirely visible to us [literally: “fall under our whole eyes”], but is wholly
uncircumscribable and invisible.63
The point to grasp is that while these are genuinemanifestations of the divine,
they nevertheless involve a kind of diminution or transposition in accord-
ance with creaturely capacity. The case is different with the Transfiguration,
however, for when theWord of God became incarnate, he
dwelt substantially with his own image, not shining his theophany on us,
but making our nature subsist substantially with his own person. Hence-
forth therefore thepurebeauty is hiddenunder the assumption, and since
it was necessary that sometime this [beauty] be seen by the creature as
62 Theologica I, 11.41–47: αἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλλάμψεις πεμπόμεναι, εἰκόνες τῆς ἐκείνου οὐσίας
τυγχάνουσαι, ἄλλως μὲν ταῖς ὑπερτέραις {οὐσίαις} ἰνδάλλονται τάξεσιν, ἄλλως δὲ ταῖς ὑφειμέ-
ναις. ἐν πάσαις γοῦν ταύταις οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὁρᾶται τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλ’ ἐν εἰκόσι τισὶ καὶ ἐν [……] μασι
καὶ λεπτοτάτοις καὶ ἀμυδροῖς ἴχνεσιν, ἐπεὶ μηδ’ ἔστι τις γεννητὴ φύσις οὐσίαν χωρῆσαι δυναμένη
θεοῦ.
63 Theologica I, 11.59–80: ἀλλ’ ἐπειδήπερ ἡ τῶν θεωμένων φύσις χωρεῖν τοῦ θείου τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδύ-
νατος ἦν, ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐμφαντάζεται ἃ δὴ καὶ ἰδεῖν δεδύνηνται· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν
τοῦ θείου φύσιν ἡ τῶν εἰκόνων ἐλάττωσις, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ὁρώντων ἀσθένειαν. […] ἐν εἰκόνι
τοῦτον καὶ σκιαῖς φανταζόμεθα· τὸν δὲ θεὸν καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκονιζόμεθα, ὅτι μὴ σεσωμάτωται, ἵν’
ὅλοις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν ὑποπέσῃ, ἀλλ’ ὅλος ἐστὶν ἀπερίληπτος καὶ ἀόρατος.
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though from somemirror, he prepared Tabor as a limit for himself in rela-
tion to this […]. Moses and Elijah appear to him, who […] foreshadowed
his descent iconically so that, what they saw in shadows, this also they
might see shining truly.64
The “archetypal beauty,” according to Psellos, is “the truly flashing of the pure
hypostasis of the Son.”65
[…] having the whole divinity that is in the Father and in the Spirit, the
Son came down, and hypostatizing our whole nature with his filial hypo-
stasis through his body, by his divinity he mixed and joined together
divided things, i.e. humanity and divinity, through his one hypostasis.
For since the Son is one hypostasis, he had the divinity of Father and
Spirit indivisibly in this [hypostasis], and he united man to his own
hypostasis—not this or thatman, but thewhole nature—and in fact alto-
gether united this with the divinity.66
It is as though the archetype descended to the level of its image, wholly unit-
ing that image with itself. While one might have expected that Psellos would
employ Proclus’ ‘canons’ in order to explicate God’s distinctive manifestation
in the Incarnation, it seems that in fact the role of Proclus is limited here to elu-
cidating the usual or ‘normal’ modes of divine manifestation, precisely so that
the entirely new character of the Incarnation may be made plain. By elucidat-
ing the structure of manifestation “in images,” Psellos shows how, in the usual
order of things, images always fall far short of their paradigms. The starkness
of the polarity (paradigm/image) then serves as the backdrop for something
64 Theologica I, 11.84–93: ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν εἰκόνα οὐσιωδῶς κεχώρηκεν, οὐκ ἐλλάμψας ἡμῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ
θεοφάνειαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ προσώπῳ οὐσιωδῶς τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ὑποστησάμενος. τέως μὲν
οὖν ἐκρύπτετο τὸ ἀκήρατον κάλλος ὑπὸ τὸ πρόσλημμα, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔδει ποτὲ οἷον ἀπό τινος δίσκου
ἐναυγάσαι τοῦτο τῷ πλάσματι, ὄρος μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἡτοίμαστο τὸ Θαβώριον, […]Μωυσῆς
αὐτῷ καὶ Ἠλίας ἐμ[φ]αίνονται, οἱ […] τὴν τούτου κάθοδον εἰκονικῶς προτυπώσαντες, ἵν’ ὃν ἐν
σκιαῖς [εἶδον], τοῦτον καὶ ἀληθῶς θεάσωνται λάμποντα·
65 Theologica I, 11.98–99: ἀρχέτυπον δὲ κάλλος ἡ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ὑποστάσεως ἀκήρατος τῷ ὄντι μαρ-
μαρυγή.
66 Theologica I, 11.118–126: ὅλην γοῦν ἔχων τὴν θεότητα τὴν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι κατε-
λήλυθεν ὁ υἱός, καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει τῇ υἱικῇ ὅλην τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν διὰ τοῦ κυριακοῦ
ὑποστησάμενος σώματος, κατέμιξε τῇ θεότητι καὶ συνῆψε τὰ διεστῶτα, ἀνθρωπότητά φημι καὶ
θεότητα, διὰ τῆς μιᾶς αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσεως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ μία τυγχάνων ὑπόστασις ὁ υἱός, ἀμερίστως
ἐν ταύτῃ τήν τε πατρικὴν εἶχε θεότητα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος, ἥνωσε δὲ καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστά-
σει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ τόνδε ἢ τόνδε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, πάντως δήπου καὶ τῇ θεότητι τοῦτον
συνήνωσε.
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like a collapsing of this polarity: the paradigm (Christ the archetypal beauty)
is united with its image (humanity) in such a way (namely, according to sub-
stance) that, nevertheless, no reduction of the paradigmhas occurred.That this
is so is the revelation of Tabor, showing forth Christ the eternal Son in all his
glory.
In Theol. I, 11 Psellos thus seems to rely upon Proclus’ precision in order to
give an explanation inphilosophical termsof a principle that is sharedbetween
Christianity and Neoplatonism, namely the image/paradigm relationship or
(put in other terms) the fact that God is manifest in creation itself and in
‘theophanies,’ yet “through a glass darkly.” Psellos does not confine himself to
this common ground, however, but deals forthrightly with the mystery of the
Incarnation, conceiving of it as a “substantial” descent of the archetype into the
image, yet without raising the question of whether Proclus himself could have
admitted this possibility.Theol. I, 11 thus represents a substantial (i.e. notmerely
incidental or ornamental) use of Proclus in which Psellos neither transgresses
the bounds of orthodoxy nor sees a need to point out differences between
Proclean and Christian teaching.
My remaining two examples, however, seem to involve genuine doctrinal
conflict, partially acknowledged by Psellos in the first case, and unacknow-
ledged in the second.
In Theol. I, 105 Psellos explicitly refers to Proclus’ teaching on the doctrinal
question being considered, but then explicitly rejects that teaching. The con-
text is a discussion by Psellos of the two different senses that the adjective
anarchos, “unoriginate,” may have in Christian theology. Having noted that the
Father is “unoriginate” in two senses, both as not begotten (ἀτέκτου) and as
not generated (ἀγεννήτου),67 whereas the Son and Spirit are “unoriginate” only
67 Theologica I, 105, 416.75–84: “ ‘Father,’ he says, ‘the father and unoriginate; for [he is] not
from something.’ For the sense of anarchos is double, applied on the one hand to the atek-
tos, and on the other to the agennetos. And the agennetos is, both according to the outside
philosophers and according to us, what does not have an older hypostasis than its own
existence; for in this way the philosopher Simplicius, interpreting the De caelo of Aris-
totle, defines the agennetos. Nothing therefore among beings is agennetos, except the One
for them, andGod for the Jews, and for us the triadic hypostasis commonly and the Father
individually. For the others are generated (γεννᾶται), some from each other, some from the
first cause, and so in this way Greeks produce (γεννῶσι) soul from intellect, and intellect
from being, and being from the one.” (‘Πατήρ’ φησίν ‘ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἄναρχος· οὐ γὰρ ἔκ τινος’.
διττὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀνάρχου σημασία, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀτέκτου φερομένη, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου. ἀγέν-
νητον δέ ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἔξω φιλοσόφους καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ἔχον πρεσβυτέραν ὑπόστασιν
τῆς ἰδίας ὑπάρξεως· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος Σιμπλίκιος τὴν Περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείαν ἐξηγούμε-
νος τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὡρίσατο τὸ ἀγέννητον. οὐδὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἀγέννητον, εἰ μὴ παρ’ ἐκείνοις
τὸ ὂν [Gautier: scr. ἓν?] καὶ παρ’ Ἰουδαίοις θεὸς καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν κοινῶς μὲν ἡ τριαδικὴ ὑπόστασις,
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in the second sense, as not generated, Psellos then cites an axiom from Por-
phyry’s Sententiae that he had also considered and rejected in Phil. min. II, 35,
namely the claim that “everything that generates generates something inferior
to its own substance.”68 He suggests that this claim derives from the assump-
tion of a hierarchy inwhich “theOne generates Being, Being generates Intellect,
and Intellect generates Soul,” and he summarizes part of Proclus’ proof of the
same claim (though expressed in different terms) in Prop. 7 of the Elements,
calling him here “the most philosophical Proclus.” Proclus had expressed Por-
phyry’s claim as follows: “Every productive cause is superior to the nature of
what is produced,” and he began his proof with a tri-lemma that Psellos para-
phrases: “for either […] things that generate will generate something similar
to themselves or something inferior to themselves or something superior to
themselves.”69 Curiously, while Psellos reports Proclus’ refutation of the possib-
ility that one thingmight generate something superior to itself, he conveniently
ἰδίως δὲ ὁ πατήρ. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννᾶται, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· οὕτω
γοῦνἝλληνες ψυχὴν μὲν ἀπὸ νοῦ γεννῶσι, νοῦν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ ὂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνός.) It seems
that Psellos’ philosophical sources have led him to ignore the patristic convention, from
around the time of Nicaea, of reserving agennetos (with two ‘nu’s) for the Father, in the
sense of unbegotten, while agenetos (with one ‘nu’) could apply to the whole Trinity, as
uncreated. The loss of this distinction here is perhaps a sympton of the difficulty in apply-
ing the features of an emanative system to theChristian vision of reality,where neither the
idea of creation nor the intra-trinitarian relationships correspond exactly to the features
of an emanative continuum. Cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, I: “Now, one ought
to know that ἀγένητον written with one ν means that which has not been created, or, in
other words, that which is unoriginated; while ἀγέννητον written with two ν’s means that
which has not been begotten. Therefore, the first meaning implies a difference in essence,
for it means that one essence is uncreated, or ἀγένητος; with one ν, while some other is
created, or originated. On the other hand, the second meaning does not imply any dif-
ference in essence, because the first individual substance of every species of living being
is unbegotten but not unoriginated. For they were created by the Creator, being brought
into existence by His Word. But they were certainly not begotten, because there was no
other like substance pre-existing from which they might have been begotten. Thus, the
first meaning applies to all three of the super-divine Persons of the sacred Godhead, for
they are uncreated and of the same substance. On the other hand, the second meaning
definitely does not apply to all three, because the Father alone is unbegotten in so far as
He does not have His being from another person. And only the Son is begotten, for He
is begotten of the substance of the Father without beginning and independently of time.
And only the Holy Ghost proceeds: not begotten, but proceeding from the substance of
the Father. Such is the teaching of sacred Scripture, but as to the manner of ’the begetting
and the procession, this is beyond understanding” (trans. Chase 1958, p. 181–182).
68 Theologica I, 105.86: πᾶν τὸ γεννῶν χεῖρον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίᾳ γεννᾷ; cf. Philosophica minora II,
35 (120.3–4).
69 Theologica I, 105.89–90: ἤ,γάρφησιν, ὅμοια γεννήσει τὰ γεννῶνταἑαυτοῖς ἢ χείρονα ἢ κρείττονα.
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omits Proclus’ denial that one thing could produce another that is like or equal
to itself. Yet this in fact is precisely the position that Psellos, as an orthodox trin-
itarian, wishes to maintain, and so he asserts, just as Nicholas of Methone will,
that Prop. 7 simply is not applicable to the Trinity:
But in regard to the divine generation this philosophical theory is non-
sense; for the Father has not begotten a Sonwho is inferior to himself, but
onewho is equal to himself. And if someonewishes to live philosophically
by reason, hemight say that this theological saying of the Greeks holds in
the case of those things that generate and are generated where the one
that generates is older by time than the one that is generated; but for us
no age, still less time, intervenes between Father and Son, and because of
this the Begotten is not inferior to the Father.70
Psellos certainly recognizes the problem that this fundamental Proclean prin-
ciple raises vis-à-vis Christian doctrine, but he seems to avoid dealing with Pro-
clus’ argument in detail, dismissing the entire proposition as only pertinent to
generation in time. This is perhaps disingenuous onhis part, for he surely knows
that Proclus’ proposition intends to describe a non-temporal truth. Indeed, in
an important sense, asNicholaswill later point out, it is demonstrably false that
in time-bound generation the cause is superior to the effect, for it is character-
istic of natural generation that the offspring are fully equal in nature or species
to their progenitors: humans beget humans, horses beget horses, and so forth.71
I turn now tomy final example of Psellos’ use of Proclus’Elements.Whereas,
in the passage just discussed, Psellos takes pains to limit the application of a
Proclean principle so that it will not conflict with orthodox doctrine, in Theol.
I, 62 we find that Psellos not only uses Proclus in a substantive way, but even
thoroughly integrates problematic Proclean structures into his own exposition
of the topic, doing so with no hint of disagreement.
The treatise concerns a line fromGregory of Nazianzus’sOration 14, “On the
Love of the Poor,” which I provide here in its context:
What is this wisdom that concerns me? And what is this great mystery?
Or is it God’s will that we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down
from above, not become exalted and lifted up on account of this dignity,
and so despise our creator? Or is it not rather that, in our struggle and
70 Psellos, Theologica I, 105.95–96; cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of the Elements of
Theology, ch. 7.
71 Cf. Nicholas, Refutation of the Elements of Theology, chs. 18, 25 and 151.
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battle with the body, we should always look to him, so that this veryweak-
ness that has been yoked to us might be an education concerning our
dignity?72
Psellos is concerned with the phrase, “we who are a portion of God that has
flowed down from above.” He divides it into two parts, first considering the
words, “portion of God,” and later the words, “flowed down from above.” Psel-
los imagines that someone might ask how we are “a portion of God,” given the
corporeal connotations of this language. He observes that while thinking of
corporeal ‘parts’ of Godmight be consonant with the perspective of the Stoics,
both the older Academy and the new [Academy] agree explicitly that the
divine, whatever it is, is incorporeal, creator of bodies and souls and intel-
lects. And our philosophy as well, following them in fact, lays it down
clearly that nothing among beings is like it. How then does this great one,
speaking concerning men, say that these are a portion of the greater?73
In effect, though without citing it explicitly, Psellos provides as an answer an
extended meditation on Prop. 1 of the Elements: “Every manifold participates
in someway theOne.”His eventual answer to thequestionposed is thatweare a
“portion” of God becausewe each after our fashion participate in theOne, as do
all things. “If someonewould approach [the saying] philosophically,” he begins,
“using the division of Plato, then he would discover how the truth is hidden.
That nothing among beings is purely one, then, philosophers and noble men
are agreed.” Psellos proceeds to argue in very Proclean terms that everything
short of the unique and transcendent One is not purely one: not matter, not
form, not soul, not intellect, not being, not unification, and not henads. It is a
remarkable passage, worth quoting at length:
[…] for matter is immediately indefinite; for this reason you can keep on
cutting it to infinity. And form, plunged into misery with matter and suf-
72 Τίς ἡ περὶ ἐμὲ σοφία καὶ τί τὸ μέγα τοῦτο μυστήριον; ἢ βούλεται μοῖραν ἡμᾶς ὄντας Θεοῦ καὶ
ἄνωθεν ῥεύσαντας, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ μετεωριζόμενοι καταφρονῶμεν τοῦ κτί-
σαντος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάλῃ καὶ μάχῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀεὶ βλέπειν, καὶ τὴν συνεζευγμένην
ἀσθένειαν παιδαγωγίαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀξιώματος; Trans. Constas 2014, p. 75.
73 Theologica I, 62.19–24: οἱ δ’ἀπὸ τῆςἈκαδημίας τῆς τε πρεσβυτέρας καὶ τῆς νέας ἀσώματον διαρ-
ρήδην τὸ θεῖον, ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ὡμολόγησαν, σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν καὶ νόων δημιουργόν. τούτοις
δὴ καὶ ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία συνεπομένη αὐτά τε σαφῶς διατάττεται καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
ἐκείνῳ προσείκασται. πῶς οὖν οὗτος ὁ μέγας περὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλεγόμενος ἀπόμοιραν τούτους
εἶπε τοῦ κρείττονος;
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fering all things through it, is changed from its name of being one. But
in fact even soul, keeping itself beyondmatter, has a confused andmulti-
powered nature, but it is not free from separation; so it does not have the
forms of beings in a concentrated form, but unrolls them, going from the
premises to the conclusions. And the intellect has a certain reflection of
the One, as also ancient philosophy says, not separated, and not seeing
another through another intermediate, but it gathers the forms of beings
together in itself in a compacted way. Yet it is also many; for the intellect
is the beings themselves, which in fact are many, but it intellects itself,
and in intellecting itself it intellects beings, and the beings are many; and
therefore the intellect is many. But if it is many, then what else would
exceed so as not to be many? Yes, he says, but being exceeds intellect;
however far intellect extends, so too does being; but the converse is not
the case, that however far being extends, so too does intellect. For asmany
things as are intellects or have an intellect, these are also beings; but as
many things as are beings, not all of these also intellect (νοεῖ). But [then]
the argument proceeds of itself; for if beinghas thepower overmany, then
it is not in fact purely one, but even beyond these is unification, and uni-
fication is a union either of henads or of composites, so that this too is
many. What then would someone say concerning the henads? For is not
each of these one? How would a henad not be one? But because of this,
O good man, it is not one, because it is a henad; for the One transcends;
but that which something transcends is not purely that to which it is sub-
ordinated.74
74 Theologica I, 62.28–49: ἥ τε γὰρ ὕλη εὐθὺς ἄπειρος. διὸ καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἄπει-
ρον τομή, τό τε εἶδος τῇ ὕλῃ συνδυαστὸν καὶ παντοπαθὲς διὰ ταύτην γενόμενον τῆς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι
προσηγορίας ἀπήλλακται. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ψυχή, ὑπὲρ τὴν ὕλην ἑαυτὴν στήσασα, πολυμιγὴς καὶ
πολυδύναμος πέφυκεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἀπήλακται διαστάσεως· ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἔχει τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων
συνεσπειραμένως, ἀλλ’ ἀνελίττει ταῦτα, ἀπὸ τῶν προτάσεων χωροῦσα ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. ὁ δὲ
νοῦς ἔχει μέν τινα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔμφασιν, ὡς καὶ ἡ ἀρχαία φιλοσοφία φησίν, οὐ διιστάμενος, οὐδὲ δι’
ἄλλου μέσου ὁρῶν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰσυνεπτυγμένως τὰ τῶν ὄντων εἴδη ἐν ἑαυτῷ συλλαβών.πλὴν ἀλλὰ
καὶ οὗτος πολλά· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὁ νοῦς, ἃ δὴ πολλά εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὗτος ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοῶν
τὰ ὄντα νοεῖ, τὰ δὲ ὄντα πολλά· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἄρα πολλά. εἰ δ’ οὗτος πολλά, τί ἂν ἄλλο ὑπερβαίη ὥστε
μὴ εἶναι πολλά; ναί, φησίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὂν τὸν νοῦν ὑπερπέπτωκεν· ἐφ’ ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὸ ὄν,
ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἃ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὁ νοῦς· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ νόες εἰσὶν ἢ νοῦν ἔχει, καὶ ὄντα εἰσίν· ὅσα δὲ ὄντα
τυγχάνει, οὐ δήπου πάντα καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλ’ αὐτόθεν ὁ λόγος ἔρχεται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἔχει τὴν
δύναμιν, οὐ δήπου ἕν ἐστι καθαρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἕνωσις, ἡ δ’ ἕνωσις ἢ ἑνάδων ἢ συνθέ-
των συναθροισμός, ὥστε καὶ αὕτη πολλά. τί δ’ ἂν εἴποι τις περὶ τῶν ἑνάδων; ἆρα γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτων
ἑκάστη ἕν; πῶς οὖν ἑνάς; ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο, ὦ λῷστε, οὐχ ἕν, διότι ἑνάς· ὑπερβέβηκε γὰρ τὸ ἕν· ὃ δὲ
ὑπερβέβηκέ τι, οὐ καθαρῶς ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὗ ὑφεῖται.
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Psellos introduces the passage by speaking of “the division of Plato,” and per-
haps he has Plato’s divided line inmind. But in fact Psellos here follows Proclus’
Elements in several particulars, reflecting much of the content of Propositions
20–22 (especially 20), as regards the increasing causal scope in the ascending
series: soul, intellect, being, one. It is a striking passage of philosophical ascent,
but also surprising, for whereas Psellos often simplifies the Neoplatonic hier-
archy, here it is notable and puzzling that Psellos retains the distinctive term
“henads” without any explanation or qualification. Here if anywhere Psellos
seems to be stepping outside the bounds of orthodoxy. He concludes the pas-
sage thus:
So, since the divine is something other than beings, it is uniquely one,
whereas being and intellect are called one according to secondary and
tertiary senses. But on the one hand, being itself truly what it is called, it
exists in an unmixed way in relation to the opposed; for it is purely one,
and [is] being in the proper sense, and inviolate and blessed intellect.75
Psellos then gives the complementary conclusion as well: only the One is truly
one, but for this very reason we must also affirm that all things participate in
the One:
but if something among other things is called one, then it is named one
and is one by virtue of its participation in that One. And so, the great
father here calls “portion” that which those who belong to the outside
[i.e. pagan] philosophy called imparting and participation. For it seems to
many thatmanhas his subsistence fromsoul andbody alone, and they say
that he is “intellectual” because the intellect is the most sovereign part of
the soul. But tomeand thosewho rightly philosophized, the intellect both
is and is called something other than the soul. And just as the body both
lives and is moved by its participation in soul, so also the soul intellects
by its participation in intellect; and where there is intellect, there also is
being; and where there is being, there also is the One. The result is that
although we subsist by participation in the One, nevertheless God is con-
75 Theologica I, 62.50–53:Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ θεῖον ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὄντα, ἕν ἐστι μόνως κατὰ δευτέρους καὶ
τρίτους λόγους καὶ ὂν καὶ νοῦς καλούμενος. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μέν, αὐτὸ δὴ ὅπερ λέγεται, ἀμιγῶς ἔχει
πρὸς τὸ ἀντίθετον· εἰλικρινῶς τε γάρ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ κυρίως ὂν καὶ νοῦς ἀκήρατος καὶ μακάριος […]
This is more Dionysian than Proclean, insofar as Dionysius identifies the One, Being and
Intellect in a transcendent sense in God, whereas Proclus preserves a hierarchy of theOne
over Being and Intellect.
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fessed as “One” properly speaking, so that we have acquired images and
reflections of God in ourselves, because of which we are in fact “a portion
of God.” But we were once one, not in nature, but in identity of inclina-
tion andmotion;76 for the one in us agrees with our being, and this agrees
with the intellect, and this agrees with the soul, and this agrees with the
body; or rather, so that I may speak more precisely, the body followed the
soul, and this followed the things that went beyond it and the One itself,
and by means of soul, intellect and being the body was led up to the One
and was itself one by participation.77
“We were once one,” but Psellos proceeds to recount the fragmenting effects of
the Fall.
This is how it was formerly; but when the soul cast off its iconic beauty,
turning its back on the divine command, then the divine series itself was
torn asunder, and because the impartations were not distributed accord-
ing to the analogy of the existence, the parts were torn asunder, the
wholeness became a part, and the commonality became a great quant-
ity. Because of this Christ is named “corner stone,” and he was unified by
means of soul so that he might join together the extremes, i.e. One and
body, and so that we might become spirit, intellect and god, with “death
being swallowed up in” and giving way to “life.”78
76 Cf. Gregory,Or. 29.2, when speaking of the Trinity: γνώμης σύμπνοια, καὶ ταὐτότης κινήσεως.
77 Theologica I, 62.53–72: τῶν δ’ ἄλλων εἴ τι οὕτως λέγεται, κατὰ μετοχὴν ἐκείνου ἔστι τε καὶ ὀνο-
μάζεται. ἣν οὖν οἱ τῆς ἔξω φιλοσοφίας μετάδοσιν καὶ μετοχὴν κατωνόμασαν, μοῖραν ἐνταῦθα ὁ
μέγας πατὴρ προσηγόρευσε. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐκ ψυχῆς μόνης καὶ σώματος ὁ ἄνθρωπος δοκεῖ
τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν· ἔννουν δὲ αὐτόν φασιν εἶναι, ὡς τοῦ νοῦ μέρους τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῆς ψυχῆς
τυγχάνοντος. ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς κυρίως φιλοσοφήσασιν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ νοῦς ἔστι καὶ
λέγεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς μετουσίᾳ ζῇ τε καὶ κινεῖται, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ παρουσίᾳ
νοεῖ· ὅπου δὲ νοῦς, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ὄν· ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ὄν, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἕν. ὥστ’ εἰ καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐν μετοχῇ
καθέσταμεν, ἀλλ’ ἓν κυρίως ὡμολόγηται ὁ θεός, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἐμφά-
σεις κεκτήμεθα, δι’ ἃ δὴ καὶ μοῖρα τυγχάνομεν τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἀλλ’ ἦμεν ποτὲ ἓν οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ
τὴν ταὐτότητα τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῶν κινήσεων· ὡμολόγει γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὄντι, καὶ
τοῦτο τῷ νῷ, καὶ οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῷ σώματι· μᾶλλον δέ, ἵνα τἀκριβέστερον εἴπω, τὸ μὲν
σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ εἵπετο, ἐκείνη δὲ τοῖς ὑπερβεβηκόσι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνί, διὰ δὲ μέσης ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ
καὶ ὄντος καὶ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἀναγόμενον καὶ αὐτὸ ἓν ἦν κατὰ μετοχήν.
78 Theologica I, 62.70–77: ταῦτα μὲν πρότερον· ἀφ’ οὗ δὲ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα κάλλος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπεβάλετο,
κατὰ νώτου ἑαυτῆς τὸ θεῖον ποιησαμένηπαράγγελμα, διεσπάσθη ἡ θεία αὕτη σειρά,καὶ τῶν μετα-
δόσεων μὴ διαδιδομένων κατ’ ἀναλογίαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, διεσπάσθη τὰ μέρη καὶ γέγονεν ἡ μὲν
ὁλότης μέρος, ἡ δὲ κοινότης πολυπλήθεια. διὰ τοῦτο Χριστὸς ‘ἀκρογωνιαῖος λίθος’ὠνόμασται καὶ
ἡνώθη διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς, ἵνα τὰ ἄκρα συνάψῃ ἓν καὶ σῶμα καὶ γενώμεθα πνεῦμα καὶ νοῦς καὶ θεός,
‘καταποθέντος ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θνητοῦ’ τε καὶ ῥέοντος.
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Psellos next traces, in away thatmirrors his earliermetaphysical statements,
a corresponding course of redemptive personal unification:
And observe how much force his phrase “and have flowed down from
above” has; for the One is praised here, the One that the argument has
in fact shown to be higher than our intellect and being; so truly we estab-
lished the flowing down from above. For just as in the case of the Her-
aclean bonds (which in fact are customarily understood as magical in
regard to comprehensivemagic) if you destroy the beginning of the bond
then thewholewill be destroyed, in the sameway in fact in the case of our
series too, if you tear away the one of the bond, then straightway being,
intellect, soul and body—the divine series itself—will also be torn apart
and destroyed. It is necessary therefore that we, if we live in body alone,
run back up to soul and discover from philosophy the bond by which we
will bind and loose matter in relation to soul; and if we are “soulish men,”
on the one hand existing beyond bodies but on the other hand living a
life fitting for a man, so that we are not able “to receive the things of the
spirit,” then it is necessary to ascend to the intellect; but not even this is
being in theproper sense, and so from this it is necessary thatwebe assim-
ilated to being, and then that we run up to the principle of our bond, the
One, because in fact we are “a portion of God” according to this alone. For
God is one properly speaking, but he is not intellect in the proper sense,
since intellect is constitutive of forms, and a form is itself what is unmixed
even with privations. But if God were intellect in the proper sense, then
where would privations come from, unless we will understand somehow
that they come from thedemiurge andbeing? But because there aremany
privations, it is necessary that the unifications and thehenads exist before
the others; for this reason, in fact, the One is before all.79
79 Theologica I, 62.78–98: Σὺ δέ μοι ὅρα τὸ ‘καὶ ἄνωθεν ῥεύσαντας’ ὅσην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν· τὸ γὰρ
ἓν ἐνταῦθα αἰνίττεται, ὃ δὴ ὁ λόγος ἀνωτέρω τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπέδειξεν· ἄνωθεν
γοῦν ἀληθῆ ὑπέστημεν τὴν ῥοήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶνἩρακλείων δεσμῶν, οὓς δὴ νόμος τοὺς γόη-
τας παραλαμβάνειν ἐπὶ τῶν συλληπτικῶν μαγειῶν, ἢν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ δεσμοῦ διαλύσῃς, τὸ πᾶν
ἔσῃ διαλυσάμενος, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς σειρᾶς, ἢν τὸ ἓν ἀποσπάσῃς τοῦ δεσμοῦ, εὐθὺς
καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ θεία αὕτη σειρὰ συνδιασπᾶται καὶ συνδιαλύεται.
δεῖ οὖν ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὲν ζῶμεν σώματι μόνῳ, πρὸς ψυχὴν ἐπαναδραμεῖν καὶ τὸν δεσμὸν εὑρεῖν παρὰ
φιλοσοφίας ὅτῳ τὴν ὕλην εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν συνδήσομέν τε καὶ ἀναλύσομεν· εἰ δὲ ‘ψυχικοί’ ἐσμεν
‘ἄνθρωποι’, σωμάτων μὲν ὑπερκείμενοι, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ζῶντες ζωήν, ὥστε ‘μὴ’
δύνασθαι ‘δέξασθαι τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος’, ἐπανελθεῖν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ οὗτος τὸ κυρίως ὄν,
ἀπὸ γοῦν τούτου καὶ τῷ ὄντι προσεικασθῆναι ἡμᾶς χρεών, εἶτα πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ καθ’
ἡμᾶς δεσμοῦ τὸ ἓν ἐπαναδραμεῖν, καθ’ ὃ δὴ μόνον μοῖρα τυγχάνομεν τοῦ θεοῦ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς κυρίως
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Theol. I, 62 is a good illustration of how thoroughly Psellos has absorbed
Proclean structures into his own thought. The significance of ‘henads’ is not
made clear here, but in Proclus’ works the henads are, as Nicholas repeatedly
points out, a polytheistic feature. The fact that without any explanation Psel-
los integrates ‘henads’ into his exposition of the participatory relation of all
things to the One suggests either that he has lost sight of the boundaries of
orthodoxy, or that he is not in this instance very concerned about these bound-
aries.
6 Conclusion
Aswe have seen, Psellos uses Proclus’Elements in different genres and in differ-
entways. In some texts he simply quotes or paraphrases himwithout comment,
in others he quotes passages from Proclus and appends brief comments on
the compatibility of Proclus’ philosophy with Christian teaching, and in oth-
ers (most notably in his discussions of Gregory of Nazianzus), he uses Proclus
as a hermeneutical tool. I suggest that this lastwayof using Proclus provides the
clearestmeasure of Psellos’ commitment to Proclus’ philosophy, since his com-
pilation of Proclean texts is not a proof of his own commitment to the ideas.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the large volume of Proclean
material in Psellos’ compilations, especially in the De omnifaria doctrina, and
especially in light of his frequent use of Proclus in other non-compilatory texts,
shows his deep investment in Proclus’ thought. This is not surprising, given the
prominence Psellos himself ascribes to Proclus when describing the course of
his education. Furthermore, whether or not he endorses a given philosoph-
ical source, his high regard for the role of reason in theology makes him far
more inclined to expect common ground with philosophical sources in the
first place, and therefore to consult and employ them.80 The depth of Psel-
los’ interest in Proclus, quite apart from particular doctrinal questions, prob-
μὲν ἕν, οὐ κυρίως δὲ νοῦς· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἰδῶν ἐστιν ὑποστάτης, εἶδος αὐτὸς τυγχάνων τὸ ἀμιγές, οὐ
μὴν δὲ καὶ τῶν στερήσεων. εἰ δὲ νοῦς κυρίως ὁ θεός, αἱ στερήσεις πόθεν; εἰ μή που τὸν δημιουργὸν
καὶ ὄντα νοήσομεν. ἀλλ’ αἱ στερήσεις πολλαί, δεῖ οὖν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὰς ἑνώσεις εἶναι καὶ τὰς
ἑνάδας· διὸ δὴ πρὸ πάντων τὸ ἕν.
80 Regarding the different genres, Graeme Miles remarks (2017, p. 89): “The most immedi-
ately striking feature of Psellos’ Theologica, for a reader acquainted also with his Philo-
sophicaMinora, is the continuity of the two.These lectures as awhole,whether designated
philosophical or theological in recent editions, are parts of a continuous pedagogical and
philosophical undertaking.”
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ably would have troubled Nicholas of Methone, who also probably would have
regarded Psellos as treading dangerously close to the ‘rationalism’ for which
Nicholas criticizes Proclus.81
Psellos uses Proclus in a variety of ways in the exegetical works we have con-
sidered. Some of his citations of the Elements are inconsequential, some are
doing real hermeneutical work but are entirely uncontroversial because they
involve principles shared between Christianity and Neoplatonism, and finally,
some seem tome to push the bounds of orthodoxy.Theol. I, 62 at least seems to
be in this category, though I must add that the text is puzzling in several ways,
and that Psellos’ use of ‘henads’ here must be studied in relation to other texts
where he uses this word.82
Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone thus have starkly contrasting atti-
tudes towards the Elements of Theology. Psellos approaches itwith great respect
and sympathy, and on occasion this sympathy may lead him to see a greater
common ground between Proclus’ thought and Christian doctrine than actu-
ally exists, or even to transgress the bounds of orthodoxy.Yet such occasions are
not as frequent as Psellos’ reputation among scholarsmight lead one to expect,
and in several cases Psellos quite clearly rejects aspects of Proclus’ thought. For
his part, Nicholas is so thoroughly devoted to the teaching of Dionysius that
he shares more common ground with Proclus than he realizes: one finds him,
for example, using emanative metaphors to characterize divine creation, even
while criticizing aspects of Proclus’ emanative system. Psellos in any case is in
some passages clearly conscious that philosophy can lead into heresy. As the
quotation at the head of this article indicates, learnedness must bemixed with
piety, and Gregory of Nazianzus represents for Psellos the perfection of this
mixture. It is difficult to think that anyone who admired Gregory as deeply as
Psellos did could have been very offensive to Nicholas.
Despite their real differences in both substance and rhetoric regarding Pro-
clus, it seems to me unlikely that Psellos’ use of the Elements was a sufficient
reason for Nicholas to write his Refutation.While Psellos does seem to push the
bounds of what Nicholas would have found acceptable, he does not do so often
81 Whether Proclus should be considered a ‘rationalist’ is of course another matter, but if
‘rationalism’ in theology is understood as a confidence in the power of reason to under-
stand transcendent reality, then it is clear that Nicholas regarded Proclus as a rationalist,
and would surely have thought the same of Psellos in some instances.
82 In the texts by Psellos included in the TLG, the word ἑνάς occurs twenty-nine times in the
singular and thirteen times in the plural. For plural uses seeTheologica I, 20 (52), 56 (42), 72
(73), 76 (69) and 93 (45);Theologica II, 8 (55); Philosophicaminora II, 38 (144.23); Epistulae,
13a (31) = ed. Maltese 1 (47); Orationes panegyricae 17 (328).
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enough or to a sufficient extent to match plausibly Nicholas’ description in his
prologue of those who have been led into heresy by Proclus’ teaching, espe-
cially since Nicholas presents them as his own contemporaries.83 Two altern-
atives remain then, as explanations for Nicholas’ critique of Proclus: either
it responds to a real enthusiasm for Proclus among his own contemporaries,
enthusiasm inspired partly by Psellos himself, presumably, but more offens-
ive because less nuanced and discriminating, or it is directed not so much at
actual persons as at ‘straw men’ representing hypothetical appropriations of
Proclus, appropriations anticipated in Psellos’ use of Proclus, but now envi-
sioned as more thorough and unambivalent, and thus more hostile to Chris-
tian teaching. In either case, I suggest, Nicholas’ own twelfth-century con-
text holds (hides?) the explanation for his assault upon Proclus’ new tower of
Babel.84
83 In this article I have limited myself to a consideration of Psellos’ use of the Elements of
Theology. A full assessment of Psellos’ relationship to Proclus can of course only be made
on the basis of a complete survey of all his citations of Proclus.
84 My reading of Psellos here takes for granted his sincerity, but as Anthony Kaldellis has
argued (2012) there are reasons to doubt this in some contexts, if we consider his demon-
strable tension with the ecclesial and especially monastic mainstream, and take account
of the fact that he needed to appear to be orthodox even if and when he was not. This
consideration must be taken seriously, but I have not yet read widely or deeply enough in
Psellos to be able to factor this ambiguity intomy account. If we stipulate that Psellosmay
indeed have been more heterodox than his writings explicitly show, then the question as
regards Nicholas’Refutation would be, to what extent might Nicholas have ‘seen through’
Psellos’ facade of orthodoxy? If Nicholas could see a greater threat in Psellos’ works than
lay on their surface, thenPsellosmayhave played a greater role in provokingNicholas than
I have here argued.Whatever the case with Psellos, however, I am confident that we need
not apply the same hermeneutic of suspicion to Nicholas himself, who shows no signs of
wavering in his orthodoxy. Whatever Nicholas’ reasons for writing a lengthy refutation,
he was no doubt sincere in opposing Proclus, and did not engage merely in an elaborate
‘display’ of orthodoxy. For an account of Psellos that acknowledges the ambiguity of his
persona and writings while nevertheless reading him as operating with established tradi-
tions of Christian reflection and scholarship, see Louth 2007, p. 334–343. Louth stresses,
as I have, Psellos’ great admiration for Gregory of Nazianzus. While this admiration was
certainly based in large part onGregory’s rhetorical and stylistic abilities, it seems unlikely
to me that Gregory’s writings would have attracted such extensive engagement by Psellos
had not both form and content interested him deeply.
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chapter 5







The Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (Ἀνάπτυξις τῆς Θεολογικῆς Στοι-
χειώσεως Πρόκλου τοῦ Λυκίου = Refutatio Procli) attributed to the twelfth-cen-
tury Byzantine theologian Nicholas of Methone (died between 1160–1166) is
an important witness to the circulation and reception of Proclus’ work in
eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantium.* The work analyses the text of Pro-
clus’Elements of Theology from the point of view of twelfth-century Byzantine
orthodoxy and provides for each topic discussed by Proclus its Christian coun-
terpart.1 However, the paternity of this work has occasionally stirred some
controversy as two fourteenth-century Vatican manuscripts ascribe two of the
many sections composing this work to the late antique rhetor and theolo-
gian Procopius of Gaza (ca. 465/470–526/530CE). The dispute appeared to be
settled in 1984 with the publication of the editio princeps of Nicholas’ work.2
However, recently, Eugenio Amato has defended again the Procopian author-
ship of the text in an erudite article that brings forth new historical and tex-
tual arguments favoring this view.3 Eventually Amato went further than this
in editing the two sections of the Refutatio Procli ascribed to Procopius as
authentic Procopian fragments.4 According to Amato, Nicholas of Methone
* Michele Trizio was responsible for drafting chapters 1–7; Anna Gioffreda for chapter 8. The
conclusions were jointly written.
1 For a general presentation of the work, see Robinson 2014 and Robinson 2017. We would like
to thank Joshua Robinson for reading an earlier draft of this essay.
2 Angelou 1984.
3 Amato 2010a.
4 Procopius of Gaza, Opuscula rhetorica et oratoria.
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appropriated an earlier Procopian work for purely rhetorical purposes and
without declaring his source.5
But is it really so? DidNicholas—one of themost important twelfth-century
theologians—shamelessly appropriate a text that he (and evidently his con-
temporaries as well) knew as Procopius’ without fearing detection? Are the
two fragments of the Refutatio Procli attributed to Procopius all that is left of
a polemical work against Proclus written by the scholar of Gaza? And, if so,
why does the attribution to Procopius only appear in the second half of the
fourteenth-century? Who is the late Byzantine scholar who ascribed to Pro-
copius sections 139 and 146 of the Refutatio Procli in the Vatican manuscripts,
and why was he interested in this text? Contrary to what has been done so
far, this article addresses this dispute from amultidisciplinary approach, using
text-criticism, paleography andhistory of culture and education. In thiswaywe
are confident of reaching inasmuch as possible, if not a definitive argument, at
least a probable one on this issue.
1 Nicholas Reloaded: TheModern Debate on the Refutatio Procli
To start, we would like to briefly summarize the earlier debate on the author-
ship of the Refutatio Procli.6 It all began in 1825 when the German philologist
Johann Theodor Voemel published the first modern edition of the Refutatio
Procli under Nicholas of Methone’s name.7 In 1893, however, Demetrios Rous-
sos noticed that ch. 146 of Nicholas’Refutatio Procliwas identical to a fragment
attributed to Procopius in a Vatican manuscript edited by Cardinal Angelo
Mai in 1831.8 At this point, after composing three articles on the Refutatio Pro-
cli as Nicholas’ authentic work,9 the German philologist Draeseke changed
his mind and published in 1895 a sensational article accusing Nicholas of
plagiarism. According to Draeseke, the Refutatio Procli should be regarded
as a Procopian work plagiarized in its entirety by Nicholas.10 This allegation
has been widely accepted by Procopian scholars despite the fact that in 1899
Stiglmayr published a refutation of Draeseke’s view that rigorously supported
Nicholas’ authorship of the Refutatio Procli.11 Thus, while most scholars accept
5 Amato 2014, p. xi–lxxxv.
6 For a precise reconstruction of the debate, see Robinson 2014, p. 44–72.We take the oppor-
tunity to thank Joshua Robinson for sharing his work with us.
7 See Voemel 1825. On this publication, see Jeck 2015.
8 Roussos 1893; Mai 1831, p. 247.
9 Draeseke 1888; 1891; 1892.
10 Draeseke 1895; 1897.
11 Stiglmayr 1899.
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Nicholas’ authorship of the text, several specialists on Procopius doggedly
adhere to the Procopian paternity of the Refutatio Procli, although none have
ever really demonstrated proof.12 Moreover, the supporters of the Procopian
authorship have never confronted Stiglmayr’s arguments. In fact, these demon-
strate that, if attributed to Procopius, the text of the Refutatio Procli would
contain a great amount of anachronism and adynata, sources such as Ps.-
Dionysius the Areopagite, John of Damascus, Photios etc., whom Procopius
could not possibly know. In other words, after Stiglmayr the thesis that Nich-
olas plagiarized an earlier Procopius work in its entirety could no longer be
defended.
In 1931 Giovanni Mercati published his monumental volume on the four-
teenth-century Byzantine controversy known as ‘the hesychast controversy’.13
For reasons which will be explained later, he dealt with the fragments in the
Vatican manuscripts which ascribe chapters 139 and 146 to Procopius. Mer-
cati accepted Stiglmayr’s arguments against the plagiarism thesis, but whereas
Stiglmayr thought the attribution to Procopius was a wrong conjecture by the
scribe of the Vatican fragments, Mercati believed that, on the contrary, the
scribe inherited the attribution to Procopius from his model and that, there-
fore, he cannot be blamed for unskillfulness. According toMercati, at a certain
point chapter 139 and 146 circulated under the name of Procopius independ-
ently from the rest of the Refutatio Procli ascribed to Nicholas in the extant
tradition of the text.14
That is why Amato’s recent reassessment of the issue is a welcome contri-
bution to the discussion. For the first time, a Procopian scholar admits the
Procopian authorship of the text without implying that the whole Refutatio
Procli ascribed toNicholas is a plagiarizedwork. In fact, Amato defends that the
Refutatio Procli is an authentic work by Nicholas which nonetheless elaborates
on an earlier text by Procopius.15 On this basis Amato explains the existence of
theVatican fragments attributing chapters 139 and 146 toProcopius alone: these
fragments are all that are left of a Procopian Refutation of Proclus’ Elements
of Theology later re-elaborated by Nicholas of Methone. Amato also insists on
a reference by Choricius of Gaza, one of Procopius’ disciples, to his master’s
12 See e.g. Aly 1957, p. 271; Chauvot 1986, p. 87–88; Matino 2005. To be fair, the thesis of the
Procopian authorship of the Refutatio Procli has also been accepted by the authoritative
Krumbacher 18972 and by Tatakis 1949, p. 38.
13 Mercati 1931, p. 264–266. On the controversy, see Russell 2017.
14 Mercati 1931, p. 264–266.
15 Amato 2010a, p. 11–12.
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commitment to refute the heresies as a proof favoring Procopius’ authorship
of the Refutatio Procli,16 and on two testimonia favoring the existence of a Pro-
copian refutation of Proclus’ commentary on the Chaldean Oracles (more on
this later).17 In his view, these testimonia make the existence of a Procopian
Refutatio Proclimore than probable. Accordingly, the copyist of the twoVatican
manuscripts was the last scholar having access to one or evenmore redactions
of a now-lost Refutatio Procli penned by Procopius of Gaza.
Overall, Amato’s erudite solution to the controversy appears to be a reason-
able one which reconciles the Procopian authorship of the Refutatio Procli and
Nicholas of Methone’s role in the tradition of the text. However, Amato’s view
currently struggles to gain adherents outside the circle of Procopian special-
ists. Proof of this is the fact that the fragments ascribed to Procopius in one
of the Vatican manuscripts have been recently treated once again as Pseudo-
Procopius by Ioannis Polemis18 in his edition of a fourteenth-century theolo-
gical treatise attributed by Mercati19 to the Byzantine scribe and scholar Isaak
Argyros and tentatively attributed to JohnKyparissiotes by the same Polemis.20
However, it is also true that the Vatican fragments ascribed to Procopius have
been included in the TLG online, though the text is reproduced according to
Mai’s edition instead of Amato’s version.
We can already point out for the reader’s benefit that Isaak Argyros, the
fourteenth-century hesychast or Palamite controversy, and the two Vatican
manuscripts ascribing chapters 139 and 146 of the Refutatio Procli to Procopius
are key elements of this complex story. We believe that by reviewing the avail-
able data and by unearthing new evidence we can still make progress in the
reconstruction of this complexmatter.Wewill first discuss Amato’s arguments
favoring the existence of an earlier Procopian refutation of Proclus’Elements of
Theology, then we will present some new findings on the Vatican manuscripts
preserving the fragments of the Refutatio Procli under Procopius’ name, and
finally we will propose our solution to this intricate matter.
16 Choricius, Opera, 8.1.21, 117.19–22.
17 Cf. infra p. 101–102.
18 See Polemis 2012, p. lxxvii. To be fair, elsewhere in his edition Polemis attributes the frag-
ments to Procopius without further elucidation.
19 Mercati 1931, p. 241.
20 Polemis 2012, p. LIII–LVIII.
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2 Towards an Unbiased Approach
In our view the previous debate on the authorship of the Refutatio Procli has
been often limited by:
1) The reluctance to take into account the twelfth-century Byzantine intel-
lectual history and the circulation of Proclus’ work in this period. None of
the supporters of the Procopian authorship of the Refutatio Procli seem
to be aware that Neoplatonism, and in particular Proclus’ work, had a tre-
mendous impact on eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine scholars.21
This bias is evident, for instance, in Amato’s claim that Nicholas’Refutatio
is a mere rhetorical piece with no relationship with the theological and
philological literature of the time.22
2) The reluctance in engaging seriously the tremendous amount of philolo-
gical and historical arguments favoring Nicholas’ paternity of the Refuta-
tio Procli brought forward by Stiglmayr and Angelou. Even if we accept
Amato’s more sophisticated thesis that Nicholas appropriates and re-
elaborates an earlier Procopian text, the elements in the text pointing
to a middle Byzantine dating of the Refutatio are so many and so rel-
evant that one may fruitfully wonder what is left of this alleged earlier
Procopian work. In this regard even Amato’s reintroduction of the plagi-
arism theory does not seem to dispel the ambiguity.23 As a matter of fact
Amato’s thesis leads to the paradoxical view that in composing the Refut-
atio Nicholas generally re-elaborated on an earlier work and introduced
new elements of his own everywhere, with the exception of chapters 139
and 146, which are to be regarded as authentically Procopian texts.24 By
contrast, we believe that in order to make their case stronger the sup-
porters of the Procopian authorship of the Refutatio Procli must identify
stylistic features or doctrines in the text that could only be explained by
referring to a fifth-century text. In this regard, even if we accept Amato’s
more sophisticated view, Stiglmayr’s arguments still hang as a sword of
Damocles above the supporters of the Procopian authorship of the Refut-
atio Procli.
3) The insistence by supporters of the Procopian authorship of the Refutatio
Procli on relying for defending their viewon two articles byWesterink and
Whittaker, published in 1942 and 1975 respectively, whereas none of these
21 Cf. infra p. 108–114.
22 Amato 2014, p. xi–lxxxv.
23 Amato 2014, p. xxx.
24 Amato 2010a, p. 7.
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articles has ever touched upon this issue.25 In the first article, Westerink
provided slight evidence favoring the existence of a Procopian refutation
of Proclus’ commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, namely a late scholion
to Lucian’s Philopseudes (119.17) and a text of eleventh-century polyhistor
Michael Psellos,26 more on which later. As toWhittaker, nowhere does he
demonstrate the existence of a lost Procopian Refutation of Proclus’ Ele-
ments of Theology, but simply suggests that Psellos got his information on
Procopius’ alleged refutation of the Oracles not from Procopius himself,
but rather from an intermediate commentary onGregory theTheologian.
4) The reluctance to address the state of the fragments attributed to Pro-
copius in the Vatican manuscripts, the method of the scribe, and finally
the circulation of these fragments. By contrast, we believe that a close
inspection of the manuscripts preserving the fragments and a review of
the scribe’smodus operandi can be of great help for establishing the origin
and circulation of the fragments themselves, including the attribution to
Procopius of chapters 139 and 146. As amatter of fact, unknown toAmato,
such an attempt has already been pursued by Daniele Bianconi.27 In this
paper we are going to expand on Bianconi’s findings.
3 Procopius’Refutatio Procli? The External Evidence
We must begin by briefly discussing the arguments supporting the Procopian
authorship of the text. Most of them cite external evidence suggesting the
plausibility of the attribution to Procopius of an otherwise lost Refutatio Pro-
cli. To start with, supporters of the Procopian authorship of the Refutatio Procli
remind us that Procopius’ work has come down to us in fragmentary form. Of
the many works authored by Procopius and praised by Photios as “many and
diverse” (πολλοί τε καὶ παντοδαποί)28 only a few survive, and because of this one
cannot exclude the possibility that Procopius ever authored a text such as the
Refutatio Procli. However, we believe that the Patriarch’s words cannot be used
as a sort of nihil obstat argument favoring the existence of a lost Procopian
work.29 If, on the one hand, Photios’ praise of the expansive breadth of Pro-
copius’ literary output encourages the supporters of the Procopian authorship,
25 Cf. e.g. Clavis Patrum Graecorum III, p. 390.
26 Westerink 1942; Whittaker 1975.
27 Bianconi 2008, p. 354.
28 Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 160, 130a6. On Procopius’ life and work, see Amato 2010b.
29 Cf. e.g. Amato 2010a, p. 5.
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then, on the other hand, it must be said that when examining Procopius’ works
available to him, Photios only mentions Procopius’ Commentary on Octateuch,
Kings, Chronicles and Isaiah.30 The well-informed patriarchmakes nomention
of a Procopian Refutatio Procli nor does he ever suggest that such a work exis-
ted.
More importantly, Choricius—insist the supporters of the Procopian
authorship of the Refutatio Procli—tells us that Procopius embarked upon the
refutation of heresies as well. Also this witness makes it theoretically plaus-
ible that Procopius authored a work like the Refutatio Procli, but actually does
not prove it, because Choricius only says that Procopius devoted himself “to
the refutation” (πρὸς ἔλεγχον) of the opinions which contradicted the Christian
dogma,without further clarifyingwhether these includedphilosophical pagan-
ism or other Christian heresies. It is surely true that distinguished members of
the school of Gaza engaged philosophical paganism (see for instance Zacharias
Scholasticus’ Ammonius, Aeneas of Gaza’s Theophrastus and the Commentary
on Genesis by the same Procopius),31 but it is also true that they engaged other
heresies as well. Zacharias, for instance, composed a refutation (ἀντίρρησις) of
the Manichaeans.
Procopian scholars also cite other texts authored by eminent representat-
ives of the so-called “school of Gaza” that underwent a process of appropriation
or plagiarism by later Byzantine scholars.32 Of all arguments, this is probably
the weakest one. In fact, none of the writings cited as parallel are actually by
Procopius, but rather by his disciple, Choricius. More importantly, they are all
rhetorical texts such as encomia or ekphraseis, i.e. they belong to a particular
literary genre known for easily allowing later borrowings or even plagiarisims.
Quite on the contrary, with regard to theological works such as the Refutatio
Procli it is very hard to imagine that a prominent theologian likeNicholas could
openly plagiarize or re-elaborate on a work which both he and his contempor-
aries knew as written by Procopius.
Nor is it possible to prove the Procopian authorship of the fragments by
referring them to Procopius’ Commentary on Genesis. In fact, chapters 139 and
146 deny the existence of divine causes other than God and explain the nature
of the intratrinitarian procession in far too vague a manner to allow a connec-
tion with Procopius’ Commentary. Procopius had no copyright on these issues,
and actually these chapters summarize standard Christian beliefs commonly
found in Patristic and Byzantine sources. In particular, the fragments simply
30 Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 206–207, 164b–165a.
31 See Champion 2014, p. 71–195; Sorabji 2015, p. 71–93.
32 Amato 2010a, p. 8–10.
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rephrase Proclus’ text in order tomake it compatiblewithChristianity.33 In fact,
as we shall elucidate later, it appears that the technical vocabulary of chapters
139 and 146 is reminiscent of middle-Byzantine theology.
We would also like to make a few incidental remarks on the testimonia
for Procopius’ writing against Proclus’ Chaldean Oracles. The first testimony
comes fromMichael Psellos.The latter reports that Proclus is said to have called
the Hellenic arguments “squalls of words” (λόγων καταιγίδας), as reported by
Procopius of Gaza.34 Since in another passage Psellos refers to the Chaldean
Oracles and speaks of “the pagan Greek of our day”, Westerink believed that
here Psellos is quoting from a refutation of the Chaldean Oracles by Proco-
pius.35 However, as Dominique O’Meara (the distinguished editor of Psellos’
philosophicalwork) has elucidated, to connect these two texts is risky, since it is
far from clear whether or not the second text, which is a summary used by Psel-
los elsewhere as well, actually excerpts from Procopius or from another as yet
unidentified source of later date.36 Whittaker supported this latter view when
suggesting the existence of a commentary on Gregory the Theologian contain-
ing this and other information.37 To this we shall add that in both passages
where Psellos ascribes to Procopius the description of theOracles as “squalls of
words”, Proclus is described by Psellos in enthusiastic terms, something which
would be rather strange if we assume that here Psellos excerpts fromProcopius’
alleged Refutation of the Chaldean Oracles.
The secondwitness is a scholion to Lucian’s Philopseudes (119.17)which reads:
οἷα εἰκὸς τὰ τελεστικά φησι Ἰουλιανοῦ, ἃ Πρόκλος ὑπομνηματίζει, οἷς ὁ Προκό-
πιος ἀντιφθέγγεται πάνυ δεξιῶς καὶ γενναίως.38 The authority of this scholion
has been challenged by Kroll on the basis of its late dating and its absence
33 Unfortunately, the text editedbyAngeloudoes not allowdistinguishing betweenNicholas’
paraphrase of Proclus’ text andNicholas’ own comments on it. Perhaps itwould have been
better to edit the former in italics in order to differentiate those passages where Nicholas
is using and citing Proclus’ text from those where he elaborates his own critique.
34 Michael Psellos, Orationes forenses et acta, 1, 12.293–294.
35 Michael Psellos, Theologica, 88.46–53: ὧν δὲ τοιούτων ὀνομάτων τε καὶ δοξῶν ὁ ἐπὶ Μάρκου
Ἰουλιανὸς καθηγήσατο, ἐν ἔπεσιν αὐτὰ συγγραψάμενος, ἃ δὴ καὶ ὡς λόγια ἐφυμνεῖται παρὰ τῶν
μετὰ ταῦτα. τούτοις δὲ ἐντυχόντες καὶ οἱ καθ’ ἡμᾶς Ἕλληνες οὕτω δὴ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἠγάπη-
σαν, ὡς ἀφεμένους εὐθὺς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πρὸς ταῦτα δραμεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ ὁ θεῖος
τῷ ὄντι Πρόκλος ἀνήρ· ὁμοῦ τε γὰρ τούτοις συνεγένοντο, καὶ καταιγίδας τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς μεθόδους
περὶ τὸν συλλογισμὸν ὠνομάκασι. τοιαύτη μὲν οὖν ἡ τῶν Χαλδαίων πολυαρχία. It is worth not-
ing that this text echoes the description of the Greek demonstrations as “squalls of words”
(λόγων καταιγίδας).
36 O’Meara 2013, p. 56.
37 Cf. supra p. 98–99.
38 Lucian of Samosata, Scholia, v. IV, 224–225.
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in the earlier and more important manuscripts of Lucian’s work.39 Westerink
prudently recalled, however, that it is theoretically possible for the scholion to
be an excerpt from an earlier authoritative source.40 Eager to test Westerink’s
suggestion, we decided to investigate this matter further. As a result of this, we
realized that the manuscript which purportedly transmits the scholion is the
now lost codex Graevii, a manuscript which Graeve used for his seventeenth-
century edition of Lucian.While it is not possible to detect information from a
direct study of themanuscript itself, it is nevertheless possible to trace the text
of this scholion, at least tentatively, back to its possible source or to the context
in which it originated. This is whatMartin Sicherl did in an article published in
1960. Sicherl brought forth convincing arguments suggesting that the scholion
goes back to the very source of the first testimony for Procopius’ writing against
Proclus’ ChaldeanOraclesmentioned above, namely the sameMichael Psellos,
who in fact is known for having read Lucian’s Philopseudes.41 The consequence
of this finding is that we do not have anymore two distinct and independent
witnesses to Procopius’ refutation of Proclus’ commentary on the Chaldean
Oracles, but rather only one, the aforementioned Psellos. Whether the latter
had access to this Procopian work or only to a later source (as suggested by
Whittaker andO’Meara) is stillmatter of debate and is not relevant to the scope
of the present paper.What is pretty clear is that there is noway this tenous evid-
ence favoring the existence of a Procopian refutation of Proclus’ scholarship on
the Chaldean Oracles can be used to demonstrate the existence of a Procopian
Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.
4 Sources and Stylistic Pattern of the Fragments
Then come Stiglmayr’s arguments. For the sake of brevity, we cannot compre-
hensively detail Stiglmayr’s arguments, but we will focus on a few that also
allow us to introduce new evidence. For instance, Stiglmayr references Trinit-
arian language as proof for a twelfth-century dating. This reveals the distinctive
trace of John of Damascus’ and Photios’ Trinitarian speculation and a strong
39 In Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen AltertumsWissenschaft, X, col. 15. Actually the
scholion has not been included by Rabe in his 1906 edition of the scholia to Lucian’s work
(Rabe 1906).
40 Cf. Westerink 1942, p. 276–277.
41 Sicherl 1960, in part. p. 18–19. This might well explain why the scholion at hand is not
found in the earlier ninth-tenth-century manuscripts preserving Lucian’s works, namely
because it originated in a later source such as Psellos.
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emphasis on the procession of the Spirit ex solo Patre typical of the anti-Latin
theological literature of which Nicholas is an eminent figure.42 In what follows
we shall corroborate Stiglmayr’s findings and we shall provide further internal
evidence suggesting that 1) chapters 139 and 146 are consistent with the rest of
Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli and that 2) the language in these chapters reveals a
theological concern that hardly fits within the view of the Procopian author-
ship of the Refutatio Procli.
The first example comes from the refutation of prop. 22 of the Elements of
Theology (section 22 of the Refutatio Procli): “All that exists primally and ori-
ginally in each rank is one, and not two or more than two, but unique” (Πᾶν
τὸ πρώτως καὶ ἀρχικῶς ὂν καθ’ ἑκάστην ἄξιν ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε δύο οὔτε πλείω δυεῖν,
ἀλλὰ μονογενὲς πᾶν).43 Before embarking upon the refutation of the proposition
at hand, Nicholas remarks: “and thus someonemight even use this proposition
against the Latins, who say that the Spirit has two principles, Father and Son”
(οὕτω δ’ ἂν καὶ χρήσαιτό τις τῷ θεωρήματι τούτῳ κατὰ Λατίνων τῶν δύο τὰ ἀρχικὰ
αἴτια τοῦ πνεύματος λεγόντων, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν).44 As Stiglmayr points out, such
a statement can only be understood in the context of the Filioque controversy
which led to the great schism of 1054.45 Nicholas, who engaged the Filioque
thesis at length, knew it terribly well.
To Stiglmayr’s remark, we shall add that in one of his anti-Latin treatises
Nicholas summarizes the Latin position as follows:
For this reason, if the Father and the Son are one and they are one also
in nature, one must concede that just as [the Spirit] proceeds from the
Father, so it proceeds from his Son (in fact this is the mistake implied in
the innovation introduced in the Latin dogma).
Εἰ διότι ἕν εἰσι Πατὴρ καὶ Υἱός, εἰσὶ δὲ πάντως ἓν τῇ φύσει, διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐκ τοῦ
Πατρός, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ δοτέον ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα (τοῦτο
γὰρ ἡ καινοφωνία τοῦ λατινικοῦ δόγματος ἀπαιτεῖ).46
A similar text is found in Nicholas’ treatise on the Holy Spirit addressed to the
megas domestikos:
42 Stiglmayr 1899, p. 289–293.
43 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 30.14–15.
44 All English translation of Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli are by Robinson (2014), with slight
modifications. The English text of Proclus’Elements of Theology is that by Dodds.
45 See Stiglmayr 1899, p. 290. On the Filioque see Siecinski 2010.
46 Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, p. 363.7–10.
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For because of thiswewill neither say that the Spirit is a divine indwelling,
nor that it proceeds from the Son, which is the Latin madness.
ὡς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα λέγειν εἶναι ἐμφύσημα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύε-
σθαι, τῆς τῶν Λατίνων ἐστὶ παρανοίας, οὐχ ἡμέτερον λέγειν.47
Indeed, one may fruitfully recall that Amato’s thesis takes into account these
anachronisms and explains them as resulting from Nicholas’ re-elaboration of
Procopius’ Refutatio. But if we look at chapter 146, which in Amato’s view is
authentically Procopian, we read that:
Only the begetting of the Son from the one and only Father and [the] pro-
jection from the same of the one and only Holy Spirit would be called a
divine processionwithout beginning andwithout end, [the begetting and
the procession] according to which the paternal and original, or rather
pre-original Monad, moved toward the Dyad, which is beheld in the Son
and the Spirit, and at the Trinity come to a halt, as our theologian Gregory
says
Or. 29.2, PG 36, 76B
Θεία πρόοδος ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος μόνη ἂν λέγοιτο ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ
μόνου πατρὸς γέννησις τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου υἱοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρόβλησις
τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου ἁγίου πνεύματος, καθ’ ἣν ἡ πατρική τε καὶ ἀρχική, μᾶλλον δὲ
προάναρχος μονὰς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα, τὴν ἐν υἱῷ θεωρουμένην καὶ πνεύματι,
μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη, καθά φησι ὁ ἡμέτερος Θεολόγος Γρηγόριος.48
This text and the quotation fromGregory in it have been regarded as a key argu-
ment in previous scholarship on the Refutatio Procli. For instance, it promp-
ted Whittaker to suggest a link with the commentary tradition on Gregory
of Nazianzus.49 And yet, we totally agree with Stiglmayr that the first lines
of the text unmistakably cast the citation from Gregory within the frame of
the middle Byzantine theory of the procession of the Spirit ex solo Patre and
of the theological dispute with the Latins.50 Furthermore, it should be noted
that the word πρόβλησις, here “procession”, is extremely rare and never appears
in Patristic texts as referring to the procession of the Spirit. The only other
47 Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, p. 212.5–6.
48 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 133.22.
49 Whittaker 1975, p. 313.
50 Stiglmayr 1899, p. 297.
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occurrence is in section 7 of Nicholas’Refutatio Procli.51 This suggests that the
author of section 146 is the same as the author of section 7. The fact that
in section 7 the author casts the term πρόβλησις within the technical Byz-
antine distinction between the generation of the Son and the spiration of the
Spirit is consistent with Stiglmayr’s idea that the author is not a late-antique
one.
In other words, right from the beginning of the “authentically” Procopian
fragment of chapter 146 one finds an element which cannot be Procopian. By
contrast, it belongs to the Middle Byzantine anti-Latin controversy and is con-
sistentwith the other passages fromNicholas’Refutatio Procli andhis anti-Latin
treatises. In particular, the first sentence of chapter 146 connects with section
22 of the Refutatio Procli, where Nicholas questions the Latin Filioque as a case
of causation by two principles (the Father and the Son), instead of the Father
alone. Furthermore, no one seems to have noticed that the above-mentioned
citation from Gregory appears in other sections of the Refutatio Procli and is
explained by Nicholas with the theological vocabulary typical of Byzantine
theology after Photius. See, for example:
5.10–15: διὰ τοῦτομονάς,φησὶν ὁΘεολόγος Γρηγόριος,ἀπ’ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδακινη-
θεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη. διότι γοῦν ἓν καὶ τοῦτο γόνιμόν τε καὶ αὐτοκίνητον,
διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τρία, καὶ διότι τρία (καὶ ταῦτα οὐχ ὑπαρίθμια ἀλλ’ ὑποστατικὰ
παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ), διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἕν, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τριὰς ἡ μόνη
καὶ ὑπερούσιος.
20.17–20: ἥτις κατὰ τὸν Θεολόγον Γρηγόριον ὡς μονὰς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα
φυσικῶς κινηθεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη, δημιουργικῶς δὲ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀγα-
θότητος κινουμένη παράγει πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τά τε δευτέρως αὐτοκίνητα καὶ τὰ
ἑτεροκίνητα.
27.26–30: δῆλον δ’ ὅτι νοερῶς καὶ οἰκείως ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν μονάδα, δηλο-
νότι τὸν ἕνα πατέρα, μοναδικῶς, ἔφησεν ὁ θεολόγος, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς κινηθεῖσαν εἰς
δυάδα, τουτέστιν εἰς ἑνὸς υἱοῦ γέννησιν καὶ ἑνὸς πνεύματος προβολήν, μέχρι
τριάδος στῆναι.
Indeed, supporters of the existence of a Procopian Refutatio Proclimight argue
that Nicholas took this citation from the Procopian version of chapter 146 and
used it elsewhere in the Refutatio. Alternatively, theymight argue that the pres-
51 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 7, 11,19.
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ence of the citation fromGregory belongs to the residual part of the text which
Nicholas incorporated into his own version of the text. Such an argument
would be to no avail. In fact, we have demonstrated that chapter 146 presents
the Gregory passage as supporting the typically Byzantine procession of the
Spirit ex solo Patre. Therefore, chapter 146 can no more be regarded as a Pro-
copian text and, if this is the case, neither can the other sections of the Refutatio
Procli where the citation from Gregory appears. On the contrary, the presence
of Gregory throughout the Refutatio Procli ascribed to Nicholas suggests a con-
sistent pattern. Furthemore, the frequent use of this very sameGregory passage
in the other anti-Latin writers and Byzantine theologians confirms the pattern
as well.52 Nicholas himself is among these writers of anti-Latin treatises, which
is evidenced by:
Niketas Stethatos, Contra Latinos et de processione spiritus sancti, ed.
Michel, 375.12–16: δῆλον, καὶ τίνων φώτων πατὴρ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ
τοῦ πνεύματος, εἷς τῶν δύο, οὐ τοῦ ἑνὸς οἱ δύο· ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ’ ὅλου μονὰς δυάδος
ἀρχή, οὐ δυὰς μονάδος· διὸ καὶ «μονὰς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς» φησὶν ὁ μέγας ἐν θεολόγοις
Γρηγόριος, «εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη».
Eustratios of Nicaea, Περὶ τοῦ τρόπου, τιμῆς τε καὶ προσκυνήσεως τῶν σεβα-
σμίων εἰκόνων συλλογιστικὴ ἀπόδειξις, ed. Demetrakopoulos, 152.31–33: καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο μονὰς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη, ὁ μέγας
ἐν θεολογίᾳ φησὶ Γρηγόριος.
Nicholas of Methone, Νικολάου ἐπισκόπουΜεθώνης κεφαλαιώδεις ἔλεγχοι τοῦ
παρὰ Λατίνοις καινοφανοῦς δόγματος, τοῦ ὅτι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς
καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται, ed. Demetrakopoulos, 359.15–27: Ἔτι δύο μὲν κινή-
σεις, ἤγουν δυνάμεις καὶ ἐνεργείας μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, ἠκούσαμέν τε καὶ ἔγνωμεν
καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν διηγήσαντο ἡμῖν.Μονὰς γάρ, φησὶν ὁ θεολόγος Γρηγόριος,
ἀπαρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα (τουτέστιν ὁ Πατὴρ εἰς γέννησιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ
πρόεσιν τοῦ Πνεύματος) μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη· εἰς δύο δὲ αἴτια, ὁπωσοῦν διαφέ-
ροντα, τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν ἀναφερομένην οὐδαμόθεν ἐμάθομεν, εἰ μὴ
νῦν πρῶτον παρὰ τῆς καινοφωνίας ἀκούομεν, ἥτις ἐκ δυοῖν αἰτίων διαφερόντων
κατὰ τὰς ὑποστατικὰς ἰδιότητας ὑφιστῶσα τὸ Πνεῦμα, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως μὴ τῇ δια-
φορᾷ τῶν αἰτίων διαφόρους καὶ ὑποστάσεις συναπαρτίσει καὶ τομὴν ἐπαφήσει
κατὰ τῆς ἀτμήτου καὶ ἑνιαίας καὶ ἁπλῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος ὑποστάσεως.
52 See Trizio 2014, p. 206.
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This latter text is particularly interesting in that in it Nicholas links the
Filioque to a procession from two causes rather than one. This is exactly his aim
in chapters 22 and 146 of the Refutatio Procli: ascribing the divine procession
to one and the same cause, namely the Father, and excluding that other prin-
ciples, such as the Son, can be cause the way the Father is cause in the proper
sense. Thus, the first lines of chapter 146 are pretty much consistent with the
anti-Filioquist undertones in the rest of the Refutatio Procli.
While looking for stylistic features of theRefutatioProcli ascribed toNicholas
we realized that just as he cites Gregory in chapter 146, so does he consist-
ently in the rest of the Refutatio.53 This suggests once more the existence of
a common stylistic pattern between chapter 146 and the rest of the Refuta-
tio Procli. However, since we have demonstrated that in chapter 146 the quote
from Gregory reflects Nicholas’ anti-Latin concerns, it would not be possible
to consider this and the other citations from Gregory as residual elements of
Procopius’ alleged Refutatio.
Another passage supports the consistency between ch. 146 and the rest of
the Refutatio Procli, reading:
by contrast, the procession according to illumination proceeds thence
as perpetual and without end, bestowing to some in first distribution, to
others in second distribution and so forth, as the divine effulgences pour
forth according to transmission in correspondence with the ranks or sta-
tions of each, even to the last ones among them.
ἡ δὲ κατ’ ἔλλαμψιν ἀΐδιος ἐκεῖθεν προβαίνει καὶ ἀτελεύτητος τοῖς μὲν πρωτοδό-
τως, τοῖς δὲ δευτεροδότως καὶ καθ’ ἑξῆς, τῶν θείων ἀπαυγασμάτων προχεομέ-
νων κατὰ μετάδοσιν ἀναλόγως ταῖς ἑκάστων τάξεσιν εἴτουν στάσεσι μέχρι καὶ
τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐσχάτων.54
This text reflects a passage from ch. 70:
if every illumination from above proceeds from the one and first prin-
ciple, it is plainly evident that nothing of the things after the first prin-
ciple projects its own illumination to the things after it, but rather, that
53 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 5.11; 12.31–32; 14.27–
28; 17.5–7; 20.17–18; 22.21–22; 25.19–21; 26.30–27.1; 27.28.28; 41.3–5; 49.2; 59.16–17; 89.16–17;
101.20–21; 117.11–12; 133.20–21; 137.17–18; 146.2–3; 149.15; 149.22–26; 152.30–153.1; 168.23–25;
174.7–8.
54 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 134.7–10.
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which is immediately after the principle, since it has illumination from
that primary-giving, transmits this to those after it by secondary-giving.
Εἰ πᾶσα ἔλλαμψις ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς πρόεισιν, εὔδηλον
ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἰκείαν ἔλλαμψιν προβάλλει τοῖς μετ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’
ἢ τὸ εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνης πρωτοδότως ἔσχεν ἔλλαμψιν, ταύτην
δευτεροδότως τοῖς μετ’ αὐτὸ διαδίδωσι.55
This as well as the previous textual parallels are consistent with the hypothesis
that the Refutatio Procli has been written by one and the same author and that
this author is Nicholas.
5 A Historian’s View
Another argument against the attribution of the Refutatio Procli to Nicholas
alone is that to compose such a work in the twelfth century would not make
any sense, as by that time the pagan followers of Procluswere all virtually gone.
On this basis, for instance, even Amato, while accepting the hypothesis that
Nicholas re-elaborated on an earlier Procopian work, concludes that Nicholas’
work is a merely rhetorical one insofar as there were no real opponents, i.e.
no real followers of Proclus, at the time.56 We disagree with this view and we
believe that Procopius scholars from Dräseke to Amato have underestimated
thehistorical circumstances surrounding the circulation of Proclus’work in the
twelfth century. These suggest that far frombeing amerely rhetoricalworkwith
no real target, the Refutatio Procli (be it entirely the work of Nicholas or a re-
elaboration of an earlier Procopian work) fits in well with the twelfth-century
Byzantine intellectual history. In what follows we shall summarize the evid-
ence.57
In the eleventh centuryMichael Psellos celebratedProclus as thebest among
Greek philosophers58 and devoted much attention to the Elements of Theo-
logy.59 Psellos’ pupil, John Italos, discussed at length Elements of Theology 69,
55 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 71.10–14.
56 Cf. supra p. 98.
57 On this topic see Podskalsky 1976 and Angelou 1984, p. liii–lxiv. See also Robinson’s
paper in this volume.
58 Reinsch 2014, p. 6.38.3–5.
59 Michael Psellos,Opuscula, v. 1, 7, p. 29.45–46,Theologica, 11, p. 43.21–24. On this subject see
O’Meara 2014.
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where Proclus expounds his whole-and-parts theory,60 while in the first half of
the twelfth century Eustratios of Nicaea excerpted from this andother Proclean
works aswell. Possibly around the sameperiod Ioane Petritsi translated the Ele-
ments of Theology into Georgian and wrote a commentary on it.61
Nonetheless, Proclus’most passionate readers already admitted that he (and
the other Neoplatonists) were often incompatible with Christian dogma.62
In one of his meteorological treatises Michael Psellos writes, with regard to
the demonology of the Chaldean Oracles, that Proclus is just a “story-teller”
or “charlatan” (ὁ τερατολόγος),63 i.e. someone who tells absurd stories, while
the Chaldean Oracles themselves are said to be “foolish talks” (ληρωδίαι),64 an
expressionwhich amongChurchFatherswasusedwith respect toheresies.65 In
the same vein, after summarizing theHellenic view on the evocation of deities,
Psellos comments: “These were the absurd teachings of Porphyry, Iamblichus
and Proclus the story-teller. We wish to make it clear that none of these teach-
ings is a true one, butwehave to learn not only to discern the therapeutic herbs,
but also the poisonous ones, in order to become healthywith the former and to
avoid the latter,without embracing extraneousdoctrines as if theywereours”.66
There are several similar later statements. George Tornikès’Funeral Oration
on princess Anna Komnene is one of the best examples. In this text, written
only a few years earlier than Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli,67 Tornikès adopts the
very same strategy as Psellos: he lists philosophers and associates them with
doctrineswhich cannot be reconciledwith the orthodoxy accepted at the time.
In this way the author suggests that Anna’s fondness for philosophywas a pious
one. The first to appear is Aristotle, whomTornikès blames for his theory on the
eternity of the world and the denial of the Creator and divine providence.68
60 John Italos, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, p. 15.
61 On this Günther 2007, p. 1–25. See also Alexidze 2014.
62 Cf. e.g. Michael Psellos, Opuscula, 19, p. 89.28–33.
63 The word bears a strong negative meaning. Cf. A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ad loc.
64 Michael Psellos, Philosophica Minora, op. 19, p. 74,167–179. Michael Italos, Lettres et dis-
cours, p. 113.17–20.
65 See A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ad loc.
66 Michael Psellos, Theologica, op. 74, p. 297.145–149: Ταῦτα δὴ Πορφύριος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ
ὁ τερατολόγος Πρόκλος ἐλήρησαν· ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἀποπεφάνθω μηδὲν τούτων τυγχάνειν ἀληθές. ἀλλ’
ἡμεῖς γε οὐ τὰς θεραπευούσας μόνον βοτάνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς φαρμακώδεις εἰδέναι ὀφείλομεν, ὡς
ἂν ταύταις μὲν ὑγιαζοίμεθα, ἐκείνων δὲ πόρρω γιγνοίμεθα καὶ μὴ ὡς οἰκείοις τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις περι-
πίπτοιμεν. Michael Psellos, Theologica, op. 90, p. 354.52–56. Other similar texts by Psellos
are discussed in Maltese 1996.
67 See Angelou 1984, p. xlii–xliii.
68 GeorgeTornikès, AFuneralOration, p. 285.14–16. On this allegation, see Bydén 2013, p. 159–
162 and p. 164–165.
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Then comes Plato, who is praised for his acceptance of a Demiurge, creator of
the Universe, but whose doctrine of separate ideas is rejected as impious.69 On
the human soul, according toTornikès, Anna standsmorewith the Platonists in
order to avoid the traditional prejudice on the perishability of Aristotle’s soul.
Yet Tornikès adds that she rejected the Platonic metempsychosis and accep-
ted themore nuanced understanding of Aristotle’s psychology as elaborated by
earlier commentators that sees only the lower faculties as perishable, whereas
the intellect is eternal and immortal.70 A bit later in the text, the Neoplatonists
Proclus and Iamblichus arementioned in opposition to Ps.-Dionysius theAreo-
pagite and his allegedmaster Hierotheos.71 Having said that princess Anna fol-
lowed the latter two, rather than the former two, Tornikès suggests that Anna’s
education, although comprehensive, was animated by the awareness of the
limits of ancient philosophy. In this respect Tornikès depicts the figure of the
ideal intellectual of the time as someone whomixes intellectual curiosity with
an awareness of the limits and realm of validity of the earlier philosophical tra-
dition.
69 George Tornikès, A Funeral Oration, p. 287.12–15.
70 George Tornikès, A Funeral Oration, p. 289.3–19. The Byzantine inherited from the earlier
Patristic literature and from the earlier philosophical authority of Atticus (see Atticus,
Fragments, fr. 7bis) the prejudice that saw Aristotle’s theory on the soul as purporting its
corruption once the body ceases to exist. Some of these witnesses are collected in Bydén
2013, p. 163–164. However, the solution developed in Late Antiquity, according to which
only the intellect survives the corruption of the body was equally known in Byzantium.
This is what Tornikès refers to when he mentions the notion of “double entelecheia” (cf.
GeorgeTornikès, AFuneralOration, p. 289.17) as thatwhich allowshim to acceptAristotle’s
psychology. A very similar textual parallel is found in Priscianus Lydus’ commentary on
Aristotle’s On the Soul. See Ps.-Simplicius (re vera Priscianus Lydus) p. 4.30–5.3: καὶ ἐντε-
λέχεια καὶ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς ὁ πλωτὴρ τῆς νεώς· διττὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια, ἡ μὲν καθ’ ἥν ἐστι ναῦς,
ἡ δὲ ὡς πλωτήρ. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς εἴρηται κοινῇ πάσαις ταῖς τῶν θνητῶν ζῴων ψυχαῖς τὴν
εἰδητικὴν αὐτῶν ἀποδίδωσιν αἰτίαν διττὴν οὖσαν. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἐπεξιὼν ἅμα μὲν
τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν παραδίδωσιν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ πάσαις ὑπάρχον ἰδιοτρόπως καθ’ ἑκάστην
θεωρεῖ, ὅπερ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ παραγγέλλει ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὰς μὲν μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ὀργανικὸν ἀποκλι-
νούσας, τὰς δὲ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ἱσταμένας μᾶλλον ὁρᾷ. καὶ πᾶσαν μὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν
τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ σώματος παραδίδωσιν, οὐ πᾶσαν δὲ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἑαυτῆς δύναμιν· σαφῶς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
εἴρηται μηδὲν συνέχων σῶμα καὶ μηδὲ ὡς ὀργάνῳ τῷ σώματι χρώμενος. Michael Psellos, a wit-
ness closer to Tornikès who knew Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary (according to Steel 2003,
p. 28), refers to the notion of “double entelecheia” as well. Cf. Michael Psellos, Opuscula,
13, p. 44.22–25. As the editor of Psellos’ text diligently noted, the whole text is made out
of excerpts from Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul. The most relevant
Byzantine witnesses that agree with the commentators on this point have been collected
in Bydén 2013, p. 174, n. 74.
71 George Tornikès, A Funeral Oration, p. 299.24–30.
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The same strategy had been adopted in Anna’s Alexiad, written not somany
years before the Refutatio Procli. While reconstructing the events that led to
the condemnation of John Italos,72 Anna depicts Italos as a reader of Proclus,
Plato, Porphyry and Iamblichus, on the one hand, and of Aristotle’s logic, on
the other, who had no awareness of the value of the Neoplatonic doctrines and
their limits. Thus, just as Tornikès depicted Anna’s pious approach to philo-
sophy by opposing Proclus and Iamblichus to Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite and
Hierotheos, Anna compares Italos’ undiscerning approach to the pious attitude
of her parents towardsphilosophical literature. InparticularAnna’s intermezzo
on her parents opposes the books by Proclus, Iamblichus and the like to those
by the Church Fathers, in particular Maximus the Confessor, whose writings
Anna’s mother always brought with her, even to breakfast. In Anna’s narrative
this opposition exemplifies the difference between true Wisdom and the wis-
dom of this world.73
However, Tornikès’ and Anna’s rhetoric should not be understood as fic-
tional. Their statements actually reflect the way the philosophy of the Neo-
platonists (and that of Aristotle’s non-logical works as well) was taught even
by those who, like Psellos, were passionate readers of Neoplatonic books. In
fact, as we have seen before, this does not prevent Psellos from accusing Por-
phyry and Iamblichus of talking non-sense with regard to their account of the
causation process. In this very samepassage,which inmany respects resembles
that discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Proclus is questionned for his
“fairy tales” (τερατολογίαι) on the same subject. Psellos’ words could not have
been clearer: “let us dismiss Proclus’ fairy tales on the way things come to be in
theworld”,74 i.e. through intermediary causes, somethingwhich in Psellos’ view
compromises the Christian prerogatives of the First Cause as the only Cause of
the Universe. This critical approach to Proclus anticipates Nicholas’ Refutatio
Procli, where Nicholas criticizes Proclus on this and other topics as well. In this
respect, one cannot help but notice that the Refutatio Procli fits in very well
with the twelfth-century Byzantine intellectual history.
In theprevious sections of this paperwedemonstrated thatNicholas’Refuta-
tio Procli (including the supposedly Procopian fragments) conveys the author’s
72 On Italos’ condemnation see Clucas 1981, to be updated and correctedwithGouillard 1985.
73 Anna Komnene, Alexias, p. 5.9.1–3.
74 Michael Psellos, Philosophica Minora, p. 123.102–105: ἐκ μιᾶς γὰρ ἀρχῆς πάντα γεγέννηται,
ὡς τὰ ἱερά φασι λόγια, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου, ὡς τὰ Πορφυρίου καὶ Ἰαμβλίχου ληροῦσι περὶ
τῶν προόδων συντάγματα. ἀποπεμπέσθωσαν δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ αἱ τοῦ Πρόκλου τερατολογίαι περὶ τῶν
ἀπογεννήσεων […].
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concerns for contemporary theological issues such as the Filioque.75 There is
more. Three times in the Refutatio Procli Nicholas cautiously accepts Proclus’
theory that the effects revert upon the causes, but warns the reader not to
understand this in terms of Origen’s apokatastasis.76 The author here suggests
that Origen derived his apokatastasis theory from Proclus. Such a statement
would be rather bizarre if the authorwere Procopius of Gaza, whowould surely
have known that this was chronologically impossible. However, it fits well with
Nicholas’ theological endeavours. In fact, Nicholas wrote a theological treat-
ise on ICor. 15.28 in order to dissuade contemporary readers of this text from
understanding the sentence ἵνα ᾖ ὁ Θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι as a reference to Ori-
gen’s apokatastasis.77 The interesting thing is that the expression τὰ πάντα ἐν
πᾶσι occurs in prop. 103 of Proclus’Elements of Theology as well, where Proclus
writes: “All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature”
(Πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ).78 All Proclus wants to say here is that
participation takes place according to the status of the participant. Nicholas’
comments on this text make it clear that all things are in God insofar as He
is their cause and that God is in all things according to participation, but not
according to existence, for, if so, each thingwouldbe indistinguishable from the
others.79 Doubtless Nicholas must have connected these texts in that they are
both part of one and the same concern, namely avoiding confusion between
Cause and effects, Creator and creatures.
From this it is pretty clear that the Refutatio Procli reflects theological con-
cerns discussed by Nicholas elsewhere. This is even more evident when one
compares the Refutatio Procliwith Nicholas’ efforts in the controversy over the
liturgical expression “For youare theOfferer, theOffered, theOnewho receives”
(Σὺ εἶ ὁ προσφέρων καὶ προσφερόμενος καὶ προσδεχόμενος). It all started around
1155, when Nikephoros Basilakes and Michael of Thessaloniki, two teachers
in the Patriarchal School of Constantinople, suggested that the rendering of
Christ simultaneously as victim, officiant and receiver is self-contradictory.80
By contrast, according to these teachers, the sacrifice was offered to the Father
alone.Nikephoros andMichaelwere condemned in 1156, but found apower ally
in thepatriarch-elect of Antioch, SoterichosPanteugenes.The latter is probably
75 Cf. supra p. 103–107.
76 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 41.12–14; 42.13–15;
149.27–28.
77 Cf. Angelou 1984, p. LXIII.
78 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 103, p. 92.13–16.
79 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, 103, p. 99.30–32.
80 See Kazdhan, Epstein 1985, p. 160–161; Magdalino 1993, p. 279–289; Felmy 2011.
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to be identified with the Soterichos who was author of a work on the eternal
generation of the Son addressed to Patriarch Michael II Oxeites (Korkouas)
(1143–1146) in MS Angel.gr. 43, f. 189v–192.
Soterichos is an interesting figure in the reception of Plato and Platonism
in twelfth-century Byzantium. In order to support his view on the nature of
Christ’s sacrifice he composed a Platonic dialogue;81 when questioned by the
synod, he answered with an apology whose words echo here and there the
vocabulary of Plato’s Apology of Socrates.82 More importantly, Soterichos may
be the author of a certain number of scholia to Nicomachus’ Introduction to
Arithmetic largely taken from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus.83
Both because of his view on this theological controversy and because of his
fondness for Platonism, Soterichos exemplified everything Nicholas disliked.
In fact, he was personally involved in the controversy over Christ’s sacrifice
and challenged Soterichos’s teaching in a work known as Refutation of the
teaching of Soterichos Panteugenes, Patriarch-elect of Antioch (Ἀντίρρησις πρὸς
τὰ γραφέντα παρὰ Σωτηρίχου τοῦ προβληθέντος Πατριάρχου Ἀντιοχείας). This text
is important for two reasons: first, its existence demonstrates that Nicholas
was accustomed to composing works in the form of a refutation; second, it is
important because, just as in the case of his opposition to the Filioque and in
that of the right interpretation of ICor. 15.28, Nicholas here saw the controversy
with Soterichos through the lens of his opposition to Proclus’ Neoplatonism.
Let us give an example of this.
Following Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.22 (83a33), section 184 of Nicholas’
Refutatio Procli dismisses in toto Proclus’ classes of divine soul and Gods as
“twittering” (τερετίσματα). Just as Aristotle had rejected Plato’s theory of forms
insofar as this treats concepts as self-subsisting realities, so the Christian Nich-
olas challenges Proclus’ classes of gods and divine souls as mere notions with
no existence beyond the mind that conceives them.84 Unsurprisingly, this very
same text parallels Nicholas’Refutatio (Ἀντίρρησις) of Soterichos. According to
Nicholas, while defending the view that the sacrifice is offered to the Father
alone, Soterichos had denied the very status of the Trinity and had considered
the Father and the Son as two distinct and independent substances. According
to Nicholas, Soterichos does away with the notion of person and relies exclus-
ively on that of nature. But this would be absurd, for—claims Nicholas—not
81 See Spingou 2017.
82 See Trizio 2019, p. 596–597.
83 Part of the tradition of the scholia ascribes them to Michael Psellos. See Moore 2005,
PHI 72a e PHI 72b. See Hofstetter 2018.
84 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 184, 160.18–23.
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even Plato introduced forms or ideas as self-subsisting entities or natures.85
Intriguingly, Nicholas attributes to Plato a theory according to which genus
and species, understood as ideas, can be more or less general and are called
“henads”. Obviously here Nicholas attributes a well-known Proclean doctrine
to Plato.86 By the same token,whenNicholas refers to Plato’s distinction among
primary and secondary deities he alludes to Proclus’ classifications of souls and
deities.87 Just as he did in the Refutatio Procli, in his Refutatio Soterichi, Nicholas
mentions Aristotle’s description of the Platonic ideas as “twittering” (τερετί-
σματα).88
Fromwhat has been said, it seems that Nicholas’Refutatio Procli conveys the
main theological controversies of the time as if these could be traced back to
one and the same source: Proclus. In other words, it seems that in Nicholas’
view the most important theological controversies of his time (the Filioque,
the interpretation of ICor. 15.28, the dispute over Christ’s sacrifice) could all be
addressed through the prism of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. In the end that
is what Nicholas himself suggests in the prologue of the Refutatio Procli, where
he explicitly intends to prevent thoseChristian readers of Proclus from slipping
into blasphemous heresies.89We believe that these included Nicholas’ oppon-
ents in the theological controversies in which he was involved as a theologian.
6 Another Incongruence: The Use of Aristotle in the Refutatio Procli
Another feauture of the Refutatio Procli transmitted as Nicholas’ is the distinct-
iveAristotelianismof its author. Nicholas exploits Ps.-Dionysius theAreopagite
in order to contest Proclus’ errors in theology, but when attacking Proclus for
his philosophical mistakes, Nicholas makes use of Aristotle’s physical theories
as corrective of Proclus’ errors.90 Section 96, for instance, challenges Proclus’
theorem that “the power of every finite body, if it is infinite, is incorporeal.”91
85 Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, p. 324.9–27. Text discussed also in Golitsis 2014, p. 48 in connec-
tion to the scholia to Aristotle’s Metaphysics in MS Par.gr. 1853.
86 On which see Chlup 2012, p. 212–219.
87 Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, p. 324.14–19: καθ’ ὅσον καὶ πρώτας εἶναι ταύτας καὶ αὐθυποστάτους
οὐσίας εἴτουν φύσεις, μάλιστα τὰς καθολικωτέρας, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰς μερικωτέρας ὑφεστάναι διισχυ-
ρίζεται,ὡς καὶ θεοὺς ταύτας πρώτους καὶ δευτέρους ἀναγορεύειν, κἀκ τούτων αὖθις τἄλλα λέγειν
ὑφίστασθαι. See Chlup 2012, p. 119–127.
88 Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, p. 324.19–23.
89 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, p. 2.6–12.
90 See Trizio 2014, p. 207.
91 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop. 96.
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Nicholas here rejects as superfluous Proclus’ restriction of the principle at hand
to finite bodies alone on the basis that, as Aristotle states in Physics 3.5.205b35–
206a7, there is no such thing as an infinite body.92 Accordingly, in section 94 of
the Refutatio Procli, Nicholas criticises Proclus’ theorem that “all perpetuity is a
certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity” by recalling that according
to Aristotle’s On the Heavens 1.5–9 there is only one world and this cannot be
infinite in nature.93
By contrast, as Michael W. Champion has elucidated, along with the refusal
of other philosophical sources, Procopius of Gaza’s known work endorses a
rather negative attitude towards Aristotle’s physics and cosmology. For
example, in his Commentary on Genesis Procopius elaborates a powerful rejec-
tion of the cornerstones of Aristotle’s physical theory, such as Aristotle’s prime
matter (cf. e.g. Metaphysics 7.3.1028b36–1029a20; Physics, 4.2.209b6–11), as
something that has no quality, dimension or form.94 In the same work, Pro-
copius dismisses the Aristotelian arguments on the eternity of matter (In de
caelo 3.2.301b30–302a9; Physics 1.9.192a27–32) and restores the Christian view
on this subject.95 It is surely true that in all these cases Procopius contests Aris-
totle as one of the several Greek philosophers supporting unacceptable views
on creation, but still the difference in the treatment of Aristotle in the Com-
mentary on Genesis and in the Refutatio Procli is so striking that it is hard, if
not impossible, to believe that these works belong to one and the same author.
Nor does the positive use of Aristotle found in the Refutatio Procli correspond
with other late-antique works similar to the Commentary on Genesis, such as,
for instance, Ps.-Justin’s Confutatio quorundam Aristotelis dogmatum, a work
possibly coming from the milieu of Gaza.96
On the contrary, the acceptance of Aristotle in the Refutatio Procli resembles
the wider twelfth-century reception of Aristotle as a safe authority compatible
with Christianity vis-à-vis the more dangerous Platonic source-material. Two
witnesses from this period are relevant. The first witness is the inaugural lec-
ture given around the mid-twelfth century by Michael III ‘Anchialos’ on the
occasionof his appointment as consul of thephilosophers.HereMichael prom-
ises to stick to the safer Aristotelian logic and meteorology and to avoid the
more dangerous Platonic doctrines.97 The second witness comes from a set
92 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, 96, p. 94.22–24.
93 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, 94, p. 93.12–13.
94 Procopius of Gaza, Commentary on Genesis, p. 5.111–10.250. Cf. Champion 2014, p. 112–113.
95 Procopius of Gaza, Commentary on Genesis, p. 5.111–10.250. Cf. Champion 2014, p. 114.
96 Cf. Boeri 2009.
97 Browning 1961, p. 190.103–110. On the dating of the text, see Polemis 2011.
116 gioffreda and trizio
of twelfth-century scholia preserved in MS Par.gr. 1853 (f. 225v–308r). Here an
anomyous scholiast wrote in themargin of Aristotle’sMetaphysics his own per-
sonal remarks, which were mostly sympathetic towards Aristotle’s philosophy
and rather critical of Plato. As Pantelis Golitsis elucidates, there are strong
philological similarities between the vocabulary of the scholia and Nicholas
of Methone’s distinctive antiplatonism.98
Clearly the positive appraisal of Aristotle’s philosophy in the Refutatio Procli
exemplifies twelfth-century intellectual trends. One can indeed contend that
the passages of the Refutatio Procliwhere Nicholas sympathizes with Aristotle
belong to Nicholas’ alleged re-elaboration of an earlier version of the text by
Procopius. And, yet, this positive usage of Aristotle only adds substance to the
enormous pile of arguments favoring Nicholas’ authorship of the text, which
is so large that at a certain point one gets the impression that Nicholas had no
need of an earlier version of the Refutatio and that nowhere in the text does
the presence of an earlier version by Procopius appear evident at all.
7 The Fragments: A Philologist’s View
We have already lengthily discussed the content and historical circumstances
of the fragments of the Refutatio Procli found in the Vatican manuscripts. Let
us now present the fragments from a philological point of view.
There are two fragments of the Refutatio Procli attributed to Procopius. They
have both been copied in MSS Vat. gr. 1096 andVat. gr. 604 by one and the same
book-hand, that of the prolific Byzantine scribe and scholar Isaak Argyros. In
particular chapter 146 of the Refutatio is found in MS Vat. gr. 1096 at f. 52r12–
52v18 and at f. 61r of the same manuscript. As to chapter 139, it is found in MS
Vat. gr. 1096 at f. 108r15–27, and in MS Vat. gr. 604 f. 46r1–9 ab imo. These chapters
of the Refutatio Procli have been edited as authentic Procopian fragments by
Amato (ch. 139 = fr. VIII.1; ch. 146 = fr. VIII.2),99 who concluded on this basis that
the Refutatio Procliwas originally composed by Procopius of Gaza and later re-
elaborated by Nicholas of Methone in the twelfth century. According to this
view, the fragments in MSS Vat. gr. 1096 and Vat. gr. 604 are the only existing
witnesses to the Procopian Refutatio Procli.
However, in its present state theRefutatio includesnumerous features incon-
sistent with Procopius.100 In this regard, if we were to retain Amato’s view,
98 Golitsis 2014, p. 43–50.
99 Cf. supra p. 95–97.
100 Cf. supra p. 102–116.
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we must accept a paradox: the Refutatio is a twelfth-century work in all its
parts with the exception of chapters 139 and 146, where the text is entirely Pro-
copian.101 As said above, this conclusion invites more problems than it solves.
Let us now add a few remarks concerning the textual aspects of the fragments
of the Refutatio Procli attributed to Procopius in the Vaticanimanuscripts. The
first observation concerns the state of the fragments in the Vatican manu-
scripts, in particular the fact that they have all been copied by a single scribe.
Amato’s view on the origin of the fragments would be more compelling had
the fragments been copied by two or more scribes independently from each
other. However, this is not the case, for the scribe in our case is one and the
same. It is pretty obvious that, being convinced of the Procopian authorship of
the fragments, the scribe reproduced the same attributionwhenever he copied
the two texts. But Amato believes he can avoid this inconvenience on the basis
of the state of the fragments in the manuscripts. In fact, the text of the frag-
ments has been copied more than once in the Vaticani manuscripts, and the
different redactions occasionally show some variant readings. From this Amato
concludes that the scribe had at his disposal two different redactions both
attributing the text (evidently independently from each other) to Procopius.102
This argument, however, becomes less compelling oncewe take into account
themodus operandi of the scribe, who is known for introducing his own correc-
tions in scribendo.103 Thus the variant readings present in the different redac-
tions of the fragments may not indicate the existence of more than one tradi-
tion of the same text. More importantly, a close inspection of Amato’s extens-
ive list of variant readings,104 suggests that many are mere misreadings by the
editor.105 For example, it is not true that chapter 139 as transmitted in MS Vat.
gr. 604 at f. 46r does not read καί before λέγοιτο. The καί is perfectly read in the
usual abbreviated form. Vat. gr. 604 f. 46r and Vat. gr. 1096 f. 108r reads κυρι-
ότατα instead of Amato’s κυριότατον.106 MS Vat. gr. 1096 f. 108r (and not Vat.
gr. 604, as Amato believes) reads τῶν μὴ κοινωνούντων instead of Amato’s τῶν
κοινωνούντων.107 The absence of πνεύματος in the version of ch. 146 found in
101 Cf. supra p. 98.
102 See Amato 2010, p. 12.
103 Cf. infra p. 124–128.
104 Cf. Amato 2010, p. 11–12.
105 For example, at fr. VIII.2 l. 30 we read ἐπιστροφαῖςwith manuscript Vat. gr. 1096 instead of
Amato’s ἐπιτροφαῖς.
106 The form κυριότατα is found in some of the manuscripts of the Refutatio Procli edited as
Nicholas of Methone.
107 In any case one must follow MS Vat. gr. 604 f. 46r and the whole manuscript tradition of
Nicholas of Methone’s Refutatio Procli in reading τῶν οὐρανίων.
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MS Vat. gr. 1096 f. 52r–v is a mere lapsus of the scribe. MS Vat. gr. 1096 f. 52r
wrongly cites the fragment as ρνς´ instead of ρμς´, but Amato wrongly reads ρν´,
just as he wrongly reads ρμ´ instead of ρμς´ in the redaction of chapter 146 in
MS Vat. gr. 1096 at f. 61r.108 In the same manuscript, at f. 108r, we read οὐδὲν
οὔτε πρῶτως οὔτε κυρίως instead of οὐδὲν οὔτε πρῶτως καὶ κυρίως. The vari-
ant οὔτε should have been noted in the apparatus. The same holds true for
fr. VIII.2, l. 35, where MS Vat. gr. 1096 f. 52v does not read καί and fr. VIII.2
l. 37, where MS Vat. gr. 1006 f. 61r does not read καί after καθά. Finally, Amato
diligently noted the differences in the titles of the fragments in the Vaticani
manuscripts, but did not realize that these are due to the fact that in MSS Vat.
gr. 604 f. 46r and Vat. gr. 1096 f. 52r–v and 61r the fragments are parts of an
anthology prepared by the scribe for the composition of future works, whereas
in MS Vat. gr. 1096 f. 108r the fragments appear as a citation in a theological
work.
In light of our analysis of the text, we believe that neither the number of the
variant readings nor their type signifies the existence of more than one tradi-
tion or redaction of the fragments. The few discrepancies are mere corrections
in scribendo or variants found in the manuscripts of Nicholas’Refutatio Procli,
and, therefore, their importance should not be overstated.
8 The Fragments: A Paleographer’s View. The Anti-Palamite florilegia
of Vat. gr. 1096 and the Two Extracts of Nicholas of Methone’s
Refutatio Procli
MS Vat. gr. 1096 is a composite volume consisting of 246 folios, plus an inde-
pendent unit between folios 170 and 171 which formerly belonged to the earlier
Vat. gr. 1892.109 The manuscript contains seven codicological units which, with
the exception of the last one (dating to the fifteenth century), are all linked to
the activity of the Byzantine anti-Palamite circle close to the Kydones’ broth-
ers and Nikephoros’ Gregoras’ pupil Isaak Argyros.110 The latter is a key fig-
ure in both the so-called “Palaiologan Renaissance” of the late fourteenth-
century and in the theological controversies of the same period. In fact, Isaak
shared the scientific interests of his master as well as his commitment to
108 The mistake has been corrected in the Teubner edition of the fragments.
109 On this unit see Mercati 1931, p. 230. For a description of the codex see also Polemis 2012,
p. lxx–lxxx.
110 Cf. Rigo 1989.
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refute the theological teachings of Gregory Palamas. Before clarifying the role
played by Argyros in this codex, especially in regard to the two fragments from
Nicholas of Methone’s Refutatio Procli attributed to Procopius, we consider it
worthwhile to offer a preliminary description of the units’ content.
The first unit (f. 1–64) gathers numerous extracts fromdifferentChurchFath-
ers, copied by at least eight different hands. Among these it is possible to dis-
tinguish one main scribe, A, to whom we can ascribe the entire copy of the
collection of texts transmitted at f. 17r–58v. Although anonymous, this scribe
is otherwise known from several other manuscripts linked to Isaak Argyros’
anti-Palamite circle. The hand of this scribe is quite regular, proceeds with
geometrically-shaped letters and angular strokes giving an aspect both stiff and
forced. This is especially true for his formal handwriting, where he forgoes curs-
ive in favor of sharp right angles. Typical of this scribe’s handwriting are the
shape of uppercase beta, lowercase epsilon in an ancient form (cut in half) and
phi written with oval loop. Among ligatures the most characteristic is that of
tau-iota, with the vowel lifting from the basic line and surmounted by dier-
esis.111
Afterwards, other hands added further implementations wherever they
found empty spaces, such as blank pages, marginal vacua or half-empty sheets.
Thesebookhands include IsaakArgyros,whocontributed to the compositionof
this theological anthology, transcribing twice chapter 146 fromNicholas’Refut-
atio Procli. Isaak copied this text first at f. 52r–52v; then he copied it again
at f. 61r. In both cases Argyros registered the title of the work from which he
drew the fragments. Yet, he made a mistake at f. 52r as he reported the text
as chapter 156, instead of chapter 146. At f. 52r we read: Προκοπίου Γάζης ἐκ
τῶν εἰς τὰ θεολογικὰ κεφάλαια τοῦ Ἕλληνος Πρόκλου ἀντιρρήσεων, κεφαλαίου ρνς´.
Instead at f. 61r the same chapter, equally considered as stemming from Pro-
copius’ work, is numbered rightly as 146 in the title: f. 61r ἐκ τῶν εἰς τὰ τοῦ
Πρόκλου θεολογικὰ κεφάλαια ἀντιρρήσεων Προκοπίου Γάζης ἀντίρρησις κεφαλαίου
ρμς.112
The identification of Isaak Argyros’ hand is due toMercati, who in 1931 iden-
tified this book-hand in several Vatican manuscripts related to the Palamite
111 In Gioffreda 2020 the copyist here named as A has been recognized in the following
manuscripts, all of which related to anti-Palamite circle: Laur. Plut. 56.14 (f. 1–163v); Vat.
gr. 604 (f. 17r–47); Vat. gr. 678 (f. 63r–69v); Vat. gr. 1094 (f. 63v); Vat. gr. 1096 (f. 1r–8r, 9r–17v,
19r–20r, 21rv, 22v–23r, 26r–27r, 36v–40r, 53r–54v, 64r–64v). For a specimen see: https://digi.
vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1096.
112 Cf. Mercati 1931, p. 265–266 and Bianconi 2008, p. 354.
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controversy,113 including the above-mentioned fragments as well as another
fragment of the Refutatio Procli in MS Vat. gr. 604 (f. 39–47).114
As it is well known to specialists, Mercati has gained a definitive confirma-
tion for his hypothetical identification thanks to amarginal note left byArgyros
on f. 138v of Vat. gr. 176, a witness of Ptolemy’s Harmonica.115 The numer-
ous scholia surrounding the main text in this manuscript must be assigned
to Argyros’ hand as well.116 Argyros’s note reads as follows: “This material has
been revised not by the philosopherGregoras, but rather by his pupil, themonk
Isaak Argyros” (διωρθώσατο δὲ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁ φιλόσοφος Γρηγορᾶς ἀλλ’ ὁ μαθητευ-
θεὶς αὐτῷ Ἰσαὰκ μοναχὸς ὁ Ἀργυρός). This allowed Mercati to identify Argyros
as the main scribe of the codex and as the author of several of its exegetical
notes.
Let us present in short the characteristics of Argyros’ book-hand.
8.1 Argyros’ Hand
Argyros’ handwriting is a small, regular and tidy hand, which slightly bends to
the right, and is marked by the presence of angular strokes and vertical traits
stretched over both the upper and lower writing lines.117 In spite of its several
abbreviations and tachygraph signs, Argyros’ cursive handwriting still remains
stylish and neat. In light of these features and because of the angular strokes
peculiar to this handwriting, Argyros’ book-hand has been associated with a
113 More recently afterMercati, who recognizedArgyros’ hand inVat. gr. 604, Vat. gr. 1096, Vat.
gr. 1102, Vat. gr. 1115, Vat. gr. 2335, other scholars have increased the attribution of Argyros
in up to thirty manucripts. We indicate here for each attribution the scholars in brack-
ets: Laur. Plut. 28.13 (Mondrain 2008), Laur. Plut. 89 sup. 48 (Bianconi 2008); Marc. gr. 155
(Bianconi 2008, Mondrain 2008), Marc. gr. 162 (Mondrain 2008), Marc. gr. 308 (Bianconi
2008, Mondrain 2008), Marc. gr. 310 (Bianconi 2008), Marc. gr. 323 (Bianconi 2008, Mon-
drain 2008); Neap. III D 37 (Bianconi 2008), Norimb. Cent. V App. 36, Norimb. Cent. V
App. 37, Norimb. Cent. V App. 38 (Mondrain 2008, Murr 1930); Par. gr. 940 (Mondrain
2008), Par. gr. 1246, Par. gr. 1276 (Mondrain 2008, Pérez Martín 2008), Par. gr. 2507 (Mon-
drain 2008), Par. gr. 2758 (Mondrain 2008), Par. gr. 2821 (Bianconi 2008, Mondrain 2008);
Parm. 154 (Bianconi 2008, Mondrain 2008); Prah. XXV. C. 31 (Mondrain 2008); Vat. Pal. gr.
174 (Menchelli 2014), Vat. gr. 81 (Bianconi 2008), Vat. gr. 1094 (Polemis 2012), Vat. gr. 1721
(Bianconi 2008). In addition, there are three new identifications, namely that of Esc. Y III
21, Vat. gr. 573 and Par. gr. 1672, for those see Gioffreda 2020.
114 See again Mercati 1931, p. 158–159, p. 259–265.
115 See Mercati 1931 and Laue, Makris 2002, p. 226–245.
116 This conjectural identification by Düring 1930, p. XXXIII was confirmed by Mercati 1931,
p. 229, n. 6.
117 For a description of Argyros’ hand see Bianconi 2008, p. 356, Mondrain 2008, p. 165–170,
Pérez Martín 2008, p. 445–448 and Gioffreda 2020, p. 29–43.
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current known as “geometrical”. Interestingly, the book-hands belonging to this
category are found in several fourteenth-century mathematical and scientific
manuscripts.118
Furthermore, according to Bianconi and Pérez Martín, Argyros’ script is
based on twodifferentmodels: on the one hand, the above-mentioned geomet-
rical script; on the other, the individual writing of Argyros’ teacher, Nikephoros
Gregoras.119 Typical of the latter model are the shapes of the bilobular beta,
rare in “geometrical” handwriting, of the enlarged uppercase kappa and the
frequent ligatures of iota and tau, with the latter marked by an angular track at
the bottom. The influence of Gregoras’ script is more evident in Argyros’ curs-
ive handwriting which is mostly used for copying scholia, marginal notes or
vacua spaces. It is, by contrast, rarely used for copying main texts. In the latter
case Argyros adopts a more regular script typical of the so-called τῶν Ὁδηγῶν
style, although in a version less formal than expected. Typical of this script
is the zeta in form of two, with angular tracts, and the uppercases delta and
lambda. Both these handwritings coexist for example in f. 177r of ms. Neap. III
D 37.
8.2 Argyros and theRefutatio Procli
As stated by Mercati long ago, the two extracts of the Refutatio Procli in Vat.
gr. 1096 have clearly been copied by Isaak Argyros. On the basis of this iden-
tification we can go one step further in the attempt to clarify the reasons why
Argyros copied these two fragments, as well as the manner in which he used
and re-elaborated them for his own purposes. Before doing so, we shall briefly
present the other fragment from Nicholas’ Refutatio found at f. 46r of Vat. gr.
604.120
This codex is also composite andcollects at thebeginning twodifferent theo-
logical anthologies. Just as in the case of MS Vat. gr. 1096, the two anthologies
preserved in MS Vat. gr. 604 concern the fourteenth-century Palamite contro-
versy.121 The first collects passages concerning the nature of the Taboric light
(f. 17–38), whereas the second contains a theological florilegium against the
essence-energies distinction (f. 39–47). Both anthologies are copied in their
main parts by the main copyist of the anthology transmitted in the first unit
118 For a description of these handwriting see Pérez Martín 2008, p. 440.
119 Descriptions of Argyros’ hand canbe found inBianconi 2008, PérezMartín 2008 andMon-
drain 2008 and Gioffreda 2020.
120 Mercati 1931, p. 158–159, p. 259–265. For a reproduction of the manuscript see: https://digi
.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.604.
121 On this controversy, see Russell 2017.
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of Vat. gr. 1096, namely scribe A, who copied f. 17r–58v with exception of the
five annotations left by Argyros on f. 46r–47r.122 Among these, we should focus
on that one at f. 46r, l. 1–9, where Argyros transcribed chapter 139 of Nicholas’
Refutatio under the name of Procopius of Gaza: φησὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῖς Προκλικοῖς
κεφαλαίοις ἀντιλέγων σοφὸς τὰ θεῖαΠροκόπιος ὁ Γάζης ἐν ἀντιρρήσει κεφαλαίου ρλθ.
Before addressing the issue of the real motivation behind Argyros’ exploit-
ation of the Refutatio Procli, we shall briefly present other anthologies of the
same kind copied under the same circumstance of those preserved in the two
aforementioned Vaticanmanuscripts. In fact, we believe that Argyros’ excerpt-
ing from the Refutatio Procli can only be understood when seen in the light of
his commitment against the Palamite theology.
8.2.1 Other Anti-Palamite Anthologies
The production of dogmatic anthologies containing extracts from different
works seems to be one of themost important prerogatives of the figures known
for taking part in the Palamite controversy. These collections often occupy one
or twounits of amanuscript and gather extracts from the earlier synodal tomes,
especially those of 1341 and 1351, passages from the Church Fathers and from
later authors, and finally passages derived from the opponents’ works. Some-
times they are found as organized in topics and introduced by pinakes that
illustrate their content. In all likelihood the composition of these anthologies
had several purposes, such as facilitating the research of crucial anduseful quo-
tations, making authoritative sources available to those who wished to write
their own works, making available to authors an appropriate procedure for
drafting of new texts and for producing new anthologies. In the Palamite con-
troversy both sides resorted to such a literary product.
Thanks to Antonio Rigo’s important studies we know of several of these
theological anthologies composed by both pro-Palamite theologians and by
their opponents.123 We have already mentioned those contained in Vatt. grr.
604 and 1096 copied, among others, by scribe A and by Isaak Argyros. Both
textual and paleographical evidence allow us to relate to the same milieu the
anthologies transmitted in the followingmanuscripts: Marc. gr. 162 (f. 1r–103v),
Vat. gr. 678 (f. 62–103v) and Vall. F. 30 (f. 2r–297v).
Let us provide a few remarks on these anthologies, on the way they were
produced and on their use by the theologians involved in the controversy.
122 Russell 2017, p. 264–265.
123 Rigo 1989, p. 135–149.
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8.2.1.1 MS Vat. gr. 678
MS Vat. gr. 678 preserves at f. 62r–103v a florilegium consisting of various
excerpts and divided into three sections: the first one (f. 62v–86v) is divided
into twelve chapters and transmits among other texts the profession of faith
of the Byzantine Thomist and anti-Palamite Prochoros Kydones;124 the second
one (f. 87r–96v) is composed of nine chapters; the last (f. 96v–103v) preserves
various extracts from Gregory Palamas’ works under the title: Τοῦ Παλαμᾶ
ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ φωτὸς λόγου αὐτοῦ. Four different book-hands collaborated in
these folios. All of them are copyists involved in the production of several
manuscripts belonging to Isaak Argyros’ circle.125 For example, f. 63r–69r have
been copied by the previously-mentioned Scribe A, while Argyros left three
autograph annotations on the much-debated episode of Christ’s transfigura-
tion on Mount Tabor (Mt. 17.1–8 et passim):126 an excerpt from Leontius of
Byzantium’sHomelia inTrasfigurationem on f. 86v, wrongly transmitted as John
Chrysostom; two unknown passages at f. 103v on the light seen by the disciples
on Mount Tabor;127 and finally, in the margins of f. 101v–102r, a passage from
Anastasius Sinaita’s Homelia in Trasfigurationem.128
8.2.1.2 MSMarc. gr. 162
The first unit of this fourteenth-centurymanuscript transmits an anti-Palamite
florilegium in 64 chapters (f. 1r–103v) and Argyros’ treatise De paternitate et fili-
atione dei (104r–116v), both copied by an anonymous but prolific scribe, whose
career has been related to Nikephoros Gregoras and his circle.129 The second
unit preserves one of John Kyparissiotes’ work, Utrum proprietates personales
in Trinitate ab essentia differant (f. 117r–125v) copied by the hand of John Dukas
Malakes.130 In the marginal spaces of this second unit Argyros left two differ-
ent annotations, at f. 117r and f. 118v.131 In light of this we can safely assume
that Argyros supervised the copy not only of this unit, but also of the first unit
124 On PLP, no. 13883.
125 On this manuscript Cf. Codices Vaticani Graeci III, p. 132–136, andMercati 1931, p. 248–251,
and Bianconi 2008, p. 362–365.
126 Among others, we detected the following book-hands: Anonymous ξ at f. 62r, 69v–72v,
76v–86r, 87r–96v, Anonymous ερ at f. 97r–101v, and finally at f. 73r–76r a well-known copy-
ist named John Dukas Malakes. On the latter, see Gioffreda 2020, p. 140–141.
127 The first one occupying the lines 1–14 of f. 103v, inc.: τοίνυν ἐν πάσαις, des.: ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ
λέγειν; the second one at l. 15–28, inc.: καὶ αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ σημασία, des.: εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν ἅν.
128 Cf. Guillou 1995, p. 239, l. 6–5, inc.: σήμερον γὰρ ἀληθῶν, des.: κατάστασις.
129 See Bianconi 2015, p. 261, n. 126, also for the bibliography.
130 Cf. Gioffreda 2020, p. 51, 62, 248. On Kyparissiotes cf. PLP 13900.
131 See Mondrain 2008, p. 168.
124 gioffreda and trizio
containing the anti-Palamite florilegium, fromwhich he derived excerpts from
Isaac of Nineveh, Evagrius Ponticus and Diadocus of Photice.132
8.2.1.3 MS Vallicellianus F 30
MS Vallicellianus F. 30 transmits at f. 2r–297v a rich anti-palamite florilegium
to be dated on the basis of a paleographical analysis to the fourteenth century,
not to the fifteenth century as proposed byMartini’s outdated catalogue of the
Greek manuscripts preserved in Italy.133 The florilegium is divided into several
chapters and has been mostly copied by two principal scribes, although later
hands are present as well. The twomain scribes display scholarly hands proper
to the book-hands of this century.
This composition is based on the same Patristic and post-Patristic sources
employed in the previous collections. It must be noted that in the margins of
some of the fragments there are notes concerning the sources and books from
which the passages were drawn. Among these, one of the scribes refers to the
books of John Dukas Malakes. It is no coincidence that this name occurs also
in the margins of Vat. gr. 604, where scribe A noted that the passage from Cyril
of Alexandria on Luke’s Gospel on the divine transfiguration (Luke 9.28–36) is
taken “from Doukas’ book” (ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ὅπερ καὶ ὁ Δούκας ἔχει).134 From this
factwe can infer that in themilieu involved in the composition of anti-Palamite
florilegia the same books circulated and that different copyists worked on the
same source materials.
As Stiglmayr has shown, both florilegia in MSVat. gr. 1096 and in MSVallicel-
lianus F 30 are very similar both with regard to their structure and content.135
Interestingly, inmany instancesMSVallicellianus F 30 transmits several scholia
and excerpts with no indication of the authorship.136
8.3 The Drafting of Argyros’ Adversus Cantacuzenum
The case of Isaak Argyros’ Adversus Cantacuzenum (Argyros’ work containing
the excerpts from the Refutatio Procli ascribed to Procopius) offers a sample of
the re-using of Patristic quotations by the individuals involved in the hesychast
controversy. The work is addressed to John VI Kantakouzenos, a fervent
defender of Gregory Palamas’ teachings who served as Grand Domestikos
132 See Rigo 2012, p. 101–103.
133 See Martini 1902, p. 156–157.
134 On the annotations see Mercati 1931, p. 260, 263–265, Rigo 1987–1989, p. 126–129 and
Bianconi 2008, p. 364, n. 82.
135 Stiglmayr 1989, p. 263–301, 300–301.
136 Stiglmayr 1989, p. 300–301.
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under emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328–1341), as regent for John V
Palaiologos (emperor from 1341) and as emperor between 1347–1354.137
We shall now provide some arguments that refute once and for all the attri-
bution of the Adversus Cantacuzenum to Johannes Kyparissiotes, as suggested
by the editor of the text, Ioannis Polemis, against the earlier views by Mercati
and Rigo, who rightly attributed the text to Isaak Argyros.138 Mercati noticed
that the Adversus Cantacuzenum contains several passages found in other
treatises of the same Argyros. For example, in chapter 21, l. 8–57 of Adversus
Cantacuzenum (cfr. ed. Polemis 2012, p. 73–75) one can find the very same pro-
fession of faith written by Argyros in his letter addressed to Gedeon.139 Further
textual concordances found by Mercati include the citations of the excerpts
fromGregory of Nazianzus’Oratio XXIX andOratio XIX found in Adversus Can-
tacuzenum. The former figures in the introduction to Argyros’Περὶ τοῦ μετοχῆς,
whereas both are found in the conclusion of Adversus Cantacuzenum. The lat-
ter was copied by Argyros at the beginning of Tomus Anthiochenus in Vat. gr.
2335140 and then employed at the very beginning of Adversus Cantacuzenum.141
In addition, Rigo proved the relationship between the Adversus Cantacuzenum
and the anti-palamite florilegium contained in Marc. gr. 162, a manuscript that
Argyros knew well, as demonstrated by the presence of his book-hands in this
manuscript. Finally, Rigo pointed out that chapters 255–257 of Adversus Can-
tacuzenum include the samepassages from Isaac of Nineveh, Evagrius Ponticus
and Diadocus of Photice available on f. 55r–57v of this anti-Palamite florile-
gium.142
Whereas the attribution of Adversus Cantacuzenus to Argyros appears cer-
tain beyond doubt, it is in our view important to describe the way Argyros
re-elaborated and re-used the source-material available to him. In particular
we would like to point out the strong connection between the previously-
mentioned florilegia and Argyros’ own works. For example, chapters 156–158
of Adversus Cantacuzenum are built around the extracts copied by Argyros at
f. 46r–47r of the anthology transmitted in Vat. gr. 604. As mentioned above,
at l. 6–8 of f. 46r Argyros copied the text of chapter 139 of the Refutatio Procli
which he then used in chapter 158 of the Adversus Cantacuzenum, where it is
137 See PLP 10973.
138 Cf. Mercati 1931, p. 239–241, Polemis 2012, p. liii–lxi and Rigo 2012, p. 100–103.
139 Cf. Candal 1957, p. 100.10–102.25.
140 About this Tomus see Mercati 1931, p. 209–218, 240–242 and Polemis 1993.
141 Cf. Mercati 1931, p. 231–242, 270–278, and Polemis 2012, p. 73–75.
142 Rigo 2012.
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ascribed to Procopius: ὁ τοῖς τοῦ Ἕλληνος Πρόκλου κεφαλαίοις ἀντιλέγων σοφὸς
τὰ θεῖα Προκόπιος ὁ Γάζης ἐν ἀντιρρήσει καφαλαίου ἐνάτου καὶ τριακοστοῦ καὶ ἑκα-
τοστοῦ.143
In other words, we believe that while investigating the cause for the wrong
attribution to Procopius of chapters 139 and 146 of the Refutatio Procli, one
must take into account the different authorial practices adopted by the scribe.
Argyros first copied the excerpts from the Refutatio Procli in a florilegiumwhich
he prepared for the composition of his own works. He then reproduced the
same text in a newly-composed work, in our case the Adversus Cantacuzenum.
This neatly explains the variant readings in MS Vat. gr. 1096 and in Vat. gr. 604.
Whereas Amato thinks that these variants are witnesses to two traditions or
redactions of the text,144 we are convinced that these few variant readingsmust
be explained on the basis of Argyros’ way of excerpting and copying themater-
ial. In fact, as shown extensively by Gioffreda, when copying a text Argyros was
accustomed to add frequent corrections in scribendo.145 To modern scholars
unfamiliar with Argyros’ modus operandi, these corrections may be misunder-
stood as variant readings that hark back to other traditions or redactions of the
text. However, research shows that in several manuscripts copied by Argyros
this is not the case. The fragments copied in MSS Vat. gr. 1096 and Vat. gr. 604
could be among the many instances in which this tendency is more evident.
In other words, it is pretty clear that the chapters of the Refutatio Procli
attributed to Procopius in MS Vat. gr. 1096 and Vat. gr. 604 have been copied
according to different authorial practices. The extracts from the Refutatio Pro-
cli have been first copied as drafts for Argyros’ private use and then they have
been published in a theological work such as the Adversus Cantacuzenum. Like
many of his contemporaries, Argyros first prepared a provisional draft and then
an official published version of all source material. Accordingly, the various
sources undergo a process of transformation from drafts into texts ready for
publication.While selecting and publishing, the various excerpts are subject to
revision, which explains the existence of a few variant readings between the
different versions of the same text.
In sum, Argyros’ excerpts from the Refutatio Procli attributed to Proclus as
found in the aforementioned florilegia and in Argyros’ theological pamphlet
Adversus Cantacuzenum do not reflect two different traditions of the same
text, but rather two different stages of the same editorial procedure: from the
selection of the material to its final publication. In the same way the excerpts
143 Cf. ed. Polemis 2012, p. 191, cap. 158, l. 1–2.
144 Cf. Amato 2010, 12.
145 Gioffreda 2020, p. 90–95.
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copied by Argyros in another manuscript, Vat. gr. 678, were reused in his own
writings.146 As Bianconi already noted, Argyros used the extract from Anastas-
ius Sinaita’s Homelia in Trasfigurationem, copied by himself in the margins of
f. 101v–102r, in a short version of his Contra Dexium.147 This very same excerpt
has been included by Argyros as chapter 38 of Adversus Cantacuzenum.
But what is the rationale behind Argyros’ citations of patristic and post-
patristic authorities in Adversus Cantacuzenum and in his other theological
writings? As anticipated above, Argyroswas a fervent anti-Palamite and a fierce
opponent of the very core of the Palamite theology, namely the distinction
between God’s essence and his providential energies through which the divine
economy is displayed.148 Understandably, in selecting his sources he favored
those theological passages which in his view stressed God’s substantial unity.
This is precisely what he did when excerpting chapters 139 and 146 of the Refu-
tatio Procli. A close inspection of these passages shows that both emphasize—
from different point of view—the divine unity. Chapter 139 addresses Proclus’
polytheism and his admission of a series of other entities through which caus-
ality occurs. Against this, chapter 139 remarks that God is the only cause of the
universe. Chapter 146 starts with the citation from Gregory of Nazianzus (Ora-
tio 29.2, PG 36, 76B) on the nature of the intratrinitarian procession as the only
case of procession where the cause and the effects remain one. This text went,
according to Argyros, in the direction of defending God’s substantial unity
within the process of causation. Argyros’ exploitation of these two fragments
from theRefutatioProcli is therefore consistentwith oneof themain arguments
brought forth by Argyros’ master, Nikephoros Gregoras, namely that separating
God’s substance and his energies would admit a form of Neoplatonic polythe-
ism.149 Taking a cue from Nicholas’ critique of Proclus’ polytheism, Argyros
believes he can adapt Nicholas’ refutation to his own critique of Palamas’ dis-
tinction between God’s substance and his providential energies, as if this latter
view introduces entities other than God as responsible for the causation pro-
cess.
At the end of this excursus on Argyros’ modus operandi, we can infer that
in all probability the attribution to Procopius of chapters 139 and 146 of the
Refutatio Procli found in the Vatican manuscripts originated in the fourteenth
146 Cf. supra p. 125
147 See Candal 1957, p. 106, l. 21–108, l. 3, Bianconi 2008, p. 363–364 and Polemis 2012, p. 90–91,
cap. 35, l. 2–16.
148 See Russell 2017.
149 Cf. NikephorosGregoras, ByzantinaHistoria, p. 481.5–483.11.We are grateful to Börje Bydén
for alerting us to this passage.
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century, at the timeof the hesychast controversy. At this time, scholars involved
in the controversy, such as Argyros, produced anthologies and florilegia con-
taining theological texts which could be used against opposing parties.Within
this process, we believe that for reasons probably relating to a mechanical
error, someone extracted the fragments of the Refutatio Procli and improperly
ascribed it to Procopius. This is not unlikely if one takes into account the fact
that in several of these anthologies, such as MS Vallicellianus F 30, the various
excerpts are transmitted as anonymous, thus making it easier for a scribe to
misattribute. Furthermore, as we will show in our conclusions, the tradition of
Nicholas’Refutatio Procli includes an acephalous version of the text, something
which once again could possibly explain a later misattribution. In this regard,
it is our intention to investigate more closely in the future the aforementioned
fourteenth-century anti-Palamite anthologies in order to detect further ele-
ments favoring this view.
9 Conclusions
Two fragments of the Refutatio Procli, a refutation of Proclus’Elements of Theo-
logy, attributed in the manuscript tradition of the text to the twelfth-century
learned bishop Nicholas of Methone, have been ascribed in two fourteenth-
centurymanuscripts, copied by the byzantine scribe and scholar IsaakArgyros,
to the late-ancient Christian rhetor and ecclesiastical writer Procopius of Gaza.
On this basis, from the late nineteenth-century until recent years Procopius
scholars have blindly accepted Argyros’ attribution of the fragments to Pro-
copius and, accordingly, have argued that Nicholas has re-elaborated and even
plagiarized a now lost Refutatio Procli by Procopius, of which the two afore-
mentioned fragments are the last surviving traces.
In this paper we provide a complete and balanced account by comparing
for the first time historical, philological and paleographical data. An unbiased
analysis of the extant data suggests that the attribution to Procopius of the
two fragments is probably wrong and, therefore, it is highly improbable that
Procopius of Gaza ever authored a Refutation of Proclus’Elements of Theology.
One reasonable explanation for a scribal mistake has already been brought
forth by Mercati and more recently by Bianconi. According to these scholars,
Argyros probably had at his disposal a codex in which the Refutatio Procli was
either wrongly attributed to Procopius or was transmitted as anepigraphic and
anonymous together with a Procopian text. The only advantage of this solu-
tion is that such a codex exists and, more importantly, it surely circulated in
the circle of Argyros and his collaborators, as demonstrated by the presence of
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the book-hand of one of Argyros’ fellows.150 The MS in question is Vat. gr. 626,
a codex copied at the beginning of fourteenth-century and divided into two
units preserving Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Graecarum affectionum curatio (f. 1–
120) and Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli (f. 121–212), respectively. The attribution of
the Refutatio to Nicholas at f. 121 is due to a later hand, thus suggesting that
an anepigraphic copy of the Refutatio Procli circulated among Argyros and his
collaborators. At the present stage of research it is not possible to ascertain
whether this circumstance alone explains Argyros’ attribution to Procopius of
chapters 139 and 146 of the Refutatio Procli, or whether Argyros inherited this
attribution from a hitherto unknown florilegiumwhich he used as a source.We
can only suggest that the attribution to Procopius of the fragments in question
must be taken with the greatest caution and that, in absence of new incontro-
vertible evidence, this attribution must be regarded as highly dubious.
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chapter 6
Die Elementatio theologica des Proklos im Kontext
der kaukasischen Philosophie
Tengiz Iremadze
Grigol Robakidze University, Tbilisi / New Georgian University, Poti
1 Fragestellung: Das Konzept der kaukasischen Philosophie
ImKontext der interkulturellenPhilosophie besitzendieErforschungundAna-
lyse der transnationalen philosophischen Diskurse eine eminente Bedeutung.
Aus dieser Perspektive erweist sich daher der Versuch, die Konturen der kau-
kasischen Philosophie zu entwerfen, als wichtig. DiemethodologischenVoraus-
setzungen und Grundlagen einer derartigen Philosophie habe ich bereits in
meinen Studien näher vorgestellt.1 Dort nehme ich erstmals die „kaukasische
Philosophie“ als einGanzes indenBlick, indem ichvor allemdiejenigenDenker
aus dieser Region berücksichtige, die produktive philosophische Beziehungen
zwischen Armenien und Georgien initiiert haben.2
Als „kaukasische Philosophie“ gilt dabei jenes philosophische Denken der
Hochkulturen des Kaukasus, das zunächst im Ausgang von spätantiken und
byzantinischen Anregungen, dann aber unter dem Einfluss anderer Strömun-
gen zu einer eigenständigen philosophischen Tradition heranwuchs, die sich
bis in die Gegenwart durch Originalität, Produktivität undWeitblick auszeich-
net.3
Im Kontext der kaukasischen Philosophie erhält die Elementatio theologica
des Proklos eine wichtige Stellung. In Bezug auf dieses Werk wurden in
1 Vgl. Iremadze 2013; Iremadze 2014a.
2 Udo Reinhold Jeck spricht in seinen bahnbrechenden Studien Platonica Orientalia (2004)
und Erläuterungen zur georgischenPhilosophie (2010) über eine neue Bestimmung derwestli-
chenPhilosophie innerhalb der globalenKonstellation des philosophischenDenkens. Beson-
ders in seinen Erläuterungen zur georgischen Philosophie hat er auf die Wichtigkeit eines
Umdenkens des westeuropäischen Philosophiebegriffs hingewiesen. Der in den Philosophie-
geschichten stark verbreitete und vertretene Eurozentrismus, der sich auf die Hochkulturen
des Westens bezog, hat die Erforschung vieler früher unbekannten Traditionen der Philo-
sophie wesentlich behindert. Dazu zählen vor allem zahlreiche europäische und besonders
außereuropäische Philosophien. Vgl. Jeck, 22012, p. 9–10.
3 Vgl. Iremadze 2013, p. 7–14, 138; Iremadze 2014a, p. 7–35.
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dieser Region auch die Rolle, Mission sowie der Zweck des Philosophierens oft
bestimmt.4
Um das oben Gesagte zu verdeutlichen, werde ich in meinem Aufsatz fol-
gendermaßen verfahren: Zunächst lasse ich Joane Petrizis Übersetzung und
Auslegung der Elementatio theologica des Proklos zuWort kommen. Erst dann
versuche ich zu zeigen, wie die Proklos-Rezeption in der kaukasischen Region
entwickelt wurde. Hierin sollen verschiedenartige Proklos-Deutungen in der
kaukasischen (georgischenundarmenischen) Philosophie desMittelalters und
der Neuzeit zur Sprache kommen. Daraus wird ersichtlich, daß die Elementa-
tio theologica des Proklos in der Philosophie der Kaukasier eine wichtige Rolle
gespielt hat.
2 Joane Petrizis Übersetzung und Auslegung der Elementatio
theologica des Proklos
Der erste georgische Kommentator des Proklos, Joane Petrizi (12. Jh.), wollte
die griechische Philosophie in Gestalt des Proklischen Denkens in Georgien
bekannt machen und die Lehre der Platoniker darstellen.5
Petrizi meinte, daß man auf der Basis der platonischen Philosophie das
christliche Weltbild am besten begründen könne.6 Deshalb übersetzte er
Schriften des Nemesios von Emesa7 und des Proklos8 ins Altgeorgische. Im
folgenden sollen Petrizis Methode des Kommentierens und ihre wichtigsten
strukturellenAspekte zur Sprache kommen. Dabei wird es notwendig sein, von
inhaltlichen Problemen weitgehend abzusehen und vielmehr das spezifische
Verfahren der Exegese darzustellen.
Petrizis Kommentar zur Elementatio theologicades Proklos besteht aus einer
Einleitung und aus den Erläuterungen zu jedem Kapitel dieses Werkes. In der
Edition von Petrizis Proklos-Kommentar durch Sch. Nuzubidse und S. Kaucht-
schischvili folgt diesen Erläuterungen ein Nachwort.
In den Einleitungen stellten die Kommentatoren fast immer die Frage nach
der Intentiondes zu kommentierendenWerkes, der vita auctoris, demTitel und
der Form. Der Kommentar (und entsprechend die Einleitung) entwickelte sich
stets weiter, denn es wurden immer neue Formen (Verfahren) des Kommentie-
4 Vgl. Iremadze 2007, p. 66–78.
5 Vgl. Iremadze 2009, p. 285–286.
6 Vgl. Iremadze, 2004a.
7 Vgl. Nemesios von Emesa 1914.
8 Joane Petrizi 1940; Joane Petrizi 1937.
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rens erprobt. Trotzdem blieben die in ihm zu behandelnden Probleme gleich-
artig. Der spätmittelalterliche Kommentar erhielt eine einheitlichere Form, die
Methoden änderten sich jedoch, denn an die Stelle des relativ einfachen acces-
sus trat die Vier-Ursachen-Einleitung. Schließlich ging es darum, in einer Ein-
führung mit möglichst angemessenen Methoden die o.g. Fragen an den kom-
mentierten Text zu beantworten.
Joane Petrizis Einleitung zur Elementatio theologica geht auf alle diese Fra-
gen ein. Er betrachtet den Sinn (die intentio) dieses Buches und sieht ihn darin,
‚das vielbesprocheneEine‘ zu beweisen.9Dannbehandelt er kurz die Besonder-
heit des Einen, das nach seiner Ansicht mit keinem Seienden identisch ist. Das
reine und echte Einemüsse gemäß denRegeln der Syllogismen untersucht und
bewiesen werden.10 Dieses Eine ist nach Petrizis Exegese der entscheidende
Begriff im ganzen Begründungsprozeß des Wissens. Ohne die Beweisbarkeit
dieses Prinzips gibt es keine unwiderlegbaren Sätze, und das gnoseologische
Ziel bleibt unerreicht. Das Eine ist das Prinzip, das Wissen überhaupt erst
ermöglicht.
Nachdem Petrizi die intentio des Proklischen Werkes herausgestellt hat,
behandelt er den Titel dieses Traktats und die Biographie des Proklos. Zuerst
nennt er den vollständigen Titel: Die Elementatio theologica des platonischen
Philosophen Proklos Diadochos.11 Dann beginnt er sofort mit der Darstellung
des Lebenslaufs des Proklos, indem er ihn und seine Tätigkeit als Lehrer lobt:
Er habe das Eine zu erfassen versucht. Den verborgenen Sinn der Platonischen
Dialoge habe er ebenso erschlossen und zu ihnen auch Kommentare geschrie-
ben. Wegen dieser Verdienste habe er den Namen Diadochos (der Nachfolger)
des Platon erhalten. Noch eine weitere große Leistung stamme von ihm: Prok-
los habe die Lehre der Peripatetiker, d.h. der Anhänger des Aristoteles, wider-
legt.12
Petrizi unterscheidet in seiner Einleitung zwischen der Kraft und der Wir-
kung der Seele wie der Vernunft (Intellekt). Die seelische Erkenntnis wird als
Dianoia, die vernünftige (intellektuale) aber als Noesis bezeichnet. Der oberste
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis ist das Noeton. Nach dieser Bestimmung erklärt
Petrizi jedenBegriff und führt klareDistinktionen zwischen ihnen ein.DieWir-
kung der seelischen Erkenntniskraft bestehe in dem ‚Hinundher-Denken‘, das
dem schrittweisen Vorwärtsgehen gleiche. Im Gegensatz dazu sei die Vernunft
die stetigeErkenntnis, ihreWirkungentstehe zusammenmit ihremWesen, und
9 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 149.
10 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 3.
11 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 4.
12 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 150.
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ihr Wesen existiere immer zusammen mit ihrer Wirkung. Der Gegenstand der
Vernunft und die Vernunft selbst existierten gleichzeitig und zusammen.13
Bei der Erklärung und Charakteristik der seelischen Erkenntniskraft führt
Petrizi ein Zitat aus der Schrift des Porphyrios14 an: „Das Hinundher-Denken
der Seele ist dem Schreiten des Menschen ähnlich: Der geht nicht einfach hin,
wohin er geht, sondern er vervollkommnet allmählich Schritt für Schritt seinen
Weg.“15
Petrizi stellt die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Gegenstandes der Erkennt-
nis zum Erkennenden. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis übertrifft immer den
Erkennenden. Dabei bringt er die Aristotelische These ins Spiel, daß das Erste
im Bewußtsein des Erkennenden von Natur aus das Letzte, das Letzte im
Erkenntnisprozeß das Erste von Natur aus ist.16 Die Kraft und Wirkung der
Seele sei zusammengesetzt. Demgemäß sei ihrWesennicht einfach. Einfach sei
vielmehr dieWirkung derVernunft, und dementsprechend sei auch ihr eigenes
Wesen einfach.17
Die Seele hat in der Potenz (in der Möglichkeit) die Aktivität (das Erken-
nen), sie erkennt in der fortschreitenden und hinzufügendenWeise oder bleibt
immer in reiner Möglichkeit als die bloße Kraft, wie die Seelen der Nichtphilo-
sophen– so Petrizi unter Berufung auf Aristoteles – nicht verwirklicht sind. Die
Wirkung der Seele und der Vernunft wird den Philosophierenden zugeschrie-
ben.18 Die Vernunft bleibt der ewige (ununterbrochene) Erkenntnisprozeß. Ihr
Wesen besteht im Erkennen; sie versteht und erkennt alles auf singuläreWeise
und das Viele vielfältig. Wenn wir uns hier an Petrizis These erinnern, daß
jeder Erkennende gemäß seinemWesenwirkt, dann kannman die aktive Kraft
der Vernunft aus den Kommentaren Petrizis eruieren. Das Eine selbst braucht
keine Erkenntnis, weil diese immer mit dem Nicht-Wissen verbunden ist. Das
Eine aber ist der Ursprung desWissens und der Vernunft.
In seiner Einleitung unterstreicht Petrizi die pädagogische (wahrscheinlich
auch didaktische) Bedeutung der Elementatio theologica (und seinesKommen-
tars dazu).DerartigeBücher erfordernnach seinerAuffassung für dasVerständ-
nis ihrer Bedeutung eine sorgfältige Lektüre. Sokrates habe genauso gelesen
wie die Kinder, denn immer habe er auf das Gelesene zurückgegriffen. Um den
13 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 6–8.
14 G. Tevzadze ist der Ansicht, daß sich Petrizi auf Porphyrios’Werk Sententiae ad intelligibi-
lia ducentes bezieht; vgl. Vgl. Iremadze, 2004a, p. 54.
15 Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 152.
16 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 8.
17 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 8.
18 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 9.
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wahren Sinn zu begreifen, seien auch beim Schreiben und Sprechen die Inter-
punktionszeichen zu beachten.
Diese Fragen stellt und behandelt Petrizi in seinem Vorwort (Einleitung).
Dann folgt der eigentlicheKommentar zu jedemeinzelnenKapitel der Elemen-
tatio theologica. Petrizis Intention ist es gewesen, für die Leser die schwierigen
Gedanken des Proklos möglichst verständlich zu machen. Dieser Kommentar
besitzt folgende Struktur: Am Beginn steht die Lehrmeinung des Proklos aus
dem entsprechenden Kapitel der Elementatio theologica. Erst dann folgt sein
eigener Kommentar. Petrizi hat dabei alle ihm vorgegebenen 211 Kapitel des
Proklos ausgelegt und sich in seinen Kommentaren über die wichtigsten Pro-
bleme der antiken Philosophie geäußert.19 Mit besonderer Sorgfalt behandelt
er die kompliziertenKapitel. Das ProblemdesVerhältnisses des Einen zumVie-
lennimmtdabei viel Platz ein. Auchdie FragennachderUrsacheundWirkung,
der Zeit, dem Seienden, dem Guten und Bösen, den Göttern, dem Ganzen und
demTeil nehmen einen breiten Raum ein. Die Vernunftlehre (Nous-Lehre) des
Proklos ist vor allem in Petrizis Auslegung, Kapitel 160–183, erläutert.
Petrizi ist sich aber bewußt gewesen, daß die von Proklos streng und kurz
formulierten Sätzemanchmal keineMöglichkeiten zurUmformulierung zulas-
sen. Deswegen bringt er oft eigene Beispiele, um Proklische Gedanken für den
Leser klar und in erkennbarer Form darzustellen. Petrizis Umgang mit den
Lesern ist hilfreich, denn er spricht sie mit großer Freundlichkeit an: „Hör zu,
oh Lehrling, der (Du) geistig erkennst.“20 Diese Anredeform findet man in der
Auslegung sehr oft, was darauf hindeutet, daß Petrizis Kommentare zu Vorle-
sungszwecken geschrieben worden sind. Sein Kommentar ist ein Dialog mit
den Lesern inGestalt einesMonologs.Wahrscheinlich hat Petrizi die in seinem
Kommentar erklärten Themen imGelati-Kloster (bei Kutaisi) vorgetragen und
diskutiert.
Eine derwichtigsten Fragen, die bei der Prüfung derKommentare auftaucht,
ist das Problem der Quellen Petrizis. Petrizi, der sich sehr gut in der griechi-
schen Philosophie auskannte, hielt es oft nicht für nötig, seine Zitate genau
nachzuweisen unddie zitiertenWerke exakt anzugeben.Vielleicht besaß er ein
gut vorbereitetes Publikum, so daß ihm die genaue Zitation nicht erforderlich
schien. Aber genau dieser Mangel seiner Arbeitsweise bereitet dem heutigen
Leser große Schwierigkeiten.
19 In der altgeorgischen Übersetzung der Elementatio theologica des Proklos findet sich das
Kapitel 129, das in den bis heute erhaltenen griechischen Handschriften dieses Werkes
fehlt. In der altgeorgischen Übersetzung fehlt dagegen das Kapitel 149 des griechischen
Textes; vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 143.
20 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 163.
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Petrizi nennt selbst die Philosophen, mit denen er sich in seiner Auslegung
beschäftigt hat: Orpheus, Parmenides, Zenon, Platon, Aristoteles, Alexander
vonAphrodisias, Porphyrios und die Kirchenväter.21 Besonders hat er die plato-
nische Philosophie geschätzt. Zu ihrenVertretern gehören nach seiner Ansicht
sowohl Platons Vorgänger (Orpheus, Pythagoras usw.) als auch die Neuplatoni-
ker. Platon bezeichnet er als ‚den Philosophen des Tages‘.22 Wenn Petrizi über
den ‚Philosophen‘ spricht, ist darunter Proklos zu verstehen. Dagegen war im
lateinischen Mittelalter die Bezeichnung philosophus dem Aristoteles vorbe-
halten.
Von den Schriften Platons rekurriert Petrizi auf die Dialoge Parmenides,
Nomoi, Phaidros, Phaidon und Timaios. Obwohl er sie nicht erwähnt, zitiert
er auch den Theaitetos und das Symposion.23 Petrizi nennt zudem verschie-
deneWerke des Aristoteles, aber nicht die in der Scholastik benutzten pseudo-
aristotelischen Schriften.24 Seiner Auslegung läßt sich entnehmen, daß er
außer der Elementatio theologica auch andere Schriften des Proklos gekannt
(z.B. die Kommentare zum Parmenides und Timaios sowie die Platonische
Theologie) und bei Bedarf für die Erläuterung der Elementatio theologica von
ihnen Gebrauch gemacht hat (z.B. in den Kapiteln 41, 58 und 59).25
Wie schon erwähnt, befindet sich in der vorhandenen Edition von Petrizis
Proklos-Kommentar ein Nachwort.26 In diesemwerden verschiedene Probleme
und Fragen seiner Tätigkeit behandelt. Es bezieht sich hauptsächlich nicht auf
die Elementatio theologica. Dieses Nachwort trägt keinen einheitlichenCharak-
ter. In diesem Teil findet man auch Auszüge aus anderen Schriften des Philo-
sophen. Eine in der georgischen Forschung weit verbreitete Gliederung dieses
Textes besitzt folgende Struktur: 1) Erklärung des Hauptsinnes der Psalmen als
Verweis auf die Dreieinigkeit. Die Fragen nach der Vorsehung, des Guten, der
Wesenslosigkeit bzw. Seinslosigkeit des Bösen. 2) Die Probleme der Überset-
zung (sowohl der biblischen als auch besonders der philosophischen Texte). 3)
21 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1940, XXVI–LII; Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 145.
22 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1940, XXVII. Petrizi erwähntDionysius Ps.-Areopagita nicht, dessenWerk
schon in der georgischen Übersetzung des Ephrem Mzire vorlag; vgl. G. Tevzadze 1996,
p. 196.
23 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 34; 84.
24 Die Frage nach den Autoren und Quellen der Auslegung benötigt eine gesonderte Unter-
suchung und gehört nicht zur Aufgabe der vorliegenden Studie. Einiges dazu ist bereits
geleistet worden (vgl. L. Alexidse 1997, p. 148–168).
25 Petrizi nannte in seinem sog. Nachwort die Kommentare des Proklos zum Timaios und
Parmenides; vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 209.
26 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1937, p. 207–227.
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Fragmente aus dem Epitaphios des Gregor von Nazianz für Basilius den Gro-
ßen. 4) Über die Sprichwörter Salomons (unvollendet).27
Wie oben erwähnt, behandelt Petrizi in seinem Nachwort auch Überset-
zungsprobleme. Sie sind im Kontext der vorliegenden Untersuchung von
Bedeutung, weil sie im engen Zusammenhangmit demProblemdes Kommen-
tierens stehen.
Zwar entfaltete sich im Kloster Athoni und in anderen kulturellen Zentren
Georgiens zu damaliger Zeit eine regeÜbersetzungstätigkeit, auch galten Petri-
zis Zeitgenossen als gute Übersetzer undKommentatoren, doch scheint Petrizi
mit den vorliegenden Leistungen nicht zufrieden gewesen zu sein. Die dama-
lige Übersetzungspraxis hat Petrizi wie folgt charakterisiert: „Bei uns ist es
üblich, einfache und gewöhnliche (Texte) in die gewählte und geschmückte
Sprache zu übersetzen.“28 Abweichend von dieser Praxis versuchte Petrizi, die
kompliziertenGedanken des zu übersetzendenTextes einfach und seiner Spra-
che angemessen wiederzugeben. In erster Linie sei auf den Sinn des zu über-
setzenden Textes zu achten (sei es, daß es ein Text der Philosophie, oder sei es,
daß es ein Text aus einer davon verschiedenen Wissenschaft ist). Petrizi führt
im Nachwort falsche Übersetzungsbeispiele von Bibelstellen an und korrigiert
sie. Um eine falsche Interpretation zu vermeiden, so Petrizi, müsse man eine
Sprache entwickeln, die einerseits die Gedankenwelt verständlich und präzise
ausdrückt, andererseits aber literarisch reich ist. Die griechische Sprache habe
dieses Niveau erreicht und könne daher dem Georgischen in diesem Sinne als
Muster dienen.
EinKommentator des Proklos zu seinwar auch im griechisch geprägtenKul-
turraum nicht leicht. Petrizi hat viele Schwierigkeiten gehabt. Er fand keine
Unterstützung unter Griechen undGeorgiern.29 Selbst dieWorte des Abschrei-
bers der Kommentare Petrizis zeigen, wie riskant es war, sich mit der Elemen-
tatio theologica zu befassen.30 Petrizi hat sich dennoch daran gewagt und eine
Renaissance der Proklischen Philosophie (und damit der ganzen antiken Tra-
dition) auf dem christlichen Boden Georgiens erreicht.
27 Vgl. Iremadze, 2004a, p. 23–25.
28 Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 171.
29 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 171.
30 Vgl. Joane Petrizi 1995, p. 147: „Aufgrund dieses Buches war der dreimal verdammte Areios
verdorben worden, und von demselben Buch haben die dreimal gebildeten [Männer] –
die großen Weisen Dionysios, auch Gregorios und Basileios sowie die anderen den Titel
des Theologen gewonnen. Dein Geist soll ganz rein im Verhältnis zu Gott sein. Du sollst
nicht die von den hl. Vätern [festgesetzten] Grenzen überschreiten und in Versuchung
kommen.“
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3 Die Rezeption der Elementatio theologica des Proklos in der
kaukasischen Philosophie
Die Proklische Philosophie wurde auch im lateinischen Mittelalter produktiv
rezipiert, etwa in den intellekttheoretischen Schriften Dietrichs von Freiberg,
besonders aber im Proklos-Kommentar Bertholds von Moosburg.31 Im Unter-
schied zu diesen Philosophen hat die Proklos-Rezeption Petrizis eine einfluß-
reiche Wirkung gezeitigt. Während Dietrich von Freiberg nur sporadisch rezi-
piert und Berthold vonMoosburg fast kaumberücksichtigt wurde, besaß Petri-
zis Philosophie dagegen eine signifikante Rezeptionsgeschichte.32
Petrizis Proklos-Kommentar mit seiner georgischen Übersetzung der Ele-
mentatio theologica hat nicht nur in der georgischen Philosophie und Kul-
tur, sondern auch außerhalb Georgiens großen Einfluß ausgeübt. 1248 hat der
armenische Mönch Svimeon Petrizis Proklos-Werk ins Armenische übersetzt
und hiermit zur Verbreitung der Proklischen Philosophie dort wesentlich bei-
getragen. Im 17. Jh. setzten sich armenische Philosophen mit dem Proklischen
Gedankengut intensiv auseinander und sprachen über die Aktualität des Prok-
los; 1651 hat der armenische Episkopus Svimeon (= Svimeon Dshughaezi) zum
leichteren Verständnis der Elementatio theologica Kommentare zu ihr verfaßt.
AlsVorlage seines Kommentars galt dabei die aus der georgischenÜbersetzung
Petrizis im 13. Jh. angefertigte armenische Übersetzung des Mönches Svimeon.
1757 sind diese Kommentare zusammen mit der armenischen Version der Ele-
mentatio theologica ins Georgische übersetzt worden; sie haben in der georgi-
schen Kultur eine spürbareWirkung hinterlassen. Im 18. Jh. gab es also in geor-
gischer Sprache mindestens zwei verschiedene Kommentare zur Elementatio
theologica. Es ist zu betonen, daß sich die Denker der georgischen Aufklärung
des 17. und 18. Jh.s auf diese Überlieferungen unterschiedlich bezogen. Man-
che kritisierten die armenische Version angesichts ihres Inhalts scharf.33 Eines
steht jedoch fest: Die Proklische Philosophie wurde in der georgischen Neuzeit
intensiv berücksichtigt und rezipiert. Hier seien drei wichtige Stationen in der
neuzeitlichen georgischen Proklos/Petrizi-Rezeption genannt:
1) Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani (1658–1726) integriert in sein Georgisches Wörter-
buch34 zahlreiche Theoreme aus dem Proklos-Werk Petrizis. Bei der Definition
und Erörterung der Erkenntnisproblematik verweist er auf die 20. Proposi-
31 Vgl. Jeck 2011, 112–170; Mojsisch 2002, p. 175–184.
32 Vgl. Iremadze 2004b, p. 237–253.
33 Vgl. Dedabrischwili 1974, p. 64.
34 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991; Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1993.
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tion der Auslegung und bestimmt die Vernunft als die einfache, körperlose
Erkenntnis des Erkannten;35 die diskursive Erkenntnis der Seele wird von ihm
ebenfalls im Anschluß an Petrizi als sukzessiv, d.h., als eine in der Zeit ent-
faltete Erkenntnis bezeichnet. Auch andere wichtige Definitionen der Philo-
sophie (z.B. die Bestimmung des Wirklichseienden36, der Hervorbringung37,
der Kausalität38, der Bewegung39) sind aus dem Proklos-Kommentar Petrizis
übernommen. Wichtig ist jedoch, daß Orbeliani im Anschluß an Proklos und
Petrizi – wenngleich in transformierterWeise – die Vernunft in drei Arten glie-
dert:
Die Vernunft als Gott / die Vernunft als Engel / unsere Vernunft.40
So ist Petrizis Philosophie als Grundlage für die Charakterisierung der Erkennt-
nisaktivität im Werk Sulchan-Saba Orbelianis zu deuten. Besonders bemer-
kenswert ist die Tatsache, daß dieser neuzeitliche Denker die damalige geor-
gische Leserschaft auf die Aktualität der neuplatonischen Gedankenwelt auf-
merksammachte, und dies im Rekurs auf Petrizis Proklos-Kommentar.
Ebenso intensiv bezog sich Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani in seinem Georgischen
Wörterbuch auf Petrizis georgische Übersetzung der Schrift Über die Natur des
Menschen des Nemesios von Emesa. Orbelianis Werk ist also ein sprechendes
Beispiel dafür, wie stark Petrizis Philosophie das moderne georgische Denken
geprägt hat.41
2) Anton I. (Bagrationi) (1720–1788)42, Philosoph und Theologe, bezieht sich
imdrittenTeil (in demer seine Seelenlehre entwickelt) seines philosophischen
Werks Spekali43 (1752) auf die AuslegungPetrizis undübernimmtvon ihmnicht
zuletzt die Unterscheidung zwischen Seele und Vernunft, indem er die Ver-
nunft als eine der Seele überlegene Instanz betrachtet. Es ist bemerkenswert,
daß Anton I. einige Kapitel, welche der Erkenntnisproblematik des Proklos
gewidmet sind, Petrizis Werk fast wörtlich entlehnt hat.44
35 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991, p. 166,1–2.
36 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991, p. 574,1.
37 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1993, p. 366,2; p. 367,1.
38 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991, p. 480,1–2.
39 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991, p. 479,2.
40 Vgl. Sulchan-Saba Orbeliani 1991, p. 166,1.
41 Vgl. Iremadze 2007, p. 74–75.
42 Vgl. Iremadze 2006, p. 135–143.
43 Anton I. (= Bagrationi) 1991.
44 Anton I. 1991, p. 327–331.
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Anton I. geht soweit, daß er die Spontaneität der erkennenden Vernunft im
Anschluß an die von Petrizi angeführten Philosophen (z.B. Porphyrios) erläu-
tert.45 In den Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie ist Petrizi für ihn der wichtigste
Autor. Dies bezeugt seine Erörterung des Erkenntnisgegenstandes.
Die letzten Kapitel des Werks Spekali sind Petrizi gewidmet. In den Kapi-
teln 148 und 149 behandelt Anton I. die Erkenntnisthematik aufgrund der
Nous-Propositionen der Auslegung. Hier wird nämlich in Anlehnung an Petrizi
behauptet, daß die vernünftige Erkenntnis von der Erkenntnisart der Seele
unterschieden ist: Im Wesen der Vernunft bilden ihre Aktivität und ihre Sub-
stanz eine Einheit, die seelischeNatur präsentiert sich dagegen als differenziert.
Das Wesen und die Tätigkeit der Seele lassen sich unterscheiden, denn die
Erkenntnis ist nicht die primäreQualität der Seele. Bei ihrer Erkenntnis bewegt
sich die Seele von einem Seienden zum anderen, d.h. die erworbenen Kennt-
nisse gelten hier als die Grundlagen für das Fortschreiten des Wissens. Die
vernünftige Erkenntnis muß man anders charakterisieren, da die Tätigkeit der
Vernunft im ewigen Erkennen begründet ist und die Vernunft in ihremWesen
sich nicht anders als diese Aktivität versteht. An dieser Stelle muß bemerkt
werden, daß sich Anton I. für die Charakteristik seines Erkenntniskonzepts
dernoetischenTerminologie aus Petrizis Proklos-Kommentar intensiv bediente.
Seine wichtigen philosophischen Bestimmungen der Noetik sind ausschließ-
lich im Hinblick auf Petrizi ausgearbeitet worden.
Anton I. hat die armenische Version der Elementatio theologica scharf kri-
tisiert, denn sie stelle nicht die echte Lehre des Proklos bzw. Petrizis dar. Die
wahreMetaphysikwurdehier –wie er in seiner (nochnicht edierten)Theologie
hervorhebt – mit falschen Theorien kombiniert und deshalb entstellt. Seiner
Ansicht nach sollte man die alte Version der Elementatio theologica (Petrizi)
studieren und nicht die neue (armenische).46 Damit sprach er sich für Petrizi
aus, denn dessen Auslegung der Proklischen Nous-Thematik sollte gelten und
nicht ihre willkürlichen Transformationen der modernen armenischen und
georgischen Exegeten.
(3) Im Unterschied zu Anton I. (Bagrationi) benutzt Joane Bagrationi (1768–
1830)47 in seinem Hauptwerk Kalmasoba (dt.: „Die fröhliche Lehre“), das er
in den Jahren von 1813 bis 1828 schrieb, hauptsächlich die armenischen Kom-
mentare zur Elementatio theologica. Es ist besonders hervorzuheben, daß das
45 Anton I. 1991, p. 327–329.
46 Vgl. Dedabrischwili 1974, p. 64–65.
47 Vgl. Gogatishvili 2014, p. 81–90.
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WerkKalmasoba alsDialog verfasstwurde.Dort spielt JonaKhelaschwili (1778–
1837), einer der bedeutenden georgischen Theologen und Philosophen der
Neuzeit, bei den Gesprächspartnern die wichtigste Rolle.48 Dieser übernimmt
hier etwa jene Funktion, die Sokrates in den platonischen Dialogen besitzt. Bei
der Bestimmung des Einen und seiner Dialektik zitiert er die ersten Kapitel
des Proklischen Werks. Auch die auf den Nous bezogenen Kapitel (z.B. prop.
20) finden im Kalmasoba eine angemessene Berücksichtigung. In diesemWerk
erläutert Joane Bagrationi nicht alle Kapitel der Elementatio theologica, son-
dern insgesamt 86. Bemerkenswert ist, daß der Verfasser einige Stellen aus Pro-
klos bzw. PetrizisWerk auf originäre Art undWeise interpretiert bzw. transfor-
miert; bei der Erörterung der Ursachenproblematik unterscheidet er zunächst
zwischen drei Hauptarten – Gott, Natur und Fertigkeit – und betont die Über-
legenheit Gottes gegenüber allen anderen Ursachen.49 Dies läßt sich vor allem
damit erklären: JoaneBagrationi hat sich derKommentare des SvimeonDshug-
haezi bedient und Proklos sowie Petrizi durch sie zu interpretieren versucht.
Auch die Noetik der Elementatio theologica brachte Joane Bagrationi auf einen
eindeutigen Nenner, indem er die verschiedenen Arten und Funktionen der
Erkenntnis herausstellte unddie erkennendeSeele als das SpezifikumdesMen-
schen bezeichnete. Dies war ebenfalls ein Gedanke aus den Kommentaren des
Svimeon. Für die Begründung seines Konzepts definierte Joane Bagrationi das
Gute als das Prinzip des Seienden als solchen; die Rangordnung der verschie-
denen Entitäten sah er in diesem Prinzip des Kosmos verwurzelt. Dazu dient
auch seine überzeugende Erklärung der kausalen Triadik: Sowohl der Hervor-
gang als auch die eigenständige Existenz und Rückwendung setzten ein erstes
Prinzip voraus, und zwar das Gute. Auch andere Themen der Elementatio theo-
logica sind von Joane Bagrationi detailliert diskutiert worden: Zeit – Ewigkeit
/ Körper – Seele / Potenz – Akt usw. Somit darf konstatiert werden, daß Petri-
zis Proklos-Werk unter rezeptionsgeschichtlicher Perspektive in Georgien, aber
auch in Armenien eine bedeutsame Rolle gespielt hat.50
Die Elementatio theologica des Proklos und seine Lehre hat im Kaukasus
in der Spätantike, im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit viele wichtige Interessen-
ten gefunden. Wie ihre Rezeptions- und Transformationsgeschichte zeigt, war
der Philosophiebegriff des Proklos dort von besonderer Bedeutung. Zusam-
men mit Pythagoras, Platon und Aristoteles galt er als einer der wichtigsten
48 Vgl. Iremadze 2014b, 91–96; Metropolitan of Poti and Khobi Grigoli (Berbichashvili) 2014,
p. 146–152.
49 Vgl. Iremadze 2011, p. 96–111.
50 Joane Bagrationi 1974.
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Denker der antiken Philosophie. Die kaukasischen Philosophen nutzten daher
gern seine Lehre bei der Bestimmung der Aufgabe der Philosophie und ihres
Wesens. Eine interessanteAufgabe künftigerUntersuchungender Philosophie-
geschichte wird es daher sein, zu zeigen, wie die Transformation der Elemen-
tatio theologica bzw. der Liber de causis im Kaukasus gewirkt hat. Hier war-
tet auf sachkundige Wissenschaftler ein bedeutsames Forschungsfeld. Durch
weitere Untersuchungen auf diesemGebiet könnten sie zur Erweiterung unse-
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Porphyry and the Theology of Aristotle
Michael Chase
Centre Jean Pépin-UMR 8230, ENS, CNRS, PSL University
1 Introduction
Despite the fact that the Theology of Aristotle states, in its preface, that it is a
commentary (Arabic tafsīr) by Porphyry, and that we know from Porphyry’s
own testimony that he composed commentaries (ὑπομνήματα) on some of the
Enneads of Plotinus, current scholarly consensus denies that Porphyry played
any role in the elaboration of this work.1
No historian of philosophy has made more important contributions to the
study of the Theology of Aristotle (hereafter ThA) and the Plotiniana Arabica
in general than Cristina D’Ancona, and I have taken this exemplary scholar to
be representative of what I will call the anti-Porphyrian view. In what follows,
I would like to re-examine and criticially engage with some of C. D’Ancona’s
views on the possible role of Porphyry in the elaboration of the Theology of
Aristotle.
2 The Evidence. The Preface to the Theology of Aristotle
As is well known, the Theology of Aristotle opens with a Preface, which reads as
follows:
The first chapter of the book of the philosopher Aristotle, that is called
in Greek “Theology”. It is the discourse on Divine Sovereignty, comment-
ary (tafsīr) by Porphyry of Tyre, translated into Arabic by ʿAbd al-Masīḥ
1 Among these studies, in addition to those of C. D’Ancona, I include those of Zimmermann
1986 and Adamson 2002. According to Zimmermann 1986, p. 131, followed by Adamson,
the mention of Porphyry as commentator results from a “simple-minded error” committed
at some stage of the transmission process in which Porphyry was originally mentioned as
Plotinus’ pupil and editor.
158 chase
ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī, corrected for Aḥmad ibn al-Muʿtaṣim
bi-llah by Abū Yūsuf ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī, may God have mercy upon him.2
This paragraph transmits several precious items of information: it identifies the
work’s translator as the Syrian Christian ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī,3 its corrector or
editor as al-Kindī, and its dedicatee as al-Muʿtaṣim bi-llāh, son of the caliph al-
Muʿtaṣim—which enables the translation to be dated to between 833 and 842
of our era.4 Two points in particular have given rise to controversy: the attribu-
tion to Aristotle,5 and the implications of the words “commentary by Porphyry
of Tyre”.6 Following a long line of scholars, but especially the late Pierre Thil-
let, I will argue in this contribution that we should take this latter statement
seriously.
In 1933, Willy Theiler suggested that in all of the many passages in which
Augustine quotes or alludes to Plotinus, his knowledge came not from direct
reading of Plotinus, but from Porphyry. “We hasard the supposition,” wrote
Theiler,7 “that Augustine himself never read Plotinus’Enneads (in translation),
that the quotations in him from Plotinus (…) are taken fromwork by Porphyry,
aswas the case formany later authors,whowerehappy to rely onhis interpreta-
tion of Plotinus”.8 Thus, on this hypothesis,9 almost all of Plotinus’ considerable
2 Badawi 1955, p. 1. Cf. Aouad 1989, p. 546. All translations from Greek and Arabic are my own
unless otherwise indicated.
3 On this figure and his intellectual background, see now the important study by Treiger 2015.
4 Adamson 2002, p. 9.
5 The question here is whether the attribution toAristotle is the result of a deliberate forgery or
an honest, albeit ignorant mistake (Zimmermann 1986, p. 128). I agree with D’Ancona 2003b,
p. 85f. that the hypothesis of a deliberate forgery is much more likely. Cf. the Prologue of
the work, p. 5, 12–13, where the author states, using the first person: “let us not waste words
over this branch of knowledge, since we have already given an account of it in the book of
the Metaphysics” (trans. Lewis). Despite Zimmermann’s attempts to explain away this pas-
sage, it seems clear that the Adaptor is here impersonating Aristotle; cf. D’Ancona 2007, p. 45;
D’Ancona 2011b, p. 13 n. 28. I would argue that this impersonation is implicit throughout the
work.
6 tafsīr Furfuriyūs al-Ṣūrī. Although the word tafsīr can have many meanings, all of them refer
to the basic sense of “interpretation”. As a synonym of šarḥ, tafsīr refers to a systematic com-
mentary; cf. Gacek 2009, p. 79. It is, for instance, the word used in the titles of the Long
Commentaries of Averroes.
7 Theiler 1966, p. 161.
8 Theiler cites the example of Macrobius, who sometimes claims to be quoting Plotinus when
he is in fact probably quoting Porphyry. At In somniumScipionis, I 8, 5, for instance,Macrobius
supposedly cites Plotinus’De virtutibus (I 2), where a comparison with Sent. 32 suggests his
real source was Porphyry (cf. Schwyzer 1974, p. 227); at In somn. I 13, 9 f. Macrobius claims to
be citing from Enneads I 9, but again, he seems to be relying on Porphyry’s commentary.
9 This hypothesis is, of course, extremely controversial. Rejected by Henry 1934, for instance, it
was accepted by Dörrie 1976a; 1976b.
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influence on the Latin West throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages was
due, not to direct reading of Plotinus, who seems never to have been trans-
lated into Latin, but to explanatory commentaries by Porphyry,10 which may,
like other works by the philosopher from Tyre, have been translated by Marius
Victorinus. According to Heinich Dörrie,11 even in the Greek-speaking East, the
understanding of Plotinus shown by Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, is essen-
tially that of Plotinus as interpreted by Porphyry. Porphyry seems to have been
famous for his explanations of Plotinus even during his lifetime. As Eunapius
records in his Lives of the Sophists:
For Plotinus, because of the celestial nature of his soul and the oblique
and enigmatic character of his discourses, seemed heavy and hard to
listen to. But Porphyry, like a chain of Hermes let down to mortals, by his
variegated culture expounded everything in away that was easy to under-
stand and clear.12
The main vehicle by which the thought of Plotinus was handed down to
the Latin West was, according to Theiler, Porphyry’s commentaries (ὑπομνή-
ματα) on the Enneads.13 What, then, were these Porphyrian ὑπομνήματα on the
Enneads of Plotinus?
3 The Evidence. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus
Near the end of his Life of Plotinus, written in 301, some thirty years after
Plotinus’ death, Porphyry summarizes his activity, past and present, as editor
of his teacher’s Enneads.
10 Cf. Dörrie 1976a, p. 467.
11 Dörrie 1976b, p. 28.
12 Eunapius of Sardes, Vitae Sophistarum, IV, 11, p. 9, 13–17. Cf. Dörrie 1976a, p. 465: Porphyry
“war der einzige, der die oft schwierigenGedankengänge Plotins in verständlichesGriech-
isch zu dolmetschen vermochte.” Dörrie goes so far as to refer to Porphyry as “Plotinus’
publicist and translator” (1976a, p. 466).
13 As an example of the indirect tradition of Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα, Theiler cites Aeneas of
Gaza, Theophrastus, p. 45, 7–8 Colonna: “Porphyry (…) interpreting Plotinus’ bookWhere
does evil come from? says somewhere, arguing that matter is not ungenerated …” (trans-
lation Dillon/Russell 2012, p. 40). Cf. Eunapius, Lives of the Sophists, III, 5, p. 6, 15–16: “In
addition, he [Porphyry] clearly commented on several of his [Plotinus’] books.”
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Sowe arranged the fifty-four books in thisway in six Enneads, andwehave
written commentaries on some of them without any order (καταβεβλή-
μεθα δὲ καὶ εἴς τινα αὐτῶν ὑπομνήματα ἀτάκτως),14 because friends urged us
to write on points they wanted cleared up for them. We also composed
headings (κεφάλαια) for all of them except On Beauty, because it was not
available to us, following the chronological order inwhich the bookswere
issued; and we have produced not only the headings for each book but
also summaries of the arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα), which are numbered in
the same way as the headings.15
In addition to the treatises of the Enneads themselves, Porphyry here informs
us that he has added three kinds of items to his edition: headings (κεφάλαια),
or abbreviated descriptions of contents;16 summaries of the arguments (ἐπι-
χειρήματα); and commentaries (ὑπομνήματα). Based on Porphyry’s testimony,
C. D’Ancona, following earlier scholars,17 has proposed a two-stage process of
elaboration:
1. As the treatises were first issued (c. 263–270),18 Porphyry first provided
them with headings, and wrote commentaries on some of them, at the
request of his ἑταῖροι, i.e., presumably, his fellow members of the School
of Plotinus.
2. Some thirty years later, when preparing his definitive edition of the
Enneads, Porphyry added summaries of the arguments of the treatises,
which “are numbered as headings” (ἃ ὡς κεφάλαια συναριθμεῖται). These
headings, probably numbered, were not copied by the scribe of the arche-
type of the surviving manuscripts of the Enneads, but some manuscripts
preserve traces of them in the form of marginal numbers, probably inten-
ded as references to Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα, κεφάλαια, and/or ἐπιχειρή-
ματα.19
14 Note Porphyry’s emphasis that his commentaries were written “without any order,” and
compare the frequent observation of modern commentators that the Theology of Aris-
totle lacks any order; cf. Zimmermann 1986, p. 130, who speaks of the Plotiniana Arabica’s
“chaos”.
15 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, ch. 26.
16 On κεφάλαια in Greek texts, see for instance Regenbogen 1940, p. 1472–1475; Goulet-Cazé
1982, p. 315–321; Scholten 1996, p. 28f. To the examples listed by Scholten one may add the
κεφάλαια contained in themanuscripts of the Commentary on the Categories byDexippus;
cf. Dexippus, In Cat., p. 1–3 (Book I); 36–38 (Book II); 62–63 (Book III).
17 In particular, Goulet-Cazé 1982.
18 That Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα on the Enneads represent an earlier work was pointed out by
Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin, 17 = 1966, p. 180 n. 41.
19 D’Ancona 2012, p. 53–54. On these marginal numbers, see Goulet-Cazé, 1982, p. 313.
porphyry and the theology of aristotle 161
It has long been suggested that the headings (ruʾūs al-masāʾil) preserved in
the Theology of Aristotle,20 142 short sentences indicating the contents of the
first 34 chapters of Ennead IV 4 [28], bear some relation to these lost features of
Porphyry’s edition. Although this was disputed by Zimmermann,21 recent work
by C. D’Ancona22 has confirmed that these headings preserved in the Theology
of Aristotle are in fact remnants of theArabic translationof Porphyry’s κεφάλαια
and ἐπιχειρήματα.23
Two of the three editorial features that Porphyry, according to his own testi-
mony, added to the Enneads, have thus been shown to be included in the Theo-
logy of Aristotle, although only the faintest traces survive of them in the Greek
tradition. This being the case, it does not seem to be wildly unlikely that the
third element, Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα, may also have left traces in this work as
well. If this is so, however, since these ὑπομνήματαwere composed some thirty
years before Porphyry’s edition of the Enneads, we could expect them to reflect
a relatively early phase in the Tyrian scholar’s philosophical development. This
might partially explain what some authors, including C. D’Ancona, have taken
to be the philosophical incompetence of the author of the Theology, although
it must be said that the reports of this incompetence seem to me to be greatly
exaggerated.24
20 Theology of Aristotle, p. 8–18. Cf. Aouad 1989, p. 548–550.
21 Zimmermann 1986, p. 165–173.
22 D’Ancona 2013.
23 According to Peter Adamson (2002, p. 44–47), the headings were written by the same per-
sonwhowrote theparaphrase itself. Adamson contends that the author of theparaphrase,
whom he calls the Adaptor, was al-Ḥimsī; but if he accepts D’Ancona’s cogent demonstra-
tion that the headings were written by Porphyry, he would have to concede, at the very
least, that Porphyry was, if not the author, then at least an important contributor to what
we know as the Arabic Plotinus.
24 D’Ancona agrees with Zimmermann’s (1986, p. 121; 133; 173) judgment of the “pervading
dilettantism” and “amateur character” of the Theology’s author; she argues for this judg-
ment in D’Ancona 1991. Most of the instances she cites, however, could be explained as
divergent interpretations of Plotinus’ text, rather than failures to understand it. For a
different view, according to which the Theology of Aristotle evinces “philosophical soph-
istication,” cf. Adamson 2002, p. 2; 12 et passim.
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4 The Doctrines
4.1 Indices porphyriens in the Plotiniana Arabica
AsPierreThillet pointedoutnearly ahalf-century ago,25 themost fruitfulway to
approach the study of the sources of the PlotinianaArabica is to focus on those
passages which do not correspond to Plotinus’ Greek, but represent interpola-
tions into or interpretations of the text of Plotinus.26 In ground-breaking stud-
ies first presented in 1969, ShlomoPinès andPierreThillet (1971) identifiedwhat
the latter scholar called “indices porphyriens,” present in the PlotinianaArabica
but absent fromPlotinus. These include the following features: a preference for
describing the derivation of the various levels of the universe in causal terms;27
the idea that the First Principle produces being,while the secondprinciple pro-
duces Form;28 the doctrine of learned ignorance; and the identification of the
First principle with pure being.29 For her part, C. D’Ancona has identified sev-
25 Thillet 1971, p. 295.
26 According to Zimmermann (1986, p. 116), the author of these interpolations is the trans-
lator Ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī. Yet he also admits that the presence of doctrinal shifts with
regard to Plotinus may be traced back to “a common Neoplatonic vulgate,” and adds that
he does notmean to deny “the possibility of some reliance byHimsi on Porphyrian glosses
lost to us”. On the scant likelihood of Ḥimṣī being the sole author of the interpolations, cf.
Daiber 1988.
27 For an example, cf. Theology of Aristotle, X.1, p. 134, 5, where the Adaptor transforms
Plotinus’ statement (V 2, 1, 1) that “the One is all things and not a single one of them” into
the claim that “The absolute One is the cause of all things and not like any of the things”.
Cf., for instance, Porphyry, In Parmenidem, XIII, 22–23, where the intelligence “that can-
not enterwithin itself,” and is “beyond all things” (ἐπέκεινα πάντων), hence coincidingwith
the First One, is called “the uncoordinated cause of all things” (πάντων αἰτία ⟨ἀ⟩σύζυγος).
On causality in the Neoplatonica Arabica, cf. D’Ancona 2001a, p. 102–103 and especially
1999a.
28 This corresponds to the doctrine C. D’Ancona (1992) has described as creatio mediante
intelligentia.
29 On these last two principles, see below. One could add to this list. The Adaptor believes
in an allegorical interpretation of the Timaeus (cf. Adamson 2002, p. 142–143), as did Por-
phyry. He is also a firm believer in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, a topic to which
Porphyry devoted two (now lost) treatises; cf. Karamanolis 2006, p. 243–330. Indeed, what
D’Ancona (1998, p. 854) describes as the “crucial inspiration (…) that Aristotle and Plato
were not at variance with one another, transmitted to the first falāsifa by the Alexan-
drian commentators,” was already to be found in Porphyry; cf. I. Hadot 2015, p. 54–64.
Adamson (2002, p. 69) has noted that the Adaptor was more concerned with ethics than
Plotinus, or was interested in making explicit the ethical dimension of Plotinian thought;
compare Porphyry’s elaboration of the Plotinian scheme of the virtues in his Sentence
32, or the hortatory ethical tone of such works as the De abstinentia or the Letter to Mar-
cella. D’Ancona (2007, p. 45) and others have called attention to the Adaptor’s importa-
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eral additional non-Plotinian features as characteristic of the Theology of Aris-
totle. These include the transformation of Plotinus’s One into a principle that
creates what derives from it instantaneously and by its being alone; that thinks
and knows its derivatives; and that exercises providence over them. D’Ancona
argues that most of these features derive from the Ps.-Dionysius the Areopa-
gite, with whose writings the Christian translator al-Ḥimṣī will, she believes,
have been familiar.30 In what follows I will examine her arguments with regard
to some of these characteristic doctrines.
4.2 The Identification of the First Principle with Being
Perhaps the most striking of the doctrines that are present in the Plotiniana
Arabica, but absent from Plotinus, is the one that identifies the First Principle
with pure being (Arabic anniyya or huwiyya, terms that usually translate the
Greek neuter participle τὸ ὄν, or the infinitive τὸ εἶναι).31 Yet the anonymous
Commentary on the Parmenides, ascribed with great plausibility to Porphyry,32
contains the doctrine of the One as pure being (τὸ εἶναι) in a manner closely
tion of Aristotelian material into the Plotiniana Arabica: compare Porphyry’s inclusion
of Peripatetic material into his exposition of Plotinus in his Sentences (Schwyzer 1974,
p. 227). Porphyry’s lost Commentary on the Categories addressed to Gedalios seems to have
been largely devoted to defending Aristotle’s doctrines against the attacks of Plotinus; cf.
P. Hadot 1974.
30 According to the current state of scholarship (Treiger 2005, p. 234; 2007, p. 366), the only
known translation of the entire CorpusDionysiacum into Arabic is that by ʿĪsā b. Isḥāq Ibn
Saḥqūq, also a native of Ḥims, which is extant in two MSS (Sinai MS ar. 268; 314) and dates
from 1009, nearly two centuries after Ibn Nāʿima’s translation of the Theology of Aristotle.
To be sure, someearlier, partial translations did exist: but the versionof DivineNames 4.18–
35 by Ibrāhim b. Yūḥannā al-Anṭākī dates from the late 9th-early 10th centuries (Treiger
2007, p. 238), while the anonymous translation of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 1–9 is also
ascribed conjecturally to al-Anṭākī (ibid., p. 238 & n. 85). If so, then even these fragment-
ary Arabic translations of the Ps.-Dionysius postdate the translation of the Theology of
Aristotle by at least half a century. It is true, however, that various Syriac translations of
the Corpus Dionysiacum were in circulation since the late 6th century. In a forthcoming
paper (Treiger 2020), Professor Treiger claims to have discovered a “ninth-century Arabic
Dionysian paraphrase” which he reconstructs on the basis of passages in various works
al-Ġazālī. Despite the author’s great erudition, I am not convinced by his arguments. The
passages he discusses show thematic, but not lexicographical similarities, and I see no
reason to believe they represent “paraphrases” of an (otherwise unattested) early peri-
phrastic translation of Dionysian texts, rather than independent treatments of themes
that were widely diffused in Greek Neoplatonic and Patristic texts.
31 Thillet 1971, p. 301; Pinès 1971, p. 305, D’Ancona, 2000, p. 56. Anniyyamore often translates
τὸ εἶναι, while huwiyya more often renders τὸ ὄν; cf. Endress 1997, p. 61; Adamson 2002,
p. 219 n. 32.
32 On this attribution, cf. for instance Chase 2012; Chase, in press.
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parallel to the doctrine of the first principle as anniyya faqaṭ33 (‘simple being’),
which plays a crucial role in the Plotiniana Arabica.
I need not go into this subject in detail, since it’s been expertly addresed by
Richard Taylor (1998), among others. Suffice it to say that Cristina D’Ancona
believes that the argumentative context of the occurrence of the formula of
“pure being” (anniyya faqaṭ) in the Plotiniana Arabica and “being” (τὸ εἶναι) in
Porphyry’s Commentary on the Parmenides are too different to able to prove the
dependence of the former on the latter. Even if one acknowledges this differ-
ence, however, it remains possible that Porphyry may have included the same
doctrine within a different argumentative context in his lost Commentaries on
the Enneads. In any case, the parallels in formulation between the Plotiniana
Arabica and the In Parmenidem remain quite striking, as when the Adaptor
decribes the First Principle as “pure act” (al-fiʿl al-maḥḍ, p. 51, 13), while Por-
phyry says that the first principle “acts, or rather is pure action” (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ
μᾶλλον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθαρόν; In Parmenidem, 12, 26). It is crucial to note,
as Richard Taylor and Peter Adamson have pointed out, that this notion of the
First Principle as pure act is not to be found in the Pseudo-Dionysius, whom
D’Ancona has identified as the likely source for the Plotiniana Arabica’s doc-
trine of the First Principle as being.34
4.3 Porphyry and the Plotiniana Arabica on Soul and Intellect
I will also have to be brief inmydiscussion of Cristina d’Ancona’s important art-
icle from 1999, entitled “Porphyry,Universal Soul and theArabicPlotinus”.Here,
D’Ancona starts off from what she describes as the characteristic Porphyrian
tendency tominimize the difference between the hypostases of Soul and Intel-
lect, sometimes to the point of identifying them. One of the main proof texts
of this doctrine is a passage from Iamblichus’De anima:35
33 The term anniyya, of disputed etymology (cf. Adamson 2002, p. 124–126), occurs some 87
times in the Theology, most frequently in contexts without parallels in the Enneads, with
the meanings of “being, existence, reality”; cf. Thillet 1971, p. 301. For the First Principle as
al-anniyya al-ūlā cf. Theology of Aristotle, p. 26; 27; 51; 87, and compare Marius Victorinus
(Adv. Ar., II, 4, 8, 1092; IV, 16, 29, 1025A), who, probably under Porphryian influence, calls
God esse primum. Cf. Pinès 1971, p. 310.
34 It seems to me unlikely that, as Taylor and Adamson suggest, this notion may have been
independently developed, on the basis of the Plotinus’Ennead VI.8, by Porphyry and the
Adaptor of the Theology of Aristotle, simply because, as far as I know, very few Greek
authors other than Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry ever proposed such a doctrine. For two
subsequent authors to come up with such an unusual doctrine independently of one
another seems to be too much of a coincidence, especially when one adds that the Theo-
logy of Aristotle presents itself as the work of Porphyry.
35 Porphyry fr. 441, ap. Iamblichus,DeAnima, 6, p. 30, 10–13:Πορφύριος δὲ ἐνδοιάζει περὶ αὐτήν,
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As for Porphyry, he is of two minds on the subject, now dissociating him-
self violently from this view, now adopting it as a doctine handed down
from above. According to this doctrine, the soul differs in no way from
intellect and the gods, and the superior classes of being, at least in respect
to its substance in general.
This “typical confusion” of Soul and Intellect is, according to D’Ancona, absent
from the Theology of Aristotle in passages where one would expect it to appear.
This shows that the Porphyry is unlikely to have been the main Greek source
behind the Theology of Aristotle.
I would have two main responses. First, argumenta e silentio are of notori-
ously doubtful value: it is a tricky business to infer what Porphyry would or
should have said in any givenpassageof his lostCommentaryon theEnneads. He
may have had his reasons for omitting the doctrine from the passages in ques-
tion, or the Adaptormay, for whatever reason, have chosen to omit this portion
of Porphyry’s comments. More tellingly, however, Peter Adamson has found
traces in the Theology of Aristotle of precisely this Porphyrian hesitation over
the distinction between the hypostases, particularly Soul and Intellect. Along-
side passages in which the Plotinian hypostases of the One, Intellect, Soul, and
the sensible world are clearly distinguished,36 Adamson points out that there
are others which exhibit what he calls a “tendency to compress the emanat-
ive hierarchy,” passages which “collapse the soul and intellect together”.37 Such
hesitancy is indeed strongly reminiscent of A.C. Lloyd’s description of what he
called Porphyry’s typical “telescoping of the hypostases,” as well as of Iamb-
lichus’ characterization of Porphyry as “being of two minds on the subject”.38
4.4 The Doctrine of Learned Ignorance
What has been called the doctrine of learned ignorance or docta ignorantia
holds that in order to grasp the nature of the first principle, one needs to make
use not of discursive or even intuitive thought, but of a higher form of know-
ledge that can be likened to ignorance. Although Hermetic, Neo-Pythagorean,
πῇ μὲν διατεταμένως αὐτῆς ἀφιστάμενος, πῇ δὲ συνακολουθῶν αὐτῇ, ὡς παραδοθείσῃ ἄνωθεν.
Κατὰ δὴ ταύτην νοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ διενήνοχε κατά γε τὴν ὅλην
οὐσίαν.
36 Adamson (2002, p. 220 n. 51) cites Sayings of the Greek Sage 1.41–45.
37 Cf., with Adamson, Epistle of the Divine Science, p. 166–168; Theology of Aristotle X.192,
p. 163 B.;Theology of Aristotle X.31, p. 138–139 B. “Evenmore than Plotinus,” writes Adamson
(n. 53), “he [sc. the Adaptor] treats the intelligible world (soul and intellect together) as
having one single nature”.
38 Lloyd 1967.
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and Middle Platonist authors, through their use of the techniques of negative
theology,39 had paved the way for this doctrine before the time of Porphyry, it
found its most explicit formulation in the Tyrian philosopher. In his Sentence
25, for instance, we read:
On the subject of that which is beyond Intellect (…) it is grasped only
by means of an ignorance superior to intellection (ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοή-
σεως).40
Similarly, in Porphyry’s Commentary on the Parmenides (X, 25–29, p. 96 Hadot),
one reads that the only criterion of the knowledge (γνῶσις) of God is the ignor-
ance (ἀγνωσία) that one has of him. Finally, the Theosophy of Tübingen reports
that Porphyry said that knowledge of the First Principle is ignorance (ἀλλ’ ἔστιν
αὐτοῦ γνῶσις ἡ ἀγνωσία).41 As Willy Theiler pointed out long ago, Augustine is
very probably dependent on Porphyry when hewrites about “that highest God,
who is best known through ignorance of him”.42
As in the case of the doctrine of the First Principle as being, C. D’Ancona
denies that the presence of this admittedly Porphyrian doctrine in two pas-
sages of theTheology of Aristotle43 can be taken as proof of a Porphyrian role in
the elaboration of this work. The Arabic passages, she contends, do not reflect
Porphyry’s arguments, but only the formula, stripped from its context.44 In
conclusion, while conceding that the author of the Theology may have been
influenced by the Porphyrian formula of “ignorance greater than knowledge,”
stripped of its context, C. D’Ancona prefers to explain the presence of this
39 On the origins of negative theology in Greco-Roman Antiquity, the discussion in Festu-
gière 1954, p. 92–140 remains unsurpassed. On negative theology in Porphyry see, most
recently, Beatrice 2016, p. 126–130.
40 Translation Dillon, in L. Brisson et al., ed., 2005, vol. II, p. 566–567, modified. Cf. Porphyry,
In Parmenidem, II, 17 on μηδὲν ἐνοούσῃ νοήσει.
41 Theosophia Tubignesis, II, 13, p. 34, 109 Beatrice. For these and other references, cf. the
notes by Jean Pépin in L. Brisson et al., ed., 2005, vol. II, p. 566–567.
42 Augustine, De ordine 2, XVI, 44, 18–19: de summo illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo. Cf.
Theiler 1966, p. 173 n. 29; Beatrice 2016, p. 127.
43 Theology of Aristotle p. 9, 8; Theology of Aristotle II, p. 37, 2–4. With the Arabic bi-jahlin
ašraf min al-ʿilm, cf. Porphyry’s ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως.
44 D’Ancona 1993, p. 6. Adamson (2002) uses similar considerations to reject Porphyrian
influence on the doctrine of docta ignorantia as found in the Theology of Aristotle,
arguing—unconvincingly, inmy view—that both theTheology of Aristotle and the author
of the Parmenides commentary developed the notion independently, on the basis of Aris-
totle and Plotinus’Ennead VI.9.
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theme in the Theology by an influence of the Ps.-Dionysius, who she admits
derived his inspiration from Porphyry.45
As in the case of the doctrine of the First Cause as Being, such an approach
might be adequate if it were the case thatwe knew that Porphyry had expressed
the doctrine of learned ignorance only in Sentence 25 and in the Commentary
on the Parmenides. But we have no reason to believe that this is so: Porphyry
may have discussed this doctrine in any number of those of his many works
that happen not to have come down to us.46 If the non-Plotinian interpola-
tions in the Theology of Aristotle were in one way or another based on a lost
commentary or commentaries by Porphyry on the Enneads of Plotinus, why
could Porphyry not have expressed his doctrine of learned ignorance in this
work, using a different argumentative context, different proofs and different
examples? Like Adamson (supra n. 44), D’Ancona sometimes seems to argue
almost as though the claimof thepro-Porphyrianadvocateswas that the author
of theTheologywas influenced by anArabic translation of Porphyry’s Sentences
or Commentary on the Parmenides:47 but this is of course not the case. Instead,
the claim is that that authorwas influenced by a lost commentary or comment-
aries by Porphyry on the Enneads.
4.5 Divine Knowledge and Providence
In an important series of papers,48 Cristina D’Ancona has argued that one finds
in the PlotinianaArabica a phenomenon she has referred to, followingZimmer-
45 Adamson, for his part, also arguing for some form of Dionysian influence, claims that if
the Porphyrian hypothesis, which claims that Porphyry wrote the Greek basis of theTheo-
logy of Aristotle, were true “we would expect to find an extensive Porphyian development
on the theme of ignorance,” which is not the case. But (i) there is no “extensive develop-
ment on the theme of divine ignorance” elsewhere in Porphyry’s surviving works, either,
although it is an indisputably Porphyrian doctrine; and (ii) even if therewere such a devel-
opment in Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα, the Adaptor may simply have chosen not to reproduce
it. No one is claiming that the Plotiniana Arabica is merely a complete andmindless tran-
scription of Porphyry’s lost commentaries, but that it is based on such commentaries.
46 In the latest enumeration of Porphyry’s works, R. Goulet (2012) lists 60 titles of works by
Porphyry, excluding his commentaries (11 on Aristotle, 7 on Plato; cf. Chase, 2012, p. 1349–
1376). Few of these works survive: some two dozen have been edited in modern times,
often in the form of collection of fragments. Even in the case of a preserved, well-edited
work like the Sentences, however, only about half, at most, of the original work has come
down to us; cf. Schwyzer 1974, p. 223.
47 Cf. D’Ancona 1993, p. 14, where she argues that the verbal link between Sentence 25 and
the 16th question head of the Theology “is not complete enough to admit that it repro-
duces the Porphyrian passage”. But no one has claimed that the Arabic text reproduces a
text from Porphyry’s Sentences!
48 D’Ancona 1997; D’Ancona 1999a; D’Ancona 2002; D’Ancona 2003.
168 chase
mann,49 as an Aristotelianization of Plotinus.50 In Plotinus, as is well known,
there is a twofold, and symmetrical, lack of knowledge as far as the First Prin-
ciple is concerned. As we have seen when discussing the doctrine of docta
ignorantia, the One cannot be known by what is inferior to it and derives from
it. Symmetrically, the First Principle does not think,51 but is beyond thought.52
For Plotinus, at any rate, the proximate agent in ensuring divine providence
is the Intellect, and since it is the source of that Intellect, theOneneednot actu-
ally do anything in order for pronoia over the universe to be ensured. Instead,
it ensures providence by its mere existence.53 This tendency is intensified in
Proclus, for whom the First Principle cannot know its derivatives. In order to
preserve the First Principle’s utter transcendence, knowledge of its derivatives,
and consequently the divine providence which presupposes such knowledge,
is delegated to the henads or intelligible gods. In the Plotiniana Arabica, by
contrast, the First Principle is said both to know and to exercize providence
over its derivatives. C. D’Ancona has characterized this elimination of the hen-
ads and attribution of their functions to the First Principle as a return beyond
Proclus to Plotinus, at least in the sense that omnipresence is restored to the
First Principle,54 and it is to be explained, in her view, by the influence of the
Pseudo-Dionysius, who similarly transfers cognitive andprovidential functions
from the henads back to the First Principle. For C. D’Ancona, this return was
made possible by the Christian translator Ibn Nāʿima’s knowledge of the works
of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, in whom we find Proclus’ association of
universal providence with an omnipresent divine principle, now attributed to
a God who creates by being alone.
This is certainly a possible reconstruction, but one may wonder if it is
the only possible one. In particular, one may wonder whether the Pseudo-
Dionysius is the only thinker who may have propitiated this return, beyond
49 Cf. Zimmermann 1986, p. 124–125.
50 D’Ancona, 1997, p. 421.
51 This is the theme of Ennead V 6 [24]; cf. D’Ancona 1997, p. 427–428; D’Ancona 2002, p. 22f.,
with discussion of the key Plotinian texts; D’Ancona 2003, p. 216f., p. 227. See also Krämer
1964, p. 394–403; Rist 1967, p. 38–52.
52 There are, however, passages in which Plotinus suggests that a certain kind of knowledge
may, after all, be attributed to the One, a knowledge that may be characterized as a kind
of hyper-knowledge (ὑπερνόησις, VI 8, 16, 32) or simple self-intuition (VI 7, 39, 1–2). This
strange kind of (hyper-)intellectual activity is the source of all other kinds of thought as
they occur in inferior beings. Cf. Linguiti 1995, p. 158, with references to further literature.
53 D’Ancona, 2002, p. 26, 29; Gerson 1994, citing VI 7, 39, 26–27; VI 7, 37, 29–31.
54 DAncona 1999a, p. 61.
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Proclus, to the notion of a First Principle that knows and exercizes providence
over its derivatives.
We do indeed find another such thinker: none other than Porphyry, who, in
his Commentary on the Parmenides, describes the First Principle as follows:
he never remains in ignorance of the things that will be, and has known
those that have happened, he who has never come to be in ignorance.55
Here, then, knowledge of individual things and/or events56 is explicitly
ascribed to the First Principle: knowledge not only of present events, but also of
those in the past and the future.57 When asked by his anonymous interlocutor
whether God knows the all, Porphyry replies in the affirmative; and when chal-
lenged to explain how such knowledge can avoid introducing multiplicity into
God, he replies as follows:
Because I say that it is a knowledge outside of knowledge and ignor-
ance, from which knowledge derives58 … He is found to be mightier than
knowledge and ignorance,59 and knowing everything, but not like other
knowers (…) he is knowledge itself60 … Thus, there is a knowledge of a
knower, who proceeds from ignorance to knowledge of the known object;
and again, there is absolute knowledge (γνῶσις ἀπόλυτος) that is not of the
knower and the known, but that is that One, viz. knowledge, prior to all
known and unknown things, which moves toward knowledge.61
55 Porphyry, In Parmenidem, IV, 31–V, 14, p. 104: … μόνον ὅτι μηδ’ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ μένει ποτὲ τῶν ἐσο-
μένων, γιγνόμενα δὲ ἐγνώρισεν ὁ μηδέποτε ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ γενόμενος.
56 Cf. Porphyry, Contra Nemertium, fr. 279F Smith, where God, equivalent to the Intellect,
adjusts the lifetime of particulars to one another, with a view to what is profitable to the
whole and to the duration of its harmony: οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ συμφέροντι τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ⟨εἰς⟩ τὴν
διάρκειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἁρμονίας ἄλλον ἄλλωι ἁρμόζει (sc. ὁ θεός) χρόνον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλ’ ἤδη
καὶ κηδεμὼν ὑπάρχων καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ ἰατρός…
57 Note the contrast here with the view of Plotinus, for whom not even the Intellect, much
less the One, can know future states affairs in the sensible world; cf. Noble & Powers, 2015,
p. 59, n. 20. On God’s knowledge of the future, cf. Porphyry, Against Nemertius, fr. 280F:
θεὸς δὲ εἰδὼς ὸ μέλλον…
58 Porphyry, In Parmenidem, V, 10–11, p. 104: Ὅτι φημὶ εἶναι γνῶσιν ἔξω γνώσεω⟨ς⟩ καὶ ἀγνοίας,
ἀφ’ ἧς ἡ γνῶσις.
59 Cf. Epistle of the Divine Science, p. 118–119, p. 175, transl. Lewis p. 323: the First Agent is
“above all knowledge ( fawqa al-ʿilmi), because it is the first knowledge”.
60 Porphyry, In Parmenidem V, 29–34, p. 108: (…) γνώσεως καὶ ἀγνοίας εὑρίσκεται [κρεί]ττων
καὶ πάντα γιγνώσκ (…) ν (…) αὐτὸ τοῦ[το γνῶσις ο]ὖσα.
61 Porphyry, In Parmenidem VI, 4–12, p. 108–110: οὕτως ἔστι καὶ γνῶσις γιγνώσκοντος καὶ ἐξ
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For Porphyry, then, the First principle is identical to knowledge itself, but the
knowledge in question is one that is absolute (ἀπόλυτος), prior to the distinc-
tion between knowing subject and known object. By virtue of this knowledge,
this Principle knows theAll, including things that have occurred and those that
will come to be.62
4.6 Instantaneous Creation and Action by Being Alone
As C. D’Ancona points out, the Plotiniana Arabica are characterized by two
additional features that are not attested explicitly in Plotinus: the doctrine of
instantaneous creation and the doctrine of action “by being alone”. The two
doctrines are intimately related. As we read in a passage from the Sayings of the
Greek Sage,63 the creative act of the First Agent must take place all at once: if it
did not, unmanifested actswould still remainwithin him. But if this were so, he
would notmake things by his being alone (lam tafʿal al-ašyāʾa bi-annihā faqaṭ),
but by somekindof reflection andmotion (bi-rawiyyatiwa-ḥarakatimā),which
is absurd and repugnant.
One sees from this text that the prime considerationmotivating the doctrine
of creation all at once (dafʿatan wāḥidatan) and by being alone (bi-anniyati or
annihi faqaṭ) is not so much, as Adamson contends, the avoidance of duality
in the First Principle, as it is the avoidance of motion and reflection in him.
And the prime motivation for excluding motion and reflection from the First
Principle is that they introduce change. Yet that the First Principle must be
immutable is a firm principle throughout the Plotiniana Arabica,64 as it was
throughout Greco-Roman Neoplatonism.65
ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλθόντος τοῦ γιγνωσκομένου καὶ πάλιν ἄλλη γνῶσις ἀπόλυτος οὐ [γιγν]ώ[σ-
κοντ]ος οὖσα καὶ γιγνωσκομένου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν τοῦτο γνῶσις οὖσα πρὸ παντὸς γιγ⟨ν⟩ωσκομένου
καὶ ἀγνοουμένου ⟨καὶ⟩ εἰς γνῶσιν ἐρχομένου.
62 We seem to have here a case of a phenomenon frequent in Porphyry, especially in his Sen-
tences, where he often reformulates the thought of Plotinus in what Schwyzer called a
“schoolmasterly” and systematic way (1974, p. 227: “schulmässig”; p. 231: “strenges System-
atisierung”). Here, in the case of a doctrine—the attribution of knowledge to theOne—in
which Plotinus displayed a certain unresolved tension, Porphyry comes up with a doc-
trine which is systematized to the point of rigidification, as it were, than the one found in
Plotinus.
63 Sayings of the Greek Sage §37, p. 98, 15–22f. Wakelnig 2014 = ed. Badawi p. 187, 4–10.
64 Cf. Sayings of theGreek Sage §32, p. 94, 7Wakelnig 2014 = ed. Badawi, p. 184, 10:wa-yanbaġī
li-l-fāʿil al-awwal an yakūn sākinan ġayr mutaḥarrak; cf. Sayings of the Greek Sage §44,
p. 114, 13–15Wakelnig; Theology of Aristotle p. 33; 63; 84, 10; 88, 10 ed. Badawi.
65 Cf. Proclus,On the Eternity of theWorld, apud Philoponum,Deaeternitatemundi, p. 55, 22f.
Rabe.
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Thedoctrine of instantaneous creationholds thatworld is created inno time
whatsoever, but all at once (dafʿatan wāḥidatan = Greek ἀθρόως).66 Compare,
once again, a passage such as Theology of Aristotle, p. 51, 13–14:
When he [sc. the Creator] acts, he merely looks towards his essence and
he carries out his activity all at once (dafʿatan wāḥidatan).67
Many other passages could be cited,68 but these suffice to give the gist of the
idea. It should be stressed that as in the case of the texts assertingGod’s identity
with being, most of those mentioning the doctrine of instantaneous creation
have no parallel in Plotinus.
C. D’Ancona has pointed out69 that this doctrine has its likely source in the
works of John Philoponus, several of whose works were known in Arabic trans-
lation. Yet Philoponus himself preserves a text by Porphyry that proves that this
notion of instantaneous creation was already present in the latter’s Comment-
ary on the Timaeus:70
In addition, Porphyry says that things that derive their existence from [a
process of] generation and coming to be, for example a house or a ship or
a plant or an animal, are also said to be generated. For this reason we do
not describe a flash of lightning or a snapping of the fingers or anything
else that exists and ceases to exist in an instant as generated: as Aristotle
also says, all such things come to be without a [process of] generation
66 The relevant texts in the Theology of Aristotle have been studied by Zimmermann 1986,
p. 202–205; cf. Pseudo-Ammonius, Doxography, 8.2; 17, 5–6 Rudolph. In the Ismaʿīlī tradi-
tion, one finds the notion of creation dafʿatan wāḥidatan in Nasafī, al-Sijistānī, Jābir ibn
Ḥayyān, and the Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ (Epistle 35, 3, vol. III, p. 238, 13–21 al-Bustānī); cf. Rudolph
1989, p. 149–150; Chase 2016.
67 Speaking of the First Principle, the author of the Epistle on Divine Science (p. 175, 1) writes
in an interpolation to his paraphrase of Ennead V 3 [49], 12.28–36: “He does not proceed
from doing one thing to doing another. Hemakes and originates things all at once” (lākin-
nahū faʿala al-ašyāʾ wa-ibtadaʿahā dafʿatan wāḥidatan).
68 Cf. Theology of Aristotle p. 8, 12; 31, 3; 4; 6–7; 11; 32, 4; 41, 5.
69 D’Ancona 2001, p. 107f.; 2003, p. 315–317.
70 Porphyry,Commentaryon theTimaeus fr. 36, p. 23, 14–24, 5 Sodano=Philoponus,Deaetern-
itatemundi VI, 8, p. 148, 7–15 Rabe: ἔτι φησὶν ὁΠορφύριος γενητὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ διὰ γενέσεως
καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαβόν, ὡς οἰκία καὶ πλοῖον καὶ φυτὸν καὶ ζῷον, καθὸ τὴν ἀστραπὴν καὶ
τὸν κρότον καὶ ὅσα ἐξαίφνης ὑφίσταται καὶ παύεται οὐ λέγομεν εἶναι γενητά· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἄνευ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγίγνεται καὶ χωρὶς φθορᾶς εἰς
τὸ μὴ εἶναι μεταβάλλει· καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ὑπόθοιτο ὡς
διὰ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγενόμενον· ἅμα γὰρ νοήματι εἰς οὐσίωσιν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα παρή-
γαγεν.
172 chase
and switch to non-existence without [a process of] decay. It is clear that
nobodywould hold that theworld is generated in the sense of having to
come to be through a process of generation, for God brought all things
into substantification simultaneously with ⟨his⟩ thought (ἅμα γὰρ νοή-
ματι εἰς οὐσίωσιν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα παρήγαγεν).
Here, Porphyry distinguishes things that come to be bit by bit over a period of
time,whether artificial or natural, fromphenomena that occur instantaneously
such as lightning or a snapping of fingers: such things, which come into and out
of existence instantaneously, are not said to be generated. Likewise, the world
was not generated in the sense of having undergone a process of generation,
but came into existence at the same time as God’s thought: that is, instantan-
eously.
C. D’Ancona has often pointed to the importance of the formula of action by
being alone (bi-anniyati faqaṭ = Greek αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι), referring to it as a Proclan
innovation71 and suggesting that it found its way into the Theology of Aristotle
by way of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Once again, however, this idea
is already to be found expressis verbis in Porphyry’s Commentary on the Tim-
aeus:72
The fourth point of [Porphyry’s] arguments, in addition to what has been
said, is that in which he shows that the divine Intellect carries out its
mode of creation (δημιουργία) by its mere being (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι), and he
71 Cf. D’Ancona 1995, p. 148–149.
72 Porphyry, Commentary on the Timaeus, fr. 51, p. 38, 5–15 f. Sodano = Proclus, In Timaeum,
vol. 1, 395, 10f. ed. Diels, translation Runia-Share (modified): Τέταρτον πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις
ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων κεφάλαιον, ἐν ᾧ τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδεικνύει τῆς δημιουργίας αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τὸν θεῖον
νοῦν ἐπιτελούμενον, καὶ κατασκευάζει διὰ πλειόνων· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τεχνῖται δέονται πρὸς τὴν ἐνέρ-
γειαν ὀργάνων διὰ τὸ μὴ πάσης κρατεῖν τῆς ὕλης, δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις χρώμενοι
πρὸς τὸ εὐεργὸνποιῆσαι τὴν ὕλην, τρυπῶντες ἢ ξέοντες ἢ τορνεύοντες,ἃ δὴπάντα οὐ τὸ εἶδος ἐντί-
θησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξαιρεῖ τὴν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τοῦ δεξομένου τὸ εἶδος· αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀχρόνως ἀπὸ τῆς
τέχνης παραγίνεται τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, πάντων ἐξαιρεθέντων τῶν ἐμποδών. καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν καὶ τού-
τοις ἐμπόδιον, τό τε εἶδος ἀθρόως ἂν τῇ ὕλῃ προσῆγον καὶ ὀργάνων οὐδὲν ἂν ὅλως ἐδεήθησαν (…)
εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τέχναι ἀνθρώπιναι καὶ ψυχῶν μερικῶν φαντασίαι καὶ δαιμόνων ἐνέργειαι τοιαῦτα
δρῶσι, τί θαυμαστὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν τὸ πᾶν ὑπόστασιν παρέχεσθαι τῷ αἰσθητῷ,
ἀύλως μὲν ⟨παράγοντα⟩ τὸ ἔνυλον, ἀναφῶς δὲ ἀπογεννῶντα τὸ ἁπτόν, ἀμερῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τὸ
διαστατόν; καὶ οὐ δεῖ τοῦτο θαυμάζειν, εἴ τι ἀσώματον ὂν καὶ ἀδιάστατον ὑποστατικὸν εἴη τοῦδε
τοῦ παντός· εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοσοῦτον ὄγκον ἔχον καὶ πάντας ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοὺς
λόγους, ὑφίστησι τοσαύτας διαφορὰς (…) πολλῷ δὴ οὖν μᾶλλον ὁ δημιουργικὸς λόγος τὰ πάντα
παράγειν δύναται μηδὲν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τῆς ὕλης δεηθείς, ὥσπερ ὁ τοῦ σπέρματος· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔξω ὕλης, ὁ δὲ τῶν πάντων ὑποστάτης ἐν ἑαυτῷ διαιωνίως ἕστηκε καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένοντος
τὰ πάντα παρήγαγε.
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establishes this by several arguments. Even craftsmen need tools for their
activity because they do not have mastery over all their material (ὕλη).
They show this byusing tools tomake theirmaterial easy tousebydrilling,
planing, or turning it, all of which operations do not insert a form, but
eliminate the inappropriateness of what is to receive the form.
Here, we have proof that it was Porphyry, not Syrianus73 or Proclus,74 who was
the originator of the notion of creation by being alone (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι), which
he linked to the notion of instantaneous creation. His basic argument is by
analogy: human craftsmen need tools and time to use them only because the
material on which they have to work presents obstacles which require prepar-
ation such as drilling or planing: once this preparatory work is completed, the
form is instantaneously communicated to the object onwhich theywerework-
ing. If there were no such obstacles, all of which are due to matter, a craftsman
could instantly insert the form present in hismind into the object of his labors.
But this is the case for the Demiurge: having no need formatter, he has no need
of time or tools, but produces the world instantaneously, by thinking alone
(αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν in this fragment corresponds nicely to ἅμα νοήματι in the one
cited previously).
There is, moreover, another parallel worth citing. With Porphyry’s remarks
about the Demiurge’s lack of need for tools, one may compare the following
passage from the Theology of Aristotle X.190, p. 163:
… when craftsmenwish to fashion a thing (…) when they work they work
with their hands and other instrumentswhereaswhen theCreatorwishes
to make something (…) He does not need any instrument in the origina-
tion of things ( fī-ibdāʿ l-ašyāʾ) because he is the cause of instruments, it
being he that originated them.
5 Conclusion
Let me summarize and try to be clear about exactly what my claim is.
I believe the Plotiniana Arabica in general, and the Theology of Aristotle in
particular, may preserve traces of Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα on Plotinus’Enneads,
which are otherwise lost.
73 As asserted by D’Ancona 1999a, n. 49; D’Ancona 2000, p. 94.
74 Cf. D’Ancona 1995, p. 82, n. 37.
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Of the themes we have studied that are present in the Plotiniana Arabica
but absent from Plotinus, some, as D’Ancona has emphasized, are attested
or approximated in the Pseudo-Dionysius, others in Philoponus. But all the
themes we have examined are attested for Porphyry, who was active two cen-
turies prior than they. Most importantly, it is Porphyry, not Dionysius or Philo-
ponus, to whom the authorship of the Theology of Aristotle is attributed in the
work’s prologue. It is Porphyry, not Dionysius or Philoponus, who, as D’Ancona
has proved, is the likely author of the ruʾūs al masāʾil preserved in the second
part of the Theology of Aristotle. And it is Porphyry, not Dionysius or Philopo-
nus, who we know, from his testimony, was the author of ὑπομνήματα on the
Enneads.75
It remains possible, of course that the Theology of Aristotle’s attribution to
Porphyry may be the result of some misunderstanding or series of misunder-
standings, and that the Adaptor derived these doctrines from his readings of
Dionysius, Philoponus, and perhaps other sources unknown to us. Yet it seems
more economical to take the Theology of Aristotle’s prologue at face value, and
suppose that these doctrines, all attested for Porphyry, were indeed found in a
commentary or commentaries by Porphyry on the Enneads of Plotinus, which
have disappeared in Greek, leaving behind only the faintest of traces. As far
as the Prologue’s attribution to Aristotle, rather than Plotinus, is concerned:
rather than representing some unlikely error, this is almost certainly the result
of deliberate pseudigraphy. Assuming the Adaptor and/or the editor (al-Kindī)
knew that the Greek text they were translating was by Plotinus, not Aristotle,
the decision to attribute the text to the First Master will have been motivated
by the same concerns that motivated all the many pseudepigraphic attribu-
tions in Arabic-language philosophical literature. The name and identity of
Plotinus was virtually unknown in the Arab-speaking world,76 so that it was
standard practice for an editor such as Kindī, anxious to ensure the authoritat-
ive reception of this his work, to attibute it to the most prestigious sage among
the Greeks.77
My claim is not, course, that the Theology of Aristotle represents a word-for-
word translation of Porphyry’s commentaries, with nothing omitted and no
75 This last point renders it superfluous, in my view, to speculate on Porphyrian works other
than these ὑπομνήματα as possible sources of the non-Plotinian material in the Theology
of Aristotle.
76 Cf. Chase 2019, p. 601 n. 68.
77 The list of works attributed pseudonymously toAristotle and/or Alexander of Aphrodisias
in Arabic philosophical literature is, of course, lengthy indeed. They include a great deal
of material that in fact derives fromProclus (see Endress 1973 and the discussions in Kraye
et al., eds., 1986, passim) or John Philoponus (see Hasnawi 1994).
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extraneousmaterial added. Instead, the Arabic adaptormay have worked from
a Greek manuscript of the Enneads which contained Porphyry’s ὑπομνήματα,
perhaps written in the margin surrounding the text. These ὑπομνήματα took
the form of explanatory paraphrases on passages from some of the Enneads,
in which Porphyry provided explanations of texts which he had been asked
by his collegues to explain. Ibn Nāʿima will have duly translated both Plotinus’
text and Porphyry’s commentary,78 similar to theway Boethius’ logical writings
have been surmised to derive, at least in part, from the scholia in themargins of
manuscripts of Aristotle’s Organon and Porphyry’s Isagoge.79 An editor, prob-
ably al-Kindī, then went over the result, adding Islamic formulae, changing
the sense of some passages in a more monotheist, creationist direction, and
providing transitional phases to link the various sections.The editor is probably
responsible for the current structure of theTheology of Aristotle, which appears
at first glance to be chaotic, but nevertheless, as C. D’Ancona has shown, does
present signs of coherent structure. It is not impossible that the choice of pas-
sages from the Enneads translated in theTheology of Aristotlemay be due to the
fact that it was these passages that Porphyry chose to comment upon,80 since
his companions found them especially difficult.
I believe that this reconstruction of matters, while far from certain, provides
at least a possible explanation of the genesis of the Plotiniana Arabica. The
arguments against the Porphyrian hypothesis, based largely on argumenta e
silentio, are not definitive, while the large number of Porphyrian parallels we
find throughout the Theology of Aristotle provide reason for taking seriously
the attribution of the Theology of Aristotle, at least in some sense, to the Tyrian
Neoplatonist.
78 H. Dörrie 1976, p. 28–29 suggests a similar phenomenon occurred in the Latin world. In
Porphyry’s “edition with commentary” (kommentierte Ausgabe) of Plotinus, individual
phrases of Plotinuswere interwovenwith Porphyry’s commentary in such away that read-
ers such asAugustine andAmbrosewere unable to distinguish Plotinus’ thought from that
of Porphyry. As we have seen, Dörrie suggests that evenGregory of Nyssa, although he had
no need of translation, viewed Plotinus through a Porphyrian lens, as it were.
79 Shiel 1958. For discussion of the pros and contras of this hypothesis, cf. Militello 2010,
p. 23–24.
80 Cf. the text from Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus ch. 26, cited above, n. 14: “and we have written
commentaries on some of them [sc., of the Enneads] without any order (καταβεβλήμεθα δὲ
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chapter 8
Plotinus Arabus and Proclus Arabus in the




As its title implies, the so-called Theology of Aristotle circulated as a work by
Aristotle in the Arabic-speaking world.1 In fact though, it is a partial Arabic
translation of the last three Enneads, the collection of Plotinus’ treatises put
together by his student and editor Porphyry. Though it is generally accepted
that theTheologywas amajor source forNeoplatonic ideas in the Islamicworld,
much research remains to be done in discovering when and by whom it was
read, and how exactly it was used by later readers. This paper will deal with
the earliest, and perhapsmost famous, allusion to the Theology in a philosoph-
ical work. It comes in the Harmony of the Two Sages, the two sages in question
being Plato and Aristotle.2 The concern of the author, who according to the
manuscript tradition is none other than al-Fārābī, is to dispel a widespread
impression that Plato and Aristotle conflict in their teachings. While admit-
ting that there are important differences between the two, not least in their
mode of exposition and philosophical method, the author wants to say that
their doctrines are in fundamental agreement. He refers, more than once, to
the Theology in an effort to make this case.
Both the Theology and the Harmony have been intensively studied in recent
years. Leading the way on the Theology has been Cristina D’Ancona, who has
alsowritten an interesting piece on theharmonybetweenPlato andAristotle in
Arabic philosophy, among other significant article-length studies related to our
1 For a previous study of the text, in which I do not saymuch about theHarmony, see Adamson
2002.
2 I will cite from section numbers in the edition of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, L’Harmonie entre les
opinions de Platon et d’Aristote, texte et traduction, ed. and trans. F.W. Najjar, D.Mallet (= NM).
I have also consulted the superior edition in al-Fārābī, L’armonia delle opinioni dei due sapi-
enti il divino Platone et Aristotele, ed. and trans. C. Martini Bonadeo (= MB). For an English
translation, which uses the NM section numbers, see Alfarabi. The PoliticalWritings, “Selected
Aphorisms” and Other Texts, transl. C.E. Butterworth.
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theme.3 Then there is an improved edition of the Harmony along with Italian
translation, and extensive notes, by CeciliaMartini Bonadeo. These studies add
significantly to our understanding of both texts. The following is to a large
extent just a footnote to their work and the scholarship of others, especially
Fritz Zimmermann and Gerhard Endress.
I have two broad goals. First, I will try to explain the rather complicated tex-
tual situation surrounding this appeal to the Platonism of Aristotle’s Theology
in the Harmony of the Two Sages. This situation can be summed up as follows:
not only is the Theology not by Aristotle, but the text to which the Harmony is
referring is not the Theology of Aristotle as we know it, and the Harmony itself
may not be by al-Fārābī either. My hope is that it may be useful to offer an over-
viewof thismessy philological context, even if I do not havemuch of substance
to add towhat has been established in the aforementioned studies. My second,
and hopefully more original task will be to answer the following question: how
exactly do the citations of theTheologyhelp the author of theHarmony tomake
his case? As we’ll see, there is more to this question thanmeets the eye. It is not
simply amatter of making Aristotle into a (Neo-)Platonist. For, with his confid-
ent ascriptionof theTheology toAristotle, the author of theHarmony runs a sig-
nificant risk of making Aristotle disagree not just with Plato, but with himself.
1 The Texts
First then let us turn to the textual situation, beginningwith the question of the
authenticity of the Harmony. Though, as already noted, the work is ascribed to
al-Fārābī in the manuscripts, this authorship has been doubted, especially by
Joep Lameer and Marwan Rashed.4 Their objections are based on both style
and content; of these the latter seem the more significant to me, given that
there is a degree of stylistic variation within the undisputed Farabian corpus.
Lameer lists a number of apparent philosophical errors in the Harmony, while
Rashed mounts a case that the very thesis of the harmony between Plato and
Aristotle, along with other doctrines in the text, would fit better with the group
surrounding the Christian thinker Ibn ʿAdī. For instance, al-Fārābī would not,
like the author of the Harmony, accept that providence concerns particulars,
did not think that God wills the world to exist with a first moment in time, and
was well aware that Aristotle rejects the Platonic theory of Forms.
3 Plotino, La discesa dell’anima nei corpi (IV 8[6]); D’Ancona 2006.
4 Lameer 1994; Rashed 2009.
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Possible answers to these concerns have been offered by Mallet, Najjar,
Genequand, Martini and (in a preface to Martini’s edition) Gerhard Endress.
One proposal is that differences between the Harmony and the rest of the Far-
abian corpus could be explained if we said that the Harmony is an early, even
juvenile, work. Endress thus suggests that it could be one of his first writings,
a proposal which has more recently been echoed by Damien Janos.5 On this
interpretation, the Harmony might well manifest an understanding of Plato
and Aristotle, and an approach to various philosophical questions, that the
mature al-Fārābī came to reject. On the other hand, the text refers back to
numerous previous writings, which suggests that our author is well launched
onto his career. But on the bright side, from the authenticity point of view, one
such back-reference is to a commentary by the author on theNicomacheanEth-
ics. As Martini points out, al-Fārābī is one of the few to have written such a
commentary in Arabic.
I will not argue for any firm view about authenticity here, but would like to
make some suggestions regarding the intellectual profile and approach of our
author. It does not seem tome that the Harmonywas, as Lameer suggests, writ-
ten by someone who is philosophically amateurish. However, it does seem to
be written by someone who is reluctant to delve too far into the subject-matter
and display his full understanding of the issues at stake. A crucial theme that
runs throughout thework is the contrast—so familiar fromQuranic exegesis—
between the outer and inner meaning of a text, the ẓāhir and the bāṭin.6 The
author freely admits that Plato and Aristotle seem to disagree, so that there is
a superficial disharmony between the two. His main aim is to reveal that this
is indeed just an appearance, ẓāhir rather than bāṭin. Another repeated refrain
is that the author aims at brevity. This is of course a common trope in Arabic
philosophical literature, often enough found in very long-winded texts. But the
Harmony is not a long-winded text. It offers only cursory treatment of a large
number of complicated philosophical issues. We need not suppose that the
author is dropping hints for the initiated reader while trying to leave every-
one else in the dark. My point is rather that the author’s goal will be satisfied
if he can undermine what he sees as a superficial interpretation, according to
which Plato and Aristotle disagree on fundamental philosophical topics. For
this purpose, it is enough for him to challenge the disharmony reading, and
then merely to gesture at the fuller story of their harmony. Spelling out that
story in each case would exceed the bounds of his brief.
5 Janos 2009.
6 For an example, see the text cited below, p. 185.
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This pattern is well illustrated by the notorious passage in which our author
refers to the authenticity of the Theology to establish that Aristotle did believe
in Forms, despite his attack on that doctrine in the Metaphysics:
We find Aristotle, in his book on Lordship known as the Theology, affirm-
ing the spiritual Forms and stating clearly that they exist in the world of
Lordship. If these statements are taken at face value, then one of three
things must be the case: either they are contradictory, some of them are
[really] byAristotle and others not, or they havemeanings and interpreta-
tions that bring their inner teachings (bawāṭin) into agreement, and in the
process allow their outer statements (ẓawāhir) to concur.7 Thinking that
Aristotle, despite his proficiency and intense vigilance, and the sublim-
ity of these objects, that is, the spiritual Forms, would contradict himself
within a single science, namely the scienceof Lordship, is implausible and
repugnant. But the idea that some of [the statements] are Aristotle’s and
others not is still more implausible, since the books that include these
statements are too widely known (ashhar) for any of them to be thought
inauthentic. It remains only that they have interpretations andmeanings
that, once revealed, will eliminate doubt and confusion.
Harmony, NM §66; MB 68–69 = T1
Views on this passage diverge sharply. Some, like Miriam Galston and Charles
Butterworth, think that the author is well aware that Aristotle did not write the
Theology. Butterworth goes so far as to remark, “hemust surely have known [it]
to be spurious.” Galston likewise finds it incredible that al-Fārābī, of all people,
would sincerely appeal to a widely shared opinion to secure the authenticity of
the work. But Martini, rightly I think, dismisses this “dissimulation” reading.8
She also makes the good point that in principle at least, the authenticity of the
Metaphysics is just as much in question here as that of the Theology.
However, the passage clearly involves a tacit admission that someonemight
worry about the authenticity of one or the other text. If so, it is of course the
Theology that stands under suspicion, not the Metaphysics. This suggests that,
likeAvicenna,whowill later remark that there is “somedoubt” about thework,9
the author realizes the ascription is not beyond dispute. Yet he feels free to dis-
7 This follows M. Bonadeo in retaining the reading of Najjar, and not the alternative reading
adopted by Butterworth. M. Bonadeo translates “e grazie a questo queste affermazioni diven-
gono compatibili anche con il loro senso apparente.”
8 Transl. M. Bonadeo 2008, p. 216.
9 In his Letter to Kiyā, translated in Gutas 1988, p. 63.
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miss the problem in a rather casual manner. Of course, it fits his purpose to
consider the Theology as authentic. After all, his point in citing it is to under-
mine the widespread impression that Aristotle is a critic of Plato (as he says
at the beginning of the work, §1, referring to “most people nowadays,” akthar
ahl zamāninā). People who think this are, he assumes, also likely to accept the
authenticity of the Theology, because it is so “famous.”10 Whether the Theo-
logy is really by Aristotle is, in a sense, neither here nor there. The point is
to expose an incoherence in the superficial approach to the two philosophers
that he is trying to undermine. This rival approach takes at face value evid-
ence in the Metaphysics showing that Aristotle rejected the theory of Forms.
Yet, our author assumes, its proponents will also admit that Aristotle wrote the
Theology, which emphatically accepts the existence of Forms. As the author
himself points out, this shifts the dilemma:we should notworry somuch about
Aristotle’s disagreementwithPlato, as aboutAristotle’s disagreementwithAris-
totle. His solution to that new dilemma remains tacit in this section of theHar-
mony, or so I shall argue below. For now, I just want to point out that invoking
the Theology serves a rather modest aim, namely to problematize the super-
ficial disharmony thesis, and to suggest that an alternative interpretation is
necessary, even if no such interpretation is given here in full.
This brings us to thequestionof whyour authorwould think in the first place
that the Theology is by Aristotle, and even think that it is famously a work by
Aristotle. Obviously, this statement presupposes that the Theology is already
circulating under Aristotle’s name, so we can rule out that the Harmony itself
played a key role in generating the pseudonymous attribution, though it may
have helped to perpetuate that attribution. Tomake a long story short, themost
likely explanation would instead seem to be the one offered by Zimmermann,
namely that a prologue attached to the Theology gave readers the impression
thatwhat followedwas anAristotelianwork.11 The prologue seeks to situate the
teachings found in theTheologywithin the framework of Aristotle’s philosophy,
and thismisled subsequent readers and scribes into thinking that Aristotle was
actually the author of the text.
Here we come to a further issue, and one that will provide the answer to
a still further question that may be on some readers’ minds: what is this paper
about theTheology of Aristotle doing in a book on the reception of Proclus?The
10 As M. Bonadeo suggests translating ashhar, criticizing Galston’s rendering “generally
accepted.”
11 Zimmerman 1986, p. 110–240. However in his “Proclus Arabus Rides Again,” Zimmermann
presents evidence that the Kindī circle could have been responsible for mislabeling the
treatises gathered in the collection known as the Theology.
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answer is that, on Zimmermann’s account, the prologuewas appended not just
to theArabic translationof Plotinus, or someversion thereof, but to awhole col-
lection of texts (a so-called “metaphysics file”) that included Arabic versions of
writings by Proclus and Alexander of Aphrodisias.12 In particular, it included a
partial Arabic translation of Proclus’Elements of Theology (= ET). A star witness
in Zimmermann’s case for this conclusion is none other than the Harmony. In
the section of the work devoted to showing that Plato and Aristotle agreed in
upholding the world’s atemporal creation from nothing, the author of the Har-
mony appeals to the Theology in the following terms:
Whoever looks into his [sc. Aristotle’s] statements about Lordship in the
book known as the Theology will be in no doubt as to his affirming the
Maker andOriginator for thisworld. This is so evident in those statements
that it can’t be overlooked. There, he shows that the Creator, the exalted,
originated matter from nothing, and that it became bodily thanks to the
Creator, great beHis praise, and fromHiswill; and then itwas put in order.
He has shown too, in the Physics, that the universe cannot have come
to be through chance and coincidence, and likewise in On Heaven and
theWorld. He proves this on the basis of the astounding mutual arrange-
ment found in the parts of the world. He has there explained the topic
of causes, how many they are, and established the agent cause. Also he
has explained there the source of generation and motion, and that it is
neither generated nor moved. Just as Plato, in his book called Timaeus,
showed that everything that is generated is necessarily generated from
a cause that generates it, and that what is generated is not a cause for its
own generation [i.e. the generative causemust be something else, not the
thing itself], so Aristotle showed in his book Theology that unity exists
in every multiplicity [cf. Elements of Theology §1], because any multi-
plicity in which no unity exists would be utterly infinite. He provided
clear demonstrations for this, as when he says that every one of the parts
of the multiple is either one or not one; but if it is not one, it must be
either multiple, or nothing. But if it is nothing, then no multiplicity can
be assembled from it; and if it is multiple, then what is the difference
between it and multiplicity? From this it also follows that the infinite
is greater than the infinite. Furthermore, he shows that anything in this
world that has unity in it is both one and not one, in different respects
[cf. Elements of Theology §2]. If then it is not truly ( fī l-ḥaqīqati) one,
12 Zimmermann 1986, p. 131.
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but rather, unity [merely] exists in it, then unity is different from it and
it is different from unity [cf. Elements of Theology §3–4]. Again, he shows
that the True One is that which gives unity to other existing things. Again,
he shows that the multiple is doubtless posterior to the one, and the one
prior to the multiple [cf. Elements of Theology §5]. Again, he shows that
every multiplicity that is near to the True One is less multiple than the
one that is further away from it, and vice-versa.
Harmony NM §56; MB 64–65 = T2
Asmy bracketed insertions show, the author is clearly thinking not of anything
in Plotinus, but of the opening propositions of the Elements of Theology. This
was already noted by Endress in his Proclus Arabus, who remarked that our
passage “nahezu wörtlich aus unserer Version von propp. 1–3 zitiert.” I actually
see allusions to propositions 4 and 5 as well. The last sentence is more difficult
to anchor securely in any particular source. The “closer and further away” idea
mayhoweverbe from Elementsof Theology§25: ἐγγυτέρωτἀγαθοῦ as opposed to
πορρώτερον (see also§28, §62).To thiswe canadd that the reference toForms in
T1 can also be linked to the Arabic Proclus—specifically, to the Arabic versions
of §15–17, which are the very propositions that follow the first five propositions
in themanuscript studiedbyEndress.Theupshot is thatwhen the author of the
Harmony refers to “the Theology,” we should take him to be alluding not to the
Theology of Aristotle as we think of it—a partial version of the Arabic transla-
tion of Plotinus produced in al-Kindī’s circle—but rather to a perhaps larger
text which in any case included material from the Arabic version of Proclus’
Elements.
2 The Use of Proclus in the Harmony: Creation
So much for the historical circumstances surrounding these notorious allu-
sions to the Theology in the Harmony ascribed to al-Fārābī. Now let us turn
to a rather different question: why exactly does the author of the Harmony
think that these allusions can help him to establish a fundamental agreement
between Plato and Aristotle? As I’ve already noted, this move is in a way obvi-
ous, and in another way deeply problematic. Obvious because a Neoplatonic
Aristotle is an Aristotle who may be much more easily reconciled with Plato,
but deeply problematic because a Neoplatonic Aristotle is one that will be dif-
ficult to reconcile with Aristotle’s other writings. Given that our interest here is
the reception of Proclus and not Plotinus, I will approach this problemby look-
ing at a section of theHarmony that seems to be based on the Arabic version of
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the Elements of Theology, passing over the verbatim quotation from the Arabic
Plotinus (at N/M §75; MB 74).
The section of the Harmony featuring T2, which represents the work’s
clearest dependence on the Arabic Proclus, is devoted to the question of “the
universe’s being eternal or created, and whether it has a maker who is its effi-
cient cause, or not” (N/M §53; MB 63). It may seem that Aristotle denies this,
given that he mentions the eternity of the universe as a disputed issue in the
Topics,13 and clearly states inOn theHeavens that “the universe has no temporal
beginning (laysa la-hu badʿ zamānī)” (N/M§55; MB 63). The so-calledTheology
is then invoked in T2 to provide contrary evidence, to show that Aristotle did
indeed believe in a maker for the universe and denied its eternity. But why is
thematerial from theTheology, which heremeans the Arabic Proclus, even rel-
evant? It seems surprising, not to say perverse, that he should choose to cite
of all people Proclus, author of the set of eternalist arguments that provoked
one of Philoponus’ two polemics on the issue. Damien Janos has urged us to see
theHarmonywithin the context of theChristian philosophers of Baghdad,who
may have been under the influence of those very polemics of Philoponus.14
Persuasive though Janos’ point may be, it does not answer the question of
why the author of the Harmony should have thought it useful to cite the Theo-
logy at this juncture in his argument. It may seem that an easy answer is avail-
able. Aswe just saw, this part of theHarmony is framed as answering a two-part
question: not only whether the universe is eternal, but also whether it has a
“maker (ṣāniʿ)” and “efficient cause (ʿilla fāʿila).” While the Arabic Plotinus and
Proclus offer no help to the author on the first issue, they are unambiguously
helpful on the second. The Arabic Plotinus and Liber de causis both speak of
“creation (ʿibdā),”15 and the opening propositions of Proclus’Elements of Theo-
logy that lie behind T2 make the First Principle a cause for all things. The
identity between Aristotle’s God and this First Principle, a “true One” who is
the source of all unity, is then secured with a reference to Metaphysics book
Lambda which, our author tells us, “proves the unity (waḥdāniyya) of the Cre-
13 Later this same passage from theTopicswill be cited byMaimonides andThomas Aquinas
to cast doubt on Aristotle’s commitment to eternalism (see e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theologiae I Q 46 a.1 resp.). Notice that for the author of the Harmony, it plays the very
different function of casting doubt on Aristotle’s commitment to creationism.
14 Janos 2009, p. 6. Unlike Rashed, who has also pointed out resonances between the ideas
of Ibn ʿAdī and the Harmony, Janos thinks this may be made compatible with Farabian
authorship. We need suppose only that the Harmony is an early work written while al-
Fārābī was under the influence of his Christian teachers. See above for the difficulties of
this chronological proposal.
15 Cf. Endress 1973, p. 209, 231.
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ator” (N/M §57; MB 65). His interest in God’s agency is further demonstrated
by an allusion to a lost work of Ammonius (known to us through a summary in
Simplicius), which argued that Aristotle’s divine principle is indeed an efficient
cause (N/M §58; MB 66).16
While this seems to exhaust the author’s explicit rationale for citing the
Theology, we should probe for a deeper explanation of its relevance. He needn’t
paraphrase the first several propositions of the Elements of Theology to make
the point that the Neoplatonica Arabica accept a first causal principle. And
of course, we have yet to understand the precise relationship between assert-
ing such a causal principle and denying the eternity of the universe. As Janos
has stressed, our author is not merely asserting that God is an efficient cause.
Rather, God exercises a unique form of efficient causality, capable of creating
“without time (bi-lā zamān)” and without need for pre-existingmatter.17 These
two features of divine causation are linked, according to the author of the Har-
mony. An agentwhoneeds to act in time on pre-existingmatter is an agentwho
performs amotion, whereas God does not move when He creates. Most people
fail to understand this. They “conceive of the first originator as being a body,
and acting through motion and in time,” and “are incapable of understanding
how something can come to be from nothing, or be corrupted into nothing”
(N/M §60–61; MB 67–68). Such naive conceptions of God are to be found in
many religious accounts, which describe the world as being fashioned out of
material constituents like water (N/M §58; MB 66).
The author’s goal then, is to show that Aristotle did not fall prey to these
simple-minded notions. For this sake he can appeal to the idea that time is gen-
erated through celestial motion.18 If God is responsible for causing this motion
thenHe cannot be acting in time. This, of course, is what Aristotlemeant inOn
the Heavens when he denied a temporal beginning of the universe—not that
the universe has always existed, but that God’s agency is timeless (N/M §55;
MB 64). The author can also appeal to the sequence of argument set forth by
Proclus, and cited in T2. “Aristotle” here makes God, as a source of unity, prior
to allmultiplicity. Motion is multiple, which is precisely why it generates time,
16 Simplicius, In Phys., 1361–1363, in Sorabji 2004, 8(c). In another example of the way the
author of the Harmony declines to go into detail, he says there is no need to present
Ammonius’ case in any detail “due to its fame (shuhra).” Compare this also to the remark
about the notoriety of the Theology in T1.
17 Janos 2009, p. 3. These two features of divine creation are the same ones stressed by al-
Kindī at On the Quantity of Aristotle’s Books §VI.8, transl. Adamson, Pormann 2012.
18 TheAristotelianpedigree of celestialmotion in particular as the source of time is provided
by Alexander of Aphrodisias. See Maqālat al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī l-zamān, p. 19–24, at
21. Trans. in Sharples 1982.
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unfolding “part by part.”19 This is emphasized in the author’s account of God’s
timeless causation:
The meaning of his saying that the world has no temporal beginning
is that it is not generated one part after another (awwalan fa-awwalan
bi-ajzāʾihi) as, for instance, plants or animals are generated. For when
something is generated one part after another, some of its parts precede
others in time.
N/M §55; MB 64 = T3
Similarly, in T2 we were told that the Theology affirms the creation of matter
from nothing. The thought here must be that matter is characterized by multi-
plicity, so that by showing the dependence and posteriority of all multiplicity
on pure unity, Proclus has shown that matter cannot be independent of God’s
causation.
The Harmony also gives us an explanation for the methodological status of
the argument found in theTheology. The author uses themetaphor of “ascend-
ing” from indubitable premises to establish a thesis. The metaphor is applied
twice over (at N/M §57; MB 65), first to describe the way that “Aristotle” goes
on from the proof of true unity to “speak of the parts of the world, both bod-
ily and spiritual,” and how they were created; second, to describe the way that
God’s unity is established in the Metaphysics. In this way, even the charac-
teristic “Euclidean” method of the Elements of Theology is situated within an
Aristotelian framework. In the process, the author gives us a further clue as to
whyhecites theTheology soprominently: “Aristotle’s” claimsabout thedepend-
ency of motion andmatter on God are methodologically posterior to the more
fundamental claim that God is a true One and source of all unity. Indeed, the
timelessness of creation and the denial of pre-existingmatter are nothingmore
than applications of themore general principle that whatever ismany depends
on the One.
From this it should be clear that theHarmonynot only presents theTheology
as being consistent with other works of Aristotle, but goes so far as to make it
the key to his interpretation of those other works. It may seem that Aristotle
is thus being “Platonized” so as to agree with the Timaeus. But actually, the
reverse is true. It is rather the Timaeus that is assimilated to the doctrines of
19 Again, the idea that time is characteristic of God’s multiple creation and not God as the
True One is already found in al-Kindī. See his On First Philosophy, § I.5 (God is the “cause
of time”), §VI.9 (time’s connection to motion), §XIX.4 (God is not in motion).
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the “Aristotle” who emerges from the author’s reconciliation of the Theology to
the Metaphysics and On the Heavens.20 This is particularly clear from the way
that Plato is said to deny the existence of matter prior to the creation of the uni-
verse. It’s a rather surprising interpretive claim, since in the Islamicworld Plato
was frequently made a leading representative for the idea that the universe
was fashioned with some first moment and from some pre-existing material.
The Harmony simply assumes that the Timaeus’ affirmation of a creator God
rules this out, depending (as T2 shows) on the Theology to establish the correct
meaning of terms like “creator” and “originator.”
3 The Use of Proclus in the Harmony: Platonic Forms
Let us nowmove on to the issue of Platonic Forms, which provides the context
for T2 and its allusion to the problem of the authenticity of the Theology. As
usual in the Harmony, the author begins by setting out prima facie evidence
of a disagreement between the two great sages. Here the problem is that in
his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes clear his rejection of Plato’s Forms (N/M §65;
MB 69). He cites as one problem raised by Aristotle the fact that there will be
separate mathematical entities like surfaces and solids in addition to those we
find in the sensible world. For this objection, scholars have cited Metaphysics
A.9, B.2, Z.14, andM.2, all of which accuse Plato of effectively “duplicating” our
world by positing another world of separate Forms. A somewhat less familiar
idea found here in the Harmony is that Plato is committed to additional kinds
of knowledge or science in the realm of the Forms. For in addition to the geo-
metrical objects in that realm,
there will be sciences (ʿulūm) there, like the sciences of the stars and the
sciences of melodies, and of both composed and uncomposed sounds,
and of medicine, geometry, of both rectilinear and curved magnitudes,
and of hot and cold things and in general, active and passive qualities,
and of universals and particulars and matters and forms.
Harmony N/J §65; MB 69 = T4
Now, it is true enough that on Aristotle’s interpretation the Platonic theory
makes Forms the objects of knowledge. This emerges not only from various
20 Here, I agree with Martini Bonadeo, who writes (p. 204–205) that the Theology is a key to
resolve the apparent tension between On the Heavens and the Timaeus.
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passages of theMetaphysics but also the little treatiseOn Ideas (Peri Ideon) pre-
served in Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics.21
Here though, the Harmony is saying that there will actually be a science or
knowledge that is itself a Form. This is less prominent in Aristotle’s polemics,
but can be found for instance atMetaphysicsB.2, which tries to force on the Pla-
tonist a distinction between different kinds of medical sciences, one of which
will be “medicine in itself” (997b28–30). TheHarmony, typically enough, states
that this consequence is ridiculous without really explaining why. In fact, the
objection was already mentioned by Plato himself, indeed singled out as the
greatest difficulty for the theory of Forms in the first part of the Parmenides.
There, Plato has Parmenides warn that if knowledge is relational, and if Forms
are related to one another and not to their participants, then Forms will be
knownonly by thedivine Formof Knowledge. In that case, neitherwillwemere
humans be able to know Forms, nor will God have any knowledge of our world
(Parmenides 133b–134e).
The reason I dwell on this is that it will, I think, help us to make sense of
what happens in the Harmony following on the author’s allusion to the Theo-
logy. I’ve already noted that that allusion seems to cause a problem, rather than
solve one. Why would Aristotle critique the Forms in the Metaphysics, only to
accept them in another work? It may seem that the author fails to address this
question, or is even oblivious to it, given that he never returns to say anything
about the Metaphysics. Instead, he seems to digress into a consideration of the
general problem of describing God. In terms remarkably close to those used by
al-Kindī and the texts produced in his circle, the author writes:
Because the Creator is by his very being (anniyya) and essence distinct
fromall other things, and this in amore noble, excellent and elevatedway,
nothing relates to Him inHis essence or shares anything in commonwith
Him, or is like Him either strictly speaking (ḥaqīqatan) or metaphorically
(mujāzan).
Harmony N/J §67; MB 70 = T5
He even marks the section from which this quotation is drawn as a kind of
digression, as is clear from the sequel:
Now let us return to where we left off and say: given that God, the exal-
ted, is living, willing, and the originator of this world with all that is in
21 See Fine 1993, at 79–80 of the Greek text.
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it, is there any way to deny that the conditions for one who is alive and
wills include forming a view (taṣawwur) on what one wills to do, and the
presence of forms (ṣuwar) of what one wills to undertake in one’s self
(dhāt), may God be exalted above all comparison! Furthermore, because
His essence is enduring with no change or alteration possible for Him,
whatever is in His realm is likewise enduring without disappearance or
alteration. If there were no forms and models for existing things in the
essence of Him who is living, willing, and makes them exist, then what
is it that He makes exist, and towards which pattern would He turn for
whatever He acts and originates? Surely you know that whoever denies
this idea in the case of the living, willing agent is forced to say that He
brings things to be at random and foolishly, with no purpose and without
turning towards any purpose intended by His choice. But this is most
appalling.
Harmony N/J §68; MB 70 = T6
The author seems to be ignoring the points he has just made in the appar-
ent “digression” at T5. Rather than scrupulously avoiding the ascription of any
attribute to God, he insists that we must speak of the Creator as willing and
knowing. This is why both Plato and theAristotle of theTheology accept Forms:
there must be divine knowledge, given that only a knowing agent could have
created the universe we see around us, and if God has knowledge then there
must be divine and paradigmatic Forms to serve as fit objects for that know-
ledge. How can the author say these things in light of the structures expressed
in T5? Well, he has also admitted that we cannot avoid using language to
describe God. When we do so, we apply “synonymous” language “in a more
noble and elevated way.”22 For example, when we say that God is “alive” we
mean “that He is alive in a more noble way than the one we know from any
living thing lower than Him” (§67).
I would like to suggest that the juxtaposition of T5 andT6 is intended to echo
the tension between Aristotle’s Metaphysics and what our author knows as the
Theologyof Aristotle. On theonehand,Aristotle iswell aware that strictly speak-
ing, there can be no talk of knowledge, ideas, or Forms in God—since there
can, strictly speaking, be no talk of God at all. But with this caveat in mind,
we may allow ourselves to say (for instance) that God does have knowledge. It
22 See also §70: “since necessity stands as an obstacle and intervenes between us and that,
we limit ourselves to existing utterances, forcing ourselves to bear in mind that the divine
meanings we express by means of these utterances are of a more venerable species and
are other than we imagine and conceptualize” (transl. Butterworth).
plotinus arabus and proclus arabus 195
is this less relaxed mode of discourse that Aristotle uses in his Theology. The
solution works for the objects of knowledge as well as for knowledge itself. We
cannot really affirm that there are separatemathematical objects like lines and
surfaces apart from theonesweknow—asAristotle points out in theMetaphys-
ics. Nonetheless, given that God was able to make things that have lines and
surfaces, we should be prepared to admit, using language in a more extended
fashion, that there are ideas of lines and surfaces in God’s mind. As the author
stresses (§69), this is very different from asserting that there are further realms
akin to our universe, but populatedwith Forms instead of sensible objects. That
position, the one critiqued in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, would compromise the
transcendence of the divine by making the immaterial realm amere duplicate
of our own.
If this interpretation is correct, then it gives us an example of a pervasive
feature of theHarmony, and one already noticed in the previous section of this
paper, namely that tensions between Plato and Aristotle tend to be resolved
by assimilating Plato to Aristotle rather than vice-versa.23 When late ancient
Platonists defended the harmony thesis, they usually did so by intimating that
Plato grasped and presented higher truths than those found in Aristotle. Our
author does the reverse. It is the Aristotle of the Metaphysics who wisely cau-
tions us against simply postulating duplicates of sensible things in a divine
realm. And it is the Aristotle of the Theology who tells us the sense in which
separate Forms could, with all the caution due when attempting to describe
God, be postulated nonetheless. Forms are present in the mind of the Creator
insofar as He has knowledge about what He is to create.
The passage also bears out the observation I made above, that the author
tends to stop short of a full accounting of the philosophical issues about which
Plato andAristotle disagree.While he sometimes suggests that he could indeed
give such a full accounting if he were to go on at further length, in the present
context he adds another reason for his limited ambition: the topic is just too
difficult. Thus he says (§76 N/M; 75 MB) that as regards the question of higher
principles and forms, establishing the inner harmony of Plato and Aristotle is
mumtaniʿ, a word whose semantic range stretches from “very difficult” (Naj-
jar/Mallet’s translation) to “impenetrable” (Martini Bonadeo’s translation) to
downright “impossible.” Likemost interpreters nowadays, I myself would agree
with the strongest version of that sentiment. It is impossible to reconcile the
23 A particularly striking case is Plato’s theory of recollection, which is assimilated to Aris-
totle’s empiricist epistemology at §51. My thanks to Hanif Amin Beidokhti for his obser-
vation about the text in general.
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teachings of Plato and Aristotle on all these issues, and throwing the Arabic
Plotinus and Proclus into the mix isn’t liable to help matters. Still, one can-
not blame the author of the Harmony for trying his best to do so. He is simply
echoing a long-standingpresumption amongphilosophers that these two sages
must be in agreement. In his own way, he is pursuing the quintessentially
Proclean project of drawing together what is diverse into a unity.
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chapter 9
Les Chapitres sur les thèmesmétaphysiques d’al-
ʿĀmirī et l’anonyme Kitāb al-ḥaraka : deux
interprétations du Liber de causis en arabe
ElviraWakelnig
UniversitätWien
Il y a plus de trente ans que la questionde la datationdu Liber de causis en arabe
a été tranchée en faveur d’une période durant le neuvième siècle. Il était pos-
sible d’écarter l’hypothèse selon laquelle le Liber de causis datait du douzième
siècle grâce à un texte d’Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī. Il s’agit
d’une œuvre relativement courte de vingt chapitres intitulée Chapitres sur les
thèmes métaphysiques (al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya) qui nous est parvenue
dans un seul manuscrit tardif (XVIIe ou XVIIIe siècle) conservé aujourd’hui à
Istanbul. Dans son article «An UnpublishedWork by al-ʿĀmirī and the Date of
the Arabic De Causis», Everett K. Rowson a démontré que ces Chapitres sur les
thèmes métaphysiques sont, en effet, une paraphrase très libre du Liber de cau-
sis1. Cette découverte a donné un terminus ante quem pour la datation du Liber
de causis, à savoir avant la composition de l’œuvre d’al-ʿĀmirī au Xe siècle. La
vie de l’auteur des Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphysiques s’est déroulée, sur-
tout au Khorasan, entre une date de naissance présumée vers 912 et une date
certaine de mort en 9922. Le fait qu’al-ʿĀmirī était l’ étudiant d’un maître lui-
même ancien étudiant du premier philosophe des Arabes, al-Kindī indique, en
plus, un chemin possible de la transmission du Liber de causis à notre savant du
Khorasan. Car, comme l’a proposé Cristina d’Ancona3, il semble que ce texte a
été composé dans le cercle d’al-Kindī, voire par lui-même.
Les Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphysiques présentent une hiérarchie onto-
logique qui est clairement néoplatonicienne et, dans sa relative simplicité, plu-
tôt inspirée de Plotin que de Proclus. La caractéristique la plus exceptionnelle,
qu’al-ʿĀmirī ajoute à cette doctrine de l’Antiquité tardive, est l’adéquation avec
l’ islam, c’est-à-dire que pour chaque niveau ontologique néoplatonicien, le
savant du Khorasan donne un terme coranique. L’Un est, pour lui, le créateur
1 Rowson 1984.
2 Pour la biographie d’al-ʿĀmirī, voir Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya, p. 8-34.
3 Pour la composition du Liber de causis dans le cercle d’al-Kindī, voir d’Ancona 1995.
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(al-bāriʾ) ; l’ intellect universel est le calame (al-qalam) et les formes univer-
selles sont le commandement (al-amr) ; l’ âme universelle est la tablette (al-
lawḥ) et la sphère la plus haute le trône (al-ʿarš)4. Nous lisons cette hiérarchie
et sa correspondance coranique dans le deuxième chapitre des Chapitres sur
les thèmes métaphysiques comme lecture et interprétation du passage suivant
du deuxième chapitre du Liber de causis5 :
Tout être véritable est :
soit plus haut que l’éternité et avant elle,
soit ensemble avec l’éternité,
soit après l’éternité et au-dessus du temps.
Chez al-ʿĀmirī le passage correspondant se lit comme suit :
Les choses dans la vérité de l’existence se divisent en cinq classes :
– ce qui existe par l’essence qui est au-dessus de l’éternité et avant elle ;
– ce qui existe par la creatio ex nihilo (ibdāʿ) qui est avec l’éternité et
inséparable d’elle ;
– ce qui existe par la création (ḫalq) qui est après l’éternité et avant le
temps ;
– ce qui existe par la soumission (tasḫīr) qui est avec le temps et insépa-
rable de lui ;
– et ce qui existe par l’engendrement (tawlīd) qui est après le temps et le
suivant.
Nous expliquons ‘la soumission (tasḫīr)’ par l’expression ‘le façonnement
(ṭabʿ)’ et ‘l’ engendrement (tawlīd)’ par l’expression ‘la formation (tak-
wīn)’. Ce qui existe par l’essence est le créateur (al-bāriʾ) – Sa mention
soit exaltée. Ce qui existe par la creatio ex nihilo (ibdāʿ) est le calame (al-
qalam) et le commandement (al-amr). Ce qui existe par la création (ḫalq)
est la tablette (al-lawḥ) et le trône (al-ʿarš). Ce qui existe par la soumission
(tasḫīr) sont les sphères qui tournent et les corps fondamentaux. Ce qui
existe par l’engendrement (tawlīd) est tout ce qui est formé par les quatre
éléments. Chez les philosophes le calame est expliqué par l’expression
‘l’ intellect universel’, le commandement est expliqué par ‘les formes uni-
4 Les versets du coran sont 30, 55 (al-bāriʾ) ; 68, 1 et 96, 4 (al-qalam) ; 7, 54 ; 28, 44 ; 30, 4 ; 82, 19
et passim (al-amr) ; 85, 22 (al-lawḥ) ; 7, 54 ; 9, 129 ; 10, 3 ; 11, 7 ; 13, 2 ; 17, 42 ; 20, 5 ; 21, 22 ; 23, 86 et
116 ; 25, 59 ; 27, 26 ; 32, 4 ; 39, 75 ; 40, 7 et 15 ; 43, 82 ; 57, 4 ; 69, 17 ; 81, 20 ; et 85, 15 (al-ʿarš).
5 Pour le texte arabe, voir Badawī ²1977, p. 4-5. Les parallèles littéraux entre les deux textes sont
indiqués en caractères gras.
200 wakelnig
verselles’, la tablette est expliquée par l’expression ‘l’ âme universelle’ et
le trône est expliqué quant à lui par l’expression ‘la sphère droite’ et ‘la
sphère des sphères’6.
Pour bien intégrer sa hiérarchie ontologique et ses cinq degrés dans la doc-
trine du Liber de causis, al-ʿĀmirī traite le temps comme le Liber de causis traite
l’éternité et distingue des niveaux ontologiques en-dessus, avec et en-dessous
du temps. De cette façon-là, il arrive aux deux degrés additionnels qui lui ont
manqué dans le chapitre de sa source, car il identifie le premier niveau lié au
temps, c’est-à-dire le degré avant le temps avec le dernier niveau lié à l’éternité.
Une autre innovation, qui mérite aussi d’être mentionnée, est le fait que le
savant du Khorasan applique un terme différent pour le processus de création
et de formation à chacun de ses degrés ontologiques. Ainsi, tout ce qui existe
reste directement dépendant de Dieu, qui est le seul créateur. Selon le modèle
néoplatonicien de l’émanation, notre philosophe accepte, quand même, que
les degrés supérieurs prennent une certaine part dans la formation des degrés
inférieurs ; c’est-à-dire que l’ intellect soit impliqué dans la formation de l’âme,
et que ces deux le soient dans la formation des sphères, et ainsi de suite. Al-
ʿĀmirī décrit cela comme suit :
L’essence de quelque chose créée ex nihilo (mubdaʿ) a sa subsistance par
l’essence pure du Créateur (al-mubdiʿ). L’essence de quelque chose créée
(maḫlūq) subsiste – si elle subsiste – par le Créateur et a une part de la
nature de ce créé que le Créateur a fait exister devant elle. Ce qui existe
par la soumission (musaḥḥar) subsiste – s’ il subsiste – aussi par le Créa-
teur et a une part des natures de ceux deux existants avant lui, c’est-à-dire
le créé ex nihilo et le créé. L’engendré (muwallad) a une part des natures
de ces trois existants avant lui, c’est-à-dire le créé ex nihilo, le créé et ce
qui existe par la soumission7.
En ce qui concerne la structure de notre paraphrase, nous voyons que les huit
premiers chapitres desChapitres sur les thèmesmétaphysiquesparaphrasent les
neuf premiers chapitres du Liber de causis, à l’ exclusion du chapitre cinq. Des
autres chapitres du Liber de causis, nous trouvons encore les chapitres 11 (?), 12,
16, 18-26, 29-30, 31 (?) dont quelques-uns sont largement paraphrasés, d’autres
seulement de façon très limitée – c’est-à-dire que seulement quelques lignes
6 Pour le texte arabe, voir Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya, p. 84-86.
7 Pour le texte arabe, voir Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya, p. 100-102.
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d’un chapitre sont paraphrasées. Généralement, nous pouvons constater que
lamajorité dumatériel du Liber de causis est présentée dans la paraphrase d’al-
ʿĀmirī et soumise à une transformation islamique. Le savant du Khorasan se
montre, alors, partisan fidèle du programme du maître de son maître al-Balḫī,
à savoir le philosophe al-Kindī mentionné ci-dessus, qui a œuvré pour réconci-
lier la philosophie grecque avec l’ Islam.
Il reste pourtant deux questions : pourquoi al-ʿĀmirī n’ indique-t-il nulle part
qu’ il paraphrase un texte donné? La seconde question est liée à la première,
et peut paraître surprenante au vu de ce nous avons évoqué précédemment :
quelle est la source directe de notre philosophe?
Une réponse à la première question pourrait être donnée par deux posi-
tions opposées, à savoir en disant que sa source était tellement connue, bien
diffusée et présente qu’al-ʿĀmirī a supposé que ses lecteurs reconnaitraient
cette source ; ou, au contraire, que sa source était si difficile d’accès qu’ il n’a
vu ni le sens ni la nécessité de la mentionner. La seconde question se pose,
parce qu’ il a existé, en arabe, plus que la version du Liber de causis qui a été
traduite en latin. Ce qui est conservé et connu aujourd’hui, à l’exception du
modèle de la traduction latine, est une deuxième version du Liber de causis
découverte par Saleh Oudaimah et publiée dans une traduction française par
ce dernier et Pierre Thillet en 2002 dans un article intitulé «Proclus Arabe. Un
nouveau Liber de causis?». Ce texte, nommé Liber de causis II, contient, en
29 chapitres, 30 propositions des Éléments de théologie de Proclus dont vingt-
cinq se trouvent aussi dans le Liber de causis, deux dans le Proclus Arabus, une
dans le Kitāb al-Ḥaraka – que nous discuterons plus tard – et deux se trouvent
uniquement dans le Liber de causis II. Une particularité, quimérite d’êtremen-
tionnée, réside dans le fait que la proposition 134 des Éléments de théologie est
reprise deux fois dans le Liber de causis II, à savoir dans les chapitres 13 et 29.
Cette proposition proclienne se trouve aussi dans le Liber de causis, dans le cha-
pitre 22. Le résultat très surprenant d’une comparaison de ces trois versions
différentes de la proposition 134 démontre qu’elles sont plus au moins indé-
pendantes l’une de l’autre avec quelques similarités entre n’ importe lesquelles
des deux versions à l’exclusion de la troisième.
Un passage de la paraphrase d’al-ʿĀmirī, qui ne s’explique pas par le Liber de
causis dans sa forme actuelle, pourrait très bien paraphraser le Liber de causis
II, plus précisément la deuxième moitié du chapitre 16 :
A donc été expliqué et rendu clair ce dont nous avons fait mention que
tout créé est une substance qui est soumise au temps, ainsi les corps créés,
simples et composés, et que ces derniers dépendent des corps célestes
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dont la substance est au-dessus du temps et dont l’acte est soumis au
temps. Quant aux corps célestes, ils dépendent des substances qui sont
au-dessus d’eux également au-dessus du temps, et ce sont les formes
séparées. Les formes séparées dépendent de la durée, et la durée dépend
de la cause première qui est cause de la durée et des autres choses, et
toutes les choses, créées, pures et viles dépendent de la cause première.
tr. Oudaimah et Thillet 2001-2002, p. 336
Les aspects particuliers de cette version arabe de la proposition 107 de Proclus,
qui ne figurent pas dans le chapitre correspondant (31) du Liber de causis, sont
les corps célestes, les formes séparées et la cause première. L’occurrence de
ces aspects, reformulés, chez al-ʿĀmirī constitue, en ce qui concerne cette pro-
position proclienne, une proximité avec le Liber de causis II8, à l’exclusion du
Liberde causis. Voici le passagedans LesChapitres sur les thèmesmétaphysiques,
ch. 19 :
Donc la période de survie des substances, qui n’ont pas de permanence
dans le temps, c’est-à-dire les engendrés comme les existants inférieurs,
dépend des corps élevés. […]
[…] Quant aux substances dont la permanence est temporelle, c’est-
à-dire les existants qui sont créés pour être soumis (tasḫīrī) comme les
corps supérieurs, leur perfection sont les formes dont l’essence est dans
le domaine de l’éternité et dont les actes sont dans le domaine du temps.
[…]
[…] Alors la permanence [de l’âme] est ainsi dépendante de sa per-
fection, c’est-à-dire l’ intellect, comme la permanence de l’ intellect est
⟨dépendante⟩ du fait qu’ il se consacre au contact avec l’essence de son
Créateur, le Vrai9.
Si nous regardons les deux textes et l’ interprétation et la lecture que notre
philosophe donne de son modèle, nous remarquons pourtant quelques diffé-
rences. Il y a cinq niveaux différents distingués dans les deux passages, mais
dans le Liber de causis II, ce sont :
– les existants temporels complètement soumis au temps ;
– les corps célestes soumis au temps en ce qui concerne leurs actes, mais au-
dessus du temps en ce qui concerne leur substance ;
– les formes séparées complètement au-dessus du temps [âme et intellect] ;
8 Les éléments communs sont indiqués en caractères gras dans les citations.
9 Pour le texte arabe, voir Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya, p. 116 dans l’ordre
inverse.
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– la durée ;
– la cause première.
Chez le savant du Khorasan nous trouvons :
– les existants temporels complètement soumis au temps ;
– les corps célestes avec le temps ;
– les formes avec le temps en ce qui concerne leurs actes, mais en-dessus du
temps en ce qui concerne leur essence [les âmes?] ;
– l’ intellect [complètement en-dessus du temps] ;
– le Créateur.
Alors que le Liber de causis II intègre la durée comme entité ontologique, notre
philosophe ne l’adopte pas, mais divise les formes séparées en deux, à savoir
âme et intellect. De cette façon, il parvient exactement au schème ontolo-
gique que nous avons déjà vu plus haut. Ainsi, ce dernier passage des Cha-
pitres sur les thèmesmétaphysiques ne s’explique que grâce à l’hypothèse selon
laquelle al-ʿĀmirī a eu accès à une version du Liber de causis qui contiendrait
aussi dumatériel qui aurait, aujourd’hui, seulement survécu dans la version du
Liber de causis II. Cela signifie que le modèle pour la paraphrase du savant du
Khorasan serait probablement une version plus vaste que celle qui a été tra-
duite en latin. Donc, cette version hypothétique aurait été la source du Liber
de causis, du Liber de causis II et d’al-ʿAmirī, et ce serait plutôt à elle qu’au
Liber de causis que l’attribution au philosophe al-Kindī proposée par Cristina
d’Ancona s’appliquerait10. Cette version pourrait être appellée Proto-Liber de
causis. Pourtant la question de la source des Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphy-
siques devient encore plus compliquée quand nous considérons un autre texte
avec lequel la paraphrase d’al-ʿĀmirī possède quelques similarités, à savoir le
Livre sur le mouvement (Kitāb al-ḥaraka).
Le Livre sur le mouvement est attribué à Aristote et a été conservé dans deux
manuscrits assez récents de Turquie (Ankara et Istanbul11), dont le second est
une copie du premier. Il s’agit d’une compilation d’extraits des Éléments de
théologie et des Éléments de physique de Proclus et de divers matériaux aristo-
téliciens, provenant probablement des commentateurs. Ce qui nous intéresse
pour le moment est bien évidemment l’ensemble des passages paraphrasant
les Éléments de théologie et leur rapport au Liber de causis ou, plus précisé-
ment, aux Libri de causis. Le problème qui se pose est que la plupart des
propositions procliennes du Livre sur le mouvement sont uniquement conser-
10 Voir plus haut et note 3.
11 Monéditiondiplomatiquede cemanuscrit se trouve àhttp://www.ancientwisdoms.ac.uk/
mss/viewer.html?viewColumns=sawsTexts%3AHME5683.KHar.saws01.
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vées dans cette œuvre. Ce manque de propositions communes se retrouve
dans presque tous les textes de la tradition arabe des Éléments de théologie, à
savoir :
– un groupe des textes assez homogène qui contient les deux versions du Liber
de causis et la paraphrase d’al-ʿĀmirī – nous pouvons aussi ajouter le petit
traité attribué soit à Platon soit à al-Fārābī, l’Épître sur la réfutation de celui
qui soutient que l’homme disparaît après sa mort (Risāla fī l-radd ʿalā man
qāla inna l-insāna talāšā wa-fanā baʿda mawtihi) et l’épitomé du Liber de
causis de ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī,
– puis les versions arabes des propositions procliennes dites Proclus Arabus,
éditées pour la plupart par Gerhard Endress, qui partagent une seule propo-
sition avec les Liber de causis I et II (167), et deux autres seulement avec le
Liber de causis II (16, 21),
– et enfin les passages inspirés des Éléments de théologie de Proclus dans le
Livre sur le mouvement, qui partagent trois propositions avec celles du Pro-
clus Arabus (15, 17, 76) et une avec le Liber de causis II (59).
En conséquence, à cause du manque de parallèles entre ces trois groupes de
textes distincts, il est difficile d’avancer une conclusion quant aux rapports
entre ces groupes de textes en général ; il en va de même pour ce qui nous
concerne maintenant plus précisément, à savoir les relations du Livre sur le
mouvement avec les autres textes de la tradition arabe des Éléments. Ce qui
ressort, néanmoins, est que notre anonyme, ou plutôt notre Pseudo-Aristote,
retravaille sa ou ses sources procliennes sous l’angle de son thème principal,
c’est-à-dire sous l’angle du mouvement. Cela se voit en comparant les deux
versions de la proposition 59 du Proclus, à savoir la version dans le deuxième
chapitre du Liber de causis II, qui est une reproduction fort interprétative du
texte grec12, et la version dans le Livre sur le mouvement13 :
12 Cf. la version des Éléments : «Tout ce qui est substantiellement simple estmeilleur ou pire
que ce qui est complexe. Puisque les extrémités du réel sont produites par des causes
moins nombreuses et plus simples, alors que les moyens termes le sont par des causes
plus nombreuses, ceux-ci seront complexes, tandis que, parmi les extrêmes, les uns seront
plus simples par excès, les autres par défaut. Par ailleurs, que les extrêmes soient produits
par des causes moins nombreuses, c’est évident. La raison en est que les principes plus
élevés à la fois commencent à agir avant les moins élevés et étendent leur action plus loin
qu’eux, jusqu’à des termes que l’ infériorité dynamique de ces dérivés soustrait à leur pro-
gression. C’est bien pourquoi le dernier des êtres, comme le premier, est extrêmement
simple : il procède du premier tout seul (ἀπὸ μόνου πρόεισι τοῦ πρώτου). Mais cette simpli-
cité est d’un côté supérieure à toute synthèse, et de l’autre inférieure. La loi est la même
pour tous les cas». (trad. Trouillard 1965, p. 98).
13 Les éléments communs à la lettre sont indiqués en caractères gras.
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Liber de causis II, ch. 2 :
[Il dit] Toute chose simple est meilleure que la chose composée ou bien
inférieure à elle, car les extrémités des choses sont plus simples que les
choses simples14, et je dis que les choses simples15 sont plus composées
que les extrémités, mais entre les extrémités, l’une estmeilleure et l’autre
est plus vile. Quant à l’extrémité qui est la meilleure, elle est semblable à
l’ intelligence. Quant à l’extrémité qui est la plus vile, elle est semblable
à la matière. Certes l’ intelligence est meilleure que les choses parce que
sa puissance qui coule sur ce qui est au-dessous d’elle coule davantage
que celle qui coule de l’âme. Et s’ il en est ainsi, nous revenons ⟨à notre
propos⟩ et nous disons que le Bien pur, je veux dire la cause première, fait
couler sa puissance sur les choses bien davantage que ce qui coule de la
puissance de l’âme, et il n’en est ainsi que parce que tout ce qui avoisine
la cause première est une puissance qui fait être davantage les choses. Or,
l’ intelligence est plus près de la cause première que l’âme, puis lamatière
qui ne fait que recevoir de l’ intelligence et de l’âme, sans que sa puissance
coule sur autre chose, en raison de l’éloignement de la cause première. Et
la matière n’est que simple parce qu’elle est une trace d’entre les traces
d’une chose simple, je veux dire l’âme. Toutefois même si elle est simple,
elle est plus vile, plus basse que la nature et que les choses composées,
parce qu’elle n’a aucune puissance active qui coule sur autre chose. Mais
elle n’est qu’une puissance réceptive sur laquelle coulent les formes. La
matière est inférieure à la nature et à toutes choses créées, car ⟨la nature⟩
fait couler sur elle sa puissance et accomplit sur elle des actesmerveilleux.
Ainsi a été rendu clair et expliqué : la chose simple est ce qui estmeilleur
que les choses composées et c’est l’ intelligence, et d’elle vient ce qui est
inférieur à l’ intelligence, c’est-à-dire la matière, comme nous l’avons dit
et montré.
tr. Thillet, Oudaimah 2001-2002, p. 318-320
Le Livre sur le mouvement :
La preuve du fait que la chose simple est soit meilleure que les choses
composées soit inférieure à elles, vient du fait que les choses compo-
14 Une émendation à laquelle on pourrait penser pour le terme «simples» ( تاطوسبملا ) serait
« intermédiaires» ( تاطسوتملا ).
15 Cf. n. 14.
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sées sont, certes, composées de l’agent et de l’agi, mais que l’agent est
simple et l’agi est aussi simple. Quant à l’agent, il est le premiermoteur, et
quant à l’agi, il est le premier recevant, c’est-à-dire le premier agi et mû.
Donc le simple est meilleur que tout le composé et quant à la matière,
elle est ainsi inférieure à tout le composé, parce qu’elle n’a ni ḥilya ni
forme (ṣūra). Ainsi tout ce qui avoisine le premier moteur est meilleur
et plus noble que la chose qui est éloignée de lui, et est semblable à
l’ intelligence. Car l’ intelligence est du bien pour toutes les choses. Ainsi
tout ce qui avoisine la matière est inférieur et plus vil que la chose qui
est éloignée d’elle, et est semblable au corps. Car il est inférieur et plus
vil que le vivant. Ainsi a été rendu clair : le simple est plus digne que le
composé16.
Le deuxième chapitre du Liber de causis II constitue une version du texte grec
de Proclus qui s’ inscrit bien au cadre interprétatif du Proto-Liber de causis, qui
est attestépar les Libri de causis et la paraphrased’al-ʿĀmiri. Les classes des exis-
tantsmentionnésparProclus sont identifiées avec celles d’unehiérarchie onto-
logique plutôt inspirée de Plotin. Donc l’hypothèse se confirme que le Liber de
causis II reflèterait bien la version de la proposition 59 des Éléments du Proto-
Liber de causis et, en conséquence, le modèle de notre Pseudo-Aristote. Car,
basé sur le contenu et le style du Livre sur lemouvement, il paraît évident que ce
traité a été composé probablement durant le neuvième ou le début du dixième
siècle. À ce moment-là, le compilateur pseudo-aristotélicien aurait encore dû
avoir accès à la version du Proto-Liber de causis initiale ou, pour lemoins, à une
révision qui n’aurait pas déjà passé par plusieurs étapes. Sonmodèle est encore
bien visible dans le passage du Livre sur le mouvement, mais la mention des
extrémités, qui est, certes, difficile à comprendre dans la présentation du Liber
de causis II, est supprimée. Le compilateur pseudo-aristotélicien a aussi omis la
conception néoplatonicienne de l’émanation du Bien, qui n’avait, visiblement,
pas d’ intérêt pour sa théorie. Par contre, il a ajouté deux concepts fortement
aristotéliciens, ce qui donne beaucoup de sens si nous nous souvenons que
notre auteur prétend être Aristote ; ces éléments sont l’agent et l’agi, et le pre-
mier moteur. Un indice important que la source de ce dernier passage ne peut
pas être le chapitre du Liber de causis II cité précédemment est la présence du
terme ḥilya dans le sens de «forme» seulement dans le Livre sur le mouvement.
Nous disons «indice», parce qu’ il est, bien sûr, possible que, d’une part, notre
16 Pour le texte arabe, voir lemanuscrit HacıMahmud 5683, 126b17-127a11 dansma transcrip-
tion indiquée en note 11.
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anonyme a décidé d’ajouter ici ce terme trouvé ailleurs dans le Liber de causis
II, à savoir au chapitre 2217. D’autre part, le hendiadys ḥilya et ṣura, que le com-
pilateur a utilisé, se trouve seulement dans le SageGrec (al-šayḫal-yūnānī), une
reproduction partielle des Ennéades de Plotin aussi attribuée au cercle du phi-
losophe al-Kindī18. Ce fait porte à croire que le Proto-Liber de causis, qui aurait
très bien pu employer ce hendiadys, pourrait bien être la source de Pseudo-
Aristote. En tout cas, il mérite d’être noté que le mot ḥilya est l’origine du mot
helyatin dans la version latine du Liber de causis.
La question de savoir si c’était vraiment notre Pseudo-Aristote du Livre sur le
mouvement qui a introduit la notion de mouvement dans les propositions pro-
cliennes en arabe se pose lorsque nous comparons son texte avec la paraphrase
d’al-ʿĀmirī. Chez le philosophe du Khorasan, nous trouvons un passage qui est
inspiré par la proposition 45 de Proclus et qui fait allusion au mouvement –
là, où ni Proclus ni les Libri de causis le font, mais où, au contraire, le Livre sur
le mouvement le fait. Est-il alors envisageable que le concept du mouvement
ait été introduit dans quelques propositions des Éléments de la tradition pro-
clienne arabe avant même la composition du Livre sur le mouvement et que le
compilateur ait seulement collectionné des passages parlant déjà du mouve-
ment? Examinons donc les versions de la proposition 45. La version originelle
de Proclus dit :
Aucun auto-constituant n’est soumis à la génération (ἀγένητον). S’ il est
soumis à la génération, il sera pour cette raison même essentiellement
imparfait et il aura besoin de recevoir sa perfection d’un autre. Mais du
moment qu’ il se produit lui-même, il est parfait et autonome. Car toute
être engendré reçoit sa perfection d’un autre qui donne la génération à
ce qui n’est pas. La génération, en effet, est un passage (ὁδός) de l’absence
de perfection à la perfection opposée.
tr. Trouillard 1965, p. 90
Les versions des Libri de causis, qui reprennent ce passage de Proclus, sont très
proches, bien que celle du Liber de causis II soit légèrement plus longue, et que
l’on peut la considérer comme complète19 :
17 Le terme se trouve aussi dans le Liber de causis, ch. 8, et chez al-ʿĀmirī, ch. 16.
18 Voir [Anonymous], [Philosophy Reader], p. 94, passage (33) ; p. 100, passage (39) ; et p. 106,
passage (41). Pour les traditions arabes de Plotin et de Proclus et leur origine du cercle
d’al-Kindī, voir Endress 1973, p. 186-188.
19 Voir Liber de causis, ch. 24, et Liber de causis II, ch. 9.
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Toute substance subsistant par elle-même n’est pas créée d’une autre
chose. Et si l’on dit : « il se peut que la chose subsistant par elle-même ait
été créée, et qu’elle soit créée». Nous disons s’ il se peut que la substance
subsistant par elle-même ait été créée il n’est pas douteux que cette sub-
stance est déficiente ayant besoin d’être complétée par quelque choses
d’autre ; car tout créé n’est achevé que du fait de sa création. La preuve
en est la génération elle-même. En effet la génération n’est que le chemin
de la déficience à la perfection.
tr. Thillet, Oudaimah 2001-2002, p. 328
Le début du passage suivant d’al-ʿĀmirī est clairement une paraphrase d’un
texte arabe très similaire au texte du Liber de causis II20, pourtant la seconde
moitié semble être inspirée plutôt de la proposition 41 des Éléments21, qui n’est
pas intégrée dans les Libri de causis. Voici le passage en question des Chapitres
sur les thèmes métaphysiques, ch. 17 :
La réalisation de toute substance subsistant par l’ essence de son créa-
teur n’a pas besoin de devenir progressivement cette chose, [c’est-à-
dire de passer] lentement de la déficience à la perfection qui lui est
propre.
En revanche, ce dont la réalisation dépend de cette sorte de progres-
sion, possède unematièremue et une disposition de recevoir le contraire.
Le lien avec la proposition 41 des Éléments est encore plus visible dans le pas-
sage du Livre sur lemouvement, qui s’ inspire, commeal-ʿĀmirī, des propositions
45 et 41 :
La chose fermement établie dans son essence n’est pas soumise à la géné-
ration ; car si elle n’a besoin ni d’unematière qui la porte pour qu’elle soit
établie et persévère, ni d’un moteur, qui la meut de la puissance à l’acte,
elle se contente de son essence pour sonmaintien et pour être établie. Au
20 Voir les éléments communs à la lettre indiqués en caractères gras dans les textes de Liber
de causis II et d’al-ʿĀmirī.
21 Elle dit : «Tout être qui existe dans un autre est produit uniquement par un autre. Au
contraire, tout être qui existe en soi-mêmeest autoconstituant. Ce qui existe dans un autre
et a besoin d’un sujet ne saurait en aucun cas être générateur de soi-même. Car ce qui
est capable de s’engendrer soi-même n’a pas besoin d’un appui extrinsèque, puisqu’ il se
donne sa propre cohésion et trouve en lui-même sa sauvegarde sans recourir à un sujet.
…» (tr. Trouillard 1965, p. 88).
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contraire, la chose qui n’existe que par une matière et un moteur, qui la
meut de la puissance à l’acte, a besoin d’une chose qui la porte22.
Tandis que la dernière phrase «la chose qui la porte» est très probablement
la traduction de τὸ ὑποκείμενον, qui se trouve aussi dans les Libri de causis23,
les éléments «matière» et «moteur» sont propres au Livre sur lemouvement et
aux Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphysiques. Dans ces derniers, ils apparaissent
condensés dans l’expression de «matière mue». Ces deux concepts rappellent
quand même fortement la terminologie et philosophie d’Aristote, surtout si
nous considérons les deux spécifications que fournissent al-ʿĀmirī et le Pseudo-
Aristote. Le premier parle aussi d’«une disposition de recevoir le contraire»,
c’est-à-dire qu’ il adjoint une partie de la définition aristotélicienne de la sub-
stance ; le second ajoute à propos du moteur «qui la meut de la puissance à
l’acte» et se met donc aussi fermement dans le cadre de la philosophie du
Stagirite. La présence de ces éléments aristotéliciens dans deux textes de la
tradition proclienne arabe pose de nouvelles questions, surtout la question
d’une interprétation aristotélicienne qui aurait, soit peut-être déjà concerné
quelques propositions intégrées dans le Proto-Liber de causis, soit été faite dans
une version révisée du Proto-Liber de causis que l’on devrait ensuite supposer
être la source d’al-ʿĀmirī et du Pseudo-Aristote. Pour le moment, les indices
pour trancher cette question ne suffisent pas et nous pouvons seulement espé-
rer que des nouveaux textes de la tradition proclienne arabe soient découverts
dans le futur.
La conclusionmomentanément possible est le constat des deux lectures dif-
férentes du matériel venant très probablement du Proto-Liber de causis que
nous trouvons dans Les Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphysiques, et l’ autre dans
le Livre sur lemouvement ; d’un côté, une interprétation religieuse quimaintient
le pouvoir absolu deDieu, et de l’autre, une lecture aristotélisante, qui souligne
l’ importance dumouvement. Cette dernière lecture pourrait bien être inspirée
de Proclus lui-mêmeet ses Éléments dephysiquedont se trouvent quelques pro-
positions paraphrasées aussi dans le Livre sur le mouvement24.
22 Pour le texte arabe, voir le manuscrit Hacı Mahmud 5683, 125a2-6 dans ma transcription
indiquée en note 11.
23 Voir, par exemple, Liber de causis, ch. 28 et Liber de causis II, ch. 11.
24 Nous remercions les évaluateurs anonymes pour leurs remarques très aidantes et notre
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chapter 10
Contextualizing the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair / Liber
de causis
Richard C. Taylor
Marquette University / DeWulf—Mansion Centre, Leuven
While the Liber de causis, Gerard of Cremona’s twelfth century Latin transla-
tion of the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair (hereafter, the Arabic De causis1) was com-
monly albeit incorrectly ascribed to Aristotle2 and in some sense accepted as
authoredbyAristotle bymanymedieval thinkers,modern accounts have some-
times focused on its Greek source in the Elements of Theology of Proclus as if it
is little more than Proclus in Arabic.3 No doubt some have been influenced by
the remarks of Thomas Aquinas who first wrote that the source was not Aris-
totle but Proclus in his 1272 Commentary on the Liber de causis. While Aquinas
1 With this name I refer to the Arabic work which was translated into Latin by Gerard of
Cremona. Presently there are two extant complete Arabic manuscripts and various other
Arabic works which are witnesses to portions of the Arabic De causis. Whether an extant
Hebrew translation may be from another Arabic manuscript is yet to be fully determined.
The Latin translation itself is a witness to another Arabic manuscript. The Arabic text was
critically edited in my 1981 doctoral dissertation at the University of Toronto. See Taylor 1981.
Earlier printed editions were published in Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift and Al-Aflāṭūnīya.
Another work that in some ways intersects with the Arabic De causis was discovered by
S. Oudaimah and edited, translated and published by P. Thillet and S. Oudaimah. See Thillet,
Oudaimah 2001–2002. Other Arabic texts from the Elements of Theology are edited by Ger-
hard Endress in Endress 1973. For an overview the De causis generally, see the collected essays
in D’Ancona 1995 and D’Ancona and Taylor 2003. For more recent work, see D’Ancona 2010
and 2014. SeeWakelnig 2006 and 2011.Wakelnig’s developing research on theArabic Elements
of Theology seems to support the notion that all or verymuch of theGreekwas translated into
Arabic. SeeWakelnig 2012. C. D’Ancona and I are now preparing a new edition of the Arabic
De causis.
2 The work is “Aristotelian” insofar as it is a product of the Circle of al-Kindi, as is the famous
Theology of Aristotle (see Al-Aflāṭūnīya) of the Plotiniana Arabica which was prepared by al-
Kindī from the Plotiniana Arabica texts available to him. On the meaning of “Aristotelian”
here, see Endress 1997 and also D’Ancona 2017. Regarding D’Ancona’s project to edit theTheo-
logy of Aristotle, see http://www.greekintoarabic.eu.
3 EvennowOxfordreference.comsimply describes it as “A treatise, consisting largely of extracts
from Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theology’, put together in Arabic by an unknown Muslim philo-
sopher c. 850.” See http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.201108031001
03903.
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may have accepted early in his career that this work had some connectionwith
the teachings of Aristotle or was even composed in some sense by Aristotle
as did many predecessors and contemporaries, he declared in his Commentary
that the De causis seemed to be a work which “one of the Arab philosophers
excerpted … from this book by Proclus, especially since everything in it is con-
tained much more fully and more diffusely in that of Proclus”.4 Yet, as will be
made clear in what follows, that generalization is not correct. Still, whether
accepting it as Aristotelian—as was commonly done—or later less commonly
as Proclean, theologians and philosophers in the context of Medieval Europe
found the Liber de causis to be a rich and inspiring source of metaphysical and
cosmological principles and reasoning on God and creatures as witnessed by
well over 250 extant manuscripts and the extensive number of commentaries
of various forms that have survived to today.5
In its own context, however, the Arabic De causis is by no means merely
a collection of excerpts from Proclus out of what was available of the Ele-
ments of Theology among the Procleana Arabica. Rather, although one of the
Arabic manuscripts prefaces the work with the explanation that it is a sum-
mary of the account of Plato excerpted by Proclus and is said to be by Plato,6
it is nevertheless unquestionably a work of the “Aristotelian” Circle of al-Kindi7
in which appeared the famous Theology of Aristotle edited by al-Kindī himself
4 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis, p. 3; transl. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the
Book of Causes, p. 4. L. Minio Paluello 1972, p. 530–531, remarks that it is likely William of
Moerbeke who first discovered that this work draws on the Elements of Theology by Proclus.
Aquinas is the first to note that in writing in his 1272 Commentary. Aquinas early in his career
seems to have followed the custom of many to attribute this work to “the philosopher,” scil.
Aristotle. This is the case for his citations of the work in his Commentary on the Sentences. For
example, see Super Sent. I, d.8, q.1, a.2 sed contra.
5 Taylor 1983; and Calma 2016, p. 20f.
6 SeeThe Liber de causis (Kalām fīmaḥdal-khair), p. 136 and 282. The Leidenmanuscript Biblio-
theek der Rijksuniversiteit, Oriental 209 (formerly Golius 209) ascribes the work to Aristotle:
Kitāb al-īḍāḥ li-Arisṭūṭālis fī al-khair al-maḥḍ: “The book of Aristotle’s Exposition on the Pure
Good.” The Latin tradition generally ascribes it to Aristotle, as does one of the earliest and
most important Latin manuscripts, Aosta, Seminario maggiore 71 (olim Ai° D 20) which has
Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis purae: “The Book of Aristotle on the Exposition of the
Pure Good.” Ankara, Ankara Universitesi, Dil ve Tarih-Čografya Fakültesi Kütüphanesi, MS
Ismail Saib I 1696, has “Discourse on the Pure Good. It is said that Proclus excerpted it from
the Discourse of Plato and it is also said that it is by Plato.” The issue of the differing ascrip-
tions found in the Arabic manuscripts will be addressed in the new edition of the Arabic De
causis now in preparation.
7 This valuable term is first set out in Endress 1997. On the meaning of “Aristotelian” here, see
Endress 1997 and also D’Ancona 2017.
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and other texts from the available Plotiniana Arabica.8 This may be why two
manuscripts attribute the Arabic De causis to Aristotle. In the preface to the
Theology of Aristotle the author—presumably al-Kindī himself—indicates the
Theology of Aristotle is based on a translation by the Christian Ibn Nāʿima al-
Ḥimṣī, something that likely applies to all the texts of the Plotiniana Arabica
because of the similarity of vocabulary and doctrine.9 The Plotiniana Arabica
itself in its three collections, theTheology of Aristotle, the ps.-Farabian Letter on
Divine Science, and the Sayings of the GreekWiseman, considered as a whole is
a work of translations, paraphrases and distinctively innovative doctrines reg-
ularly transforming Plotinian teachings to its own ends.10 The novel teachings
of the Plotiniana Arabica also are foundational for the unknown author of the
Arabic De causis. This is simply because, though the Arabic De causis employs
translations of texts of the Elements of Theology by Proclus, those are often
sculpted to fit the vocabulary and doctrine found in the Plotiniana Arabica as
well as to fit the reasoning the author of the Arabic De causis is constructing in
his particular argumentative contexts.11 Further, in the case of one of the most
important metaphysical chapters of the Arabic De causis, there is no direct use
of any text of the Elements of Theology at all; rather, nearly the entire chapter is
formed by teachings found in the three works making up the Plotiniana Arab-
ica.12
In this short contribution I contextualize the Arabic De causis as a work con-
ceived and written in the doctrinal framework of the teachings found in the
Plotiniana Arabica, texts and teachings which set out a version of the thought
of Plotinusmuch revised in ways to fit the religious and philosophical contexts
of its time.13 I do so by examining the single chapter of the Arabic De causis
which does not draw explicitly on a text from the Elements of Theology but
8 Adamson 2017; Adamson 2002; D’Ancona 1991; 2004; 2012; 2017.
9 D’Ancona 2017, p. 10; Adamson 2002, p. 7–9; Adamson 2017, section 2, Historical questions.
Some fascinating conjectures about Ibn Naʾima and the Christian contexts of his time are
discussed in Treiger 2015. My thanks to M. Chase for calling my attention to this and for
other valuable corrections and suggestions.
10 Lewis 1959 contains translations of nearly all the Plotiniana Arabica available at that
time. Though D’Ancona’s ERC Project is focused on the Theology of Aristotle, her research
includes all of the PlotinianaArabica. See http://www.greekintoarabic.eu/index.php?id=2
and http://www.greekintoarabic.eu/index.php?id=26&reset=1.
11 This has been well established by C. D’Ancona in a long series of articles on the Arabic
De causis. See her collection in D’Ancona 1995a, particularly D’Ancona 1995b. Also see
D’Ancona 1993.
12 See D’Ancona 1995a, p. 191 and more generally D’Ancona 2011.
13 D’Ancona argues for an influence of the Procleana Arabica on teachings found in the
Plotiniana Arabica in D’Ancona 1999, 63f.
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rather derives from the Plotiniana Arabica14 and just two additional sample
passages of the Arabic De causiswhich evidence clearly the author’s adherence
to the teachings of the Plotiniana Arabica. The latter two selections display the
author’s efforts to modify the texts and ideas of the Elements of Theology of
Proclus to form his work into the distinctive treatise that we have today. I then
consider the Arabic De causis both as a Neoplatonic contribution to the devel-
opment of metaphysical thought in the early period of philosophy in the lands
of Islam and also as a work furthering the agenda of al-Kindī to show the com-
patibility and complementarity of philosophy to the ends of Islamic—if not
more broadly Abrahamic—religion in the context of ninth century Baghdad.
I conclude with a brief summary of what has been reasoned in the two major
parts of this article.
1 The Arabic De causis and the Plotiniana Arabica
While the author of the Arabic De causis accesses texts from an Arabic version
of the Elements of Theology by Proclus, he pulls those texts into his own philo-
sophical context already dominated by a metaphysics based on the Plotiniana
Arabica and the Circle of al-Kindi. Regarding the First Cause, the Sayings of the
GreekWiseman sets forth a conception of It as the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq)
and as the Pure True Being (al-huwiyya al-ḥaqqa al-maḥḍa) which is without
adornment15 or form. As such It is only being (lā ḥilya la-hā wa-lā ṣūra la-hā …
anniyya faqaṭ).16 As Creator It is unlike any of the created things and unique
(al-mubdiʿ al-ʿawwal lā yushbih shaiʾ min al-ʿashyāʾ … al-mubdiʿ al-ʿawwal wāḥid
waḥda-hu). As First Agent It is the unmoving emanative cause of the first effect,
intellect, throughwhich things intelligible and sensible emanate from It (al-fāʿil
al-awwal … sākin ghaira mutaḥarrik … al-maʿlūl al-awwal … inbajasat min-hu
14 See the list of sourcepropositions of Proclus’s Elements of Theology for the ArabicDecausis
in D’Ancona 1995b, p. 191.
15 Ḥilya can mean jewelry or something adorning a person. D’Ancona translates it as
“détermination formelle” and indicates the sense of predicate.Hence, the First Cause tran-
scends predication and names except in the limited sense that It may be denominated
through Its effects, a sense that does not capture the very nature of the First Cause in
Itself. See D’Ancona 1995a, p. 18, 20, 106, 108, 110, 171, 182.
16 Wakelnig 2014, p. 93; 88; 94–96 respectively. For this article I draw key Arabic texts largely
although not solely from Wakelnig’s edition with translation of Oxford, Bold. Or. Marsh
539 which contains many of the extant Sayings of the Greek Wiseman, though I freely
modify the translation at times to show the similarity of the Arabic in that work and the
Arabic De causis.
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sāʾir al-ʿashyāʾ al-ʿaqliyya wa-al-ḥissiya bi-tawassuṭ al-ʿaql).17 And the Theology
of Aristotle has a consideration of Enneads IV 7.8.3 with a summarizing account
as follows:
We say that God … is cause of intellect, and intellect is cause of soul, and
soul is cause of nature, and nature is cause of all generated individual
beings. However, while some things are cause of others, God… is cause of
all of them altogether, though He is cause of some of themmediately and
cause of some of them without mediation.18
Further, the True One, while It remains beyond the reach of created know-
ledge, is Itself the pure transcendent knowledgewhich encompasses every sort
of knowledge and is the cause of all the kinds of knowledge (huwa al-ʿilm al-
maḥḍ al-ʿaqṣà al-muḥīṭ bi-kull ʿilm wa ʿilla al-ʿulūm). Since It is without form,
the First Creator is unlimited or infinite in every way ( fa-huwamin kull al-jihāt
ghairamutanāh) and not in any way a plurality (kathīranmin jiha).19 It is what
conserves (ḥāfīẓu-hā) all created things, for Its essence is the Pure True Good
(dhāta-hu hiya al-khair al-maḥḍ al-ḥaqq).20
The Plotiniana Arabica’s characterizations of the True One and Creator in
Itself and in Its causation of creatures set out in the previous paragraph are
also found in the sole chapter of the Arabic De causiswhich does not draw dir-
ectly on any proposition of the Elements of Theology by Proclus. In chapter 8
the author writes:
The stability and the subsistence of every intellect are only through the
PureGoodwhich is theFirstCause.Thepower of intellect ismore strongly
unitary than [that of] second thingswhich are after it because they donot
attain to its knowledge. This came to be so only because it is a cause for
what is below it.
The proof of that is what we state: intellect governs (mudabbirun) all
the things which are below it through the divine power in it, and by that
[divine power] it sustains things because by [divine power] it is the cause
17 Wakelnig 2014, p. 94–96; and 94.
18 Aflūṭīn, p. 50. My translation. I follow Lewis 1959, p. 205, in retaining the reading of
manuscript Istanbul, Ayasofya 2457. Though I use the text of Badawi, I generally follow
the readings of Lewis. Note that the author follows the Plotinian scheme of the One, fol-
lowed by intellect, soul and nature. This is also found in the Arabic De causis, chapter 8.
19 Wakelnig 2014, p. 98 and 100 respectively.
20 Wakelnig 2014, p. 102 and 98 respectively.
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of things. It sustains and encompasses all the things below it. For what is
primary for things and a cause of them sustains those things and governs
(mudabbirun) them, and none of them eludes it due to its exalted power.
Intellect, then, is ruler (raʾis) of all the things below it, sustaining and gov-
erning them. Just as nature governs over the things below it through the
power of soul, likewise soul governs the things below it by the power of
intellect as intellect similarly governs nature through divine power. Intel-
lect came to sustain things which are after it, to govern them and to exalt
its power over them only because it is an intellectual power which is a
power neither characteristic of soul nor characteristic of nature because
they are not a substantial power belonging to it. Rather, it is the power of
substantial powers because it is the cause of them.
Intellect encompasses generation, nature andwhat is at the horizon of
nature, namely soul, for it is above nature. For nature encompasses gen-
eration, and soul encompasses nature, and intellect encompasses soul.
Intellect, then, encompasses all things. Intellect has come to be so only
due to the First Cause which is exalted over all things because it is the
cause of intellect, soul, nature and all other things.
The First Cause is neither intellect nor soul nor nature, but rather
It is above intellect, soul and nature because It is creator of all things.
However, It is creator of intellect without mediation and creator of soul,
nature and all other things through themediation of intellect. And divine
knowledge is not like the knowledge of intellect nor like the knowledge
of soul, but rather [divine knowledge] is above the knowledge of the
intellect and the knowledge of soul because [divine knowledge] is cre-
ative of [the kinds of] knowledge. Divine power is above every power of
intellect, soul and nature because it is cause of every power. Intellect pos-
sesses formal adornment (ḥilyah) because it is being (anniyya) and form
(ṣurah), and likewise soul possesses formal adornment and nature pos-
sesses formal adornment, but the First Cause has no formal adornment
because It is only being (anniyya faqaṭ). So if someone says: It must have
formal adornment, we say: Its formal adornment is infinite and Its [dis-
tinctive] individual nature (shakhṣ) is the Pure Good pouring forth on
intellect all goodnesses and on all other things through the mediation of
intellect.21
21 Square brackets indicate my addition, mostly of the referents of pronouns. This transla-
tion is based on a draft of a newly revised edition of the Arabic De causis in preparation
by Cristina D’Ancona and myself. The text and translation in my unpublished disserta-
tion are close to this. See The Liber de causis (Kalām fī maḥd al-khair), p. 298–300. Cf. Die
pseudo-aristotelische Schrift, p. 76–79; Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 3–4.
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For the metaphysical teachings in chapter 8 of the Arabic de causis the
author clearly draws on the Plotiniana Arabica from all three of the collections
extant today: the Sayings of the Greek Wiseman, the Theology of Aristotle and
the pseudo-Farabian Epistle on the Divine Science. The doctrines of the One (i)
as pure being and only being without adornment (ḥilya) or form (ṣura), (ii) as
the Creator and cause of intellect and through themediation of intellect cause
of soul and of nature, (iii) as the Pure Good, (iv) as Itself infinite, and more are
the same in both the PlotinianaArabica and the Arabic de causiswith the same
vocabulary used in both works.22
We can note in addition that (v) the doctrine of the Creator and Pure Good
as Itself transcendent knowledge creative of the kinds of knowledge found in
intellect and soul introduces in chapter 8 of the Arabic De Causis a distinct-
ive conception commonly disavowed of the One by Plotinus when it employs
the notion of Divine Knowledge.23 For Plotinus the notion that the First Prin-
ciple has or is knowledge is clearly rejected for the sake of Its simplicity. A
teaching such as that of Aristotle wherein the highest principles and separate
movers are considered as self-thinking thought is explicitly rejected by Plotinus
who relegates that to the second principle, Nous or Intellect.24 Yet this notion
can be found in the Plotiniana Arabica in its third extant portion, the pseudo-
Farabian Epistle on the Divine Science, Risāla fī’l-ʿilm al-ilāhī. This has recently
been analyzed and expounded in detail by Cristina D’Ancona who shows that
the description of the Creator or First Cause as having knowledge may well be
grounded in a misreading (unintentional or otherwise) of the text of Plotinus
on the part of the translator of the Greek into Arabic.25 In brief, for Plotinus,
while the One is Itself unknowable and not Itself characterized as knowing,
from the viewpoint of Nous or Intellect which proceeds from the One, the One
is what Nous is in some sense able to know with the result that Nous is filled
with unlimited forms in its attempt to apprehend the One. To this extent from
the perspective of Nous, the One is a noeton, a thing known.What we find in the
Epistle on the Divine Science of the Plotiniana Arabica is that the translator and
22 For a much more detailed account of the doctrines and sources of this Chapter, see
D’Ancona 1995b.
23 Of this D’Ancona writes, “the Arabic sentence gives a distinct non-Plotinian ring.” D’An-
cona 2018, p. 148. Also see p. 149. Still, for a discussion of passages in which Plotinus
attributes to the One knowledge or intellection of some sort, see Bussanich 1987.
24 See, e.g., Plotinus, Enneads V 1, 9. For more references and discussion, see Rist 1973.
25 For the translator, however, this may not have been amistake but rather a confirmation of
the truth of God as all knowing, a teaching common to theAbrahamic religious traditions.
This issue will have to be taken up elsewhere. Note, however, that M. Chase argues in his
article in the present volume that this notion may come from Porphyry.
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adaptor has taken that description of the One as noeton from the perspective
of Nous and applied it as a predicate characterizing the One or Creator Itself.
Hence, in the Epistle on the Divine Science it can be said that the Creator and
First Cause is in Its own right noeton, knows Itself, and, thus, has Divine Know-
ledge. This is the doctrine we find set out in chapter 8 of the Arabic De causis, a
doctrine that canbe seen in context todrawuponAristotle aswell as Plotinus.26
Still, to say that the First Cause has knowledge or is notwithout knowledgedoes
not imply that Its knowledge is derived from the world, that is, from anything
outside Itself.
It is in accord with these teachings of the Plotiniana Arabica that the author
transforms texts of Proclus considered in the two samples to follow.
The first sample is a partial extract from the beginning of Chapter 5 of the
Arabic De causis27 where we find the following:
The First Cause transcends attribute (al-ṣifa). Languages are incapable
of [expressing] Its attribute by describing (waṣf ) Its being (anniyati-hā)
because It is above every cause. It is described only through the second
causes which are illuminated by the light of the First Cause. For the First
Cause illuminates first Its effect and is not illuminated by another light
because It is the Pure Light above which there is no ⟨other⟩ light. For
this reason, therefore, the First alone came to surpass ⟨any⟩ attribute
(…).28
The Procleana Arabica sources for this chapter are Propositions 11 and 123 of
the Elements of Theology, yet neither makes mention of light or illumination.
At the start of proposition 123 we find the following:
Prop. 123. All that is divine is itself ineffable and unknowable by any sec-
ondary being because of its supra-existential unity, but it may be appre-
hended and known from the existents which participate it wherefore
only the First Principle is completely unknowable, as being unparticip-
ated.29
26 D’Ancona 2018, p. 145f.
27 Cf. D’Ancona 2000.
28 This translation is based on a draft of a new edition of the Arabic De causis in preparation.
The text and translation inmyunpublished 1981 dissertation are close to this. SeeTheLiber
de causis (Kalām fīmaḥdal-khair), p. 160–161. Cf.Diepseudo-aristotelische Schrift, p. 69–70;
Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 11–12.
29 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 108–109.
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While this is a source of Arabic De causis Chapter 5, the source of the use
of the metaphors of light and illumination is rather the Sayings of the Greek
Wiseman in the Plotiniana Arabica:
It is said that the Pure One resembles light, the second one which is
related to something else resembles the sun, and the third thing
resembles the moon which attains its light from the sun. Thus, in the
soul, there is an acquired intellect which illuminates it with its light and
makes it intellectual. In the intellect, there is essential light, and it is not
only light, but also a substance receiving light. As to what illuminates
the intellect and pours light over it, It is only light and nothing other
than light, but simple, absolute, pure light which pours Its power over the
intellect andmakes it an illuminating, enlightening intellect. Yet, the light
in the intellect is something in something else, whereas the light which
illuminates the intellect is not in anything else, but is light alone, sub-
sisting and lasting in Its essence. It illuminates all things, but there are
things which receive Its light more abundantly and others which receive
it less.30
Here the author of the PlotinianaArabicaprovides a close renderingof Enneads
V 6,4.14–22, with some elaboration. Plotinus himself writes,
The First, then, should be compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the
third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets its light from the sun.
For Soul has intellect as an external addition which colours it when it is
intellectual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is not only light but
that which is enlightened in its own being; and that which gives it light is
nothing else but is simple light giving Intellect the power to be what it is.
Why then would it have need of anything? For it is not the same as that
which is in something else: for, that which is in something else is different
from that which is in and by itself.31
30 For the Arabic text with English translation, see Wakelnig 2014, p. 96–99. Here I modify
her translation slightly. Cf. the translation by Lewis 1959, p. 367.
31 Plotinus, Enneads V 6,4.14–22, (transl. Armstrong, p. 210–211): Καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν
φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνης ἄστρῳ κομιζομένῳ τὸ φῶς παρ’ ἡλίου. Ψυχὴ
μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν ἔχει ἐπιχρωννύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὖσαν, νοῦς δ’ ἐν αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον ἔχει οὐ φῶς
ὢν μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅ ἐστι πεφωτισμένον ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὂν
φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν παρέχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν αὐτὸ δέοιτό τινος; οὐ γὰρ
αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὄντος.
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This account in the PlotinianaArabica clearly is the inspiration for the use of
themetaphors of light and illumination imported by the author into the Arabic
De causis.
The second sample comes from Arabic De causis Chapter 21. Aquinas had
some difficulty locating the precise source in Proclus for this chapter and sug-
gested that it is generally based on Propositions 115 and 18 of the Elements of
Theology.32 D’Ancona, however, has suggested that this chapter is in some way
related to Proposition 131.33
The First Cause is above every name by which It is named. For neither
deficiency nor mere perfection is appropriate to It because the deficient
is imperfect and unable to effect a perfect act since it is deficient. The per-
fect, in our view, although sufficient in itself, is unable to create another
thing and to pour forth anything from itself at all. If this is so, we resume
and say that the First Cause is neither deficient nor merely perfect, but
rather It is above perfection because It is creator of things and that which
pours forth goods on them in a perfect emanation because It is a good
which has neither limit nor dimensions. The First Good, therefore, fills all
worlds with goods, except that each world receives of that good only in
accordance with Its capacity.
Thus, it has become clear and evident that the First Cause is above
every name by which It is named and transcends it and is more exalted
than it.34
This chapter of the Arabic De causismaywell have Proposition 131 in Proclus as
a source, but it seems to have been expressed here in accord with the doctrines
of the Plotiniana Arabica. In book 10 of theTheology of Aristotlewe find the fol-
lowingwhich draws onPlotinus, Enneads V 2,1. The italicized text approximates
the Greek of Plotinus.
I say that the Pure One is above the perfect and the complete. The sens-
ible world is deficient because it is created from the perfect thing which
is the intellect. Intellect comes to be perfect and complete because it is
32 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis, p. 115; transl. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on
the Book of Causes, p. 129.
33 D’Ancona 1995, p. 191. Plotinus, Enneads V 2,1. may well be a source for Proposition 131.
34 This translation is based on a draft of a new edition of the Arabic De causis in preparation.
It differs only slightly from the Arabic text in The Liber de causis (Kalām fī maḥd al-khair),
p. 232–234. Cf. Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift, p. 99–100; Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 22–23.
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created by the True Pure One which is above perfection. It is not possible
for the thing which is above perfection to create the deficient thing in
an unmediated way and it is not possible for the perfect thing to create
a thing perfect like itself because it is deficient in the creation, I mean
by this that what is created is not in the rank of the Creator but rather is
below It.
The proof that the PureOne is perfect and above perfection is that It has
noneedof anythingnordoes It seek toattain something.Owing to thepower
of Its perfection and Its superabundance another thing is produced from It.
For the thing which is above perfection cannot produce unless the thing
be perfect: otherwise it is not above perfection. For if the perfect thing
produces anything, thena fortiori the thingwhich is aboveperfectionpro-
duces perfection, because It produces the perfect thing than which none
of the things produced canbemore powerful,more splendid ormore sub-
lime. Forwhen theTrueOnewhich is above perfection creates the perfect
thing, that perfect thing turns to its Creator and casts its gaze on It and is
filledwith light and splendor from It and becomes intellect (…).35
The comparison of Arabic De causis chapter 8 with the metaphysical teach-
ings and philosophical vocabulary found in the Plotiniana Arabica gives solid
grounds for locating the author in the Circle of al-Kindi and even for asserting
that his own thought was formed in the conceptual context of the Plotiniana
Arabica. The two samples from Arabic De causis chapters 5 and 21 give further
support for the view that the unknown author found the Arabic texts of the
Elements of Theology to be a valuable opportunity to expand and further the
metaphysical accounts set out in the Plotiniana Arabica, not to excavate the
metaphysics of Proclus in its own right.36
35 My translation is a modified version of what is found in Lewis 1959, p. 291–293. This cor-
responds to the Arabic in Aflūṭīn, p. 134–135. The italicized text of the English translation
corresponds to portions of the Greek of Plotinus in Enneads V 2, 1.6–8, as indicated by
Lewis. Plotinus, Enneads, V 2, 1.8–13 (transl. Armstrong, p. 58–59): ὄν γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν
ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ δεῖσθαι οἷον ὑπερερρύη καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ
γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. καὶ
ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστη πρὸς
αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. “[T]he One, perfect because it seeks nothing, over-
flows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when
it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by
looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon
the One, Intellect.”
36 For another good sample, see ArabicDe causisChapter 19. This and other similar examples
will be discussed in edition of the Arabic now underway. It is worth mentioning that,
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2 Brief Remarks on the Doctrinal and Historical Context of the
Arabic De causis as a Product of the Circle of al-Kindi in Ninth
Century Baghdad
The famous opening chapter of the Arabic De causis employs texts from Pro-
clus, Elements of Theology, Propositions 56 and 70, to elaborate a doctrine of
primary causality that explains the manner in which the presence of the First
Cause is found to be primary in each and every effect and cause in all reality
below It.37 There we find argued the philosophical principle that “the univer-
sal first cause” is more causally efficacious than any secondary cause since its
causality with regard to any effect is presupposed by and prior to any lower sec-
ondary cause. Further, “the remote first cause is more encompassing andmore
a cause of the thing than its proximate cause.” The remote cause adheres more
to the thing and does not separate from the thing with the separation of any
secondary cause. Summarising, the author concludes,
Thus, it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more
a cause of the thing than its proximate cause which is immediately adja-
cent to [the thing] and that it emanates its power on it and conserves it
and does not separate itself from it with the separation of its proximate
cause, but rather it remains in it and strongly adheres to it in accordance
with what we have made clear and evident.38
The sort of causation involved here is not Aristotelian efficient motor caus-
ation or the actuality of a preexisting potency, nor is it Aristotelian intrinsic
formal or material causality. Nor is it the metaphysical efficient causality set
out by Avicenna for whom the Necessary Being has only one essential act,
namely the creation of Intellect as first created thing containing all the forms
while the Plotiniana Arabica can be viewed as a completion of Aristotle’s metaphysics,
the Arabic De causis can be seen as a complement to the metaphysics and cosmology of
the Plotiniana Arabica. See D’Ancona 2017, p. 14 and 22.
37 See The Liber de causis (Kalām fī maḥd al-khair), p. 137–143. Cf. Die pseudo-aristotelische
Schrift, p. 58–61; Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 3–4. On this chapter, seeD’Ancona 1999 and 2001. For the
author of the Arabic De causis, this is a metaphysical form of causality and paradigmatic
participation such that the being of everything is established by the First Cause alone. A
form of this teaching is endorsed by Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on the Sentences
at Book 2, d.1, q.1 a. 4, sol. See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, p. 25–
26. This teaching is discussed in Taylor forthcoming.
38 See Taylor 2012 for a complete translation of Chapter 1.
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for lower things. Avicenna speaks of two forms of ibdāʿ or creation. One is
absolute creation ex nihilo presupposing nothing inside shared by the Neces-
sary Being and nothing outside It. Rather, the positing of the Necessary Being
immediately entails the Necessary Being’s creation of Intellect. The other is
a secondary sense of ibdāʿ on the part of what has been created presuppos-
ing a prior cause, scil., the creative emanation of intellects, souls and celestial
spheres each depending for its substance and power on what is above it.39
Rather, this causality set out in Chapter 1 and in later chapters called creation
on the part of the First Cause as Pure Being and True One (Chapter 4), as well
as True Agent (Chapter 19), appears to be a Neoplatonic blend of some sort
of creative efficient causality and paradigmatic causality.40 The First Cause as
39 See Janssens 1997, especially p. 470–476.
40 I say “some sort of creative efficient causality” because the author of the Arabic De causis
contends in Chapter 4 that the First Cause creates directly only the first created being,
scil. Intellect, and all other things through the mediation of Intellect. Here, then, there is
efficient originative causality in the action of the First Cause in the case of Intellect. After
that, however, there is mediate creation through Intellect, yet not such that the Intellect
can be called creator. Rather, only the First Cause can be called creator. Further, the author
says that the First Cause alone creates the being of all things while other causes act on
things only “in the manner of form, not in the matter of creation” (Chapter 17). According
to the author of the Arabic De causis, then, though there is emanative efficient causality
on the part of the First Cause in the singular case of the efficient causing of Intellect,
a paradigmatic causality of participation runs through Intellect, Soul and Nature such
that the transcendent pure being of the First Cause is cause of the foundational being
of all other things which are but diminished images or kinds. In a forthcoming article,
D’Ancona remarks that “il n’est pas nécessaire que la cause opère selon la modalité de
l’efficience. Non seulement dans le monde sensible il y a des réalités qui opèrent de la
sorte,mais c’est la règle dans le cas des principes intelligibles qui sont les causes véritables
de la structure rationnelle immanente dans les choses, et par conséquent de leur existence
même. Telle étant la causalité immobile des intelligibles, un seul et même principe peut
“produire” des effets multiples et divers, non pas malgré le fait qu’ il demeure immuable,
mais précisément grâce à cela. Si, comme c’est le cas, la causalité immobile et toujours
égale à elle-même d’un principe intelligible se retrouve participée selon des degrés dif-
férents dans ses participants, cela s’explique par une différente capacité de réception de
la part de ceux-ci.” (D’Ancona forthcoming.) For Aquinas, however, both efficient caus-
ality of being (conceived in terms of a distinction of existence from essence under the
influence of Avicenna) and paradigmatic causality (found in the Arabic De causis and
also in Chapter 5 of On the Divine Names by (ps.-)Dionysius) are involved. See Thomas
Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, lib. II, d. 1, q.1 a. 4, p. 25–26. The analysis of
Aquinas surely draws on what the young Thomas learned in Cologne when he attended
presentations of theCommentary on theDivineNamesbyhis teacherAlbertusMagnus. See
Albert’s commentary on Chapter 5 where he relates the accounts of (ps.-)Dionysius to the
philosophical work of the Liber de causis, Avicenna and Aristotle. AlbertusMagnus, Super
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uniquely Pure Being, True One, and True Agent is the ultimate source for the
being and unity found in any thing. As the first chapter asserts, the First Cause
provides the formal substrate of being uponwhich other formalities are built.41
The First Cause as transcendent and unparticipated Pure Being is the cause
of all lower beings by providing the participated perfection of being which is
the foundation for other formalities at all levels.42 In this sense, other form-
alities provided by paradigmatic realities below the First Cause can be causes
of rationality and life, for example, formalities that can be removed such that
a human being can have rationality and life removed and yet still be a being,
as rehearsed in Chapter 1. This must be read together with the second half of
Chapter 31 inwhich the argument ismade that theremust be aTrueOnewhich
is the unique cause of every sort of unity in things43 and Chapter 8 and others
where the First Cause is Itself pure being without delimitating form. It is on
the basis of the identity of the First Cause as Pure Being and True One and
on the basis of Neoplatonic participation in the paradigmatic causality of the
unparticipated transcendent paradigm and the participating lower image that
the author of the Arabic De causis claims that the First Cause alone is the Cre-
ator.44
Dionysius De Divinis Nominibus, p. 303–326. For more on these matters and causality in
the Arabic De causis, see Taylor forthcoming. Cf. Taylor 2019, p. 344f.
41 Taylor 1979, p. 506–507: “Annīya, translated into Latin from the Arabic as esse, is the
formal substrate on the basis of which further perfections such as life and intelligence
are received. In the De Causis there is no notion of being as the act of existence such as
we find it in the thought of St. Thomas.” The term huwīyah as well as annīya has the sense
of being. See Chapters 15, 17, 19, 31.
42 The account of the transcendent unparticipated, the participated property and the par-
ticipant is set out by Proclus in Proposition 23, Proclus 1993, p. 26–27, and elsewhere in
various forms in The Elements of Theology, such as Proposition 123 cited above.
43 “There must then be a true one which causes the acquisition of unities and does not
acquire ⟨its unity⟩, while all the rest of the unities are acquired.” Chapter 31, The Liber
de causis (Kalām fī maḥd al-khair), p. 275. This text remains the same in draft of the new
edition of the Arabic De causis.
44 Formy reflections on the nature andmeaning of the teachings of the ArabicDe causishere
and in Taylor forthcoming I benefited from the account of the metaphysics of Proclus
in Siorvanes 1996, p. 48–113. For more profound considerations on Neoplatonism in the
Arabic De causis and the Plotiniana Arabica, several works by Cristina D’Ancona should
be consulted. See, for example, D’Ancona 1992a, D’Ancona 1992b, and D’Ancona 1999. In
D’Ancona 1999 (p. 67) she remarks: “J’estime enfin que l’auteur du De Causis s’est, quant
à lui, abondanmment inspiré de la paraphrase arabe de Plotin.” In this article she also
argues that the influence of the writings of the (ps.-)Dionysius plays a key role in forma-
tion of the reasoning found in the Plotiniana Arabica and the Arabic De causis. Also see
D’Ancona 1995 and D’Ancona, Taylor 2003.
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This is the reasoned foundation for the teaching that the First Cause alone is
the Creator that gives being to each and every thing, directly to intellect which
is its first effect andmediately through intellect to soul, nature and all the rest of
created things. Other causes act by giving form, but only the First Cause is the
cause of being.45 This philosophical account of primary causality, an account
of creation as found in theCircle of al-Kindi, shows that the study of philosophy
yields a conceptionof GodasCreatorwithout easily apparent discordancewith
the religious understanding that Allah46 is the unitary Creator whose Tawḥīd
or absolute unity permeates and grounds all other things in unity and being.47
This metaphysical account found in the Circle of al-Kindi is part of what Ger-
hard Endress has insightfully described as part of a
programme de propaganda philosophia, which came into being as an
ideology of scientists heirs to the Hellenistic Encyclopaedia, and as a reli-
gion for intellectuals compatiblewith Islam,…aprogramme for the integ-
ration of philosophy and the rational sciences intoMuslimArab society.48
It is precisely this that al-Kindī was proposing in his argument for the estab-
lishment of a central role for the foreign science of philosophy in the Islamic
religious context of Baghdad. In his On First Philosophy he reasoned against
unnamed detractors that room should be made for the study of philosophy
inside the lands of Islam since philosophy too pursues knowledge of Divine
Tawhīd and creation. His reasoning is that philosophy should not be seen as an
adversary to Islam but a co-ordinate and perhaps even co-equal way to seek
out the fullest understanding of God and His creation. To this extent philo-
sophy is properly seen as a companion to the religious teachings of Islam,
sharing in the same end. In establishing the meaning and role of philosophy
he writes,
The most noble philosophy of the highest degree is the first philosophy,
by which I mean the knowledge of the first truth who is the cause of all
45 Arabic De causis chapter 17.The Liber de causis (Kalām fīmaḥd al-khair), p. 213–216. Cf. Die
pseudo-aristotelische Schrift, p. 92–93; Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 19.
46 See Arabic De causis, chapter 22, the sole chapter in which we find Allāh. The Liber de
causis (Kalām fīmaḥd al-khair), p. 235–238. Cf. Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift, p. 100–101;
Al-Aflāṭūnīya, p. 23–24.
47 On tawḥid in the philosophical context, see Wakelnig 2015. Whether this account is fully
in accord with literal accounts in the Abrahamic religions is another question to be
addressed elsewhere.
48 Endress 2000, p. 569.
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truth. The complete and most noble philosopher is therefore necessar-
ily the man who comprehends this most noble knowledge, because the
knowledge of the cause is more noble than the knowledge of the effect.
For we only know each of the effects completely when we comprehend
the knowledge of its cause.49
He thengoes on to explain thenature of the causes and to indicate that the term
“first philosophy” is used of “the knowledge of the First Cause.” Such know-
ledge is obligatory since it offers inroads to knowledge and truth, regardless of
its sources or previous practitioners in philosophy, inroads immensely valuable
for the understanding of God and His creatures.
By knowing the things in their true nature, one knows divinity (rubūbiya),
oneness (waḥdāniya), virtue, and, in general ( jumlatan) everything bene-
ficial and how to obtain it, and how to stay away from, and protect oneself
against, all harm. The way to acquire all these is what the true prophets
brought from God, great be His praise. For the true prophets (may God’s
blessings be upon them) brought the assurance that God alone is divine,
and made [us] adhere to the virtues that are pleasing to Him, whilst for-
saking the vices that are essentially opposed to the virtues and preferring
the latter [to the former].50
He then concludes his opening apologia for philosophy, writing,
We beseech Him who can see into our hearts—who knows our efforts to
establish a proof of His divinity, to show His oneness, and to drive away
thosewho stubbornly resist anddisbelieveHim throughproofs that refute
their unbelief, tear aside the veils of their infamies and declare openly
the deficiencies of their destructive creeds—to protect us and those who
follow our path by fortifying us with His unceasing might; to dress us
in His shielding and protective armour; and to grant us the aid of the
edge of His piercing sword, and the support of His mightily victorious
strength, so that He may thereby let us reach the end of our intention
in aiding the truth and supporting what is right, and so that He may put
us in the same rank as thosewhose intentionHe favours, whose actionHe
approves, and to whomHe gives triumph and victory over His opponents
49 Al-Kindi, The PhilosophicalWorks, p. 10.
50 Al-Kindi, The PhilosophicalWorks, p. 13.
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who do not believe in His grace, and who deviate from the path of truth
that is pleasing to Him.51
The first chapter andmuchmore of the Arabic De causis,52 should be viewed in
the context of this project by al-Kindi.Whatwe find in that first proposition and
others that follow are extracts from the Elements of Theology by Proclus chosen
carefully to support a philosophical account of creative causality that may be
read to coordinate well with broadly Abrahamic religious doctrine. That God
is found causally present throughout all things of the universe, a religious doc-
trine common to the Abrahamic religious traditions, is reflected in the Qurʾan
in Surat Qaf [50:16] “AndWe have already createdman and knowwhat his soul
whispers to him, andWe are closer to him than [his] jugular vein.”53 In the first
chapter of the Arabic De causis the author uses the texts of Proclus to reason
for the presence of any primary cause throughout all that it causes even down
to the most remote of its effects. This is expressed as a principle to be followed
throughout the work. This doctrine of primary causality insists that, in a hier-
archy of causes and effects, no matter how remote the ultimate effect may be
from the first cause in the hierarchy, the first cause is more intimately present
to the effect than even the lowest and most proximate cause of the effect. This
is because the First Cause, later in the Arabic De causis identified with Pure
Being and the Pure True One, provides being as the formal substrate to which
additional formalities can be added. In this sense the First Cause is the paradig-
matic cause of the participated perfections of being and the unity in all things
while Itself remaining transcendent. Again, this causality is not that of any of
the four Aristotelian causes that largely concern the sublunar realm; nor is it
the efficient causality of the Necessary Being according to Avicenna. Rather,
it is that of a paradigmatic cause, Pure Being, causing lower things to have in
themselves amuchdiminished formal characteristic of being as the foundation
making possible additional formalities such as life and rationality. The doc-
trine is, of course, metaphysical since the being of the effect and the being and
causal activity of all the intermediate causes are only owing to the first cause in
the series. Spelled out philosophically in the first proposition of the Arabic De
causis and others to follow, this is precisely what al-Kindī expressed as philo-
sophy’s coordinate role in the explanation of the nature and activity of the First
Truth, God. Hence, the first proposition of this work on primary causality in
51 Al-Kindi, The PhilosophicalWorks, p. 13–14.
52 See D’Ancona 1999.
53 https://quran.com/50/16.
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conjunction with the later explicit discussions of creation and the identifica-
tion of the First Cause with God provides a fine instance what al-Kindī referred
to as a proper role for philosophy in the context of Islam. It is a philosophical
text easily read as consonant with religious understandings of the Divinity and
Its causality and as such constitutes a proof and example of the value of philo-
sophy to the apprehension of the meaning of Divine Tawḥīd.54
3 Concluding Remarks
The first of the two contexts of the Arabic De Causis presented here is that of
the author as a follower of the Circle of al-Kindi’s new form of Aristotelian-
ism developed through a transformed understanding of texts from Plotinus,
Enneads 4, 5 & 6. He is himself forming a philosophical creationist account
compatible if not supplemental to the thought expressed in the Plotiniana
Arabica. The second context is that of a treatise formed to be congruent with
Islam or generally Abrahamic considerations as part of the agenda of what
Endress labelled a “programme de propaganda philosophia.” The contexts of
the Arabic De causis considered here were unknown to the many hundreds of
readers of the twelfth century Latin translation and to the authors of dozens of
Latin commentaries. Rather, Latin thinkers for perhaps as long as 90 or more
years had no evidence for it to be anything but an Aristotelian treatise. For that
period and even well beyond the revelation by Aquinas of its use of the Ele-
ments of Theology by Proclus, Latin thinkers found the Latin De causis to be
an invaluable source of principles, analyses and arguments for a Latin form
of Aristotelianism in many philosophical and theological studies, as Dragos
Calma has shown.55 Yet, as I have suggested here, the Arabic De causis is much
more than an assemblage of extracts from the Elements of Theology. Read in its
proper contexts, it is rather a philosophical product of the “Aristotelian” Circle
of al-Kindi thoughtfully crafted in its reasoning and arguably aimed to contrib-
ute to the early positive reception of philosophy into the religious and cultural
context of Islam in ninth century Baghdad.
54 For amore substantial study of al-Kindi’s philosophical thought in hisOn First Philosophy
and its importance in historical and religious context, see the valuable analyses in Gan-
nagé 2017.
55 Calma 2016.
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chapter 11
La présence du Liber de causis dans l’œuvre d’ Ibn
Bāğğa et pseudo-Ibn Bāğğa: un philosophe
péripatéticien du XIe/XIIe siècle de l’Occident
islamique
Jamal Rachak
Université Cadi Ayyad, Marrakech
Les études sur le Liber de causis ont suscité un grand intérêt et connu un grand
succès parmi les arabisants médiévistes modernes. Pourtant, la majorité des
chercheurs se sont focalisés sur l’héritage de la philosophie arabe dans l’Orient
islamique, ce qui est tout à fait justifié si on prend en considération le poids du
néoplatonismedans la philosophie des grandsmaîtres philosophes de l’Orient.
Mais qu’en est-il de l’Occident islamique?
En investiguant sur le nom de Proclus et le Liber de causis (Fī al-ḫayr al-
maḥḍ) chez les plus importants chroniqueurs de l’Occident islamique du Xe au
XIIe siècle (IbnĞulğul 994 a.c et Ṣāʿid 1070 a.c), onne trouve aucunementionde
Proclus et de sesœuvres. Pourtant les premiers ouvrages de philosophie rédigés
enOccident islamique subissent l’ influence du néoplatonisme, notamment du
Jardin de sagesse d’ Isḥāq al-Isrāʾīlī (932a.c), du Ġāyat al-ḥakīm attribué à Mas-
lama al-Mağrīṭī (1007a.c)1, de la Source de la vie d’ Ibn Gabirol (1058a.c) ainsi
que de Kitāb al-ḥadāʾiq d’ Ibn al-Sīd al-Batalyawsī (1127a.c), mais sans aucune
mention explicite de Proclus ou du Liber de causis.
En travaillant sur Ibn Bāğğa, connu dans le monde latin par le nom d’Avem-
pace (1139 a.c), et considéré comme le premier philosophe péripatéticien en
Occident islamique2 et maître indirect du grand commentateur d’Aristote
Ibn Rušd, je me suis focalisé sur la présence et l’ influence du néoplatonisme
dans son corpus philosophique. Dans cette contribution, je présente une pre-
mière esquisse des résultats de cette enquête et des questions soulevées. Je
me suis d’abord interrogé sur la présence explicite ou tacite de Proclus et du
1 Je remercie mon collègue Med Boughali pour cette information transmise lors du colloque
Le néoplatonisme dans l’occident islamique organisé par le laboratoire PPSS (Philosophie et
Patrimoine dans la Société du Savoir) à l’Université Cadi Ayyad (Marrakech, Maroc), en 2017.
2 Pour plus de détails voir Rachak 2017b.
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Liber de causis dans les œuvres d’ Ibn Bāğğa. Celui-ci, comme tout autre phi-
losophe, se réfère aux doctrines et aux philosophes anciens. Il cite Aristote et
ses œuvres connus dans la tradition arabe, Platon (surtout Phédon et la Répu-
blique), Galien, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Themistius, Jean Philopon, Al-Fārābī,
Al-Ġazālī (quatre fois). Dans toutes ses références, il reste fidèle à Aristote et à
l’école péripatéticienne. Le corpus d’ Ibn Bāğğa se compose de soixante-trois
titres et se divise en trois grandes parties3, une qui porte sur la logique et les
mathématiques, une qui porte sur la philosophie naturelle ou la physique et
une autre qui porte sur l’éthique, la métaphysique et l’âme. On peut remar-
quer la présence de quelques idées de Proclus dans la partie de l’œuvre qui
se compose des écrits classés après Kitāb al-nafs (traité de l’âme), qui sont au
nombre de dix :
1. Le Tadbīr (Le régime du solitaire ou La conduite de l’ isolé)
2. Épître de l’adieu
3. Annexe de l’Épître de l’adieu
4. De la faculté appétitive 1
5. De la faculté appétitive 2
6. Traité de la fin humaine
7. De l’unité et de l’Un
8. Du mobile
9. Les choses au moyen desquelles on peut connaître l’ intellect agent.
10. Épître de la conjonction de l’ intellect avec l’homme
On reconnaît la présence de Proclus dans l’œuvre d’ Ibn Bāğğa par le biais
d’un pseudo Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Ibn Bāğğa se réfère à l’œuvre intitu-
lée Fī al-ṣuwar al-rūḥāniyya (Des formes spirituelles) deux fois par le nom et
deux fois par le thème4 de la conversion réflexive de l’ intellect. Lorsque Ibn
Bāğğa évoque Fī al-ṣuwar al-rūḥāniyya (Des formes spirituelles), il l’ attribue à
Alexandre d’Aphrodise, alors que le texte est de Proclus5. Ibn Bāğğa est victime
donc d’une erreur historique, une erreur de fausse attribution, et si le néopla-
tonisme s’est introduit dans son corpus et ses idées, cela s’est fait de manière
involontaire et sans s’en rendre compte. IbnBāğğa a voulu rester toujours fidèle
à l’école péripatéticienne dont Alexandre est l’un des plus célèbres représen-
3 Il est essentiel de souligner que Ǧ. al-ʿAlawī est le premier à établir cette répartition dans son
ouvrage : Muʾallafāt Ibn Bāğğa (al-ʿAlawī, 1983a), Par la suite, la majorité des chercheurs ont
adopté cette même division. Pour plus d’ informations, voir Rachak 2017a, p. 159-162.
4 al-ʿAlawī 1983b, p. 156, 182, 186, 193. Fakhry, 1991, p. 166 : روصلاهباتكيفردنكسالاهلوقيامىلعناكو
ص،هسفنىلععجارةيناحورلا “wa kāna ʿalā mā yaqūl-uhu al-Iskandar fī kitāb-ihi fī al-ṣṣuwar
rrūhāniya rāğiʿ ʿalā nafsih”.
5 Pinès 1955, Lewin 1955, Endress 1973.
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tants. Mais est-ce que le néoplatonisme se manifeste seulement par ce texte
faussement attribué à Alexandre, le Fī al-ṣuwar al-rūḥāniyya, ou peut-on iden-
tifier d’autres éléments dans l’œuvre de Baǧǧa?
Ibn Bāğğa confie à son disciple et ami Ibn al-Imām au début de l’épître De la
conjonction (Risālat al-ittiṣāl) qu’ il lui parle de quelque chose de neuf, à savoir
de la conjonction6, et que les seuls à avoir traité ou juste débuté à traiter d’une
telle idée sont Aristote dans le onzième livre de l’Éthique àNicomaque et Fārābī
dans sa paraphrase de l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote.7 L’Éthique d’Aristote
est en dix livres, mais dans la tradition arabe il comporte onze livres. Le thème
de la conjonction est absent dans le onzième livre de la version arabe8, ce
qui nous laisse supposer qu’ il pouvait songer à la paraphrase de Porphyre à
l’Éthique à Nicomaque, perdu en arabe9. Celui-ci est en douze livres, et Ibn
Bāğğa aurait pu le considérer commeun texte authentiqued’Aristote. Et si c’est
le cas, alors Ibn Bāğğa de nouveau est sous l’ influence du néoplatonisme sans
s’en rendre compte. Une telle suggestion reste hypothétique en l’absence de
toute autre attestation. J’ajoute aussi qu’Ibn Bāğğa mentionne à deux reprises
Hermès dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque10, mais ce nom n’apparaît pas dans la ver-
sion arabe de l’œuvre d’Aristote.
Ibn Bāğğa essaie de rester fidèle à Aristote dans ses idées et sa termino-
logie, même s’ il utilise parfois un vocabulaire issu du corpus religieux (ḥadīṯ
et Coran). On peut aussi ajouter des locutions et citations d’ Ibn Bāğğa qui
rappellent le néoplatonisme islamisé, même s’ il essaye de rester à l’écart. Il
a certainement lu l’épître Risālafī al-ʿilm al-ilāhī faussement attribuée à al-
Fārābī11 :
C’est par les actes corporels que l’homme existe, par les actes spirituels
qu’ il est noble, et par les actes intellectuels qu’ il est divin et excellent.
Celui qui possède la sagesse est donc nécessairement un homme
excellent et divin, il prend de chaque acte la meilleure partie, participe
de chaque classe d’hommes pour les meilleurs états qui leur sont propre
et se distingue d’eux par les actes meilleurs et les plus nobles. Lorsqu’ il
a atteint la fin la plus haute, et cela en pensant les intellects simples et
6 Déjà l’ idée de la conjonction de l’homme avec l’ Intellect (ou l’ Intellect agent), d’après
Cristina d’Ancona et d’autres, est néoplatonicienne. (Voir d’Ancona 2008).
7 Genequand 2010, introduction p. 89, §3-4.
8 Badawi 1979.
9 Ibn Nadīm 2009. Cette paraphrase est perdue même en grecque.
10 Fakhry 1991, p. 68, 128.
11 Badawi 1955, introduction.
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substantiels qui sont mentionnés dans la Métaphysique, dans le Livre de
l’âme et dans le Livre du sens et du sensible, il est alors l’un des intellects et
il est juste de dire de lui qu’ il est seulement divin, les attributs du corporel
éphémère lui sont retirés ainsi que les attributs du spirituel élevé, et seul
l’attribut de divin et simple lui convient.12
Bienplus, c’est une chose existante qui se produit quandon se la présente,
et par laquelle l’homme semet à exister d’une autre sorte d’existence que
celle qui appartient à ses autres facultés. Cette faculté devient l’un des
existants divins et l’homme arrive aussi près que possible de Dieu Béni et
Très-Haut ; il obtient son approbation et des biens divins innombrables.
Il sort de l’obscurité pure qui est l’état des animaux irrationnels.13
Il est évident que cet intellect qui est la récompense et la grâce divine et
l’égard de ceux de ces serviteurs dont il est satisfait. Ce n’est donc pas le
récompensé ou le châtié, mais la récompense et la grâce pour l’ensemble
des facultés de l’âme. La récompense et le châtiment concerne l’âme
appétitive, qui fait le mal et le bien. Mais celui qui obéit à Dieu et fait
ce qui Lui plaît, il le récompense de cet intellect et place devant lui une
lumière qui le guide. Celui qui le désobéit et fait ce qui ne Lui plaît pas, Il
le voile à ses yeux, et celui-là reste dans les ténèbres de l’ ignorance accu-
mulées sur lui jusqu’à ce qu’ il quitte son corps, séparé de lui et marchant
dans Sa réprobation. Ce sont là des degrés qui ne sont pas atteints par la
réflexion, et c’est pourquoi Dieu complète leur connaissance par la révé-
lation. Celui à qui Il donne cet intellect, lorsqu’ il quitte le corps, demeure
lumière parmi les lumières, louant et glorifiant Dieu avec les prophètes,
les justes, les martyrs et les bons que Dieu à favorisés : quels excellents
compagnons.14
Cette partie du corpus de Bāğğa ne contient pas de référence explicite à Pro-
clus et au Liber de causis. Les épîtres dites Aqwāl sont, de ce point de vue, un
terrain plus fertile à explorer. Ce sont treize fragments sans titres préservés
seulement dans le recueil d’ Ibn al-Imām (ms. d’Oxford), alors que l’on connaît
trois témoins manuscrits importants des œuvres d’ Ibn Bāğğa : l’un conservé à
Oxford en calligraphe orientale, l’ autre à Berlin et l’autre à la bibliothèque de
d’Escurial, en calligraphe andalouse (maġribī).
12 Genequand 2010, §164-165, p. 163-164.
13 Genequand 2010, §80, p. 114.
14 Genequand 2010, §23-24, p. 190-191.
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Ces épîtres ont, pour la première fois, fait l’objet d’une édition et d’une
importante étude critique deǦ. al-ʿAlawī15, qui a fini par douter de leur authen-
ticité. Il a appuyé sa conclusion par des arguments très convaincants, dont je
cite seulement les quatre les plus importants :
1. La contradiction frappante entre les idées de ces épîtres et celles expri-
mées dans le reste du corpus de Bāğğa.
2. L’homonymie entre les termes de ces épîtres et ceux du reste du corpus,
le ton des premières étant néoplatonicien, émanatiste et soufi, le ton des
seconds étant aristotélicien et farabien.
3. La présence des références à des ouvrages étrangers au corpus de Bāğğa, à
savoir : le Liber de causis (Al-ḫayr al-maḥḍ), leMiškāt al-anwār d’al-Ġazālī
et le ʿUyūn al-masāil d’al-Fārābī.
4. Ibn Bāğğa critique dans son corpus Ġazālī et les soufis à trois reprises16,
alors que les épîtres font l’éloge d’al-Ġazālī et des soufis17.
Il faut noter qu’al-ʿAlawī a beaucoup hésité avant de trancher la question. La
raison en est qu’en étudiant ces épîtres, il présente les difficultés, notamment
les différences entre ces épîtres et parfois au sein de lamême épître, d’un para-
graphe à l’autre. Il a conclu son étude en considérant ces épîtres comme un
ensemble, tout en doutant de leur authenticité. Fayyūmī a donné suite à ce
débat dans son livre intitulé Al-falsafa fī al-Maġrib18, mais il a opté en faveur de
l’authenticité de l’ensemble de ces épîtres, tout en essayant de répondre à cer-
tains arguments avancés par al-ʿAlawī et en relevant d’autres, précédemment
ignorés.
La question principale est de déterminer l’authenticité de ces épîtres. Dans
mon article intitulé De l’authenticité des fragments d’ Ibn Bāğğa19, j’ ai proposé
une troisième hypothèse selon laquelle ces lettres témoignent d’une corres-
pondance entre Ibn Bāğğa, qui se trouvait auMaroc à Fès, et son ami et disciple
Ibn al-Imām, qui se trouvait en Egypte à Qaws. Et je note la présence d’ Ibn al-
Imām en Egypte, c’est-à-dire dans l’Orient islamique où le Liber de causis était
bien connu au XIIe siècle, et la présence d’ Ibn Bāğğa dans l’Occident islamique
où le Liber de causis était moins connu ou, tout au moins, il n’était pas explici-
tement cité.
Dans la présente contribution, je veux montrer l’ importance dans ces épî-
tres de la présence de Proclus et le néoplatonisme à travers le Kitāb fī al-
15 al-ʿAlawī 1983b.
16 Fakhry 1991, p. 55, 121, 124.
17 al-ʿAlawī 1983b, p. 159.
18 Fayyūmī 1988, p. 369-387.
19 Rachak 2014.
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ḫayral-maḥḍ. Je commencepar les citationsqui référent explicitement au Liber
de causis :






Les propositions sont nommées :




Le Liber de causis est du même rang
que le ʿUyūn al-masāʾil d’al-Fārābī,
le Miškāt al-anwār d’al-Ġazālī ; et












Le Liber de causis est mentionné par le titre dans les épîtres que j’ai attribuées
à Ibn al-Imām, qui se trouvait en Egypte, et c’est bien clair que le sujet de la
correspondance était la perpétuité de l’ intellect et l’ultime bonheur. L’auteur
(Ibn al-Imām) déclare solennellement qu’ il a découvert une vérité certaine,
dotée d’une lumière éclatante après avoir lu et relu à maintes reprises et déli-
bérément le livre d’Al-ḫayr al-maḥḍ et ces différents abwāb (propositions), au
point qu’ il n’arrive plus à s’en séparer et ne cesse de presser Ibn Bāğğa à le lire.
Il précise également qu’ il a commenté Al-ḫayr al-maḥḍ (le Liber de causis), et
probablement ces épîtres sont le fruit de ce commentaire.
Mais il faut se demander s’ il s’agit du même Al-ḫayr que nous connaissons
dans les éditions de Badawi et de Taylor21, ou bien d’une autre version. Dans
l’épître onze (de l’édition Al-ʿalawī), l’ auteur, après avoir développé dans le
20 Rachak 2017.
21 Taylor 1981. Bardenhewer 1882. Badawi 1977.
la présence du liber de causis dans l’œuvre d’ ibn bāğğa 239
premier paragraphe la question de la hiérarchie des intellects descendants du
premier jusqu’au dernier – qui est l’ intellect humain –, incite son interlocuteur
à lire et à examiner abwāb ʾīḍāḥAl-ḫayr (« les propositions du Liber de causis»),
notamment les propositions 104, 105 et 106, au sujet de cette hiérarchie. Cette
référence est particulièrement importante parce que :
1. c’est la première fois, sauf erreur de ma part, que l’on se réfère explicite-
mentdansun texte arabeà lanumérotationdespropositionsduDecausis.
2. ces propositions du Liber de causis ne semblent pas provenir directement
des Éléments de théologie de Proclus22.
3. ce thème de la hiérarchie des intellects ne se trouvent pas dans les Élé-
ments de théologie de Proclus23.
4. l’ auteur de l’épître considère sur le même rang l’autorité du Liber de cau-
sis et le Coran quant à la question de la perpétuité et de l’ultime bonheur
de l’homme.
5. enfin, si l’on prend en considération le prologue d’ Ibn al-Naḍr (le copiste
du ms. d’Oxford), alors ces épîtres doivent être copiées en 1152 a.c. On
considère généralement que la première référence en Orient islamique
au Kitāb al-ḫayr al-maḥḍ remonte à Muwaffaq al-Dīn al-Baġdādī (m. 1231
a.c) et enOccident islamique à Ibn Sabʿīn (m. 1269 a.c).Mais si l’on admet
que ces fragments sont la correspondance entre Ibnal-Imāmet IbnBāğğa,
alors le terminus ante quem est 1139 a.c, année du décès d’ Ibn Baāğğa. Il
s’en suivrait alors, que cette référence à Îdāḥ al-ḫayr est la plus ancienne
actuellement connue.
Voici la liste des références au Liber de causis et à d’autres thèses néoplatoni-
ciennes :
Les sphères actives n’agissent pas sur
les sphères passives que d’après sa (i.e.
l’Un / le Premier) volonté. Ainsi, lorsqu’ il
a voulu ce qui est dans le monde, il a
émané ce savoir sur ses anges et par





22 La demeure de l’ être, p. 29.
23 La proposition 106 correspond au chapitre XXXI d’après ce tableau, à savoir que le thème
de la proposition XXXI est l’ intermédiaire entre une intelligence dont la substance et
l’activité sont dans l’éternité et une intelligence dont la substance et l’activité sont dans
le temps. Cet intermédiaire est une chose dont la substance est dans l’éternité et l’activité
dans le temps. (Voir : La demeure de l’ être, p. 83).
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derniers émane ce savoir sur les intel-
lects humains, ces derniers le perçoivent




… ainsi l’ intellect agit sur soi-même, son
acte est de percevoir une certitude grâce
à… et de ce fait il retourne sur soi par soi-
même, c’est la conversion de l’ intellect
comme l’a annoncé Alexandre, donc
l’ intellect est spirituel et non corporel.
(al-ʿAlawī, 156)
2. Pour savoir et intelliger, (l’Un / le
Premier) n’a pas besoin d’une matière
corruptible, mais plutôt Il a besoin de






















Le don suprême consiste dans la dispo-
sition de recevoir ce qui est la perfec-
tion de l’homme et de recevoir aussi
l’ intellect de l’homme, puis l’ intellect
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ميكحلانيب.اميظعالضافتناسنإلايفلضافتت
85.ص،ريزولاو
Le premier connaît les particuliers











L’ intellect agent avec l’aide des corps
célestes est l’agent proche des individus
dans monde de la génération et de la
corruption.
La conversion de l’ intellect sur soi
L’exemple de la vision des couleurs par
l’œil et l’éclairage du soleil.
Très proche de ce qui se lit dans Risāla fī












Les termes qu’utilise Ibn Bāğğa dans ses œuvres authentiques
perspicacité Al-basīra ةريصبلا
lumière du soleil Nūr al-Šams سمشلارون
don (divin) Al-mawhiba al-ilāhiyya ةيهلإلاةبهوملا
don suprême Al-fitra al-fāiqa ةقئافلاةرطفلا
émanation (répété 30 fois) Al-fayḍ ضيفلا
intelligibles premiers Al-maʿqūlāt al-uwal لوألاتالوقعملا
intellects seconds Al-maʿqūlāt al-tawānī يناوثلاتالوقعملا
intellect divin ‘aql ilāhī يهلإلالقعلا
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le Premier (répété 17 fois) Al-awwal لوألا
intellects seconds (répété 6 fois) Al-tawānī يناوثلا
lumière de l’ intellect Nūr al-ʿaql لقعلارون
conversion sur soi de l’ intellect (dans 4 épîtres) Al-rāğiʿ wa-l-marğūʿ عوجرملاوعجارلا
éternité Al-dahr رهدلا
anges Al-malāʾika ةكئالملا
disposé pour recevoir Al-istiʿdād li-qabūl لوبقلدادعتسالا
L’ensemble de ces épîtres témoignent de la présence d’un néoplatonisme isla-
misé compatible avec l’ idée de l’Un (Dieu), premier créateur, et des anges
comme intermédiaires, sans négliger des thèses aristotéliciennes. Ce ne sont
que quelques paragraphes, des exemples, tirés de ces épîtres, qui témoignent
de la densité et du poids du néoplatonisme transmis par le Liber de causis,
ensemble avec ʿUyūn al-masāil attribué à al-Fārābī, le Miškāt al-anwār d’al-
Ġazālī, accommodés avec le Coran.
Pour finir, cette brève contribution n’est qu’une esquisse pour montrer
1. l’ importante présence du Liber de causis dans ces épîtres. Ces références
nécessitent une comparaison plus détaillée avec les versions arabes
connue du Liber de causis, des traductions de Plotin et de Pseudo-Alexan-
dre.
2. la référence aux propositions par leurs numéros : le Liber de causis arabe
est divisé enabwāb (chapitres), alors que la traduction arabe des Éléments
de théologie est divisée en propositions numérotées.
3. la nécessité d’examiner de plus près l’hypothèse qu’Ibn Bāğğa ne voulait
pas accepter la voie du néoplatonisme, si l’on admet que ces lettres sont
effectivement le fruit de sa correspondance avec Ibn al-Imām.
4. l’ immense intérêt que présente aujourd’hui l’étude approfondie de la
présence du néoplatonisme dans l’Occident islamique.
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chapter 12
Three Double Translations from Arabic into Latin
by Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundisalvi
Dag Nikolaus Hasse
UniversitätWürzburg
Among the many philosophical translations from Arabic into Latin in twelfth-
century Spain, there are some that were translated twice, notably Alkindi’s
On the Intellect, Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences and Isaac Israeli’s On
Definitions and Descriptions.1 It has often been suggested that the two trans-
lators of these three texts were Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundisalvi,
the two contemporaries and canons of Toledo cathedral in the later twelfth
century. The first part of this paper musters the evidence for these ascrip-
tions in the manuscripts of the translations, that is, in the titles and colo-
phons, and also considers translator attributions in other medieval texts, such
as the well-known list of translations by Gerard of Cremona drawn up by his
socii.2
In all three cases, many verbal parallels between the two translations show
that one translation is a revision of the other. But it is not clear which version
was first. In the second part of the paper, I shall propose a philological solution
to this question.
I will also be concernedwith a fourth text, the Liber de causis. Of this famous
text, which in Arabic is called The Discourse on the Pure Good (Kalām fī maḥd
al-ḫayr), there exists only one version by the translator Gerard of Cremona. But
it has been argued that this version is in fact the result of a stylistic revision by
another translator, Dominicus Gundisalvi.3 I shall come back to this question
at the end of this paper.
1 I am grateful for advice from Stefan Georges and Andreas Büttner.
2 For this list see Burnett 2001.
3 Adriaan Pattin, editor of the 1966 edition of the Latin Liber de causis, has argued that the
translation by Gerard of Cremona was revised by Dominicus Gundisalvi. He claims that the
vocabulary of Gundisalvi is evident in two cases: in the term intellectibilis and in the phrase
habent essentiam (Pattin 1966, p. 98). Richard Taylor has argued that this evidence is not con-
clusive: “There is no evidence to suggest in any substantial way that the translation of the
Liber de causis was systematically revised by anyone” (Taylor 1988, p. 80). I am not convinced
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1 TheManuscript Evidence: Titles and Translators
In what follows, I shall discuss the manuscript evidence for Alkindi’s On the
Intellect, Alfarabi’sOn the Sciences and Isaac’sOnDefinitions in sequence, focus-
ing on the titles and translators named in the manuscripts. The first text is
Alkindi’s On the Intellect (Risāla fī l-ʿaql). This short text, whose main sources
are Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponos, discusses four
different kinds of intellect, one outside and three inside the soul. This doc-
trine influenced later authors such as Alfarabi and Avicenna, but also the
scholastic discussion.4 The two Latin translations of Alkindi’s On the Intel-
lect were edited in 1897 by Albino Nagy. One translation, with the incipit
Intellexi quod quesivisti de scribendo sermonem, was edited by Nagy with the
subtitle “translatum a magistro Gerardo Cremonensi”. The other translation,
with the incipit Intellexi quod queris scribi tibi sermonem, was edited without
any mentioning of the translator. The first translation uses ratio for render-
ing the Arabic term ʿaql (‘intellect’), the second intellectus. Nagy’s ascription
of the De ratione translation to Gerard of Cremona is based on the evidence
of one manuscript, as the table below shows. I have tried to check as many
titles, colophons, incipts and explicits as possible in a reasonable time by turn-
ing toMarie-Thérèse d’Alverny’sCodices volume in theAvicenna Latinus series
and to the online indices In principio, Manus Online and Manuscripta mediae-
valia.
of the intellectibilis argument by Pattin, since the only occurrence of intellectibilis in Gun-
disalvi’s translations is one sentence in Avicenna’s De anima on principiis intellectibilibus,
where an alternative reading is principiis intelligibilibus (see Van Riet 1968–1972, vol. II, p. 153,
manuscript V). For more information on the Latin translation see d’Ancona, Taylor 2003,
p. 610–617.
4 On this work see Adamson 2007, p. 118–127; Rudolph 2012, p. 109.
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1.1 Alkindi,On the Intellect / De ratione5
Incipit: Intellexi quod quesivisti de scribendo sermonem…
Explicit: … sermo enuntiativus sufficiat.
















Biekorf, 424, f. 309r
– –
Bruxelles, Bibliothèque
royale de Belgique, II 2558,
f. 99r–v
Incipit liber de ratione sive
de formis rationis
Explicit liber de ratione
sive de formis rationis
Firenze, Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale, Conv.
Soppr. G. 4. 354, f. 111v
– –
Oxford, Bodleian Library,
Digby 217, f. 115v
– –
Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale de France, Latin
6443, f. 190r
Verbum Iacob Alkindi de
intentione antiquorum











5 See the MSS listed by Nagy 1897, p. xxx–xxxi.
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The translator Gerard of Cremona is mentioned in only one manuscript. I
am not aware of any significant external evidence; most importantly, the trans-
lation is notmentioned in the socii’s list of Gerard’s translations. The ascription
to Gerard of Cremona is not unreasonable, but needs to be treated with some
caution; it will find support from the stylistic arguments below.
The other translation does not give the name of a translator in the 21 manu-
scripts available tome. Its title isDe intellectu et intellectoor simplyDe intellectu.
1.2 Alkindi,On the Intellect / De intellectu et intellecto
Incipit: Intellexi quod queris (tibi scribi) sermonem…
Explicit: … tantum sermonis de hoc sufficiat.
at least twenty-one manuscripts
Manuscript Title Colophon
Cava de’ Tirreni, Biblioteca
statale del Monumento
nazionale della Abbazia
Benedettina della Ss. Trin-
ità, 31, f. 234r–235r
– –
Cesena, Biblioteca Mal-
atestiana, D.XXII.3, f. 2r
Epistola Auerois de intel-
lectu
Hic finis est Epistole
Aueroys de intellectu
Città del Vaticano, Bibli-
oteca Apostolica Vaticana,
Barb. lat. 463, f. 85r–85v
– –
Città del Vaticano, Bibli-
oteca Apostolica Vaticana,
Vat. lat. 2186, f. 70v–71r
Liber Aliquindi philosophi
de intellectu et intellecto
–
Città del Vaticano, Bibli-
oteca Apostolica Vaticana,
Vat. lat. 4426, f. 6r–v
Incipit liber Alkindi de
intellectu
Explicit liber Alkindi de
intellectu
Erfurt, Universitätsbiblio-
thek, CA 2° 29, f. 210r–v
– –
Erfurt, Universitätsbiblio-
thek, CA 4° 15, f. 54v–55r
and 55v
Libellus de intellectibus –
Graz, Universitätsbiblio-
thek, 482, f. 234r–v
– –








de Portugal, Fondo Geral
2299, f. 171r–v
– –
ibid., f. 208r–v – –
Modena, Biblioteca
Estense Universitaria, Lat.







Digby 217, f. 178r–v
– –
Oxford, Merton College
Library, 278, f. 183v
– –
Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale de France, Latin
6443, f. 195r
Liber Alquindi philosophi
de intellectu et intellecto
–
Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale de France, Latin
16602, f. 111r–111v
















VI, 150 (= 2671), f. 64r
– –
Worcester, Cathedral Lib-
rary, Q. 81, f. 84v
Liber Alquindi philosophi
de intellectu et intellecto
–
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Gundisalvi’s own works De divisione philosophiae and Liber de anima do not
quote this translation, to the best of my knowledge, and I am not aware of quo-
tations in other works by Gundisalvi either.
The second double translation is of Alfarabi’s famous Enumeration of the Sci-
ences (Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm), which was important for the intellectual development of
the Latin West in several respects: because it offered a systematic and broad
division of the sciences, many of which were not known in the Latin West;
because itmeasured all sciences against the ideal of demonstrative reasoning;6
and because it apparently prompted a good number of translators in twelfth-
and thirteenth-century Spain to fill in the gaps in theLatin spectrumof sciences
by producing new translations from Arabic.7
One of the two translations stems from Gerard of Cremona. This we know
from the students’ list, which contains the entry Liber Alfarabii de scientiis
among Gerard’s philosophical translations. Moreover, the translation with the
incipit Nostra in hoc libro intentio is ascribed to Gerard of Cremona in two of
the four manuscripts extant.
1.3 Alfarabi, Enumeration of the Sciences / De scientiis
Incipit: Nostra in hoc libro intentio est scientias famosas…
Explicit: … sicut fit mulieribus et infantibus.










Biekorf, 486, f. 94r–110v
Liber Alfarabii de sci-




6 See Hasse 2020, ch. 2, with further literature.
7 Burnett 2001.




thek, 482, f. 222v–229r
– Completus est liber
Alfrabii vel Abunazir de
sentenciis
Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale de France, Latin
9335, f. 143va–151vb
Liber Alfarabii de scientiis
translatus a magistro Gir-
ardo Cremonensi in Toleto
de arabico in Latinum
–
The other translation, with the incipit Cum plures essent, is extant in at least
nine manuscripts. As the below list of titles and colophons shows, the treatise
is most commonly called De divisione scientiarum and is clearly identified as
being written by Alfarabi. But none of the manuscripts mentions the name of
the translator. This needs to be emphasized, as an antidote against the optim-
istic titles given to the treatise by modern editors: Manuel A. Alonso edited
the text as Domingo Gundisalvo: De scientiis, compilación a base principalmente
de la Maqāla fī iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm de al-Fārābī, and Jakob H.J. Schneider under Al-
Fārābī: De scientiis secundum versionemDominici Gundisalvi, where the phrase
secundumversionem is Schneider’s own Latin creation. This is not wrong, as we
shall see, but it is not howmedieval readers knew the text.
1.4 Alfarabi,On the Sciences / De divisione scientiarum
Incipit: Cum plures essent (olim) philosophi…
Explicit: … alia in operationibus.





– libellus Alph. de diu. sci.
Erfurt, Universitätsbiblio-
thek, CA 2° 32, f. 79r–88r








thek, CA 4° 295, f. 24r–35r




de Portugal, Fondo Geral
2299, f. 165va–169vb
De divisione scientiarum –
London, British Library,













151 (olim 121), f. 132r–133v
Alpharabi de divisione
scientiarum









rary, Q. 81, f. 85r–87v
Liber Alfarabi de scientiis –
The anonymous Cum plures essent version is the main source of Dominicus
Gundisalvi’s own treatise De divisione philosophiae, which also draws on other
sources by Avicenna and al-Ġazālī.8
The third double translation is of the treatise On Definitions and Descriptions
(Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-r-rusūm) by Isaac Israeli, the philosopher and physician
who was active in Qayrawān in North Africa in the early tenth century and
makes much use of writings by Alkindi. One can say with great certainty that
one of the two translations comes from Gerard of Cremona. The translation
with the incipit Plures eorum qui is attributed to Gerard in two of the at least
16 manuscripts. It seems that this translation traveled under two titles: a short
title,which is Liberdediffinitionibus, and a long title,which involves thephrases
8 See Fidora, Werner 2007. For a convenient juxtaposition of Gerard’s version, the Cum plures
essent version and of Gundisalvi’s ownDedivisione philosophiae on themetaphysical science,
see Polloni 2016, p. 100–106.
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Collections from the sayings of the philosophers and About the difference between
definition and description. These phrases appear also in an Arabic-Hebrew
translation and apparently belonged to the original Arabic title, which is lost.9
The long title has close verbal parallels with the entry in the socii’s list of Ger-
ard’s translation: Liber Ysac de descriptione rerum et diffinitionibus earum et de
differentia inter descriptionem et diffinitionem.10 This again supports the ascrip-
tion of the translation to Gerard.
1.5 Isaac Israeli,OnDefinitions / Liber de diffinitionibus
Incipit: Plures eorum qui antiquorum libros inspexerunt…
Explicit: … testificatur illius contrarium.










Collegio di Spagna, 103,
f. IIIra–IVvb
– –
Città del Vaticano, Bibli-
oteca Apostolica Vaticana,
Vat. lat. 2186, f. 46v–50r
– –
Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiel-
lońska, 816, f. 1r–6v
– –
Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional










archiv, C O 536, f. 10r–13v
Incipiunt diffinitiones
Ysaac … filii Salomonis.
–
9 Altmann, Stern 1958, p. 11, fn.







et diffinitiones rerum et
quare philosophia fuit
descripta et non diffinita.
De quorum aggregatione et
ordinatione Ysaac medicus
sollicitus fuit. Verba Ysaac
–
Oxford, Bodleian Library,
Digby 217, f. 111r–115v
Incipit liber Isaac de diffin-
itionibus translatus a




l’Arsenal, 750, f. 99rb–
101vb




nationale de France, Latin
6443, f. 187r–190r


















earum et quare philo-
sophia fuit descripta
















Geneviève, 2236, f. 106r–
116r














oteket, C 659, f. 114v–118r




Amalia Bibliothek, Fol. 61,
f. 90v–94v





The second Isaac translation with the incipit Quamplures in libris is transmit-
ted in at least six manuscripts, and hence less often than Gerard’s version. Its
title is De diffinitionibus. The manuscripts do not mention any translator.
1.6 Isaac Israeli,OnDefinitions / De diffinitionibus
Incipit: Quamplures (invenientes) in libris philosophorum…
Explicit: … resolutionem ex motu.
at least six manuscripts
Manuscript Title Colophon
Cambridge, St. John’s




rary, 134, f. 34v–36v
















College Library, 86, f. 219v–
224r
Incipit liber Ysaac de
diffinitionbus




151 (121), f. 133v–135r
Ysaac de diffinitionibus –
DominicusGundisalvi silently quotes from this version of Isaac’sOnDefinitions
in his Liber de anima and his De divisione philosophiae.11 This is very indicative,
but it does not yet prove that Gundisalvi was the translator of the version. It
only shows that the translation predates the composition of the two treatises
by Gundisalvi.
As to Gundisalvi as the translator of the three anonymous versions, we are
on firmer ground with the stylistic evidence for translator attribution that I
have presented in the article “Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-Century Transla-
tions”, published together with Andreas Büttner, which focuses on philosoph-
ical translations from Arabic into Latin on the Iberian Peninsula. The analysis
of small words and phrases specific to known translators leads to the result
that it is probable that the anonymous version of all three texts, i.e. Alkindi’sOn
the Intellect, Alfarabi’s Enumeration and Isaac’sOnDefinitions, was produced by
Dominicus Gundisalvi.12 This result will be corroborated by the present paper,
in particular by the last table below which lists Gundisalvian vocabulary that
distinguishes Gundisalvi from Gerard.
11 Muckle 1940, p. 98 (De anima) and Fidora, Werner 2007, p. 56–60 (De divisione philo-
sophiae).
12 Hasse, Büttner 2018, p. 338–341.
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2 Which VersionWas First?
Gerard of Cremona andDominicus Gundisalvi were contemporaries, and both
were canons of the cathedral of Toledo: Gerard is mentioned in three charters
of the cathedral in 1157, 1174 and 1176. He dies in 1187. Gundsalvi appears in
charters between 1162 and 1190. The dates of their lives, therefore, do not settle
the question of who was translating first.
The issue of the priority of the two versions has often been discussed, espe-
cially with respect to Alfarabi’sOn the Sciences.13 Gerard’s version of this text is
a literal translation; Gundisalvi’s translation is shorter, less than half the length
of Gerard’s translation, and leaves out, among other things, topics touching
on the religion of Islam and on Arabic grammar. Manuel Alonso,14 Richard
Lemay,15 Jacob H.J. Schneider,16 Alain Galonnier17 and others have suggested
that Gundisalvi’s shorter version was the earlier one. They argue that Gundi-
salvi’s translation is a Latin digest or compendium of the Arabic original, and
that Gerard later decided he wanted to have a literal and complete version.
In contrast, Michael C. Weber,18 Franz Schupp19 and others have argued
that Gerard was first and that Gundisalvi later revised Gerard’s text, leaving
out passages he did not find relevant. One reason advanced for Gundisalvi
being the reviser is that his vocabulary is believed to be more up-to-date,
more current in the philosophy of the twelfth century: Gundisalvi writes essen-
tia instead of existentia, practica instead of activa, theorica instead of specu-
lativa.20 But Richard Lemay argues that Gerard of Cremona consciously avoids
certain vocabulary and that he did this when correcting Gundisalvi’s early and
incomplete translation.21 As one can see, the issue is not settled by these argu-
ments. Both stories are possible: that Gerard found Gundisalvi’s shorter trans-
lation deficient and decided to complete it. Or that Gundisalvi took Gerard’s
13 See the summary of the discussion in Schupp 2005, p. lxiii–lxiv.
14 Alonso 1954, p. 13–32. Cf. also Farmer 1960, p. 19–20, who believes that Gerard of Cremona
revised the translation byGundisalvi (which he believes to be by “John of Seville”) because
he was concerned about the omissions and wanted to be more faithful to the Arabic.
15 Lemay 1978, p. 175 and 181–182.
16 Schneider 2006, p. 116–117.
17 Galonnier 2016, p. 78–79.
18 Weber 2002, p. 131–132. Another scholar who advocates the priority of Gerard’s version, is
Jolivet 1988, p. 135–136. Burnett 2001, p. 269, leaves the matter open.
19 Schupp 2005, p. LXIV.
20 Schupp 2005, p. lxiv.
21 See n. 15 above.
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literal translation and transformed it into something more understandable for
the Latin reader.
My idea of a philological solution to the question is best explained by turn-
ing to an example, a passage fromAlkindi’sOn the Intellect. The following table
offers a synopsis of the two Latin versions by Gerard and Gundisalvi, as edited
by Nagy:22
Alkindi, On the Intellect














13 faciens extrahere et qui extrahit
14 animam ad hoc ut fiat
15 rationalis actu in effectu intelligens
16 postquam fuerat
17 rationalis intelligens in
18 potentia,
19 ipse et intellectum ipsum
20 non
21 est ipsa et rationatum sunt
22 res
23 una. Rationatum una. Intellectum
24 igitur in anima et
22 The table was created with a computer programme written by my Würzburg colleague
Andreas Büttner.
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Alkindi, On the Intellect (cont.)
Gerard of Cremona Anonymous (Gundisalvi)






The column on the left contains Gerard’s version, the column on the right Gun-
disalvi’s. In someparts, both versions have the same text, which iswhen the line
of the table is not divided into two columns. Line 14, for instance, only con-
tains the words animam ad hoc ut fiat, which appear in both versions. In the
following line 15, the two versions differ: Gerard writes rationalis actu where
Gundisalvi has in effectu intelligens. Line 16 is again identical in both versions:
postquam fuerat. It is very clear from this table that the two versions share a
good amount of text and that one version is a revision of the other. But which
was first?
The problem can be solved, I suggest, by concentrating on the text shared by
both translators: that is, the lines without a break in themiddle, the text which
is common ground, which is unrevised and hence clearly part of the earlier
translation. Does it contain the vocabulary of Gerard or of Gundisalvi? This is
the crucial question.
The table above with a passage of Alkindi’s On the Intellect gives first hints
towards an answer. In line 7 of the table, Gerard of Cremona writes ex parte,
where Gundisalvi has secundum quod sunt in, translating the Arabic min ǧiha,
‘with respect to’, or ‘from the perspective of ’.23 The two different renderings
appear again in another passage of the text (not quotedhere). But in line 26, the
text is unchanged: ex parte appears in both versions. This is an indication that
ex parte is Gerard’s vocabulary and that it comes from the original translation.
This, of course, is only a single passage. It is advisable to base stylistic argu-
ments on a systematic approach to make them convincing. In the following,
this is attempted in three methodical steps: first, by focusing on words and
phrases highly characteristic of Gerard of Cremona or Dominicus Gundisalvi if
23 AbūRīda 1950–1953, p. 356 and 357. The other passage is on p. 355; here ex parte and secun-
dum quod sunt in translate ammā… fa (‘as to’).
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compared against other Arabic-Latin translators of the twelfth century on the
Iberian Peninsula; second, by focusing on the vocabulary that distinguishes the
translations of Gerard of Cremona from those of Dominicus Gundisalvi; and
third, by focusing on words and phrases that the common ground shares with
oneof the twoversions. In otherwords, the three approaches search for stylistic
evidence in the common ground by comparing its vocabulary to three sets of
texts of decreasing size: comparing, first, against the translations of other per-
sons; second, against other translations by Gerard and Gundisalvi; and third,
against the individual versions of the three double translations.
(1) Let us start with the words singled out as highly characteristic of Gerard
or Gundisalvi. In the above-mentioned paper “Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-
CenturyTranslations”, about 50words andphraseswere isolated forGerard and
Gundisalvi respectively as being exclusively characteristic for them if analyzed
as part of a set of 29 philosophical translations and 23 astronomical and astro-
logical translations of the twelfth century. Do any of these highly characteristic
words reappear in the common ground of the three double translations? The
answer is presented in the following table:24
Gerard’s and Gundisalvi’s translations compared against other translators
Gerard of Cremona:
stylistic words
in the common ground
Dominicus Gundisalvi:
stylistic words
in the common ground
Alkindi, On the Intellect sunt res una (1) –
Alfarabi, On the Sciences – –
Isaac Israeli, On Definitions reliquarum (1), absque
medio (1), eius et ipsius (1)
–
While there are no words specific to Gundisalvi in the common ground, we
encounter one phrase specific to Gerard in Alkindi and three such Gerardian
phrases in Isaac Israeli. One phrase inAlkindi, of course, is not very strong evid-
ence, even in a short text, but the three highly characteristic phrases in Isaac
are significant. This is a first robust indication that the common ground of the
24 The word count is based on the following editions of the Latin versions: Nagy 1897, p. 1–11,
forOn the Intellect; Schupp 2005 and Schneider 2006 forOn the Sciences;Muckle 1937–1938
for On Definitions.
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two Isaac Israeli translations is the work of Gerard and not of Gundisalvi. Also,
it makes us wonder whether Gundisalvi was involved in the production of the
common ground at all.
(2) In a next step, we do not consider the other translators of the century
any more, but concentrate on terms and phrases that distinguish between the
translations of Gerard and Gundisalvi only. The corpus on which this search is
based contains eight translations by Gerard and seven by Gundisalvi, all in the
field of philosophy.25 I have split up each of the double translations into three
files, in the manner of the table above with the ex parte-passage from Alkindi’s
On the Intellect, which was divided into three columns. One file contains the
common ground, one file the text isolated for Gerard, one file the text isolated
for Gundisalvi. As the table below shows, Gundisalvi’s isolated texts are shorter
thanGerard’s—with the exceptionof Alkindi’sOn the Intellect, where theyhave

















733 words 358 375 430 805
Alfarabi, On
the Sciences
15106 11994 3112 3788 6900
Isaac Israeli,
On Definitions
7124 4624 2500 1952 4452
I have then started to search,with a search softwarewrittenbyAndreasBüttner,
for all those terms in Alkindi’s On the Intellect which are both in Gerard’s isol-
25 The corpus consists of the following translations: Gerard of Cremona’s translations of
Aristotle, Analytica posteriora; Aristotle, De caelo; Aristotle / Ibn al-Biṭrīq, Meteora I–III;
Ps.-Aristotle, Liber de causis; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De tempore, De sensu, De eo quod
augmentum; Themistius, Comm. on Analytica posteriora; Alkindi, De quinque essentiis;
and Alkindi, De somno et visione; as well as Dominicus Gundisalvi’s translations (partly
produced togetherwith collaborators) of Avicenna,Deanima; Avicenna,Demedicinis cor-
dialibus; Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae; Algazel, Summa theoricae philosophiae; Avicenna, Philo-
sophia prima; Avicenna, De convenientia et differentia scientiarum; Ps.-Avicenna, Liber celi
et mundi.
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ated text and in the common ground, but not in Gundisalvi’s isolated text and
not in any of Gundisalvi’s seven translations either. This I did for Alfarabi and
Isaac Israeli too, and then repeated the procedure for Gundisalvi: I searched
for vocabulary of Gundisalvi’s isolated text which is in the common ground,
but not in Gerard’s isolated text nor in any of Gerard’s translations in the cor-
pus either. The aim of this approach is to see whether any vocabulary of the
original translation, which is untypical of the other translator, survived in the
common ground. The result is presented in the table below.26
It proves a sensible procedure to extinguish all those terms that are used in
the other philosophical translations by Gerard and Gundisalvi. The phrase ex
parte, for instance, which we met above, does not appear in the table below,
even though it seemed clear that Gundisalvi twice changed Gerard’s phrase
ex parte into secundum quod sunt in and once left ex parte untouched. In fact,
however, ex parte belongs to Gundisalvi’s regular vocabulary in other transla-
tions, and the (low) possibility remains that Gundisalvi wrote both secundum
quod sunt and ex parte in the common ground. This is why in this second
approach the focus is on vocabulary that reappears in the common ground,
but not in the other translations of the rival translator.
Note that the vocabulary in this table—other than in the first approach
above—is not purely stylistic, but contains many content words that are spe-
cific to single disciplines, such as pondera (“weights”) or civitates (“states”).
Gerard’s translations compared against Gundisalvi’s translations
Gerard of Cremona:
vocabulary from Gerard’s isolated text









sermonis (2 occ. in Gerard’s isolated text/1





sermones (24/1), declarat (11/3), civitati-
bus (10/3), pondera (6/1), erret (6/1), gentis
(5/1), conditiones (5/1), ponderum (3/1),
uteretur (3/1), inimicus (3/1), propalavit
de dictionibus (5/2), est
proprium (4/1)
26 The table lists termsor phrases that appear at least twice in the isolated texts. Not included
are two-word phrases with et, which are legion and of doubtful stylistic value.
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Gerard’s translations compared against Gundisalvi’s translations (cont.)
Gerard of Cremona:
vocabulary from Gerard’s isolated text





untypical of Gerard in
the common ground
(3/1), topicis (2/1), syllogistici (2/1), penet-
rabiliores (2/1), rationalibus (2/1), admin-
istrentur (2/1), quorum proprietas (9/1),
quibus rebus (8/2), in civitatibus (7/3), in
summa (4/3), dictionum significantium
(2/1), deinde inquirit (3/1), non erret (3/1),
sciat quibus (3/1), in sermonibus (3/1), sit
modus (3/1), deinde comprehendit (2/1),
sicut proportio (2/1), quorum proprietas est
(7/1), proprietas est ut (7/1), in civitatibus
et (4/3), consuetudines et habitus (4/1), ad
illud quod (3/2), et sermones quidem (3/1),
et quibus rebus (3/1), deinde inquirit de
(2/1), et illa quidem (2/1), in utrisque rebus
(2/1), ut non erret (2/1), sit modus in (2/1),
est ut administrentur (2/1), ensis ad ensem
(2/1), suam efficit operationem (2/1), oper-
ationes et consuetudines (2/1), quorum




reliquarum (3/1), firmat (3/2), vivo (2/1),
falso (2/1), intellectualiter (2/1), post
quietem (7/1), exitum eius (3/1), scientiam
totius (2/1), definierunt eam (2/1)
effectum (3/2)
In the common ground of the two translations of Alfarabi’s De scientiis, there is
overwhelming evidence for terms and phrases of Gerard of Cremona that are
untypical of Gundisalvi. This is very clear evidence that Gerard was the first to
translate De scientiis into Latin and that Gundisalvi revised the translation by
thoroughly rewriting some passages, while leaving other passages untouched.
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In the case of Isaac Israeli’s On Definitions, there is also a good number of
Gerardian phrases in the common ground, but only one Gundisalvian phrase.
This makes it likely that Gerard’s translation was first, and that this is indeed
the case will be shown in the third step below. The vocabulary of Alkindi’s On
the Intellect, on the other hand, does not yet offer us any clues.
(3) In a third step, the textual basis for stylistic analysis is narrowed down
again. The search is now for phrases in the common ground that appear also
in the isolated versions of Gerard or Gundisalvi, regardless whether they are
employed elsewhere by the two translators. The idea is to single out all those
phrases that appear in the common ground, but only in one of the two isol-
ated versions, that is, either in Gerard’s or Gundisalvi’s version. For this pur-
pose, single words are ignored because their number is too massive. Two-word
phrases with et are not recorded either. Moreover, only those phrases are con-
sidered which appear at least two times in an isolated version for Alkindi and
Isaac Israeli. In the case of Alfarabi’s De scientiis, there is so much material
already for phrases appearing at least three times that I do not record phrases
that appear two times. The result is the following:
Gerard’s three versions compared against Gundisalvi’s three versions
Gerard of Cremona:
stylistic evidence fromGerard’s isolated








ex parte (2 occ. in Gerard’s isolated text/2
occ. in the common ground)
est in (4/5), in anima
(3/13), quod est (2/4)
Alfarabi, On
the Sciences
ex eis (24/8), sunt in (19/7), in quibus
(15/3), est possibile (15/1), est sicut (12/2),
ab eis (10/3), in lineis (10/1), proprietas est
(10/2), de eis (9/1), est illa (9/1), in omnibus
(9/1), quorum proprietas (9/1), est verum
(8/1), quibus rebus (8/2), in omni (7/1), ad
illud (7/3), quod sunt (7/7), in civitatibus
(7/3), in unaquaque (6/3), in ea (6/3), ut
non (6/1), ut sint (6/2), eis cum (6/1), hoc
nomine (6/1), ergo sunt (5/1), in illa (5/1),
secundummodum (5/1), per
est proprium (4/1), de
dictionibus (3/2), libro
qui (3/1), ut in (3/1), in
naturalibus (3/1)
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Gerard’s three versions compared against Gundisalvi’s three versions (cont.)
Gerard of Cremona:
stylistic evidence fromGerard’s isolated




text in the common
ground
eas (5/3), secundum viam (5/1), ei quod
(5/1), in summa (4/3), cum quibus (4/1),
in esse (4/1), in unoquoque (4/1), quo est
(4/1), in utrisque (4/1), in scientiis (4/1),
cum eis (4/1), una est (4/2), in qua (4/2),
est eius (4/2), corporum naturalium (4/1),
dictionum significantium (3/1), dictionum
simplicium (3/1), deinde inquirit (3/2),
in fine (3/1), an sint (3/6), eis quod (3/1),
dat regulas (3/5), secunda est (3/2), eam
apud (3/1), ex quo (3/2), in sententiis (3/1),
non erit (3/2), non erret (3/1), in anima
(3/6), sermones quidem (3/1), a quo (3/2),
sciat quibus (3/1), in sermonibus (3/1), de
omnibus (3/2), accidunt eis (3/4), sit modus
(3/1), eorum in (3/1), eis per (3/1), quod
est in (11/5), illud quod est (5/3), in civit-
atibus et (4/3), consuetudines et habitus
(4/1), in quo est (3/1), ad illud quod (3/2),
estverum et (3/1), et sermones quidem
(3/1), et quibus rebus (3/1), ad invicem et
(3/1), quorum proprietas est ut (5/1), quod
non est verum (4/1)
Isaac Israeli,
On Definitions
est quod (10/3), est ut (7/1), illud quod
(7/1), post quietem (7/1), quae sunt (6/3),
est sermo (6/1), ab eis (5/1), manifestum
est (5/1), est hoc (4/1), nisi cum (4/1),
quod in (4/1), enim quod (4/1), cum non
(3/2), secunda est (3/1), ita sit (3/1), tunc
iam (3/2), sermo in (3/1), cum enim (3/1),
exitum eius (3/1), est in (3/6), non sit (3/1),
duobus modis (8/1), sed
non (2/1)
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Gerard’s three versions compared against Gundisalvi’s three versions (cont.)
Gerard of Cremona:
stylistic evidence fromGerard’s isolated




text in the common
ground
in qua (3/1), veritas est (3/1), in ipso (3/2),
in omni (2/1), in homine (2/1), ex propriet-
ate (2/3), tertia est (2/1), exsistens in (2/2),
est sicut (2/3), scientiam totius (2/1), ex
eis (2/2), essentiam suam (2/1), eorum est
(2/1), factus est (2/1), in ea (2/2), in causato
(2/1), ad aliud (2/3), et propter hoc (6/9),
manifestum est quod (2/1), cum non sit
(2/1)
While the evidence for Alkindi’sOn the Intellect remains inconclusive, the com-
parison of the isolated versions against each other leaves no doubt about the
priority of Gerard’s translations of Alfarabi’s On the Sciences and Isaac’s On
Definitions. The common ground of Alfarabi and Isaac is full with vocabulary
fromGerard’s isolated version, but it hardly ever resonates with the vocabulary
of Gundisalvi’s isolated version. Apparently, Gundisalvi left much material in
these two translations intact when revising Gerard’s version.
In order to know more about Alkindi’s On the Intellect, we have to return to
the close reading of the text which we started above when analyzing the usage
of ex parte and secundum quod sunt. Another noteworthy difference between
the two versions is Gerard’s and Gundisalvi’s rendering of the Arabic waqaʿa
taḥta, ‘falling under’, i.e., the senses or the intellect. Gerard translates with
cadere sub, Gundisalvi with subiacere:
Gerard of Cremona Anonymous (Gundisalvi)
1 dixit enim
2 Aristoteles
3 quod forma est duae formae quarum una est habens materiam et
4 illa
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(cont.)




8 cadit sub sensu sed subiacet sensui et





14 cadit sub ratione subiacet intellectui
16 et
17 illa
18 est specialitas rerum et
19 id
20 quod est supra eam
21 scilicet generalitas rerum




26 sensata quoniam si non esset actu sensata non caderet sub sensu cumque
27 adquirit apprehendit
28 eam anima tunc ipsa est in anima
This passage again speaks in favour of Gerard being the first translator and
Gundisalvi being the reviser. For Gerard’s phrase cadere sub is once retained
in the common ground (line 26). The most natural explanation is that Gundis-
alvi twice changed the text into subiacet, but once left it untouched. Particularly
telling is the three-word phrase cadere sub sensu for Arabicwaqaʿa taḥta al-ḥiss,
‘falling under the senses’, whichGerard also uses in line 8 (cadit sub sensu). This
phrase is highly distinctive of Gerard of Cremona in all Arabic-Latin translation
literature, as far as I can see by searching through the Arabic and Latin Gloss-
ary27 and the Arabic and Latin Corpus on the University of Würzburg website.
27 Hasse et al. 2009–.
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At present, I only know the phrase from Gerard’s translations of the Liber de
causis (where it appears twice), of Aristotle’s De caelo (1) and of Alkindi’s De
quinque essentiis (1). It is highly probable, therefore, that Gerard is the author
of the common ground and thus of the first translation of Alkindi’sOn the Intel-
lect.
Another example of Gerardian language left untouched in the common
ground is the phrase inventus/-a/-um est, which translates the Arabicmawǧūd,
‘existing’. The translation of this Arabic termwith forms of inveniri ismotivated
by the literal meaning of the root waǧada, whichmeans ‘to find’, ‘to encounter’.
This translation of mawǧūd is non uncommon in the Middle Ages, as is recor-
ded in the Arabic and Latin Glossary: it is used, for example, by John of Seville,
Alfred of Shareshill and the Burgos translators of Avicenna. In the present
translation of Alkindi’s On the Intellect, Gundisalvi translates mawǧūd with
forms of esse in four passages where Gerard employs inventus est. But in two
passages inventus est is left unchanged. It is true that inventus est is not an
exclusively Gerardian term, and, hence, the evidence is not as convincing as
with cadere sub sensu. But it adds additional weight to the priority of Gerard’s
version.
A final example concerns the Arabic phrase matā šāʾa, ‘whenever it wants’,
which appears four times in our text. The first three occurrences are translated
by Gerard as quando vult, cum vult and quando vult, where Gundisalvi writes
quando voluerit, cumvoluerit and cumvoluerit. The fourth occurrence, however,
is left unchanged by the reviser and appears as quando vult in the common
ground. Again, this is Gerard’s phrase, not Gundisalvi’s.
In view of all this evidence for the common ground, which includes the
highly characteristic phrase sunt res una mentioned above and the Gerardian
vocabulary ex parte, cadere sub, inventus est and quando vult, it is safe to con-
clude that Alkindi’s On the Intellect was translated first by Gerard and later
revised by Gundisalvi. The case of Alfarabi’s On the Sciences and Isaac’s On
Definitions is even more definite: given the enormous amount of Gerardian
vocabulary in the common ground and the dearth of Gundisalvian vocabulary,
even if we consider the isolated Gundisalvi versions, one can conclude with
great certainty that Gerard’s renderings of Alfarabi’s and Isaac’s text were first.
3 Was the Liber de causis Revised by Dominicus Gundisalvi?
After all this, we are in a better position to answer the question of whether
Gerard’s translation of the Liber de causis was revised by Gundisalvi. We have
learnt from the three examples of double translation that Gundisalvi is a thor-
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ough reviser of Gerard’s translations—to an extent that we can still recognize
his style in the revision. Is this the case too with the Liber de causis, in the form
edited by Adriaan Pattin?
As to the style of Gerard of Cremona himself, there are many phrases dis-
tinctive of him in the Liber de causis translation. If the translation had been
anonymous, wewould have had no problem assigning it to Gerard of Cremona.
Among those stylistic phrases of two words or more which serve to distinguish
Gerard’s translations fromGundisalvi’s andwhich appear in at least 80%of his
philosophical translations and at least 10 times, the following are in the Liber de
causis: et ipsius (3), inter utraque (1), per hunc (1), quoniam quando (1), similiter
quando (1), et propter illud (3), et nos quidem (3), et causa in (1), eius et ipsius (1),
et illud quidem (1). These terms contribute to the very “Gerardian sound” of the
translation.
As to Gundisalvi, the probability that he revised the Liber de causis can be
estimated best if we compare the traces of his vocabulary in the Liber de causis
translationwith the traces in the three double translations discussed above. For
this purpose, I have searched for Gundisalvian phrases of two words and more
which differentiate Gundisalvi’s translations from Gerard (not from the other
twelfth-century translators) andwhich appear in at least 80%of his philosoph-
ical translations and at least 10 times:
Gundisalvi’s vocabulary differentiated from Gerard’s vocabulary
Dominicus Gundisalvi
stylistic phrases found regularly and often in Gundisalvi’s




quantum ad (1), et id (1), non erat (1), est in potentia (2), et id




et ideo (1), et deinde (1), ob hoc (2), nec in (3), alio modo (1),
vel ex (1), et ob (2), ad illam (1), eorum non (1), hoc totum (2),
id de (1), autem fuerint (1), omnibus illis (1), modo in (2), et
multa (3), et ob hoc (2), si autem fuerint (1), ut per hoc (1), et
hoc totum (2), et haec sunt (1)
28 The Gundisalvian terms are listed in decreasing frequency of occurrence in his oeuvre for
two-word, three-word and four-word phrases respectively.
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Gundisalvi’s vocabulary differentiated from Gerard’s vocabulary (cont.)
Dominicus Gundisalvi
stylistic phrases found regularly and often in Gundisalvi’s
translations, but not in Gerard’s
Isaac Israeli, De diffi-
nitionibus
(length: 4452 words)
sine dubio (1), et ideo (4), quicquid est (2), et deinde (4), et
quicquid (2), ob hoc (7), postquam autem (1), ad modum (1),
ideo non (1), unde non (1), et ob (6), est vel (3), nihil aliud
(1), alicuius rei (1), dicitur esse (1), quod agit (1), in tantum
(1), cum suis (1), eius natura (1), ad id quod (2), et ob hoc (6),
et ideo non (1), quicquid est in (1), ut per hoc (1), in tantum




esse cum (1), unde non (1), eorum non (2), quod agit (1), cum
suis (1)
Wecan see here that Gundisalvi’s style remains recognizable in his revisions. In
the translations of Alfarabi and Isaac Israeli, one can find very distinctive three-
words phrases such as et ob hoc or in tantum quod. And even the very short text
On the Intellect by Alkindi contains some phrases that clearly distinguish the
revision from Gerard’s version. The Liber de causis, in contrast, is longer than
evenAlfarabi’sOn theSciences (inGundisalvi’s version), but contains only some
stray traces of Gundisalvian vocabulary. If Gundisalvi had revised the text in a
way similar to the other three revisions, he would have left manymore stylistic
traces in such a long text. It is therefore very unlikely that Gundisalvi revised
the Liber de causis.
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chapter 13
Doubles traductions et omissions : une approche
critique en vue d’une édition de la traduction
latine du Liber de causis
Jules Janssens
DeWulf-Mansion Centre, Leuven
Il y a presque trente ans, Richard Taylor publiait une liste de soixante-quinze
cas dont la grande majorité concernait la nécessité de revoir de façon majeure
(ou, dans des cas plus rares, mineure) l’édition de la traduction latine du Livre
duBien pur parA. Pattin1, quelques cas ayant trait directement au rapport entre
la traduction latine et le texte arabe2. Ces remarques étaient largement déri-
vées de sa thèse de doctorat3, qui signalait, pourtant, un plus grand nombre
de cas impliquant une divergence entre la traduction latine et le texte arabe
tel qu’ il l’ avait édité4. Plus que quiconque, Taylor était conscient des nom-
breux problèmes auxquels tout éventuel nouvel éditeur ou réviseur de la tra-
duction latine est inévitablement confronté : le nombre extrêmement limité
des manuscrits arabes (un seul connu à l’époque de l’édition Pattin, trois à
l’époque de l’édition Taylor), et à l’ inverse un nombre très élevé demanuscrits
latins5. Ensuite, il y a la nature particulière du texte lui-même, qui constitue
dans son ensemble une paraphrase d’une série de propositions des Éléments
de théologie de Proclus, non sans certains remodelages doctrinaux et mise
à contribution d’autres sources, en particulier la Pseudo-Théologie6. Un rap-
prochement avec le texte des Éléments de théologie peut donc être utile pour
1 Pattin 1966, p. 134-203.
2 Taylor 1989, p. 84-100. Taylor (1989, p. 84) reconnaît que son projet est similaire à celui de
Vansteenkiste 1967, mais remarque à juste titre que ce dernier prenait comme référence pour
l’arabe l’édition Bardenhewer (basée sur le seulmanuscrit LeydeOr. 209) et ignorait donc les
manuscrits Ankara, İsmail Saib I 1696 et Istanbul, Sülemanyie Kütüphanesi, Hacı Mahmud
5683. Notons toutefois que le manuscrit d’ Istanbul est une copie directe de celui d’Ankara,
voir Taylor 1982, p. 259-262 (nous remercions M. Taylor d’avoir attiré notre attention sur son
article où il offre sinon la preuve, du moins des indications très fortes en faveur d’une telle
dépendance).
3 Taylor 1981, p. 431-519.
4 Taylor 1981, p. 130-279.
5 Pour une liste provisoire, énumérant 237 manuscrits, voir Taylor 1983, p. 68-80.
6 D’Ancona 1995, p. 121-153 ; voir aussi Taylor 2016, p. 228-230.
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une compréhension correcte du texte, et apporter ainsi une contribution à
l’évaluation adéquate de certaines différences entre le texte arabe et la traduc-
tion latine, bien que limitée aux cas où le rapprochement avec le texte grec de
Proclus est incontestable.
L’existence d’une autre version arabe du Livre du Bien pur, que Thillet et
Oudaimah ont appelé Liber de causis II, présente également un intérêt mani-
feste7. Il faudrait aussi tenir compte de la réception dans la tradition arabe,
fût-ce de façon partielle, du Liber de causis I dont témoignent : le vingtième
chapitre du Livre de la Métaphysique de ʿAbd al-Lāṭif al-Baġdādī8 ; la seconde
partie de la Réfutation de celui qui parle de la disparition et l’annihilation de
l’âme après lamort, le plus souvent attribué à Platon, mais parfois à al-Fārābī9 ;
plusieurs paragraphes des Chapitres sur desmarques distinctives divines (Fuṣūl)
d’al-’Āmirī10 ; quelques fragments dans les Questions siciliennes d’ Ibn Sabʿīn11 ;
et enfin des larges extraits du Ce qui est nécessaire pour celui qui connaît (Budd)
de ce même auteur12. La traduction latine est parfois conforme à une leçon
7 Liber de causis II.
8 Badawi 1955, p. 248-256 ; Taylor 1981, p. 520-529. Une présentation brève de ce chapitre
se trouve chez Martini-Bonadeo 2013, p. 242-254, où il est indiqué (p. 243) qu’al-Baġdādī
reproduit, dans l’ordre, (des extraits de) tous les chapitres du Livre du Bien pur, à l’ excep-
tion des chapitres 4, 10, 18 et 20. Taylor (Taylor 1981, p. 120) tient compte du texte tel
qu’al-Baġdādī le présente – non de façon systématique, mais de temps à autre.
9 Türker 1965, p. 58, §2-59, §3 ; Badawi 1974, p. 338-339 ; Taylor 1982, p. 530-544. Ce petit traité
contient une citation (relativement littérale) du ‘chapitre’ 23 et de la première partie du
chapitre 5 (et a été mis à contribution par Taylor pour l’édition de ces ‘chapitres’, voir Tay-
lor 1982, p. 120).
10 Wakelnig 2006; Taylor 1981, p. 545-548. Notons queWakelnig indique quelques parallèles
en plus de ceux déjà signalés par Taylor (Taylor 1981, p. 546) et que les Fuṣūl citent toujours
de façon très fragmentaire et non littérale les ‘chapitres’ du Livre du Bien pur (rapproche-
ments avec tous les ‘chapitres’, à l’exception des chapitres 5, 10, 13-17, 20, 27, 28 et 31).
11 Akasoy 2006, p. 340-410 (arabe), 411-563 (traduction allemande) ; Spallino 2002, p. 314-223
(reproduction de l’édition arabe de Yaltkaya 1941), 53-222 (traduction italienne) ; Taylor
1981, p. 549-553, où une liste des citations du Livre du Bien pur est donnée (liste ignorée
autant par Akasoy que par Spallino).
12 Ibn Sabʿīn 1978, passim ; Lator 1944, p. 415-417 établit une liste des passages où le Budd cite
un ‘chapitre’ (en entier ou partiellement), faisant référence au manuscrit Carullah 1273
d’ Istanbul pour le Budd et à l’édition Bardenhewer 1882 pour le Livre du Bien pur, mais
nous avons trouvé quelques passages additionnels (indiqués en gras dans la liste qui suit).
Voici une nouvelle liste (toujours provisoire) des fragments communs, faisant référence
aux éditions Taylor 1981 [T] (et Badawi 1955 [B]) pour le Kitāb ʿal-īdāḥ fī ḫayr al-maḥḍ,
Livre du Bien pur et à l’édition Katturah [K] pour le Budd : 1 : T p. 138,11-13 (B p. 3,10-12) // K
p. 77,23-24 ; 2 : T p. 144-146 (B p. 4-5) // K p. 50,3-16 (incluant quelques additions et change-
ments mineurs dans la formulation) ; 3 : T p. 147,1-148,11 (B p. 5,10-14) // K p. 132,9-14 ; 4 : T
p. 151,1-152,8, 156,33-159,48 et 159,49-52 (B p. 6,8-11, 7,10-8,6 et 8,7-9) // Kp. 49,15-21, 202,3-13
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non attestée dans les trois manuscrits utilisés par Taylor pour son édition, mais
pourtant présente dans un (ou plusieurs) de ces ouvrages que nous venons de
mentionner, comme nous le montrerons dans la suite. Quant à la réception
de la traduction latine elle-même, elle fut considérable et selon l’état actuel
des recherches, on dénombre une soixantaine de commentaires entre le dou-
zième et le seizième siècle13. Ils ont clairement une importance capitale pour
l’étude de la transmission de la traduction latine, car ils ne sont pas dépourvus
de valeur pour fixer la leçon originale la plus vraisemblable. Enfin, une édition
critique de la traduction latine ne peut pas ignorer l’existence des trois traduc-
tions latino-hébraïques14.
Mais avant d’offrir des exemples illustrant l’ importance de ces multiples
témoins indirects, nous voulons attirer l’attention sur quelques phénomènes
typiques des traductions arabo-latines tolédanes de la fin du XIIe siècle. Une
partie importante fut réaliséepar le cercle deGérarddeCrémone, dont la pater-
nité de la traduction du Livre de la bonté pure ne semble plus être contestée à
l’heure actuelle.
1 Doubles traductions
Le phénomène des doubles traductions a été bien attesté dans les volumes
publiés de l’Avicenne latin : De anima, De prima philosophia et Liber primus
naturalium, Tractatus I et II. Les traductions rapportées dans ces volumes
datent toutes du XIIe siècle et toutes ont été faites à Tolède, bien que dans le
cercle de Gundissalinus. Simone Van Riet a eu le mérite d’avoir attiré l’atten-
tion sur lui. Elle en a conclu à l’existence des deux familles, dont l’une reflète la
traduction originale, l’ autre un effort de révision de celle-ci, soit par un copiste,
et 202,19-21 ; 6 : T p. 166-170 (B p. 9-10) // K p. 215,11-216,3 ; 9 : T p. 181,2-184,18 (B p. 12,19-13,7)
// K p. 200,22-201,10 ; 12 : T p. 192,2-193,8 (B p. 14,15-15,2) // K p. 51,24-52,4 ; 13 : T p. 195,2-5
(B p. 15,7-9) // K p. 52,11-14 ; 14 : T p. 200-202 (B p. 16) // K p. 38,15-20 (quelques modifica-
tions mineures dans la formulation) ; 20 : T p. 229-231 (B p. 22) // K p. 133,22-134,6 ; 21 : 20 : T
p. 232-234 (B p. 22-23) // K p. 133,12-20 ; 22 : T p. 235,2-236,7, 237,11-12 et 238,26-30 (B p. 23,7-
10,12-13 et 23,15-24,1) // K p. 147,21-148,6 ; 23 : T p. 239,2-240-10 (B p. 24,3-7) // K p. 148,7-13 ;
25 : T p. 248-251 (B p. 26) // K p. 134,7-20 (aussi p. 312,1-14) ; 26 : T. p. 252-253 (B p. 27) // K
p. 148,15-20 ; 28: T p. 258-259 (B p. 28) // K p. 312,17-22 ; 31 : T p. 273,2-274,12 (B p. 31,11-32,4)
// K p. 133,4-10.
13 Calma 2016a, p. 20-21.
14 Concernant ces trois traductions et leur signification comme témoins de la traduction
latine, voir Rothschild 1994 et Rothschild 2013.
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soit par le traducteur lui-même, en vue d’établir une traduction plus littérale15.
Nous avons essayé de démontrer que ces doubles traductions furent sans doute
présentes dans l’exemplaire original même du traducteur et qu’elles résul-
taient d’un effort pour ‘latiniser’ le premier essai de traduction (trop) littérale16.
Quelle que soit l’alternative que l’on accepte parmi ces deux hypothèses, il est
incontestable qu’ il est possible, pour chacune de ces traductions, de distinguer
l’existence des deux familles dans leur transmission. Pour chaque traduction
on assiste, en outre, à l’existence de manuscrits contaminés, où des variantes
spécifiques à chacunedes deus familes sont attestées. L’étude systématiquedes
doubles traductions est donc utile afin de découvrir si l’on est bien confronté à
ce qui peut être qualifié de ‘familles’. Comme il est incontestable que les nom-
breuxmanuscrits de la traduction latine du Livre duBien pur portent beaucoup
de doubles traductions, il est clair qu’ il faut y prêter une attention sérieuse, car
celles-ci peuvent contribuer à mieux saisir sous quelles différentes formes la
traduction latine a été transmise, voire, ne fût-ce dans une mesure limitée, à
établir le stemma codicum. Sans être exhaustif, nous proposerons dans ce qui
suit quelques cas exemplaires et/ou significatifs. Nous nous limiterons en géné-
ral, mais non toujours, à l’édition Pattin et à son apparat de variantes.
Nous commencerons avec un cas plutôt classique, à savoir ergo / igitur
pour la conjonction arabe fa-. L’édition Pattin, en conformité avec six des dix
manuscrits utilisés pour l’édition, porte en I, 9,23, ergo, mais l’expression équi-
valente igitur est attestée dans les quatre autres ; la même variante est attestée
après, à savoir en I, 18, 63 (trois manuscrits dont seulement deux la portaient
aussi à la première occurrence), en XIV(XV), 125,53 (un seul manuscrit où elle
figurait aussi dans le premier cas, mais pas dans le deuxième), XXI(XXII), 168,77
(unmanuscrit, qui porte cette variante seulement ici), XXIX(XXX), 204,84 (cinq
manuscrits, dont un l’attestait aussi dans le premier et le deuxième cas ; un
dans le premier et le troisième cas et enfin, un dans le seul premier cas, alors
que les deux autres portaient toujours auparavant ergo), XXIX(XXX), 206,7 (un
seulmanuscrit, qui le portait aussi dans le premier, le troisième et le cinquième
cas) et XXXI(XXXII), 219,12 (deux manuscrits, dont l’un en témoignait dans le
premier, le troisième et le cinquième cas, et l’autre dans le deuxième et le cin-
quième cas). Inversement, on trouve igitur dans le texte et ergo dans l’apparat
des variantes en I, 12, 39 (ergo : quatre manuscrits, dont deux figuraient aussi
comme témoins de la variante igitur pour ergo) et en III, 36, 32 (ergo : un
manuscrit, qui fait partie des quatre témoins du premier cas). Sans en spécifier
15 VoirVanRiet 1963 ; Avicenna latinus 1977, p. 128*–130* et Avicenna latinus 1992, p. 54*–62*.
16 Voir Janssens 2002.
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le détail, mentionnons encore d’autres variantes pour ergo, telles que autem,
enim, unde et vero. Mais le cas de ergo / igitur suffit à mettre en lumière qu’ il
existe une assez grande fluidité entre les deux, ce qui se laisse aisément expli-
quer si ce choix fut effectivement présent dans l’autographe du traducteur.
Un cas très significatif, car très fréquent, est la traduction de l’adjectif arabe
ʿaqlī par un nombre assez important de termes différents : intellectibilis / intel-
ligibilis / intellectualis / intelligentialis / intelligens / intelligentiae / intellectus17.
L’édition porte dans la vaste majorité des cas (une quarantaine) intellectibilis.
Mais il est frappant que l’apparat des variantes mentionne partout l’existence,
dans aumoins un des dixmanuscrits témoins, de la variante intelligibilis et que
celle-ci soit tout simplement la leçon de la majorité des manuscrits18. À plu-
sieurs reprises, on trouve un troisième terme: intellectualis (dix cas), intelligens,
intelligentiae, intelligibiliter et intellectus (chaque fois dans une seule instance).
La présence de deux autres options outre celle d’ intelligibilis est attestée une
fois : intellectualis et intelligentialis. Par contre, les deux mots intellectibilis et
intelligibilis figurent dans l’apparat des variantes, bien qu’une seule fois (en
III, 36,34), alors que le textus porte intelligentiae. Ce dernier cas a de quoi sur-
prendre, mais il est relativement bien attesté et par ailleurs confirmé par le
commentaire de Gilles de Rome19. On peut se demander si, à l’origine, on ne
lisait pas dans la traduction eius intelligentiae / intellectibilis ou intelligibilis20,
suivant à une hésitation selon laquelle il aurait fallu lire en arabe (quwwa)
ʿaqlihi ou ʿaqliyya, car immédiatement après se trouve un cas similaire : l’ arabe
(quwwa) ḏātiyya est traduit par (virtutem) eius essentiae (ce qui suggère la lec-
ture ḏātihi) / (virtutem) essentialem (bien qu’attesté dans un manuscrit seule-
ment)21. Observons toutefois que dans le cas d’ intelligentiae, contrairement à
17 Pour ne pas compliquer inutilement les choses, nous nous limitons à utiliser le nominatif
singulier et ne tenons donc pas compte du cas de déclinaison. Nous ne faisons pas non
plus attention à des coquilles évidentes, comme intellitibilem (III, 34, 20).
18 La raison de la préférence accordée par Pattin à la leçon intellectibilis n’est pas claire. Il est
regrettable qu’ il n’ait pas explicité la raison de son choix.
19 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 12v–13rAA.
20 De nouveau, Pattin ne justifie nulle part son choix (comparez supra, note 18). Pourtant, ni
les témoinsmanuscrits ni les commentaires choisis par lui pour son éditionnepermettent
de privilégier la leçon intelligentiae.
21 Pace Taylor 1989, p. 89, cas (14), nous ne croyons pas que le modèle arabe du traducteur
latin portait seulement une leçon différente en ce qui concerne la troisième qualification,
à savoir ḏātihi au lieu de ḏātiyya. Observons que l’apparat de Pattin affirme l’existence
dans ce dernier cas d’essentialis dans le manuscrit Vat. Lat. 20984 – unique, il est vrai –
indiquant ainsi que le traducteur latin, ou, à la limite, quelqu’un qui aurait révisé la tra-
duction originale, lisait sans doute ḏātiyya, en conformité à la tradition manuscrite arabe
(comme ce même manuscrit témoigne auparavant de la leçon intelligentiae, il semble
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celui d’essentiae, la variante intelligibilis est présente dans un bon nombre de
témoins (quatre manuscrits, l’ édition latine de Bardenhewer et le commen-
taire de Bacon).
Quant à la variante intellectibilis, elle est attestée dans le manuscrit Vat.
Ottob. Lat. 1415, dont Vansteenkiste a démontré le caractère relativement pré-
cieux comme témoin du texte arabe22. Or, depuis que Taylor a élaboré une
édition non seulement sur la base du manuscrit de Leyde, mais aussi de ceux
d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul, il est apparu évident que lemanuscrit d’Aoste, Semina-
riomaggiore 71 (olim Ai° D 20) est lui aussi un témoin de grande valeur23. Il est
dès lors incontestablement frappant de voir que lui aussi porte la leçon (virtu-
tem) intellectibilem, exactement comme lemanuscrit Vat. Ottob. Lat. 1415. Dans
le cas présent, on peut par conséquent s’ imaginer que l’archétype portait : et
virtutem intelligentiae / intelligibilem intellectibilem, où d’une part on trouve un
essai de traduction alternative suite à une hésitation entre une lecture ʿaqliyya
et ʿaqlihi de l’arabe (de graphie assez similaire, surtout en absence de point
diacritiques), et d’autre part l’alternative habituelle intellectibilis / intelligibilis.
En outre, la leçon intellectibilis est (presque) partout ailleurs présente dans les
deux manuscrits. Tout indique donc que ce terme, typique du néoplatonisme
latin24, soit se trouvait dans l’archétype du traducteur, sans doute accompagné
de l’alternative intelligibilis, soit que l’un de ces deux termes a été introduit
comme alternative pour l’autre relativement tôt dans la transmission de la tra-
duction. Parmi toutes les autres options, la variante intellectualis est encore
relativement bien attestée et il est intéressant de constater qu’ intellectualis se
trouve dans le De anima de l’Avicenne latin (qui, bien sûr, n’appartient pas
à Gérard de Crémone, mais à Gundissalinus et à son cercle) parmi les termes
qui traduisent ʿaqlī25. Le terme intelligentialis est certainement aussi une tra-
exclu que cette leçon d’essentialis soit due à une initiative de son copiste). En plus, comme
nous l’avons dit, on peut aisément s’ imaginer un doute chez le traducteur concernant la
façon dont on doit lire l’arabe (lemême problème se posant pour ḏātiyya/ ḏātihi que pour
ʿaqliyya / ʿaqlihi). Enfin, sa reconstruction et secundumvirtutem intelligibilem impliqueune
préférencepour intelligibilem à l’ intérieur de l’alternative intellectibilis / intelligibilis.Mais,
sauf erreur de notre part, rien ne justifie une telle préférence.
22 Vansteenkiste 1967, p. 62-66.
23 Concernant la valeur précieuse de cemanuscrit, voir Taylor 1989, p. 84 et 101-102. Quelques
caractéristiques particulières de cemanuscrit avaient été déjàmises en lumière par Pattin
1966, p. 104-105.
24 Vansteenkiste 1967, p. 76.
25 Avicenna latinus 1968, p. 8,99 et 28,84 (mais ce terme n’est pas utilisé dans Avicenna lati-
nus 1972). Observons encore que la variante intellectibilis ne figure dans l’ensemble de
cette traduction qu’une seule fois, à savoir Avicenna latinus 1968, p. 153,11 (en alternative
avec intelligibilis).
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duction valable, mais somme toute, un mot assez rare ; il n’apparaît qu’une
seule fois dans un seul manuscrit26. Quant à l’utilisation en VII(VIII), 78,45 de
l’adverbe intelligibiliter, attestée dans un seul manuscrit, elle s’explique par le
contexte, mais il faudrait alors s’attendre à la suppression du substantif appre-
hensione, qui précède intellectibili dans l’édition27. Par contre, les termes intelli-
gens et intelligentiaeposent problème. Le dernier correspond à une leçon arabe
(al-)ʿaql, mais l’utilisation d’ intelligentiae pourrait résulter de la présence du
mêmemot immédiatement à sa suite, alors que le premier présuppose une lec-
ture ʿāqil de l’arabe. Il est intéressant de noter que ces deux variantes ne sont
attestées qu’une seule fois, à savoir en III, 34,19-20, à l’ intérieur d’une seule
phrase et semblent donc intimement liées28. Enfin, tout indique que la men-
tion d’ intellectus (en XVIII(XIX), 149,69), attestée dans un seul manuscrit (le
ms. Bruges, Bibliothèque de la ville 463), résulte d’une erreur de copiste, car
l’expression anima intellectus est dépourvue de sens. Selon nous, sur la base de
toutes les observations qui précèdent, une nouvelle édition critique devra sans
doute maintenir l’alternative intellectibilis / intelligibilis dans le textus. Mais, si
sur la base du stemma codicum, il est incontestable qu’un des deux termes fut
présent d’abord sans alternative et que l’autre a été introduit à un moment
postérieur de la transmission de la traduction, alors on pourrait opter pour ne
maintenir que le terme concerné dans le textus en vue d’éditer la traduction
originale, ou, du moins, ce qui s’en rapproche le plus.
Un autre cas intéressant est la traduction des comparatifs arfaʿ et ‘alā. En
V(VI), 63,61-63, l’ édition, à la ligne 61, porte dans le textus altior comme traduc-
tion d’arfaʿ et mentionne comme variante sublimior dans l’apparat, en faisant
référence à un seulmanuscrit, lems.Tolède, Cabildo 97-1 (sur l’ensemble de dix
26 Le terme intelligentialis (X, 102, 62) se trouve dans le manuscrit Toledo, Cabildo 97-1. Il est
attesté dans les traductions des œuvres de Proclus parMoerbeke, voir, par exemple, Procli
opuscula, p. 120, 6, 10, mais il faudra examiner s’ il ne fut déjà pas utilisé par Gérard de Cré-
mone et son cercle. En effet, il semble possible qu’ il s’agisse d’un choix du copiste inspiré
par une volonté de souligner davantage le caractère proclien de l’ouvrage.
27 Le texte arabe porte : yudriku (…) idrākan ʿaqliyyan, dont apprehendit (…) apprehensione
intellectibili (ou : intelligibili) constitue une traduction très littérale. De façon plus latini-
sée, on attendrait plutôt une traduction apprehendit (…) intelligibiliter. Dans le contexte,
on peut donc considérer apprehensione intellectibili (intelligibili) et intelligibiliter comme
un essai de double traduction.
28 Elles sont toutes deux présentes dans lesmanuscrits Vat. Lat. 2089 et Bruges, Bibliothèque
de la Ville 478, mais dans ce dernier intelligens figure en marge, comme correction pour
intelligibilis et est écrit d’autre main que celle du copiste original. En III, 3420, la variante
intelligentiae se trouve confirmée en outre par lemanuscrit Bruxelles, Bibliothèque royale
II, 2314.
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manuscrits qui constituent la base de l’édition).29 Toutefois, deux lignes plus
loin, le textus offre la traduction sublimior, présente dans tous les dix manus-
crits, dont, selon l’apparat, trois (Vat. lat. 2984, Vat. Urb. lat. 206 and Paris,
BnF Lat. 6318) ajoutent subtilior comme traduction alternative. En VI (VII),
67,76, on trouve la traduction altior et superior (sublimior dans deux manus-
crits) pour l’expression arabe arfaʿ wa-ʿalā et, en XXI (XXII), 171,89 superior et
altior (mais dans un manuscrit altior et superior) comme traduction d’ʿalā wa-
arfaʿ30. Enfin, enXXII (XXIII), 174,6, sublimior (subtilior : 2mss ; superior : 1ms) et
altior peut correspondre soit à la leçon arfaʿ wa-ʿalā, présente dans les manus-
crits d’ Istanbul et d’Ankara, soit à celle inversée, ʿalā wa-arfaʿ, attestée dans
le manuscrit de Leyde31. À l’exception du premier cas, altior apparaît toujours
sans alternative, alors que sublimior est accompagné deux fois de l’alternative
subtilior, et une fois, en plus, de la variante superior, qui, à son tour, est claire-
ment distingué d’altior en XXI(XXII), 171,89 (en outre, en V(VI), 57, 22, superior,
sans variante aucune, traduit ʿalā). On aurait donc tendance à croire que subli-
mior (subtilior / superior) traduit ʿalā et qu’altior rend arfaʿ. Par conséquent,
le témoignage unique – parmi les dix manuscrits consultés par Pattin – du
manuscrit Tolède, Cabildo 97-1, de la leçon sublimior comme alternative pour
altior en V(VI), 63, 61, pourrait paraître à première vue suspect. Cependant,
on constate immédiatement à sa suite que sublimior / subtilior traduit effec-
tivement arfaʿ. Le traducteur latin aurait-il lu à cet endroit dans son modèle
arabe ʿalā? Dans l’état actuel des choses, nous devons laisser cette question
ouverte32, mais il faudra essayer à l’occasion d’une nouvelle édition critique de
résoudre ce problème délicat, surtout en vue de fixer les lexiques arabe-latin et
latin-arabe.
29 Bien qu’ il énumère 92manuscrits, Pattin s’est limité pour son édition à collationner entiè-
rement dix manuscrits. Bien qu’ il précise lui-même que son édition ne prétend pas être
une édition critique définitive, il est regrettable qu’ il n’ait pas expliqué les raisons de
ce choix. En outre, dans quelques cas rares il prend recours à d’autres manuscrits. Là
encore, il n’explique pas clairement ce qui motive son choix. Notons simplement qu’ il
s’est limité à collationner, pour le passage sous discussion, les dix manuscrits témoins
majeurs.
30 Certes, on lit altior dans le textus de l’édition et superior dans l’apparat des variantes (un
manuscrit), mais il ne s’agit là pas d’une vraie variante, car il y a eu inversion des deux
termes. En fait, le copiste dumanuscrit Vat. Lat. 2089, a clairement inversé les deux termes
altior et superior, qui se trouvent tous deux très proches sur la même ligne.
31 Pour l’existence de cette lecture inversée dans la tradition arabe, voir Taylor 1981, p. 237,
note 12, où il met en parallèle la traduction latine avec la leçon du manuscrit de Leyde.
32 Sauf erreur de notre part, aucun témoin arabe, direct ou indirect, ne contient une indica-
tion à cet endroit de la leçon ‘alā.
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Un cas qui mérite une attention très particulière est celui de l’expression
non destruuntur [nec permutantur] en X(XI), 101,55-56. Dans le texte arabe on
lit seulement lā tastaḥīlu, ce qui explique que Pattin ait opté pour la suppres-
sion de nec permutantur. Taylor a estimé que nec permutantur traduit sans
doute lā tataġayyaru, expression attestée dans le manuscrit de Leyde, mais
seulement à la fin de l’affirmation qui suit dans le texte33. Il incline donc à y
reconnaître un cas où la traduction latine témoigne d’un déplacement d’un
segment de texte par rapport à l’arabe. S’ il s’abstient d’offrir une explication
pour ce déplacement, on pourrait songer à une mention de nec permutantur
dans la marge de la copie du traducteur, qui, à cause d’un oubli, aurait marqué
par un signe que l’expression devait être ajoutée ; après, lors de la transmission
de la traduction, l’endroit du signe aurait été mal interprété par un copiste.
Cette explication est en principe possible, mais loin d’être évidente. Pattin et
Taylor semblent avoir perdu de vue que le verbe permutantur rend parfaite-
ment le sens du verbe arabe tastaḥīlu, même plus que ne le fait le verbe des-
truuntur34. En outre, un seul des dix manuscrits utilisés pour l’édition porte
nec permutantur ; quatre, par contre, lisent vel permutantur et cinq omettent
l’expression35. Comme Vansteenkiste l’avait remarqué il y a déjà un demi-
siècle, permutantur résulte sans doute d’un essai de double traduction par le
traducteur lui-mêmeet l’utilisationde la conjonction vel en constitueun indice
sérieux36. Compte tenu de tous ces éléments, nous sommes plutôt convaincus
33 Taylor 1981, p. 466, note 88. En Taylor 1989, aucune remarque est formulée à propos du
passage.
34 La traduction du verbe istaḥāla par permutari est solidement établi dans le De anima de
l’Avicenne latin, voir Avicenna latinus 1972, p. 311 et Avicenna latinus 1968, p. 229, alors
que dans le De philosophia prima, la traduction permutari est absente bien que, il est vrai
à une seule occasion, le substantif istiḥāla y est rendu par permutatio – par contre, on y
trouve à deux reprises la traduction alternative destrui (absente du De anima), voir Avi-
cenna latinus 1983, p. 34.
35 Un rapide survol d’une vingtaine de manuscrits, outre ceux consultés par Pattin, nous
a montré que le cas de l’omission est le mieux attesté dans la tradition manuscrite (y
compris dans le manuscrit Aoste, Seminario maggiore 71). Elle est confirmée par les com-
mentaires de Thomas d’Aquin et de Gilles de Rome et, en plus, par deux des trois traduc-
tions latin-hébraïques (mais la troisième de celles-ci confirme la leçon nec permutantur),
voir Rothschild 1994, p. 445. Toutefois, la traduction vel permutantur se trouve, outre dans
les quatre manuscrits désignés par Pattin, dans quelques autres, tels par exemple, Troyes,
BM 1374 ; Rouen, BM 920; Chicago, Vault Case 23.
36 Vansteenkiste 1967, p. 63, où il note : « l’arabo ha soltanto un verbo (che significa permutan-
tur, ma che viene anche tradotto con corrumpere e destruere) ; l’ espressione sembra essere
dunque un doppione, forse dello stesso traduttore, e potrebbe essere stato con vel, conser-
vato da O [= Vat. Ottob. Lat. 1415]». Pour le rôle des conjonctions dans la formulation de
doubles traductions, voir Janssens 2002, p. 118-120.
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que la leçon non destruuntur vel permutantur était présente dans l’exemplaire
du traducteur, qui hésitait entre ces deux verbes latins pour savoir lequel ren-
dait lemieux l’arabe – le second ayant l’avantage d’être plus littéral, le premier
d’être plus adapté au sens général du chapitre. On comprend aisément qu’un
copiste ait cru que ce vel soit inadéquat dans la mesure où il semble suggérer
que les choses éternelles soit ne sont pas détruites, soit subissent un chan-
gement, et, afin d’arriver à une affirmation plus cohérente, l’ a remplacé par
neque. Un autre copiste a sans doute estimé que l’alternative était trop littérale
et l’a par conséquent supprimée37. Il est clair que c’est cette dernière version
qui a été la plus répandue. Mais, somme toute, il est hautement probable que
l’expressionnondestruuntur vel permutantur corresponde lemieux à la traduc-
tion originale. Selon le poids que l’on accorde tantôt à approcher aumaximum
la traduction d’origine, tantôt à valoriser la réception de cette traduction, on
éditera donc soit la formule telle que nous l’avons exprimée, soit on se limitera
à non destruuntur. En aucun cas, la formule non destruuntur neque permutan-
tur, que Pattin a choisie (tout en mettant entre crochets neque permutantur)
ne mérite de figurer dans le textus38.
Enfin, nous ne voulons pas passer sous silence les multiples occasions où
l’on trouve, dans un ou plusieurs manuscrits, causare / causatum / causans au
lieu de creare / creatum / creans, ou alors, bien que ce soit plus exceptionnel,
l’ inverse. On pourrait spontanément songer à un essai de traduction double
(ou alternative). Généralement parlant, la variante qui ne correspond pas vrai-
ment au terme original arabe (causare, etc. fautivement pour b d ‘ et creare,
etc. fautivement pour ‘ l l) n’est attestée que dans un nombre plutôt infime de
manuscrits. Tout indique qu’ il s’agissait donc d’une confusion faisant suite à
une lecture fautive qui a eu lieu au cours de la transmission de la traduction (la
confusion entre les deux termes latins étant somme toute courante en raison
des abréviations)39. Cependant, une étude approfondie à ce sujet est souhai-
table et reste donc à faire.
37 Nous avons observé le même phénomène dans l’Avicenne latin, voir Janssens 2002, p. 118.
38 Si la traduction latine offre effectivement un essai de double traduction, elle correspond
pleinement au texte arabe, tel qu’ il est attesté dans les trois manuscrits connus.
39 Il est d’un intérêt particulier de remarquer que dans la Philosophia prima de l’Avicenne
latin, ne figure qu’une seule occurrence (Avicenna latinus 1980, p. 481, 51) de causatis là
où creatis était normalement attendu, ce qui conduit plutôt vers une lecture fautive que
vers une réelle double traduction ou traduction alternative. De façon plutôt surprenante,
S. Van Riet n’offre aucune note.
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2 Traductions alternatives (de type exclusif )
La traduction de la conjonction wa- dans une etmême occurrence par et et sed
peut être considérée comme l’expression d’un essai de traduction alternative.
Ce cas se présente en I, 11,31 et 3340.
L’expression [apponitur vel] parificatur (II, 25,91), retenue par Pattin, est
sans doute beaucoup plus significative, même si aucun des dix manuscrits
témoins ne la porte41. Toutefois, la formule apponitur vel parificatur est attes-
tée dans quelquesmanuscrits, tels que : Assise, BC 663 ; Berlin Staatsbibliothek,
M 1494, Lat. Qu. 449 ; Munich, BSB Clm 527 et Rennes, BM 149. Mais la tradition
manuscrite révèle l’existence d’une variété nettement plus grande :
– opponitur vel parificatur :
Bruges, Bibliothèque de la Ville 463 ; Tolède, Bibl. del Cabildo 97-1 ; Paris,
BnF, lat. 16082 ; Florence, Bibl. Laur., Ashburnham 1674 ; Bologne, Bibl. Univ.
2344 ; Rouen, BM 920; Troyes, BM 1374 ; Bordeaux BM 421 ; Vienne, ÖNB 2491 ;
Genève, BGE, Lat. 76 ; Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 837 ; Cava de’
Tirreni (Salerne), B. SS. Trinità 31 ; Madrid, BN 489. Le ms. Aoste, Sem. Magg.
71 : opponitur dans le texte42, mais ajoute de vel parificatur dans la marge.
– opponitur et parificatur :
Angers, BM 450
– opponitur / parificatur :
Bruges BC 102/125 : opponitur dans le texte, parificatur au-dessus de la ligne ;
Cologny, Bodmer CB 10 : opponitur dans le texte, parificatur (dans une autre
encre) au-dessus de la ligne ;
– opponitur :
Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale 2314 ; Assisi BC 298 ; Césène, Bibl. Malates-
tiana, Ms. Plut. XXII, Dext. 6 ; Paris, BnF, lat. 6318.
– opponitur exponctué, parificatur dans la marge :
Tours, BM 680.
– parificatur :
Vat. Lat. 2089 ; Oxford, Bodl., Selden sup. 24 ; Césène, Bibl. Malatestiana, Ms.
Plut. XXIII, Dext. 6 ; Erfurt, Ca-2-00363 ; Évreux, BM 79; BerlinM 1491, Lat. Qu.
48.
40 Taylor 1981, p. 438, notes 7 et 8, observe à juste titre que la conjonction wa- «may be trans-
lated here as sed or et».
41 Pattin 1966, p. 139, note 91, affirme que le verbe apponitur est attesté dans lemanuscrit Vat.
Urb. Lat. 206, ainsi que dans le commentaire de Gilles de Rome. Cette dernière affirma-
tion est erronée, car Gilles lit clairement le seul verbe parificatur (Gilles de Rome, Super
Librum de causis, f. 8vX).
42 Taylor 1981, p. 443, lit à tort apponitur.
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– apponitur :
Vat. Lat. 206 ; Vat., Ottob. Lat. 1415 ; Chicago, Vault Case MS. 23.
Notons encore que le manuscrit Erfurt, Ca-4-00018 porte ponitur (pour oppo-
nitur ?) et que le manuscrit Admont, cod. 405 est abimé à cet endroit, mais il
semble que le copiste ait effacé unmot avant d’écrire opponitur au-dessus de la
ligne. Ces manuscrits sont donc plutôt indicateurs d’une leçon qui se limite au
seul verbe opponitur. Enfin, dans le manuscrit Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek
1339 opponitur a été exponctué et remplacé par coextenditur dans la marge par
une autre main et dans une autre encre43.
Nous inclinons à croire que le traducteur a hésité comment lire le verbe
arabe : yuḥāḏī (opponitur) ou yuğārī (parificatur)44. En effet, en l’absence de
points diacritiques, la graphie des deux verbes arabes est très similaire. La tra-
dition manuscrite indique de façon assez nette que les deux verbes opponitur
et parificatur étaient tous deux présents dans l’archétype, pourvus ou non de
la conjonction vel. Dans la suite, à un moment qu’ il est difficile voire impos-
sible à déterminer, on voit la suppression d’un des deux verbes, conduisant à
l’existence de deux nouvelles familles, dont l’une n’atteste que le seul verbe
opponitur, l’ autre que le seul verbe parificatur. Le manuscrit de Tours, BM 680
est incontestablement éclairant pour ce développement, car son copiste a clai-
rement les deux verbes sous les yeux, mais il exponctue opponitur et le rem-
43 Sans doute, sur la base du contexte (quoniam extenditur cum ea), un lecteur attentif du
manuscrit aura saisi que la leçon opponitur fait problème et opté pour une correction en
coextenditur, qui donne lieu, toutefois, à une affirmation assez redondante.
44 Les trois manuscrits arabes connus portent la leçon yuğārī sans points diacritiques, sauf
que le manuscrit de Leyde vocalise le y du début et suggère ainsi une lecture tuğārī (voir
Taylor 1981, p. 146, l. 3 [Bāb, 22, l. 14]). Badawi, dans son édition (voir Badawi 1955, p. 5,
note 8), opte pour une lecture yuḥāḏī. Cette correction d’auteur ne se comprend pas faci-
lement, car le contexte invite plutôt à lire yuğārī. Aurait-elle été faite sur la base de la
traduction latine? D’autre part, nous doutons l’affirmation de Vansteenkiste (voir Vans-
teenkiste 1967, p. 62) selon laquelle le verbe ğārī peut avoir le sens d’opponere. Rothschild
(Rothschild 1994, p. 415, note 6) affirme que le verbe opponere a ici le sens secondaire de
«mettre en regard» et que ce sens est attesté en latin classique, mais nous n’avons trouvé
que celui de «placer devant». En outre, d’après lui, les deux verbes opponere et parificari
paraissent mieux correspondre à ḥāḏī, «être vis-à-vis de», ce qui nous paraît discutable.
Signalons encore que dans cette même note, Rothschild indique que les trois traductions
latino-hébraïques avaient dans leur modèle soit le seul verbe opponitur, soit le seul verbe
parificatur : elles portent en effet trois formes différentes (šāwwōt,mešuwwōt, yišetawwōt)
de la racine šwh qui signifie principalement l’«égalité» et de manière moins aisée, mais
possible, la «mise sur un même pied», la «comparaison» (v. Klatzkin 1933 (en hébreu), t.
IV, p. 78-80) ; tant à cause du sens de la racine hébraïque que de celui des termes latins, le
rapport avec parificatur paraît malgré tout le plus immédiat et le plus indiscutable. (Nous
remercions très vivement M. Rothschild pour cette précision.)
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place – en marge, il est vrai – par l’autre verbe, à savoir parificatur. Quant à la
leçon apponitur, elle résulte sans doute de la démarche d’un copiste intelligent
qui a saisi que la leçon opponitur pose problème d’un point de vue doctrinal.
Afin d’y ‘remédier’, celui-ci a choisi le verbe apponitur qui se rapproche davan-
tage de parificatur, sans en être pour autant un parfait synonyme, croyant vrai-
sembablement qu’opponitur était le fruit d’une lecture erronée d’apponitur
par un copiste.
3 Omissions
Une partie importante des omissions suggérées dans l’édition Pattin sont
basées sur la version du texte original tel que celui-ci a été préservé dans
le manuscrit de Leyde. Souvent, pourtant, le latin se révèle ici conforme au
texte arabe tel qu’ il est attesté dans les manuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul.
Il en va ainsi pour I, 5,16 ; VI(VII), 69,86 ; X(XI), 102,59 ; XIII(XIV), 123,43 et
123,49 ; XVI(XVII), 139,20 ; XVII(XVIII), 148,62 ; XVIII(XIX), 154,95 ; XIX(XX), 158,19
et 159,31, 34 ; XX(XXI), 164,59 et 164,60.
Des cas plus délicats constituent XXII(XXIII), 175,9 et XXIX(XXX), 204,78. Pat-
tin y supplée chaque fois la négation non, ce qui s’ impose en effet d’un point de
vue doctrinal. Dans le premier cas, la négation lā est présente dans le manus-
crit de Leyde (et confirmé par ʿAbd al-Lāṭif al-Baġdādī), mais pas dans ceux
d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul, alors que dans le second elle est absente de tous les
trois témoins arabes. On peut donc se demander avec Taylor s’ il est justifié de
suppléer dans un cas comme dans l’autre la négation dans la traduction latine
contre la tradition manuscrite arabe (surtout dans le second cas, où elle est
unanime), et, ajouterions-nous, contre le témoignage du commentaire littéral
de Gilles de Rome45.
Dans deux cas, il est possible qu’ il y ait eu une omission volontaire de la part
du traducteur car les affirmations sont assez redondantes :
45 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 80rT et 100vE. Avant d’apporter un jugement
définitif, il faudra examiner en détail l’ ensemble de la tradition manuscrite de la tra-
duction latine. Observons encore que l’absence de la négation en XXII(XXIII), 175, 9, est
confirmée par les traductions hébraïques de Juda, d’Ḥabilio (à partir de la traduction
latine) et de Zeraḥyah (basée directement sur le texte arabe) (voir Rothschild 1994, p. 468,
note 2) et celle en XXIX(XXX), 204, 78 par celles de Juda et de Zeraḥyah, mais pas de Ḥabi-
lio (Rothschild 1994, p. 479, note 3). Que ce dernier ait lu non dans son modèle, comme
Rothschild le suppose, n’est pas absolument certain, car il se pourrait qu’ il ait senti le
besoin d’ introduire la négation afin de sauvegarder la cohérence doctrinale.
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– en X(XI), 102,61, la spécification «qui tombent sous la génération et la cor-
ruption (al-wāqiʿat taḥtu l-kawn wa-l-fasād)», car elle exprime exactement
la même idée que l’adjectif destructibiles, qui précède ;
– en XXXII(XXXIII), 218,98, l’ addition «et qu’ il [à savoir un deuxième Un sup-
posé en concurrence avec l’Un véritable] soit un comme lui (wa-kāna wāḥi-
dan miṯlihi)», car il a déjà été affirmé que cet Un supposé ressemble à tous
les égards à l’Un véritable.
Cependant, plutôt que de signaler une omission dans le textus, il nous semble
préférable de formuler pour ces cas unenote indiquant simplementque le texte
arabe ajoute une affirmation redondante – ce qu’ il est possible de faire dans un
apparat qui discute le rapport précis entre le texte arabe et la traduction latine.
Quant à l’omission d’etiam (ar. ayḍan) en VI(VII), 70,90 et XV(XVI), 131,85,
elle pourrait avoir sa source dans la transmission de la traduction latine. En
effet, à causede l’abréviationmédiévale, un copiste apucroire àun iteravit de la
conjonction etqui précède.Mais elle pourrait aussi résulter d’un choix délibéré
du traducteur ou encore de l’absence du terme ayḍan dans le modèle du tra-
ducteur. Si la première hypothèse s’avérait correcte et que l’on trouvait etiam
attesté dans au moins un manuscrit, il serait préférable de l’ introduire dans le
textus et d’ indiquer son omission dans un (grand) nombre demanuscrits. Mais
il ne s’agit plus alors d’une omission. Quant aux deux autres hypothèses, elles
reconduisent à l’ idée d’une note dans un apparat séparé.
L’omission, qui est clairement présente en IX(X), 96,33, et qui est confir-
mée par les traductions latino-hébraïques46, résulte probablement d’un saut
du même au même, lié au texte arabe dans le modèle du traducteur : inbijāsan
kulliyyan mutawaḥḥidan… inbijāsan kulliyyan mutawaḥḥidan47. Si cela s’avère
correct, le traducteur latin a lu : ‘aruḍaminḏālikaan takūna l-ṣuwarallatī tanba-
jasa min al-ʿuqūl al-awwal (…) inbijāsan kulliyyan mutawaḥḥidan. Il a pu alors
considérer la séquence allatī… al-awwal commeune phrase relative qui précise
de quel genre de formes (ṣuwar) il s’agit et a pu par conséquent, lier inbijā-
san directement avec le verbe takūn – verbe qu’ il traduit, conformément au
contexte, par procedant plutôt que par la traduction habituelle sint. Il est néan-
moins intéressant de voir que Gilles de Rome insiste dans son commentaire48
sur ce qu’ implique de différent cette procession universelle des intellects pre-
miers au niveau des intellects seconds : supple inde accidit quod ex intelligentiis
secundis procedunt formae processione particulari multiplicata. Il couvre ainsi
46 Rothschild 1994, p. 442-443, note 1.
47 Nous remercions les participants du colloque d’avoir attiré notre attention sur l’extension
précise de l’omission.
48 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 38rN.
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presque littéralement une large partie de l’omission où il est explicitement dit,
dans le texte arabe, que les formes «procèdent des intellects seconds selon une
procession particulière et multiple» (mss Ankara et Istanbul ; ms Leyde : dis-
tincte)49.
Un cas particulier concerne la proposition XVIII(XIX), 150,75. Comme ce
cas fait partie d’une affirmation assez corrompue dans son ensemble, nous le
discuterons plus tard, lorsque nous nous pencherons avec une attention parti-
culière sur la complexité de la transmission de la traduction latine.50
Enfin, le passage XIX(XX), 159, 29–31, pourrait laisser croire à une seconde
omission à la même ligne 31, non signalée par Pattin et qui serait à placer après
la conjonction et. Mais la traduction latine soulève ici de larges difficultés. On
peut y lire (selon l’édition Pattin) : scilicet quando agens et factum sunt per ins-
trumentum et [or cette conjonction est absente dans six des dix manuscrits
témoins et devrait, selon nous, être supprimée] non facit per esse suum et sunt
composita51. Le texte arabe affirme: aʿnī iḏā kāna l-fāʿil yafʿalu bi-āla lā yafʿalu
bi-anniyyatihi wa-kānat anniyyatuhumurakkabat (« je veux dire, quand l’agent
agit (en utilisant) un instrument, il n’agit pas par son essence et son essence
n’est pas composée»). Toutefois, le traducteur latin a lu de toute évidence dans
sonmodèle : aʿnī iḏā kāna l-fāʿil wa-l-mafʿul, leçon attestée dans lemanuscrit de
Leyde. Cela explique le début de sa traduction, quando agens et factum sunt per
instrumentum, à conditionde comprendre suntper dans le sensde«sontmis en
rapport». Immédiatement après, non facit per esse suum, peut sous-entendre,
comme le fait le texte arabe, agens avant facit, même si ce sous-entendu reste
moins évident dans la traduction latine que dans le texte arabe. Quant à la fin
de sa traduction, et sunt composita, elle se détourne clairement de l’arabe, sauf
si le substantif anniyya avait à faire défaut dans son modèle, ce qui n’est pas le
cas dans les trois manuscrits connus. La traduction originale portait-elle alors
49 Taylor 1981, 183,16-184,17.
50 Voir infra, p. 295.
51 Pattin 1966, p. 179, l. 31 signale une omission après suum, mais celle-ci est conforme aux
manuscrits arabes d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul. Il est par contre plus étonnant qu’ ilmaintienne
la première occurrence de la conjonction et dans le textus, alors que la majorité de ses
manuscrits l’omettent en conformité avec le texte arabe ; en plus, l’ absence de la conjonc-
tion dans la traduction latine est confirmée par les traductions latino-hébraïques, voir
Rothschild 1994, p. 462, où on lit dans la traduction française reposant principalement sur
le texte de Juda Romano: «… par un instrument, [l’agent] n’agit pas…» (hébr. hēm bi-kelī
ēynō pō ʿēl) ; la traduction plus tardive de ‘Eli Ḥabilio comporte en revanche la conjonc-
tion : hū’ be-ʾemṣaʿūt kelī we-loʾ yīfʿal (Rothschild 2013, p. 341). La traduction française du
Liber de causis (voir Magnard et alii 1990, p. 71), ainsi que la traduction allemande (voir
Fidora, Niederberger, 2001, p. 105) maintiennent la lecture de Pattin, mais suppléent, sans
l’ indiquer, «agent» (Bewirkendes) avant leur traduction du verbe agit.
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et est esse suum compositum, ou tout simplement : et est compositum, en sup-
posant que le traducteur ait estimé redondante l’addition d’esse suum? Mais
n’est-ce pas là modifier de façon (purement) hypothétique la traduction latine
en fonction du texte arabe? Certes, mais ce n’est qu’après examen de tous les
manuscrits qu’ il sera possible de décider si le traducteur a trouvé une omission
dans son modèle, ou si l’omission s’est produite lors de la transmission de la
traduction latine et a pu donner lieu au changement du singulier du verbe est,
en son pluriel sunt, après l’omission d’esse suum.
4 Le latin médiéval
Notre traduction appartient au douzième siècle ; il n’est donc pas exclu que
certains mots soient compris dans un sens typique au latin médiéval ou soient
écrits selon une graphie spécifiquement médiévale.
En ce qui concerne la graphie, nous n’avons détecté qu’un cas qui mérite
une attention particulière. Il s’agit de (causa) exemplaria pour (causa) exem-
plaris (XIII[XIV], 119,29). Dans la tradition manuscrite, les deux formes exem-
plaria et exemplaris sont attestées avec, à première vue, une légère majorité
de cas portant la dernière forme, majorité parmi laquelle se trouve le manus-
crit d’Aoste, Seminario maggiore 71 – mais pas le manuscrit Vat. Ottob. Lat.
1415. On voit mal pour quelle raison, si exemplaris se trouvait dans l’archétype,
un copiste l’aurait modifié en exemplaria, qui est une forme extrêmement
rare. Nous n’avons pas trouvé la graphie exemplarius comme alternative pour
l’adjectif exemplaris dans les dictionnaires de latin médiéval à notre dispo-
sition, sauf sous une forme substantivée signifiant alors «copiste»52. Toute-
fois, Pattin avait déjà signalé que cette graphie était attestée dans le Thesau-
rus linguae latinae, où se trouve une référence unique empruntée au Corpus
inscriptionum Latinarum (CIL)53. En outre, la leçon (causa) exemplaria est pré-
sente dans le commentaire deGilles de Rome, qui cite littéralement le passage :
hoc ergo… causa exemplaria, pour ajouter immédiatement après idest causa
exemplaris54. Cette dernière spécification montre que Gilles est conscient du
52 Latham et alii 1975-2013, p. 840.
53 Pattin 1966, p. 165, note m ; Thesaurus linguae latinae, tome V2, col. 1326, avec référence
à CIL VIII, 26622. Ce dernier présente une inscription sur une fontaine dans un jardin à
Thygga (Dougga-Tunisie), mais l’honnêteté oblige à reconnaître que le mot exemplarius
(patrono exemplario) résulte d’un essai de reconstruction du texte, car le monument ne
porte pas davantage que patro (espace blanc) plario.
54 Gilles deRome, SuperLibrumdecausis, f. 46rG. Il est étonnant quedans la citationdupara-
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caractère inhabituel de cette graphie, car il sent le besoin de dire explicitement
qu’ il y a identité de sens parfaite entre cette graphie et celle, plus habituelle,
d’exemplaris. Plus frappant encore est le fait qu’ il ne considère pas cette gra-
phie comme fautive, ce qui aurait simplement requis une correction en exem-
plaris. Nous inclinons à croire que la lectio difficilior (causa) exemplaria figurait
dans l’exemplaire du traducteur et a été corrigée ensuite par un copiste en
exemplaris, qui aurait quant à lui cru à une erreur de copiste dans le modèle
(erreur de copiste qui se serait produite à cause d’une attraction avec le a final
du mot causa qui précède).
En III, 33,17, le texte latin selon l’édition Pattin porte stramentum. Ce choix
peut surprendre car ce terme n’est présent que dans deux des dix manuscrits
témoins. Mais l’ important manuscrit Vat. Ottob. Lat. 1415 est l’un de ces deux
témoins55 ; en outre, le mot figure dans les commentaires d’Albert le Grand,
Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome56. En latin classique ce mot signifie «ce
dont on jonche le sol» ou encore «couverture» ; en latinmédiéval, il peut avoir
le sens plus précis de tapis (de prière), ce qui correspond plus oumoins aumot
arabe bisāṭprésent dans le texte arabe tel qu’ il est conservé dans lesmanuscrits
d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul57. La remarque de Gilles de Rome dans son commen-
graphe qui commence la Secunda pars principalis commenti, l’ édition de la Renaissance
porte exemplaris.
55 L’autre manuscrit reconnu comme important, à savoir celui d’Aoste, propose aussi cette
leçon, voir Taylor 1989, p. 89, nº. 12. Notons que Vansteenkiste 1967, p. 62-63 avait déjà
indiqué qu’ il fallait supprimer les crochets que Pattin avait mis autour de stramentum.
Mais Vansteenkiste ne dit rien à propos du sens précis de ce terme dans ce cas-ci. De plus,
il se base sur l’édition de Bardenhewer pour établir un lien avec lemot arabe bisāṭ. Cepen-
dant, il nementionne pas le fait que Bardenhewer a opté pour ce choix en se basant sur la
traduction latine.Deplus, dans sonpetit lexique arabo-latin, il rapporte la racine bsṭ (p. 70,
sub 6) à trois mots latins très différents : stramentum, expansus et simplex, mais oublie de
préciser que stramentum correspond à l’arabe bisāṭ ; expansus àmabsūṭ et simplex à basīṭ
(qui, à son tour, rend le grec ἁπλοῦς). Suite à cette confusion due à l’approche peu rigou-
reuse de Vansteenkiste, Rothschild 1994, p. 418, note 10 (aussi Rothschild 2013, p. 75), a
critiqué à tort – comme le montre notre exposé – le choix de la leçon stramentum. Roth-
schild considère sans doute que le fait que les traductions latino-hébraiques témoignent
toutes de la leçon “instrumentum”, vient renforcer sa critique. Il est toutefois regrettable
qu’ il ignore la présence de bisāṭ dans deux des troismanuscrits arabes connus (et dans un
des témoins indirects arabes, voir infra, note 57). Par contre, il explique très bien comment
un copiste a pu lire facilement sicut instrumentum au lieu de sicut(i) stramentum.
56 Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis, p. 80, l. 24 et p. 87, l. 48 ; Thomas
d’Aquin, Expositio super Librum de causis, p. 23, l. 11 ; Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de cau-
sis, f. 12v.
57 Pour ce sens en latin médiéval, voir Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon, p. 994 ; pour «tapis (éten-
du)» comme traduisant bisāṭ, voir Dictionnaire arabe-français, t. I, p. 126. Observons
encore que la leçon bisāṭ n’est pas seulement celle desmanuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul,
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taire nous semble pourtant d’une signification capitale lorsqu’ il note, après
avoir cité le bout de phrase (causavit animam) : «posuit eam sicut stramentum:
aliqui textus habent instrumentum sed melior littera est que dicit stramen-
tum». Gilles a accès à plusieurs, en tout cas au moins deux manuscrits, où il
a pu lire tantôt stramentum, tantôt instrumentum58. Sans hésitation aucune, il
opte pour la première de ses lectures et indique que cela implique que la Cause
première stravit eam [à savoir, l’ âme] operationi intelligentiae. Par ailleurs, la
leçon stramentum est confirmée dans le commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin qui
offre une explication identique à celle de Gilles, la seule différence étant que
Gilles utilise le verbe stravit, alors que Thomas opte pour substravit. Mais les
deux verbes ont fondamentalement le même sens59. Dans le contexte philoso-
phique du Liber de causis, lemot paraît donc avoir plutôt le sens de «substrat»,
de quelque chose qui sert de «fondement», or c’est un sens attesté en latin
médiéval.60
Une compréhension spécifiquement médiévale du verbe sequi est sans
doute en jeu en I, 3,8 (sequitur). Richard Taylor a déjà bien expliqué que le
verbe arabe waliya – dont la signification usuelle est «suivre» – a ici le sens
de «être adjacent à» et opte en conséquence pour une lecture en latin (lignes
9-10) causa universalis secunda quae sequitur ipsum [à savoir, le causatum] au
lieude : causauniversalis secundaquae sequitur ipsam [à savoir, la causaprima],
lecture présente dans l’édition Pattin61. Mais n’est-ce pas imposer au verbe
latin un sens qu’ il n’a nullement? Jean-Pierre Rothschild fait état d’une tra-
duction malencontreuse et inexacte, dont les traducteurs hébraïques ne sont
pas venus à bout ou dont ils ont escamoté la difficulté62. Par ailleurs, dans
les commentaires d’Albert le Grand, Guillaume de Leus et Johannes Wenck
figure la leçon sequitur ipsam63, conformément à la majorité des manuscrits
témoins de l’édition Pattin64. Néanmoins, la consultation d’une trentaine de
manuscrits nous a révélé qu’un peu plus de la moitié d’entre eux témoignent
mais elle est confirmée, en outre, par le Kitāb al-fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim d’al-ʿĀmirī (voirWakel-
nig 2006, p. 182).
58 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 12v.
59 Thomas d’Aquin, Expositio super Librum de causis, p. 23.
60 Fuchs et alii 1970-2005, vol. VII, p. S 788. Magnard et alii 1990, p. 43, traduit stramentum
par «une assise (pour)», alors que Fidora, Niederberger 2001, p. 43, la rendent par Unter-
lage. Il se pourrait que la compréhensionphilosophique aumoyenâgedumot stramentum
comme «substrat» ait eu son origine dans le passage sous discussion.
61 Taylor 1978, spécialement p. 170-172.
62 Rothschild 2013, p. 74.
63 Voir respectivement Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis, p. 67, l. 63 ; Carron
2016, p. 531, l. 24 ; Meliadò 2016, p. 262, l. 8.
64 Pattin 1966, p. 134, note 8 indique que seulement deux des dixmanuscrits consultés par lui
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d’une leçon ipsum, ce qui est une indication sérieuse en faveur de l’hypothèse
selon laquelle cette lectio difficilior était effectivement celle du traducteur lui-
même. Comme l’a observé Taylor, la variante ipsam a toutes les chances d’être
le fruit de l’ intervention d’un copiste, qui a constaté une contradiction inhé-
rente à l’affirmation, en comprenant le verbe sequitur dans son sens ordinaire
de «suit». Mais le verbe latin peut-il avoir une autre sens? Cette idée est loin
d’être évidente si l’on consulte les dictionnaires de latin classique et de latin
médiéval. Néanmoins, nous avons trouvé dans le Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon
Minus un sens qui n’ inclut pas l’ idée d’une suite successive, à savoir «se rat-
tacher à»65. Si ce sens n’exprime pas exactement l’ idée de «être adjacent à», il
évite néanmoins l’ idée d’une «suite». On ne peut donc nullement exclure que
Gérard de Crémone, comme traducteur latin, ait donné ce sens, ou un sens qui
lui soit proche, au verbe sequi à l’ intérieur de ce contexte.
Un dernier cas qui mérite l’attention est l’utilisation du verbe excusare en
I, 4,11 comme traduction du verbe istaġnā (ʿan), «être capable de se dispen-
ser (de quelque chose)», «ne pas avoir besoin (de quelque chose)», incluant
donc l’ idée d’«être suffisant à soi-même». Nous avons cherché en vain un tel
sens dans un dictionnaire de latin. Rothschild, conscient du problème, signale
que le verbe latin, pourrait avoir signifié ici, au vu de l’arabe, «être exempt,
dispensé»66. De façon surprenante, un sens semblable prévaut dans la tra-
duction de certaines parties des livres naturels du Shifāʾ d’Avicenne effectuée
à Burgos entre 1275 et 128067. D’autre part, dans la traduction du De anima
de ce même ouvrage, réalisée un siècle plutôt à Tolède par Gundissalinus et
Avendauth, le verbe excusare traduit à deux reprises l’arabe kafā, qui peut
signifier «avoir quelqu’un exempt de»68. Notons enfin que dans le Flos Alfa-
rabii (traduction partielle des ʿUyūn al-masāʾil généralement attribuée à Gun-
portent ipsum. Cela n’est pas correct, car aumoins un des huit autres manuscrits, à savoir
Bruges, Bibliothèque de la ville 463 (ms A de Pattin), a cette leçon.
65 Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon, p. 960.
66 Rothschild 2013, p. 76.
67 Avicenna latinus 1987, p. 4, l. 49 : excusatum est a (probatione) dans un contexte où il est
affirmé que ce qui est évident est exempt de preuve ; p. 127, l. 81 : excusat (dicere istam dubi-
tationem), à savoir qu’on est dispensé d’exposer le doute évoqué auparavant ; et Avicenna
latinus 1989, p. 75, 1 : (nos) excusat a (reiteratione), signifiant ici «nous exempt de répéter»
(dans les trois cas, le texte arabe porte yuġnī [‘an]). Pour la datation de cette traduction,
voir Avicenna latinus 1987, p. 67*–68*.
68 Avicenna latinus 1968, p. 183, 94 : excusat (nos ab hoc labore), signifiant ici «nous exempte
de ce fardeau», et Avicenna latinus 1972, p. 234, l. 83 : excusat (laborem egrediendi spiritum
ad aerem), ce qui veut dire en contexte «dispense le pneuma de la peine de se mouvoir
vers l’air». Pour la datation de cette traduction, voir Avicenna latinus 1972, p. 92*–95* ; en
ce qui concerne les noms de ces traducteurs, voir ibid., p. 98*–103*.
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dissalinus) on trouve et non excusatio esse eius a causa pour traduire fa-lā
ġaniya bi-wuḡūdihi ‘an al-ʿilla, «car il [= le possible] ne peut pas être exempt
de cause quand il existe»69. Sur base de ces constatations, il paraît donc rai-
sonnable de penser que le verbe excusare pouvait, dès la seconde moitié du
douzième siècle, avoir le sens de «dispenser», «exempter». Reste par contre
le problème de savoir s’ il faut lire avec l’édition Pattin : excusat, ou s’ il faut
préférer, comme le suggèrent Vansteenkiste et Rothschild, la variante excusa-
tur70. Les deux formes sont attestées dans la tradition manuscrite, mais, sur
la base d’un survol d’une trentaine de manuscrits, la forme passive s’avère la
plus établie. Elle est en plus présente dans les commentaires de Guillaume
de Leus et Johannes Wenck71. Enfin, elle semble être confirmée par les trois
traductions latino-hébraïques72. Par contre, un bon nombre de manuscrits,
dont l’Ottobonianus et celui d’Aoste, portent la forme active, qui a très vrai-
semblablement constitué la base de la traduction latino-hébraïque de Ḥabi-
lio. Il n’est donc pas aisé de trancher. Certes, on peut admettre avec Roth-
schild que la forme passive semble préférable d’un point de vue grammati-
cal, mais est-ce suffisant? Enfin, il existe encore un problème additionnel, car
on trouve une troisième variante, à savoir excludit, attestée au moins dans
le manuscrit St. Gallen, Stiftsbibl., Cod. Sang. 837, f. 22. Le même verbe, au
passif cette fois, se retrouve dans le commentaire de Gilles de Rome, f. 2rK,
qui explique la citation «non excluditur ipsius [i.e., causae secundae] actio a
causa prima quae est supra ipsam» de la façon suivante : «quasi dicat quod
actio causae secundae non excludit immo praesupponit actionem causae pri-
mae». Il semble que Gilles trouve la formulation de la traduction latine inha-
bituelle et sente par conséquent le besoin de la reformuler (quasi dicat) dans
un latin plus ordinaire. Il est pourtant frappant de voir qu’ il ne mentionne pas
la leçon excusat / excusatur, ce qui indique qu’ il ne l’a nulle part vue dans la
69 Cruz Hernández 1951, p. 308, l. 40 (arabe) et p. 317, l. 14-15 (latin).
70 Vansteenkiste 1967, p. 78 ; Rothschild 1994, p. 408 (note 5B) et 2013, p. 76.
71 Carron 2016, p. 532, l. 1 ; Meliadò 2016, p. 262, l. 1. Observons que Pattin 1966, 134, note 11
indique de façon injustifiée que le commentaire de Guillaume porte la variante excludi-
tur. En fait, celle-ci est présente dans le commentaire de Gilles de Rome (voir la suite de
l’exposé).
72 Rothschild 2013, p. 292-293. Hillel : loʾ tippāšēr peʿullat ha-ri’šōnāh, « l’action de la première
ne se dissout pas» ; Juda Romano: loʾ tūsar peʿullat ha-ri’šōnāh, « l’action de la première
n’est pas ôtée» ; ‘Eli Ḥabilio : lo’ yeḥdal ʿim zeh poʿal ha-sibbāh ha-ri’šōnāh, « l’action de
la cause première ne cesse pas pour autant». La première et la troisième de ces traduc-
tions semblent reposer plutôt sur excusatur, la seconde pourrait se justifier aussi à partir
d’excluditur. M. Rothschild nous signale que, par suite d’une erreur de renvoi au texte, les
citations de l’hébreu dans son article de 1994, p. 407, n. 5 et dans celui de 2013, p. 76 sont
inadéquates.
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documentation à sa disposition, qui impliquait l’accès à aumoins deuxmanus-
crits, comme nous l’avons déjà montré73.
5 Complexité de la transmission de la traduction
Dans ce qui suit, nous ne discuterons pas tous les passages qui risquent de
soulever des difficultés sérieuses à tout qui se voudrait le futur éditeur d’une
nouvelle édition critique. Nous nous bornerons à discuter, à titre d’exemple,
trois cas à propos desquels Taylor a proposé une autre lecture que celle de
l’édition Pattin.
(1) En I, 17,59-62, on lit dans l’édition Pattin : «Quod est quia causa secunda
quando facit rem, influit causa prima quae est supra eam super illam rem de
virtute sua, quare adhaerit ei adhaerentia vehementi et servat eam». Taylor pro-
pose, sur la base de l’arabe fa-tulzima ḏālika l-shayʾa luzūman šadīdan qui
signifie «en sorte qu’elle [= la première cause) adhère à cette chose», ainsi
qu’en tenant compte de plusieurs manuscrits parmi lesquels Aoste et Vati-
can Ottobonianus, de lire le segment de phrase en italiques de la manière
suivante : «quare adhaerit illud rei adhaerentia vehementi»74. Cette lecture
trouve un appui indirect dans le commentaire d’Albert le Grand, car elle a
infixum adhaerat rei, ce qui indique qu’Albert avait illud dans sonmodèle et l’a
interprété comme infixum75. D’autres commentateurs, commeGilles de Rome,
Guillaume de Leus et Johannes Wenk confirment par contre la leçon ei, mais
tant Gilles que Guillaume comprennent ce pronom comme faisant référence
à la cause seconde, et non à la chose produite par celle-ci76. Cette position a
de quoi surprendre, car il semble plus naturel de comprendre le pronom ei
73 Voir supra, p. 293.
74 Fidora, Niederberger 2001, p. 38 adoptent cette variante en latin, mais ils traduisent (ibid.,
p. 39) : «weshalb sie jenem Ding stärker anhaftet», ce qui présuppose clairement une
leçon illi rei, non illud rei.
75 Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis, p. 68, l. 33-34. En interprétant ainsi
illud, et non en termes de l’action divine ni encoremoins de Dieu comme cause première
lui-même, Albert écarte complètement toute connotation panthéiste, voire panenthéiste.
Selon Pattin (Pattin 1966, p. 137, note 61), le commentaire de Bacon porterait aussi de la
leçon illud rei, mais nous n’avons pas trouvé un seul passage qui en témoignerait. Par
contre, la leçon est effectivement présente dans l’édition du Liber de causis qui suit celle
du commentaire, voir Roger Bacon, Quaestiones supra Librum de causis, p. 162, l. 15.
76 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 5vHH; Carron 2016, p. 537, l. 6 ; Meliadò 2016,
p. 264, l. 9.
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comme relaté à illam rem qui précède, donc en accord avec l’arabe : à la chose
produite par la cause seconde77. C’est ainsi qu’au moins deux des traductions
latino-hébraïques l’ont compris, lisant sans doute dans leur Vorlage : illi rei78.
Quand on regarde l’apparat de l’édition Pattin, on a l’ impression que les deux
variantes figurent dans un nombre presque égal des manuscrits. Un sondage
effectué dans une trentaine demanuscrits nous a révélé qu’ il n’en est pas ainsi.
En fait, un peu plus de la moitié de ces manuscrits portent la leçon illud rei et
seulement un cinquième ei. N’est-ce pas là une indication sérieuse en faveur
de la proposition deTaylor de remplacer cette dernière par la première? Et cela
d’autant plus qu’elle correspond à une lecture de l’arabe fa-yulzima (éd. Tay-
lor : fa-tulzima) ḏālika l-shayʾa luzūman šadīdan, attestée dans les manuscrits
d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul79, où ḏālika figure comme sujet de la phrase. Cette piste
écarte pourtant complètement le problèmeque soulèvede toute évidence cette
leçon. En effet, à quoi le pronom illud / ḏālika se réfère-t-il ? La réponse est sans
doute : « le fait que la cause première, qui est au-dessus de la cause seconde,
influe sur la chose, produite par celle-ci, de sa propre puissance», bref, l’ action
d’ influer de la cause première. Si cette lecture n’est pas entièrement dépourvue
de sens, elle ne tient pas compte de l’affirmation qui vient tout de suite après,
selon laquelle c’est plutôt la cause lointaine elle-même, et non son action, qui
continue à adhérer à la chose sur laquelle elle influe sa puissance, et qu’elle
conserve aprèsque la causeprochaine s’en soit séparée : «Iamergomanifestum
est et planumquodcausa longinquaest vehementius causa rei (…), et quod ipsa
influit virtutem suam super et servat eam (…), immo remanet in ea et adhaeret
ei adhaerentia vehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus».
En outre, d’un point de vue purement grammatical, tant en arabe qu’en
latin, il est loin d’être évident que ce pronom démonstratif puisse se référer
77 Il en va ainsi de la traduction française, basée sur une lecture du latin ei : «La raison en
est que lorsque la cause seconde produit une chose, la cause première, qui est au-dessus
d’elle, influe sur cette chose de par sa propre puissance. C’est pourquoi elle y [faisant
référence sans ambiguïté aucune à ‘cette chose’] adhère d’une adhérence plus forte et la
conserve» (Magnard et al. 1990, p. 41).
78 Rothschild 1994, p. 406, traduit l’hébreu de Juda Romano: «et [sous-entendu: la cause
première] y (= cette chose, produite par la cause seconde et recevant l’ influence de la
cause première) adhère» ; mais Juda Romano explicite : tiddebaq ʿim ōtō ha-dābār, «elle
adhère à cette même chose» ; de même ʿEli Ḥabilio : hīʾ meḥubberet la-dābār ha-hūʾ, «elle
est attachée à la chose en question» ; Hillel seul emploie des pronoms dont les référents
sont incertains, lisant probablement ei (Rothschild 2013, p. 294-295).
79 En l’absence de points diacritiques, comme c’était souvent le cas dans les manuscrits
anciens, la graphie des deux formes du verbe est identique et les deux lectures sont donc
également possibles. Taylor 1981, p. 142, note 39-40 remarque que lesmanuscrits d’Ankara
et d’ Istanbul (qui ne sont pas datés, mais relativement tardifs) portent la vocalisation yu.
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à l’ensemble de la phrase qui précède. On s’attend plutôt à ce qu’ il soit lié avec
lemot qui suit, qui est rei / l-shayʾa80. Dans ce sens, l’utilisation du pronom ei se
révèle plus adéquate, car il réfère à «cette chose-là», nonobstant son identifi-
cation dans certains commentaires avec la cause seconde, commenous l’avons
indiqué plus haut. Toutefois, on ne peut pas ignorer l’attestation massive de la
formulation illud rei. Pourrait-on imaginer à sa base une lecture fautive d’ illi
rei? Comme nous avons découvert cette dernière leçon dans trois manuscrits,
à savoir, Césène, Bibl. Malatestiana, Plut. XXIII, Dext. 6 ; Vienne, ÖNB 2491 et
Angers, BM 45081, cette hypothèse gagne en probabilité, d’autant plus que le
«i» d’ illi est pourvu d’un petit accent, comme d’ailleurs aussi le « i» du mot
rei qui suit. Un copiste pourrait avoir lu ce «i avec accent» comme un «d» et
avoir transformé ainsi illi en illud. Mais cela n’est pas à notre avis la seule expli-
cation possible. En effet, s’ il ne fait pas de doute que la leçon illi rei fut présente
dans l’archétype, car elle rend l’arabe de façon parfaite, on ne peut pourtant
pas exclure qu’ illud rei y figurait comme traduction alternative, dans lamesure
où le traducteur hésitait entre un pronom démonstratif lié à un substantif ou
un sujet de la phrase où il est question d’adhérence82. En somme, on se trouve
devant un choix compliqué quant à ce qu’ il faudrait mettre dans le textus
d’une éventuelle nouvelle édition critique : (1) illi rei, en fonction de la com-
préhension la plus évidente du texte l’arabe, qui paraît aussi avoir à son crédit
l’hébreu de deux des traducteurs, à moins qu’elle ne procède que d’un effort
d’éclaircissement de la part de ceux-ci ; ou (2) illud rei, en tenant compte de
ce dont témoignent la majorité desmanuscrits ; ou encore (3) tout simplement
ei, sur la base de la tradition des commentaires, mais, en même temps, d’une
minorité importante demanuscrits et d’une des traductions latino-hébraïques.
(2) En XI(XII), 107,79, on lit dans l’édition Pattin : agens in rem, à corriger
selon Taylor en agens (ou, éventuellement, agens vel quae est) in re, car le texte
arabe porte : (al-shay’) al-kāʾin fī l-shayʾ, « (la chose) qui est dans la chose»83.
Dans la partie de la traditionmanuscrite que nous avons examinée, nous avons
découvert que la vaste majorité porte ou bien agens in rem, ou bien agens in re,
sans qu’une nette préférence pour une de ces deux variantes ne se dessine, ce
80 La traduction anglaise queTaylor (voir Taylor 1981, p. 285) propose du texte arabe, à savoir :
«strongly adheres to that thing», en constitue une illustration parfaite.
81 En outre, il est à noter que le manuscrit St. Gallen, Stiftsbibl., Cod. Sang. 837 présente illi
sans l’addition rei.
82 Ce problème se posait certainement si le traducteur, dans son modèle, lisait fa-yulzima,
car dans le texte arabe aucun substantif masculin ne précède à l’ intérieur de la même
affirmation ; cette observation est à l’origine de la vocalisation tu(lzima) dans l’édition du
texte arabe de Taylor (Taylor 1981, p. 351-352).
83 Taylor 1989, p. 94, notes 45-46.
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qui ne correspond pas vraiment à ce que l’apparat de Pattin laisse croire. Les
commentaires de Gilles de Rome et de Thomas d’Aquin suivent clairement la
première leçon, tandis que les traditions latino-hébraïques avaient pour base
unmodèle où figurait la dernière84. Si on veut rester le plus proche du texte ori-
ginal arabe, il est clair que la dernière variante doit être retenue pour l’édition,
mais si on tient compte de la réception de la traduction latine dans les com-
mentaires, on ne peut pas ignorer la première sans plus d’égards. Selon nous,
il ne faudra pas uniquement la signaler dans l’apparat des variantes, mais éga-
lement insister sur son importance particulière d’une façon ou d’une autre85.
Reste le fait qu’agens a de quoi surprendre comme traduction de kāʾin. Même
si on le comprend dans le sens de «étant actif dans», qui est un de ses sens pos-
sibles en latin médiéval86, il s’agit toujours d’une traduction interprétative87.
Il n’est donc pas sans intérêt de constater que dans quatre des dix manus-
crits témoins de l’édition Pattin, la leçon agens vel quae est in re est attestée.
Il s’agit sans doute d’un essai de double traduction, où la traduction quae est
constitue une traduction assez littérale, alors que la traduction agens se pré-
sente davantage comme une traduction libre, inspirée en toute probabilité par
la qualification per modum causae qui suit88. En outre, plusieurs manuscrits,
par exemple Vat. Urb. lat. 206, Assise, BC 298 et Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek
1382, témoignent de la variante : agens secundumquod est. La formule res agens
vel quae est in re a-t-elle été jugée peu claire par un copiste et a-t-il opté pour
une correction ad sensum en remplaçant quae est par secundum quod ?
84 Pour les premières, voir Gilles de Rome, Super Librumde causis, f. 41rH etThomas d’Aquin,
Expositio super Librum de causis, p. 80, l. 26 (secundum quod causa agit in effectum) ;
concernant les traductions latino-hébraïques, voir Rothschild 1994, p. 445 : «(la chose) qui
agit (comme cause) dans une autre (…) n’est en elle (…)» (ha-dābār ha-pōʿēl be-dābār […]
ēynō/ēynennū bō […]), chez Juda Romano et chez ‘Eli Ḥabilio ; Hillel de Vérone omet tout
le développement de cette proposition (Rothschild 2013, p. 320-321).
85 Même si tout laisse croire que la variante agens in rem résulte de l’ initiative d’un copiste,
qui comprenait agens in dans son sens obvie, à savoir «agissant sur», et a par conséquent
choisi de mettre ce qui en constitue l’objet à l’accusatif au lieu de l’ablatif, nous serions
tentés de mentionner les deux variantes dans le textus (mais en indiquant la deuxième
avec un astérisque), car celle-ci a clairement influencé la compréhension de plusieurs
commentateurs latins.
86 Prinz et alii 1959sqq., vol. 1, p. 401.
87 Dans les lexiques publiés de l’Avicenne latin, nous avons trouvéun seul endroit où le verbe
kāna a été rendu en termes d’«agere», à savoir dans le De anima (voir Avicenna latinus
1968, p. 30, l. 3), mais c’est à l’ intérieur d’une phrase dont la traduction latine dévie sensi-
blement de l’arabe (voir Avicenna latinus 1968, p. 30, note 2-3).
88 Outre les quatre manuscrits auxquels Pattin se réfère, on trouve la même variante dans le
manuscrit d’Angers, BM 450.
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D’autres variantes significatives de cette formule se trouvent dans (au
moins) deux manuscrits : Paris, BnF 6569, qui porte agens in rem (mais avec
la lettre ‘m’exponctuée) sur la ligne, et quae est au-dessus de la ligne ; et Chi-
cago, Vault Case 23, qui présente la formulation complexe agens in rem vel quae
est in re. Le manuscrit de Chicago pourrait témoigner de ce que son copiste
ait observé l’existence de la double traduction, mais aussi celle de la variante
agens in rem, et ait alors estimé qu’en offrant la formule qui est la sienne, il arti-
culait la vraie alternative telle que la traduction originale l’avait exprimée. Ou
bien l’archétype de la traduction portait-il vraiment agens in rem, le traducteur
ayant, après révision, exponctué lem d’ in rem et ajouté au-dessus de la ligne et
quae est, commepeut le suggérer lemanuscrit de Paris? En absence d’un survol
complet de tous les manuscrits, il est prématuré de décider, mais tout indique
néanmoins que la traduction latine portait à l’origine, ou sinon très tôt lors de
sa transmission, un essai de double traduction. Ce queTaylor avait quelquepart
pressenti, se révèle de plus en plus une quasi-certitude.
En XVIII(XIX), 150,75-77, Pattin présente la lecture suivante : «Et hoc non
fit ita nisi quoniam est ipsa ⟨…⟩ neque intellectualis tota neque animalis tota
neque corporea tota, neque pendet per causam (…)». Taylor, de son côté, pro-
pose de lire : «Et hoc non fit ita nisi quoniam est ipsa expositio neque intel-
lectualis tota neque animalis tota neque corporea tota, neque [Taylor 1981 :
non] pendet per causam (…)»89. En effet, le mot expositio est attesté dans
les manuscrits Oxford, Bodleian Selden sup. 24 (comme Pattin l’avait déjà
signalé) et Aoste ; il constitue une traduction qui, bien que ne convenant pas au
contexte, rend littéralement le terme arabe šarḥ, présent dans les trois manus-
crits témoins du texte arabe90. De surcroît, on peut invoquer deux témoins
indirects en faveurd’unemention explicite de cemot : le commentaire d’Albert
leGrand, ainsi que la traduction latino-hébraïquede Juda91.Malheureusement,
Taylor a perdude vue que lesmots est ipsa, ainsi que la conjonctionneque avant
89 Taylor 1989, p. 97, note 58. Concernant la proposition de lire non, voir Taylor 1981, p. 485,
note 136 ; cette note n’est pas reprise dans son article de 1989, sans doute parce qu’ il s’est
aperçu entretemps qu’une telle lecture pose grammaticalement problème.
90 La leçon šarğ retenue par Bardenhewer (Bardenhewer 1882, p. 94, l. 1) résulte d’une cor-
rection d’auteur (voir l’apparat l. 1) ; il nous paraît difficile de considérer ce mot comme
un équivalent possible du grec genos, comme Rothschild (Rothschild 1994, p. 460, note 6)
le suggère.
91 Pour le premier, voir Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis, p. 155, l. 10-18 : «Et
huius quidem causa non est alia nisi quia ipsa anima secundum quod anima est, secundum
totum suum esse, nec est expositio sive expressio sive sigillatio intelligentiae, ut tota scili-
cet intellectualis (…). Et anima quidem non pendet per causam quae est supra eam». Pour
le second, la traduction est : «parce que toute explication (ba-ʿabūr [heyōt] kol bēʾūr)»,
voir Rothschild 1994, p. 460, note 6 ; Ḥabilio (… le-mah še-hīʾ ēynāh śikhlīt kullāh…) traduit
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intellectualis sont absents des deux manuscrits mentionnés et qu’ ils portent
tous deux à la fin non pendet. Par conséquent, la reconstruction correcte serait :
«Et hoc non fit ita nisi quoniam expositio intellectualis tota neque animalis
tota neque corporea tota, non pendet per causam (…)»92. Mais les manuscrits
latins témoignent d’une variété assez surprenante à cet endroit. Nous ne pou-
vons pas présenter tous les détails dans ces pages, mais pour notre propos il
est important de constater que la formule neque pendet est attestée de façon
limitée. Selon notre documentation, la plupart desmanuscrits comportent non
pendet (ou non penderet / non pendent) et le verbe est après quoniam. Toute-
fois, une grande diversité de variantes viennent après cette dernière conjonc-
tion : ipsa intelligibilis, ipsa neque intelligibilis, intellectibilis ipsa, ipsa scilicet
anima, intelligibilis tota, intelligibilis atque, ex ipso, dispositio, voire exputo et ex
tempore (?).
Ensuite, il est à noter qu’aucun desmanuscrits que nous avons consultés (en
plus de ceux déjà utilisés par Pattin) ne porte explicitement le mot expositio et
que son attestation se limite donc à deux manuscrits sur un ensemble d’une
quarantaine, plus le modèle du traducteur hébreu Juda Romano. Toutefois, la
variante exputo, dépourvue de sens, qui se lit dans le manuscrit Cologny, Bod-
mer CB 10, est relativement proche d’expositio et, compte tenu de l’abréviation
habituelle de ce dernier, s’explique facilement par une lecture erronée, suite à
un manque d’attention porté au contexte. La même explication pourrait être
valable pour la variante ex ipso attestée dans plusieurs manuscrits. Par contre,
la variante dispositio qui est présente dans les manuscrits Cava de’ Tirreni
(Salerne), B. SS. Trinità 31, etGenève, BGE, Lat. 76, pourrait témoigner d’un essai
de traduction alternative. Nous avons déjà noté qu’expositio est une traduc-
tion en soi correcte du mot arabe šarḥ. Mais il est clair que dans notre texte ce
dernier n’est pas utilisé dans son sens habituel. Commedans les Plotinianaara-
bica, il signifie plutôt «arrangement», «ordre»93. Comme il s’agit là d’un des
sens possibles dumot dispositio en latin médiéval94, on a l’ impression que son
choix ne dépend pas du hasard, mais d’une initiative délibérée, sans doute du
traducteur lui-même qui, ayant saisi que sa traduction littérale expositio posait
littéralement quoniam est ipsa neque intellectibilis tota ; Hillel de Vérone omet le dévelop-
pement (Rothschild 2013, p. 336-337).
92 Nous ne tenons pas compte ici de l’addition (accidentelle?) de ex ea est après corporea
dans le manuscrit d’Oxford, Bodl., Selden sup. 24.
93 Voir Badawi 1955, p. 20, note 2 ; pour un exemple concret, voir, par exemple, Épitre sur la
science divine, Badawi 1955, p. 178, l. 4, où le terme – tout en étant lié par un wa- epéxégé-
tique avec le mot niẓām- («ordre»), est traduit : «arrangement» par Geoffrey Lewis (voir
Plotini Opera, t. II. Enn. IV-VI, 1959, p. 333).
94 Voire Latham et alii 1975-2013, p. 692.
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problème, a opté pour une alternative qui rende mieux le sens spécifique et
exceptionnel du terme arabe dans ce contexte. Par conséquent, on ne peut nul-
lement exclure la lecture suivante dans l’exemplaire du traducteur : quoniam
expositio dispositio (ce derniermot a peut-être écrit enmarge ou supra lineam).
Faut-il en déduire que la lecture de l’éditionPattin doit être ignorée?Nousne le
croyons pas. Certes, elle n’est justifiée que par un nombre relativement limité
de manuscrits, mais elle trouve un support indirect dans le commentaire de
Gilles de Rome et, en outre, dans la traduction latino-hébraïque de Ḥabillo95.
Elle est donc significative au niveau de l’histoire de la réception. Mais on ne
peut pas entièrement exclure qu’elle remonte en fin de compte au traducteur
lui-même. La disparité de la traditionmanuscrite invite à la prudence. Ce n’est
que sur la base d’un solide et précis stemma codicum qu’ il sera possible se pro-
noncer à ce propos.
6 Traductions posant problème en comparaison avec le texte arabe
À nouveau, nous nous limitons à trois cas exemplaires.
(1) En XIX(XX), 158,15-17, l’ édition Pattin porte : «(…) ita quod est bonitas, et
bonitas [et virtus] et ens sunt res una. Sicut ergo ens primum et bonitas
sunt res una». Taylor, qui se fonde sur l’arabe et sur un nombre important
de manuscrits latins, opte pour l’omission au lieu de la suppression de et
virtus96. Dans sa thèse, il remarque en outre que la fin de la traduction
latine se détourne du texte arabe, où se trouve : fa-ka-mā ṣārat al-huwiyya
95 Respectivement, Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 64vR–65rR, Rothschild 1994,
p. 460, note 6.
96 Taylor 1989, p. 98, note 62. Taylor, dans sa thèse, remarque en plus qu’ il comprend l’arabe
d’une façon différente de la traduction latine, bien que celle-ci soit en soi possible (Taylor
1981, p. 488, note 144). La différence d’ interprétation consiste surtout dans la compré-
hension de la préposition bi-annahu, que le traducteur latin a rendu par ita quod, alors
que Taylor la rend par : «by virtue of». De façon un peu surprenante, la traduction latino-
hébraïque de Juda Romano porte la leçon be-derekh še-, que Rothschild (Rothschild 1994,
p. 462) traduit : «en tant que», ce qui semble plutôt correspondre à une lecture de la
traduction latine : inquantum (en raisond’une confusion avec ita quodou traduction alter-
native présente dans l’archétype du traducteur, mais nous n’en avons pas encore trouvé
confirmation dans la traditionmanuscrite latine) ; Ḥabilio porte ʾim, «si»,mais la suite est
altérée : ʾim hāyāh ha-ṭōbwe-ha-heyōt ha-nimṣāʾōt, «si la bonté et l’être sont les existants»,
soit parce que desmots auraientmanqué aumodèle latin (ita quod et bonitas et ens una?),
soit par une volonté délibérée de clarification, chez un traducteur qui (Rothschild 2013a,
p. 64) se pique peut-être d’écriture humaniste ; Hillel omet le développement (Rothschild
2013b, p. 338-339).
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l-ūlā huwiyyatan wa-ḫayran nawʿan wāḥidan («et comme l’être premier
devient être et bonté d’une façon singulière»). Il indique, à l’origine
de cette non-conformité, soit une corruption dans le modèle du traduc-
teur, soit l’ arrivée accidentelle d’une (ou plusieurs) déformation(s) lors
de la transmission de la traduction97. Il signale d’ailleurs, en faveur de
la seconde alternative, la présence du verbe fiunt au lieu de sunt dans
le manuscrit d’Aoste. L’examen des manuscrits à notre disposition nous
a révélé que cette dernière leçon n’est pas seulement attestée dans le
manuscrit d’Aoste, mais qu’elle est la plus fréquente. Il faut pourtant
noter que le copiste dumanuscrit Genève, BGE, Lat. 76, a exponctué fiunt
et l’a fait suivre immédiatement sur lamême ligne par la forme, dite corri-
gée, sunt. Cette dernière leçonest aussi celle retenueparGilles deRome98,
et a fonctionné sans doute comme modèle pour les traductions latino-
hébraïques99. Il est difficile de savoir si sunt résulte d’une lecture fautive
de fiunt (sans doute inspirée par la phrase qui précède où l’on trouve
effectivement la formule sunt una res), ou s’ il faut considérer les deux
verbes sunt et fiunt comme un essai de double traduction du verbe arabe
ṣāra. Quelle que soit l’option choisie, la traduction latine ne correspond
pas directement au texte arabe,mais elle peut être qualifiée de reformula-
tion légèrement interprétative, car elle accentue davantage que ne le fait
le texte arabe l’unité foncière entre l’Être premier et la Bonté100.
(2) En XXIII(XXIV), 179,38-39, la traduction latine lit dans l’édition Pattin :
« influens vero existens unum non diversum, influit (…)», tandis que le
texte arabe porte : wa-ammā al-mufīḍ fa-innahu wāḥidun ġayr muḫtalifin
yufīḍu (…)101, «mais comme celui qui influe est certes un, sans diver-
sité, il influe (…)». La présence d’existens ne s’explique donc pas aisé-
ment, comme l’a remarqué Taylor. Les traductions latino-hébraïques ne
semblent pas l’avoir eu dans leurmodèle, car elles affirment : «Mais celui
97 Taylor 1981, p. 489, note 146.
98 Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 69rX.
99 Rothschild 1994, p. 462, traduisant Juda Romano: «Ainsi, comme l’Existant premier et le
Bien sont une seule chose» (hēm dābār eḥād, chez Ḥabilio comme chez Juda ; Hillel omet
le développement [Rothschild 2013, p. 338-339]).
100 Observons que le manuscrit Vat. Lat. 14717 porte la lecture : sicut ergo ens primo et bonitas
sunt res una, mais on se demande si la leçon primo ne s’est pas produite par attraction
avec le mot ergo qui précède (dans les deux cas, le «o» étant écrit au-dessus de la ligne).
101 Taylor 1981, p. 241, l. 13-14, mais nous suivons la leçon al-mufīḍ, présente dans le manuscrit
de Leyde, au lieu de celle de fayḍ, que Taylor retient. Contrairement à ce qu’ il indique
(Taylor 1981, note 13) le latin influens n’équivaut pas à la seconde, mais à la première de
ses deux lectures.
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qui s’épancheest un, sans connaître dediversité, épanchant (…)»102. Elles
suggèrent la présence d’un est à sa place. Selon l’apparat de Pattin, le
manuscrit Bruges, Bibliothèque de la Ville 463, porte sic au lieu de vero103.
Cette leçon semble recevoir une confirmation assez significative dans le
manuscrit de Florence, Ashburnham 1674, car le copiste y a écrit sit, mais
a exponctué le t et l’a corrigé en c au-dessus de la ligne. Pourtant, deux
autresmanuscrits pointent dans une autre direction : lems Berlin, Staats-
bibliothek M 1494, Lat. Qu. 449, où se trouve sit, suivi de existens, mais
où ce dernier mot a été barré ; et le ms Rouen, BM 920, qui porte la leçon
sit vel existens. Ils suggèrent que le traducteur a hésité sur la manière de
rendre l’arabe et a présenté un essai de double traduction. Mais alors, le
conditionnel ne convient pas vraiment. Par contre, la leçon sicnous paraît
intéressante dans lamesure où elle permet demieux se rapprocher la tra-
duction de l’original arabe. En effet, en ponctuant de la façon suivante :
«Influens, sic existens unum non diversificatum, influit (…)», on peut
comprendre : « l’ influent, qui existe ainsi en tant qu’un, non diversifié,
influe…», retrouvant ainsi un sens qui ne s’éloigne pas beaucoup de celui
du texte arabe. Mais on trouve encore une dernière variante, qui mérite
notre attention, à savoir influens vero ens unum (…). Elle est attestée dans
le manuscrit Paris, BnF, lat. 16082. À nouveau, en ponctuant influens vero,
ens unum (…), «mais l’ influent, en étant un (…)», ce qui recoupe large-
ment l’arabe. Des recherches sont clairement requises à l’avenir afin de
voir dans quelle mesure chacune de ces variantes est représentée dans la
traditionmanuscrite, voiremêmede voir si une autre variante ne peut pas
se révéler – par exemple est. Il ne faut cependant jamais perdre de vue que
la lecture de l’éditionPattin aunebase solide dans la traditionmanuscrite
et trouve confirmation dans le commentaire de Gilles de Rome104.
(3) Enfin, en XXV(XXVI), 188,98-00, on lit chez Pattin : «Si ergo hoc est ita,
substantiae stantis per essentiam suam non separatur causa semper» –
«S’ il en est ainsi, la cause de la substance subsistant en elle-même n’est
jamais mise à part»105. Mais il est dit en arabe : fa-in kāna hāḏā hā-kaḏā
102 Rothschild 1994, p. 470 ; textes hébreux de Juda Romano et de ‘Eli Ḥabilio, Rothschild 2013,
p. 348-349 : ha-šōfēaʿ eḥād ašer ēyn bō ḥillūf / ha-mašepīaʿ eḥād ū-biletī miteḥallēf.
103 La même variante est attestée dans les manuscrits de Troyes 1374 et Bordeaux 421.
104 Gilles de Rome, Expositio super Librum de causis, 1550, f. 83vV et 84rV.
105 Les traductions française (voir Magnard et alii 1990, p. 77), et allemande (voir Fidora, Nie-
derberger 2001, p. 125) contemporaines traduisent ad sensum en affirmant que la cause
de la substance subsistant en elle-même n’en est jamais séparée, mais nous ne voyons
pas comment le génitif substantie stantis peut se référer à ce qui fait l’objet de l’action de
séparer.
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kāna l-ğawhar al-qāʾim bi-ḏātihi lā yufāriqu ‘illatahu abadan106, «S’ il en
est ainsi, la substance qui subsiste en elle-même ne se sépare jamais de
sa cause». Toutefois, dans son apparat, Pattin indique que le manuscrit
Paris, BnF 6318 propose une autre lecture, à savoir : «(…) substantia stans
per essentiam suam non separatur a causa», et que celle-ci fut aussi à
l’origine celle du manuscrit Vat. lat. 2089, mais qu’on y trouve en marge
une correction de substantia stans en substantiae stantis, ainsi que la sup-
pression de la préposition a avant causa107. Cette dernière correction a de
quoi surprendre, car la lecture du manuscrit de Paris, qui est également
attestée dans lemanuscrit de Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1382, corres-
pond parfaitement à l’arabe. En outre, le commentaire d’Albert le Grand,
témoigne d’une même lecture tout en apportant quelques modifications
mineures : «Si ergo hoc ita est, substantiae stantes per essentiam suam
semper ita se habent quodnon separantur a sua causa». Enfin, lesmanus-
crits de Vienne, ÖNB 2491, et Admont, Cod. 405, témoignent eux aussi
d’une leçon substantia stans, mais le premier ne porte pas la préposition
a avant causa, tandis que dans le dernier la préposition en question est
absente sur la ligne et a été ajoutée juste au-dessus108. Tout laisse croire,
par conséquent, que la traduction originale portait : «(…) substantia stans
per essentiam suamnon separatur a causa», et que, sans doute la préposi-
tion a a assez rapidement été oubliée par un copiste dans la transmission
de la traduction, pour qu’ un copiste lise au final causa d’une façon assez
naturelle comme un nominatif et modifie le nominatif substantia stans
en génitif. Cette dernière lecture est incontestablement la plus attestée
dans la tradition manuscrite. Elle est confirmée par Gilles de Rome et la
traduction latino-hébraïque de Juda Romano (mais ʿEli Ḥabilio traduit au
contraire : « la substance qui subsiste par elle-même ne se sépare pas de
sa cause»), même si la notion de «cause» y est placée directement avant
celle de «substance qui subsiste en elle-même»109.
106 Taylor 1981, p. 250, l. 1-2 [Bāb 25, l. 12-13].
107 Pattin 1966, p. 189, notes 98-99.Observons quenous avons constaté la présence (non signa-
lée par Pattin) de la préposition a dans le manuscrit du Vat. lat. 2089.
108 Insistons toutefois sur le fait que le verbe separare peut se construire seulement avec
l’ablatif (Gaffiot 2000, p. 1444). D’autre part, il est intéressant de noter qu’au moins deux
manuscrits, qui portent la leçon substantiae stantis mentionnent néanmoins la préposi-
tion a avant causa.
109 Respectivement, Gilles de Rome, Super Librum de causis, f. 91vX–92rX; Rothschild 1994,
p. 473, traduisant d’après Juda Romano; Rothschild 2013, p. 353 (Juda Romano: sibbat
ha-ʿeṣem hā-ʿōmēd be-ʿaṣmō loʾ tippārēd ; ʿEli Ḥabilio : ha-ʿeṣem hā-ʿōmēd be-ʿaṣmūtō loʾ yip-
pārēd mi-sibbātō).
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7 Traduction latine et témoins indirects arabes
Sachant que le manuscrit le plus ancien connu du texte arabe est postérieur
à la traduction latine, celle-ci n’est pas sans valeur pour l’établissement du
texte arabe. Ce point a généralement été reconnu dans la recherche contempo-
raine. Ce qui en a été dit suffit d’ailleurs, et nous n’avons pas à nous en occuper
davantage, car ces remarques dépasseraient largement le cadre de la présente
recherche. Néanmoins, nous tenons à attirer l’attention sur un élément qui n’a
pas encore reçu toute l’attention qu’ il méritait, à savoir la confirmation de cer-
taines leçons de la traduction latine par des témoins indirects du texte arabe.
En attendant un examen exhaustif, nous nous limitons à signaler quelques cas
exemplaires.
La traduction latine dévie à plusieurs reprises du texte arabe tel qu’ il a été
transmis par le manuscrit de Leyde, mais correspond à des leçons attestées à
la fois dans les manuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul. Ces dernières sont maintes
fois confirmées par les témoins indirects arabes. Il en est ainsi pour la mention
de simplex en XXVIII(XXIX), 199,52, car lemot arabe qui lui correspond, à savoir
mabsūṭ, est attesté aussi dans le Liber de causis II, ainsi que dans les Questions
siciliennes et dans le Budd d’ Ibn Sabʿīn110. Dans le dernier ouvrage, nous avons
trouvé plusieurs cas semblables, comme par exemple : l’omission demumtadd
(VI(VII), 69,86/ p. 215, l. 16) ; et cum aeternitate / wa-maʿa al-dahr (VI(VII), 71,5/
p. 216, l. 3) ; virtus / quwwa (IX(X), 94, 18 / p. 201, l. 3) ; dives / al-ġanī (XX(XXI),
164,54/ p. 133, l. 25) ; omission de ‘anī (XX(XXI), 164,59 / p. 134, l. 2) ; et bonitas eius
est res una / wa-l-ḫayr šay’ wāḥid (XX(XXI), 164, 60-61 / p. 134, l. 3) ; apud nos /
ʿindanā (XXI(XXII), 168,77 / p. 133, l. 16). Dans un cas, ergo intelligentia (XII(XIII),
113,1) est conforme à une leçon fa-l-ʿaql, qui est attestée dans le seul manuscrit
d’Ankara parmi les trois témoinsmanuscrits arabes,mais qui est aussi présente
dans le Budd (p. 52, l. 4). Il est clair pour l’ensemble de ces cas, que le traducteur
latin respecte le texte tel qu’ il le lit dans sonmodèle. Il n’est donc pas autorisé,
pour ces cas, de modifier le texte de la traduction ni d’y intervenir en suppri-
mant des mots ou en signalant des omissions (supposées). Au cas où il serait
patent qu’ il n’y a pas accord avec le texte arabe original, il faudra en faire état
dans une note spéciale.
Mais il y a aussi des cas où les témoins arabes indirects se montrent particu-
lièrement intéressants en présentant des leçons non attestées dans les manus-
110 Liber de causis II, p. 331, l. 10, respectivement Akasoy 2006, p. 406, l. 17 / Spallino 2002,
p. 238, l. 8 et Katturah 1978, p. 312, l. 17.
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crits arabes du Liber de causis, auxquelles la traduction latine correspond pour-
tant parfaitement. Nous l’ illustrerons par trois exemples :
1) proposition XXX(XXXI), 213,66 : manifestum igitur est quod. Aucun des
troismanuscrits arabesnepermetd’expliquer cette traduction,mais dans
les Fuṣūl d’al-Amirī se trouve la formule : fa-qad ẓahara idhan, à laquelle
le latin est pleinement conforme.
2) proposition XXV(XXVI), 188,97 : et servantem eam. Cette traduction trouve
un support partiel dans le manuscrit de Leyde, qui porte wa-l-ḥāfiẓa111,
mais le Liber de causis II et le Budd expliquent en plus la présence de eam
en lisant wa-l-ḥāfiẓa lahu112.
3) proposition VIII(IX), 79,47 : omnis intelligentiae fixio. Les trois témoins
arabes portent innamā, «seulement», «ne… que»113, mais cette expres-
sion est absente de la traduction latine ; toutefois, l’ absence dans la tra-
duction latine de l’expression «seulement», «solummodo» se justifie sur
la base de leçon inna, présente dans le Liber de causis II114.
Cette liste n’est sans doute pas exhaustive, mais montre à suffisance que la tra-
duction latine se base parfois sur le témoignage d’une leçon arabe qui n’est pas
attestée dans la tradition manuscrite connue du texte, mais uniquement dans
ses témoins indirects115.
Nous aimerions enfin attirer l’attention sur un cas à propos duquel Barden-
hewer a essayé de reconstruire, à partir de la traduction latine, une omission
qui prend place vers le début du chapitre 23. Il rend secundum dispositionem à
deux reprises par ʿalā tartīb116. Se basant sur les manuscrits d’Ankara et Istan-
bul, Taylor a édité : ʿalā ḥāla… ʿalā ḥāl117. Cette dernière leçon est plus oumoins
confirmée par la Réfutation du pseudo-Platon et par le Liber de causis II, qui
portent : ʿalā ḥāl… ʿalā ḥāl118. Le terme arabe qui correspond au mot latin dis-
positio est donc ḥāl, non pas tartīb119.
111 Taylor 1981, p. 502, note 182.
112 Voir Liber de causis II, p. 331, l. 4-5 et Katturah 1978, p. 134, l. 14.
113 Taylor 1981, p. 175, l. 2.
114 Liber de causis II, p. 343, l. 13.
115 Ce témoignage de leçons communes entre traduction latine et témoins indirect arabes,
sans préjuger de sa valeur exacte, mérite incontestablement une attention sérieuse et
détaillée en vue de l’édition critique du texte arabe.
116 Bardenhewer 1882, p. 102, l. 2-3.
117 Taylor 1981, p. 338, l. 3-4.
118 Türker 1965, p. 58, §2, l. 1-2 / Badawi 1974, p. 338, l. 12-13, respectivement Liber de causis II,
p. 331, l. 14-15.
119 Nous signalons ce cas parce que la reconstruction hypothétique de Bardenhewer a induit
Rothschild en erreur (Rothschild 1994, p. 470, note 1).
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8 Traduction latine et le témoignage de la traduction hébraïque de
Zeraḥyah
La traduction hébraïque de Zeraḥyah, qui pourrait se baser à la fois sur le texte
arabe et la traduction latine120, constitue clairement un témoin que ni l’éditeur
du texte arabe, ni celui de sa traduction latine ne peuvent ignorer, comme il res-
sort clairement de l’article de 1994 de J.-P. Rothschild. Nous ne pouvons pas ici
en évoquer tout le détail, mais nous essayerons à travers quelques cas exem-
plaires de démontrer son intérêt en vue d’une édition critique tant du texte
arabe – du moins quand il est conforme avec le manuscrit de Leyde contre le
latin – que de la traduction latine.
Il faut d’abord observer que la traduction de Zeraḥyah peut être conforme à
la leçon attestée dans lesmanuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul,mais nonà celle du
manuscrit de Leyde. Lamême leçon constituait indéniablement la source de la
traduction latine. Il en est ainsi en XVIII(XIX), 150,77 pour corporea : ha-garmī /
al-jirmiyya121. En XIX(XX), 156,1, la présence du mot essentia dans la traduction
latine – mot auquel rien ne correspond dans le manuscrit de Leyde – n’est pas
seulement confirmée parmāhiyya dans les manuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul,
mais aussi parmahūt dans la traduction arabo-hébraïque122. D’autre part, il est
clair qu’ il faut maintenir (avec neuf des dix témoins de l’édition Pattin) dans
120 C’est ce qui ressort du colophon que M. Rothschild nous communique d’après le ms.
Londres, (olim) Jews’ College 42, f. 224 : zeh mah še-māṣānū kātūb me-ēllū ha-šeʿārīm be-
nusḥāʾōt ha-Yišmeʿ ēʾlīm we-ha-noṣrīm («Voilà ce que nous avons trouvé de ces chapitres
dans les versions des Arabes et des Latins»). Zeraḥyah aurait ainsi recouru lui-même à la
traduction latine, voire à la traduction latino-hébraïque de Hillel de Vérone, sans doute
antérieure à la sienne ; en tout cas les deux hommes se connaissaient (Rothschild 2013,
p. 51). Toutefois, M. Rothschild nous a signalé que la question de savoir si ce colophon est
de la main du traducteur ou d’un copiste n’a, à sa connaissance, jamais été approfondie
depuis Steinschneider et Bardenhewer, le premier favorisant l’hypothèse du traducteur
lui-même, le deuxième celle du copiste (Steinschneider 1863, Hebräische Bibliographie 6,
p. 111 [référence empruntée à Bardenhewer 1882, p. 307, n. 1] ; Bardenhewer 1882, p. 307,
n. 1), à moins que Schreiber en ait discuté dans l’ introduction (écrite en hongrois) à son
édition de la traduction de Zeraḥyah (mais ni M. Rothschild ni nous-même ne connais-
sons la langue hongroise).
121 Voir Rothschild 1994, p. 460, nº. 7. Rothschild remarque à juste titre que cette notion de
«corporel» va dans le même sens que l’affirmation de Proclus, qui figure comme source
d’ inspiration du passage du Liber de causis, voir Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Propo-
sition 111, p. 98, l. 29 (somatikai). Taylor 1981, p. 218, l. 5 [Bāb 18, l. 12], a donc à juste titre
préféré la leçon al-jirmiyya, attestée dans les manuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul, non celle
de al-ḥayawānī, présente dans le manuscrit de Leyde.
122 Rothschild 1994, p. 462-463, nº. 1. Signalons toutefois que l’essai de reconstruction dont
témoigne Bardenhewer (voir Bardenhewer 1882, p. 95, n. 4) ne s’avère pas entièrement
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la traduction latine, XXIII(XXIV), 180,55, les mots esse et, après Et non intelligo
per esse nisi, sur base, une fois de plus, du témoignage commun des manus-
crits arabes d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul, d’une part, et de la traduction de Zeraḥyah,
d’autre part123.
Un contre-exemple existe cependant, dans lequel Zeraḥyah paraît aumoins
en partie confirmer Leyde contre Ankara / Istanbul : là où en XVIII(XIX), 154,95,
le latin, en pleine conformité avec la leçon du seul mot al-ṣūra des manus-
crits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul, porte formam (secundumhanc formam), Zeraḥyah
utilise comme Leyde deux expressions : u-be-zeh ha-toʾar (yiheyū ha-madregōt
ha-śikhliyōt) u-be-zeh ha-qiyyūm124.
Autre configuration encore des rapports entre les témoins : les mots et sui
complimenti sont sans doute, en accord avec la vaste majorité des manuscrits
latins, à supprimer dans la traduction latine, XXIV(XXV), 184,74-75, car rien n’y
correspond dans les trois témoins arabes ni dans la traduction de Zeraḥyah125.
correct, car il a rendu le terme essentia par ḡawhar, ce qui correspond davantage à une
lecture du latin substantia.
123 Voir respectivement, Taylor 1981, p. 500, n. 179 ; Rothschild 1994, p. 471, nº. 6).
124 Taylor 1981, p. 220, l. 4-5 [Bāb 18, l. 23], a opté pour la leçon wa-ʿalā hāḏā l-ṣifa (…) wa-bi-
hāḏāal-qiyās, présente dans lemanuscrit de Leyde, et celamalgré l’accord entre la traduc-
tion latine et la leçon des manuscrits d’Ankara et d’ Istanbul. Toutefois, son choix trouve
un support (du moins, partiel) supplémentaire dans la traduction hébraïque de Zera-
ḥyah, aumoins pour l’addition à la fin desmots wa-bi-hāḏā al-qiyās. En effet, l’ expression
u-be-zeh ha-qiyyūm confirme – moyennant l’hypothèse de Rothschild [Rothschild 1994,
p. 461-462, nº 13] d’une possible lecture fautive du s final de qiyās comme un m – la pré-
sence de ces mots dans le modèle du traducteur. Quant à l’autre expression, u-be-zeh
ha-toʾar, elle peut résulter aussi bien d’une leçon wa-ʿalā hāḏā l-ṣifa que wa-ʿalā hāḏā
l-ṣūra, car le terme toʾar couvre en philosophie médiévale un spectre sémantique très
large («attribut» ; «description, propriété» ; « forme»; Klatzkin 1933, t. IV, p. 172-176).
L’affirmation de Rothschild (ibid.) selon laquelle la traduction toʾar est «conforme au
latin» ( forma), est peut-être discutable dans la mesure où le sens primaire de ce mot,
à savoir «attribut», correspond davantage à ṣifa qu’à ṣūra. Certes, rien n’exclut que toʾar
constitue la traduction de ṣūra, mais il me semble qu’ il soit impossible dans ce contexte
de fixer avec certitude le terme arabe sous-jacent. Dans ce cas la traduction de Zeraḥyah
ne permet donc pas de fixer avec certitude le texte arabe présent dans son modèle. Reste
néanmoins la difficulté de déterminer le rapport précis avec le texte grec de Proclus (Prop.
111, p. 98, l. 31-32). Tout laisse croire que l’auteur du texte arabe du Liber de causis a lu outoos
au lieu de outos. L’option de Taylor ne peut pas simplement être écartée, mais nécessite
sans doute un examen approfondi entre le texte arabe et le texte grec de Proclus, qui en
constitue la source d’ inspiration.
125 Voir Rothschild 1994, p. 472, nº. 3. Taylor (Taylor 1981, p. 247, l. 1 [Bāb 24, l. 11]) de façon un
peu surprenante, préfère par contre d’ajouter dans le texte arabe, sur la base de la traduc-
tion latine, telle que Pattin l’a éditée (mais sans tenir compte du fait que cette lecture est
basée sur une minorité infime de ses témoins), wa-tamāmuhu.
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Enfin, nous souhaitons attirer tout particulièrement l’attention sur deux cas :
En V(VI), 58,28-30, la traduction latine rend «quod est quoniam causa prima
non cessat illuminare causatum suum et ipsa non illuminatur a lumine alio»,
alors que les trois témoins arabes portent : wa-ḏālika anna al-ʿilla allatī tunīru
awwalan tunīru maʿlūlahā wa-hiya lā tastanīru min nūrin āḫarin («En effet,
la cause, qui illumine de façon primordiale, illumine ce qu’elle a causé, alors
qu’elle n’est pas illuminée par une autre lumière»)126. La traduction de Zera-
ḥyah, qui porte : we-zeh kī ha-illāh ha-ri’šōnāh ʿōśāh ba-ʿālūlāh we-hēm ēynām
ʿōśīm bāh («c’est que la cause première agit dans son causé et eux (sic)
n’agissent pas en elle»127) a en commun avec le latin l’expression «première
cause». Cette concordance peut difficilement être le fruit du hasard. Elle pour-
rait indiquer l’existenced’unmodèle communauxdeux traductions, qui offrait
une autre lecture de l’arabe. L’épitomé de ʿAbd al-Lāṭif al-Baġdādī est un
témoin incontestable pour la confirmation de cette correspondance, car on y
lit : li-anna al-ʿilla al-ūlā tunīru kulla ‘illatinwa-maʿlūlinwa-hiya lā tastanīrumin
nūrin āḫarin («Car la cause première illumine chaque cause et chaque causé,
alors qu’elle n’est pas illuminée par une autre lumière»128). On y trouve claire-
ment exprimé que c’est la cause première qui illumine, mais on y cherche en
vain l’équivalent de l’ idée selon laquelle cette illumination est sans interrup-
tion – idée, par ailleurs, aussi absente de la traduction de Zeraḥyah129. Étant
donné qu’al-Baġdādī mentionne une illumination de l’ensemble des causes et
des choses causés (en reformulant ainsi, et en toute probabilité, d’une façon
personnelle l’expression maʿlūlahā, «ce qu’elle a causé»), il n’est la source
directe ni de la traduction latine ni de celle de Zeraḥyah. Cependant, cela ne
rend pas impossible l’existence d’une source commune arabe, qui aurait été
connue du traducteur latin et de Zeraḥyah (même si ce dernier exprime en
termes d’«agir» ce que le latin, en conformité avec tous les témoins arabes, pré-
sente en termes d’« illuminer»). En effet, il suffit de supposer que cette source
recelait une formulation très similaire à celle d’al-Baġdādī, tout en conservant,
avec tous les témoinsmajeurs, la leçonmaʿlūlahā.Onnepeut certes pas exclure
que Zeraḥyah se soit appuyé directement sur le latin. La question qui se pose-
rait alors serait celle de savoir pourquoi il a délaissé l’ idée de ‘permanence’ qui
qualifie, dans la version latine, l’ activité (illuminatrice) divine.
126 Taylor 1981, p. 160, l. 6-161, l. 1 [Bāb 5, l. 6-7].
127 Rothschild 1994, p. 427, nº. 3.
128 Badawi 1955, p. 249, l. 4.
129 Taylor (Taylor 1981, p. 451, n. 41) suggère l’existence de l’affirmation suivante dans le
modèle du traducteur latin : (wa-ḏālika anna) al-ʿilla al-ūlā lā tuzālu tunīru maʿlūlahā.
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En VIII (IX), 84,75, le latin et horizontem naturae est confirmé par la traduction
de Zeraḥyah, qui a be-ōfan (ou : be-ofeq, demême sens) ha-ṭebaʾ (l’horizon de la
nature)130, mais ne correspond nullement à la lecture des témoins arabes, qui
portent invariablement wa-mā fawqu al-ṭabīʿa («au-dessus de la nature»131).
Cette dernière leçon semble être confirmée par un des témoins indirects
arabes, à savoir le Liber de causis II, où manque toutefois, immédiatement
après, la formule assez redondante : fa-innahā fawqu al-ṭabīʿa («car elle est au-
dessus de la nature»)132. Comme Taylor et Rothschild le supposent, la variante
wa-ufuq al-ṭabīʿa figurait sans doute dans le modèle utilisé tant par Gérard de
Crémonequepar Zeraḥyah133. À l’appui d’une telle lecture onpourrait évoquer
l’affirmation en II, 22, 81-82 que l’âme est in horizonte aeternitatis inferius, mais
seul un examen approfondi du passage pourrait révéler la plausibilité de cette
hypothèse134. Quoi qu’ il en soit, la traduction hébraïque de Zeraḥyah montre
qu’on n’a certainement pas le droit d’ intervenir dans le texte de la traduction
latine, et cela d’autant plus qu’on ne peut pas totalement exclure queZeraḥyah
ait eu recours – fût-ce de façon partielle – à la traduction latine. Le véritable
enjeu est de savoir si sa leçon «horizon de la nature» est basée sur une lecture
fautive ou, tout au contraire, correcte de l’arabe.
9 Conclusion
Malgré les œuvres pionnières, et extrêmement méritoires, de Bardenhewer,
Pattin, Vansteenkiste et, en dernier lieu, Taylor, il reste un long travail à accom-
plir avant que l’on puisse songer à élaborer une véritable édition critique de la
traduction latine, qui par ailleurs restera incontestablement très dépendante
d’une véritable édition critique du texte arabe.Dans ce qui précède, nous avons
essayé de dresser un petit tableau de quelques défis majeurs et de clarifier
quelques problèmes particuliers. Ce survol est loin d’être exhaustif. En effet,
nous nous sommes souvent limités à l’examen de quelques cas exemplaires.
Mais nous n’avons pas prêté attention aux deux cas de translittération, à savoir
des mots arabes ‘aql et ḥilya, chacun transcrit sous une multitude de formes,
130 Rothschild 1994, p. 439, nº. 8.
131 Taylor 1981, p. 177, l. 5 [Bāb 8, l. 19].
132 Liber de causis II, p. 346, l. 4-5.
133 Respectivement Taylor 1981, p. 460, n. 70 ; Rothschild 1994, p. 439, nº. 8.
134 La notion d’«horizon» dans ce contexte n’est pas inspirée de Proclus, mais plutôt dérivée
de Plotin ; cf. D’Ancona 2014, p. 144, n. 44.
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attestées parfois dans lemêmemanuscrit135. Nous n’avons pas discuté nonplus
des quelques cas où seule une analyse approfondie pourrait éclairer ce qui à
première vue constitueunenon-conformité entre le texte arabe et la traduction
latine136. Nous espérons néanmoins avoir démontré la complexité de la tâche
qu’ il reste à accomplir : d’une part, fixer aussi bien que possible la traduction
latine originale telle qu’elle figurait dans l’archétype ; d’autre part, identifier
la formulation de cette traduction telle qu’elle était accessible, à un moment
précis et dans un lieu donné, à ses lecteurs.
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chapter 14
Les mots arabes du Liber de causis dans le
commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin
Pascale Bermon
CNRS, PSL Research University Paris, LEM [UMR 8584]
La présente contribution se propose de suivre la piste, dans le commentaire de
Thomas d’Aquin au Liber de causis, ainsi que dans le reste de son œuvre, de
deux termes arabes, translittérés dans le texte latin du Liber de causis : achili
(Proposition IV §43) ou alachili (Proposition (V) §52 et Proposition XI(XII)
§105) et yliathim (Proposition VIII(IX) §90)1.
Au temps où le P. Saffrey écrivait son article sur «l’état actuel des recherches
sur le Liberde causis» (1963), lesmots arabes restés dans le texte latin plaidaient
contre l’hypothèse, encore défendue par certains, d’une origine occidentale,
tolédane, du Liber de causis2. Dans cette hypothèse en effet, on ne s’expliquait
pas bien la rémanence de ces mots arabes translittérés dans le latin. Cristina
d’Ancona, dans son récent article sur le Liber de causis, rappelle avec raison
que ces mots arabes, restés dans le texte latin de Gérard de Crémone, ont de
tout temps donné aux lecteurs latins une clé concernant l’origine du texte3.
La question dont traite la présente contribution déplace toutefois l’objet
de la recherche. On s’ intéresse cette fois à ces mots arabes pour remonter
au texte du Liber de causis que Thomas d’Aquin pouvait avoir à sa disposi-
tion. Il s’agit donc de chercher quel texte avait sous les yeux Thomas d’Aquin
1 Je remercie Dragos Calma de m’avoir proposé ce sujet d’enquête, ainsi qu’Adriano Oliva, qui
a bien voulume donner accès à la filmothèque et à la bibliothèque de la Commission léonine
à Paris.
2 Saffrey 1963, lui-même plutôt favorable à l’hypothèse d’une origine bagdadienne, résume,
p. 272, l’hypothèse «latiniste» selon laquelle le traducteur et philosophe juif Ibn Daud, Aven-
dauth, aurait compilé en arabe les Eléments de Proclus, qu’ il lisait en grec à Tolède, alors
même que Gérard de Crémone y était présent et traduisait le Liber de causis en latin. Avant
Endress 1973, l’ attribution du Liber au cercle bagdadien d’al-Kindī est soutenue par Barden-
hewer 1882, Kraus 1940-1941, d’Alverny 1954, Anawati 1974 (cf. également Saffrey 1963, p. 269).
Sur la progressive prise de conscience au xxe siècle des liens du Liber avec les autres branches
du néoplatonisme arabe, il faut se reporter à D’Ancona 1995 et 2014. Selon D’Ancona 1995,
al-Kindī est l’auteur tant du remaniement arabe de Plotin (Théologie d’Aristote, qui ne fut
traduite en latin qu’en 1519) que de celui de Proclus (Liber de causis).
3 D’Ancona 2014, p. 138, n. 2.
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et de prendre appui sur les mots arabes restés dans le latin, comme sur des
indices, pour s’orienter.
Après avoir précisé le sens de ces mots, on s’ intéressera aux éditions dispo-
nibles du Liber de causis et du commentaire deThomas d’Aquin à ce livre, pour




Le mot achili [§43] ou alachili [§§52, 105] vient de «AQL, pluriel ʿuqūl, intelli-
gence, à tous les sens de ce mot désignant soit la faculté intellectuelle, soit un
être immatériel»4. Ses équivalents latins sont intellectus, intelligentia. Le texte
latin du Liber de causis, Propositions IV, (V) et XII(XI) donne ainsi l’ équiva-
lence : alachili id est intelligentia).
Achili / alachili apparaissent dans les lemmes suivants du Liber de causis :
Proposition IV §43 (éd. Pattin, p. 55) : et omne quod ex eo sequitur cau-
sam primam est achili id est intelligentia. Traduction : et tout ce qui suit
la Cause Première par lui ⟨l’être⟩, est achili c’est-à-dire intelligence5.
Proposition (V) §52 (éd. Pattin, p. 57) : animae igitur quae sequuntur ala-
chili id est intelligentiam.Traduction : donc les âmes qui jouxtent al achili,
c’est-à-dire l’ intelligence.
Proposition XI(XII) §105 (éd. Pattin, p. 105) : verumtamen esse et vita in
intelligentia sunt duae alachili, id est intelligentiae. Traduction : pourtant,
l’ être et la vie dans l’ intelligence sont deux al achili, c’est-à-dire des intel-
ligences.
1.2 Yliathim
Le sens de Yliathim, qui se rencontre avec différentes graphies qui seront exa-
minées dans la dernière partie de cette contribution, a fait l’objet d’erreurs
d’ interprétation. Yliathim ne veut en effet pas dire «universalité»6 et ne vient
4 Goichon 1938, p. 225-233, n. 439. Voir la discussion d’achili dans Calma (2021).
5 Sur la Proposition IV du Liber de causis voir Porro 2014, p. 264-298.
6 Cf. Liber de causis, p. 69, note h : «yliathim = universalité» ; Taylor 1979, p. 510 n. 2, explique
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pas non plus du grec hylè contrairement à ce que pensaient Thomas d’Aquin
et Albert le Grand7. Yliatim est la traduction arabe du grec morphè (latin
forma, forme)8. R. Taylor explique que helyatin transcrit hilyatin, génitif sin-
gulier indéfini de hilyah et souligne la fidélité de la traduction latine à l’arabe9.
C.D’Anconaprécise que l’arabehilya, traduit le grecmorphè, forme, et quedans
la proposition VIII(IX) du Liber de causis, il est dit que laCause Première n’a pas
demorphè10.
1.2.1 Yliathim dans le Liber de causis
Il y a six occurrences d’yliathim dans le Liber de causis :
Proposition VIII (IX) §§90-91 (p. 69-70) : Et intelligentia est habens ylia-
thim quoniam est esse et forma et similiter anima est habens yliathim et
natura est habens yliathim. Et causae quidem primae non est yliathim
quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. Quod si dixerit aliquis : necesse est ut sit
yliathim, dicemus : yliathim suum est infinitum et individuum suum est
bonitas pura, influens super intelligentiam omnes bonitates et super reli-
quas res mediante intelligentia.
Ce qui se traduit :
Et l’ intelligence possède l’ yliathim [la forme], puisqu’elle est être et
forme. Et semblablement l’âme possède l’ yliathim [la forme]. Et la nature
détient l’ yliathim [la forme]. Et, pour sûr, la Cause Première n’a pas d’ylia-
thim [la forme], puisqu’elle est seulement être. Et si quelqu’un disait qu’ il
queBardenhewer 1882 a lu kulliyah au lieu dehilyah, « les deuxmots ne différant que par la
première lettre en arabe» ; id., ibid., p. 510, n. 23 : la leçon correcte hilyah est due à Rosen-
thal 1952, suivi par Anawati 1956, sur la base de l’évidence du texte latin et du fait que
kulliyah n’a pas de sens dans ce contexte ; Serra 1975 a le premier repéré dans le manus-
crit Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit Golius 209, la leçon originale hilyah, sous la
correction kullyah portée par une deuxième main.
7 Cf. Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis, p. 64 : «yliatim dicitur ab yle» ; Albert le
Grand, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, c. 18, p. 111 : «et propter hoc a qui-
busdam philosophis hyliatin vocatur, quod denominativum est ab hyle».
8 Cf. Taylor 1979, p. 510 ; D’Ancona 2014, p. 151.
9 Taylor 1979, p. 510 n. 21 : «The Arabic word transliterated hilyah […] can be translated as
‘ornament’, ‘attribute’, ‘quality’, ‘state’, ‘condition’, ‘appearance’ and even ‘form’. Further-
more, the work of Franz Rosenthal on the Arabic Plotinus source has shown that ilyah,
although uncommon in philosophical texts, has been used to render the Greek morphè,
‘shape’ or ‘form’».
10 D’Ancona 2014, p. 151.
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est nécessaire qu’elle soit [ait une] yliathim [forme], nous dirons que son
yliathim [sa forme] est infinie et que son individu est la bonté pure répan-
dant sur l’ intelligence toutes ses bontés et [les répandant] sur les autres
choses par la médiation de l’ intelligence.
Cette proposition VIII(IX) du Liber de causis a fait l’objet de discussions parmi
les spécialistes, qui s’accordent pour dire qu’elle n’a probablement pas une
sourceproclusienne11. C.D’Ancona souligneque la thèse selon laquelle laCause
Première n’a pas de morphè correspond à une théorie plotinienne12. Le Pre-
mier Principe, qui est au-delà de toute forme, ne peut pas être connu: c’est
l’Un amorphon kai aneideon. Proclus n’aurait jamais concédé que l’ Intellect
soit l’ image première et la plus révélante de l’Un. Pourtant, cette thèse est pré-
sente dans le Liber de causis.
Ceci dit, l’ auteur du Liber de causis introduit un changement par rapport à
Plotin : la raison pour laquelle la Cause Première est au-delà de toute forme
est qu’ il est être pur (quoniam ipsa est esse tantum)13. Cette doctrine vien-
drait selon les uns de Porphyre14, selon les autres, des Noms divins du Pseudo-
Denys15. Richard Taylor résume ainsi la thèse soutenue par le Liber de causis :
« tous les êtres créés sont des entités limitées par la forme. L’ intelligence est
limitée à cause de son être et de sa forme; de même, l’âme et la nature sont
limitées, car chacune a un être qui est limité, spécifié et rendu fini par sa
forme»16.
1.2.2 Yliathim chez Thomas d’Aquin
Hyliathim : ce mot a paru aux lecteurs latins être connecté au grec hylè. Tho-
mas d’Aquin n’est pas à l’origine de cette étymologie, dont il faudrait faire
l’archéologie et qui est déjà présente au moins chez Albert le Grand.
Thomas d’Aquin écrit, en commentant la proposition VIII(IX) :
11 Voir cependant la contribution d’ElviraWakelnig au présent volume, selon qui on ne peut
établir qu’yliathim ne puisse provenir des traductions arabes de Proclus.
12 D’Ancona 2014, p. 151.
13 D’Ancona 2014, p. 151.
14 Thillet 1971 ; Pinès 1971.
15 D’Ancona 2014.
16 Taylor 1979, p. 512 : «The […] author of the De causis […] is stressing that all created beings
are entities limited by form. The intelligence is limited because it is being and form; and
so too are soul and nature, for each has being which is limited, specified and made finite
by form».
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Nam intelligentia habet yliatim id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum
materiae se habens ; dicitur enim yliatim ab yle quod est materia. Et quo-
domohoc sit exponit subdens :Quoniamest esse et forma. Quidditas enim
et substantia ipsius intelligentiae est quaedam forma subsistens immate-
rialis sed quia ipsa non est suumesse sed est subsistens in esse participato
comparatur ipsa forma subsistens ad esse participatum sicut potentia ad
actum aut materia ad formam17.
Ce qui se traduit :
Car l’ intelligence a un yliatim, c’est-à-dire quelque chose de matériel ou
se comportant à la manière de la matière ; en effet yliatim est dit à par-
tir de yle qui est la matière. Et il explique comment cela est en ajoutant :
parce qu’elle est être et forme. En effet la quiddité et la substance de
l’ intelligence elle-même est une certaine forme subsistante immatérielle
mais parce qu’elle-même n’est pas son être mais est subsistante dans
l’être participé, la forme subsistante elle-même est comparée à l’être par-
ticipé comme la puissance à l’acte ou la matière à la forme.
Pour Thomas, le Liber de causis épouserait la doctrine de la composition hylé-
morphique des intelligences ou substances séparées18. Selon lui, cet ouvrage
soutiendrait que «l’ intelligence a une matière», intelligentia est habens ylia-
tim. Thomas d’Aquin fait donc du Liber de causis un livre qui cite la doc-
trine de l’hylémorphisme universel. Toutefois, pour Thomas, la façon dont
l’ intelligencepossèdeune yliatim, unprincipematériel, c’est en tant qu’elle est
«être et forme», car Thomas défend dans toute son oeuvre que l’ intelligence
ou substance séparée est complètement dénuée de toute composition avec la
matière19.
Thomas cite-t-il yliathim ailleurs dans sonœuvre? Hulè figure dans l’Index tho-
misticus du P. Busa, qui y a adjoint yliathim. Thomas emploie hulè en quatre
17 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 64, l. 6-19.
18 Taylor 1979, p. 506-513. Voir la contribution de Michael Chase dans le présent volume.
19 Taylor 1979, p. 509-510 : «For him the notion that all beings except God are composed
of matter and form was a philosophically unsound teaching inspired by Ibn Gabirol’s
Fons vitae. Even St. Bonaventure’s position that angels are composed of form and spiri-
tual matter he regarded as untenable. For St. Thomas hylomorphic composition is found
only among sensible entities which have their existence in this composition of matter and
form».
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lieux supplémentaires, associé aux noms de David de Dinant et d’Alexandre
d’Aphrodise :
Scriptum super Sententiis, lib. 2, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 : David de Dinando divi-
sit enim res in partes tres, in corpora, animas, et substantias aeternas
separatas ; et primum indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur corpora, dixit yle ;
primum autem indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur animae, dixit noym, vel
mentem; primum autem indivisibile in substantiis aeternis dixit Deum;
et haec tria esse unumet idem: ex quo iterumconsequitur esse omnia per
essentiam unum.
Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 6, arg. 11 : Praeterea, Alexander dicit
in libro de intellectu, quod anima habet intellectum ylealem. Yle autem
dicitur prima materia. Ergo in anima est aliquid de prima materia.
De principiis naturae, cap. 2 : Ipsa autem materia quae intelligitur sine
qualibet forma et privatione, sed subiecta formae et privationi, dicitur
materia prima, propter hoc quod ante ipsam non est alia materia. Et hoc
etiam dicitur yle.
In De generatione, lib. 1, l. 10, n. 9. Deinde cum dicit : est autem hyle etc.
comparat praedictas transmutationes secundumsubiectumquodest tan-
tum ens in potentia. Et dicit quod hyle, sive materia prima, est maxime
proprium subiectum susceptibile generationis et corruptionis
2 Les éditions
2.1 L’édition du commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin au Liber de causis
(Saffrey 1954)
Le commentaire au Liber de causis de Thomas d’Aquin a été édité par le P. Saf-
frey en 1954. Le stemma codicum décrit une double tradition : universitaire
d’après les deux exemplaria simultanés de l’université de Paris et dont les
manuscrits sont indépendants les uns des autres ; et indépendante (des exem-
plaria parisiens). Un ancêtre X commun à ces deux traditions, très proche de
l’apographe dicté par Thomas, «devait se trouver en Italie, peut-être à la curie
pontificale ou dans un centre dominicain»20. D’après le P. Saffrey, l’ apographe
20 Saffrey dans Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. LVIII.
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a été dicté par Thomas à l’un de ses secrétaires. Ses fautes prouvent son uni-
cité. Il ne donna lieu qu’à une seule rédaction et ne portait aucune correction
d’auteur. On doit peut-être en conclure que toute remarque sur lamise en page
du commentaire dans les manuscrits ou sur sa version écrite remonte avec dif-
ficulté à Thomas lui-même. Le P. Saffrey lui-même ne fait aucune remarque sur
la mise en page des manuscrits.
L’édition Saffrey a été faite sur cinq manuscrits de la famille indépendante,
huit de la famille universitaire auxquels s’ajoutent deux manuscrits supplé-
mentaires pour la première pecia seulement. Dix manuscrits ont été en outre
consultés (deux de la branche indépendante et huit de la branche universi-
taire). Soit en tout vingt-cinq manuscrits. Le P. Saffrey mentionne en introduc-
tion cinquante manuscrits et la liste de la Commission léonine en comporte
cinquante-cinq, plus sept fragments.
Le texte du Liber de causis commenté par Thomas est différent du texte
imprimé avant le commentaire de Thomas par le P. Saffrey. En ce qui concerne
le texte imprimé avant le commentaire de Thomas, le P. Saffrey affirme:
J’ai imprimé un texte du Liber de causis qui suit celui de Bardenhewer
sauf chaque fois que saintThomas, citant le Liber, présente un autre texte.
J’ai soigneusement noté dans l’apparat critique à l’endroit de ces cita-
tions les divergences. Autrement dit, je me suis appliqué à reconstituer,
chaque fois que c’est possible, le manuscrit que saint Thomas avait sous
les yeux21.
En pratique, toutefois, les choses paraissent moins claires. Par exemple, p. 36,
Proposition V : Thomas omet dans son lemme quatre mots, ce que signale le
P. Saffrey en marge inférieure avec une *. Mais il reproduit quand même en
tête du commentaire (p. 35) le texte complet, sans rien indiquer.
2.2 Les éditions du Liber de causis (Bardenhewer, Pattin)
L’édition Bardenhewer du Liber de causis, que reprend le P. Saffrey, repose sur
deux manuscrits de Munich : Clm 162 (xive siècle) et 527 (xiiie siècle). Elle est
remplacée par l’édition Pattin du Liber de causis, qui est postérieure à l’édition
Saffrey du commentaire de Thomas à ce livre. L’édition Pattin donne des indi-
cations sur la tradition manuscrite du Liber de causis qu’ il faut prendre en
considération dans nos tentatives d’approcher le texte que Thomas avait sous
les yeux.
21 Saffrey dans Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. LXXIII.
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A. Pattin décrit quatre-vingt-douze manuscrits, en collationne entièrement
dix. Il se réfère de plus aux éditions Bardenhewer et Saffrey, à l’édition du com-
mentaire deRogerBaconpar Steele22, aux commentaires d’Albert leGrand (éd.
Venise, 1517) et de Gilles de Rome (éd. Venise, 1550). Il affirme: «De plus nous
avons largement consulté plus de quatre-vingts manuscrits dont nous ne don-
nons cependant que les variantes les plus significatives pour l’établissement de
notre texte»23.
3 Les manuscrits
Après avoir défini les emplois et le sens d’achili et d’yliathim dans le Liber
de causis et décrit les éditions dont nous disposons pour le Liber de causis et
le commentaire de saint Thomas d’Aquin, nous présentons ici le résultat de
quelques enquêtes que nous avons effectuées dans lesmanuscrits du commen-
taire de Thomas et du Liber de causis dans le but d’approcher le texte de cet
ouvrage que Thomas pouvait avoir sous les yeux.
3.1 Thomas d’Aquin et le Liber de causis
Thomas ne cite pas intégralement le texte du Liber de causis avant de le com-
menter. Il cite seulement les premiersmots de la proposition suivis d’un «etc.»,
puis il cite le Liber de causis au fur et à mesure de son commentaire. Par
conséquent, l’ impression par le P. Saffrey du texte du Liber de causis avant le
commentaire par Thomas pour chaque proposition restitue un texte du Liber
de causis à partir de l’édition critique de Bardenhewer «corrigée» par les cita-
tions qu’en fait Thomas au fil de son commentaire. Cette correction, selon
Saffrey, est toujours soigneusement signalée. Or, comme nous l’avons dit plus
haut, ce n’est pas vraiment le cas.
Thomas a conscience de l’existence de deux traditions manuscrites, l’une à
trente-deux propositions, l’ autre à trente et une propositions24. L’une collige
les propositions IV et V (tradition à 31 propositions) ; l’ autre les distingue (tra-
dition à 32 propositions). Les manuscrits à trente et une propositions forment
39% des quatre-vingt-douze manuscrits décrits par Pattin, soit trente-six
manuscrits et un à trente propositions.
22 Robert Steele utilise deux manuscrits du XIIIe siècle du British Library, Reg. 12 D XIV et 12
F I. Cf. Roger Bacon, Quaestiones super Librum de causis.
23 Liber de causis, p. 130.
24 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 31 : et hoc in sequenti propositione
quae in quibusdam libris invenitur coniuncta [iuncta, inventa] cum isto commento, et inci-
pit : ‘intelligentiae superiores et cetera’.
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ill. 14.1 Toldedo, Bibl. Capitular 47.12, f. 79r, Proposition IV : Prima
rerum creatarum est esse
Note: Ce manuscrit est peut-être le plus ancien manuscrit
de la tradition indépendante. Il appartient à une collec-
tion presque complète des ouvrages traduits du grec par
Guillaume de Moerbeke, copiée en Italie par un clerc de
Bayonne autour de 1279, qui reproduit peut-être les propres
manuscrits de Moerbeke.
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Il est bien connu que Thomas a conscience que l’auteur de ce livre est arabe
et puise à l’Elementatio theologica de Proclus qui venait d’être traduite par
Guillaume de Moerbeke (1268)25 :
Inveniuntur igitur quaedam de primis principiis conscripta, per diver-
sas propositiones distincta, quasi per modum sigillatim considerantium
aliquas veritates. Et in Graeco quidem invenitur sic traditus liber Pro-
cli Platonici, continens CCXI propositiones, qui intitulatur elementatio
theologica ; in Arabico vero invenitur hic liber qui apud Latinos de cau-
sis dicitur, quem constat de Arabico esse translatum et in Graeco penitus
non haberi : unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorumArabum ex praedicto
libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continen-
tur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo26.
L’entreprise de Thomas consiste même dans une certaine mesure à substituer
au texte du Liber de causis le texte de Proclus. Dans certains manuscrits, sur-
tout ceux de la tradition indépendante, cela se voit dans la mise en page : les
trois premiers mots de la proposition du Liber de causis suivis de «etc.», sont
suivis de la divisio textus du Liber de causis avec la citation de la proposition
du Liber de causis en grands caractères ; puis viennent les citations des propo-
sitions correspondantes de Proclus, en grands caractères, nettement mises en
évidence. Tout se passe comme si la typographie voulait suggérer que le texte
commenté est celui de Proclus. Toutefois, si l’on se souvient queThomas a dicté
son commentaire, lamise en page de son commentaire dans ce type demanus-
crits relèverait d’un autre projet.
3.2 Première enquête : L’absence d’achili/alachili dans les manuscrits de
Thomas d’Aquin
Dans une première enquête, j’ ai cherché à vérifier que les manuscrits de Tho-
mas ne comportent pas achili / alachili.
J’ ai effectué des vérifications sur les passages suivants :
Liber de causis, Proposition IV :
et omne quod ex eo sequitur causam primam est achili id est intelligentia
Saffrey, p. 26
25 Cf. Steel 2014, p. 247-263.
26 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, pr., p. 3, l. 1-10.
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quia omne quod ex eo sequitur causamprimam est achili id est intelligentia
Bardenhewer, p. 167, l. 4-6
quia omne quod ex eo sequitur causam primam est achili [id est] intelligen-
tia.
Pattin, p. 55, l. 54-55
Thomas d’Aquin, Super librumde causis, Proposition IV,divisio textus : dif-
ferentiam assignat ibi : Et omne*27 quod ex eo sequitur, etc.
Saffrey, p. 27, l. 6-7
Thomas d’Aquin, Super librum de causis, Proposition IV, divisio textus :
Deinde cum dicit : et omne quod ex eo sequitur etc., ostendit differentiam
inter membra divisionis.
Saffrey, p. 31, l. 1-2
Thomas d’Aquin, Super librum de causis, Proposition IV, commentaire (Tho-
mas paraphrase intelligentia [achili] par illud esse intellectuale) :
hanc differentiam ponit quantum ad intelligentiarum naturam, quod
illud esse intellectuale quod immediate assequitur causam primam, est
intelligentia completa ultima completione quantum ad esse creatum in
potentia essendi et in reliquis bonitatibus consequentibus, illud vero esse
intellectuale quod est inferius in ordine intelligentiarum, retinet quidem
naturam et rationem intelligentiae, sed tamen est sub superiori intelligen-
tia in complemento naturae et in virtute essendi et operandi et in omnibus
bonitatibus sive perfectionibus.
Saffrey, p. 32, l. 9-17
Liber de causis, Proposition V :
animae igitur quae sequuntur28 intelligentiam
Saffrey, p. 35
27 Nous citons ici l’ apparat de l’édition Saffrey 1954, p. 27 : «omne: correxi ‘esse’». Cf. ibid.,
p. LXVIII : « tous les manuscrits portent esse au lieu de omne. Cet esse est donc une faute
ou une graphie incertaine de l’apographe. Il faut corriger eu égard au texte repris p. 31.1».
28 Ici, l’ édition Saffrey 1954, p. 35, omet sans le signaler les mots alachili id est qui figurent
dans l’édition Bardenhewer.
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igitur animae quae sequuntur alachili id est intelligentiam
Bardenhewer, p. 168, l. 5
igitur animae quae sequuntur alachili [id est] intelligentiam.
Pattin, p. 57, l. 52-53
Thomas d’Aquin, Super librum de causis, Proposition V :
Dicit enim quod animae scilicet superiores sicut sunt caelestium corpo-
rum quae sequuntur intelligentiam quasi post eam ordinatae sunt comple-
tae scilicet in perfectione naturae animalis.
Saffrey, p. 40, l. 3-6
Liber de causis, Proposition XI (XII) :
verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae29 intelligentiae
Saffrey, p. 77
verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae aliae alachili id est
intelligentiae
Bardenhewer, p. 175, l. 5-6
verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae alachili [id est] intelli-
gentiae.
Pattin, p. 73, l. 70-71
Thomas d’Aquin, Super librum de causis, Proposition XI (XII) :
Sed hoc quod ponitur loco huius in hoc libro videtur esse corruptum
et malum intellectum habere. Sequitur enim: verumtamen esse et vita in
intelligentia sunt duae intelligentiae ; debet enim intelligi quod ista duo,
scilicet esse et vita, sunt in intelligentia intellectualiter ; et esse et intelli-
gentia [etc.]
Saffrey, p. 79, l. 2-6
Liste des manuscrits qui ont été contrôlés (sigles de l’édition Pattin) :
29 Ici, l’ édition Saffrey 1954, p. 77, omet sans le signaler les mots aliae alachili id est qui
figurent dans l’édition Bardenhewer.
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Tradition universitaire :
– (A) Paris, BnF, lat. 14706 [xiiie siècle]
– (L) Vaticano (Città del), BAV, Vat. lat. 4262 [xiiie siècle], f. 1ra–19vb
– (Y) Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 3485 [xive siècle], f. 283v–298vb [Coll. de Navarre]
– Bologna, Univ. 861 (1655/6), f. 128vb–145 (n’a pas pu être collationné par Saf-
frey)
Ces manuscrits présentent des variantes mais aucun n’a achili / alachili.
Tradition indépendante :
– (Ω) Toledo, Bibl. Capitular 47.12 [ca a. 1279, copie de la collection de Guil-
laume de Moerbeke par un clerc de Bayonne], f. 75ra–100va
– (N) Vaticano (Città del), BAV, Borgh. 114 [xiiie-xive siècle, bibliothèque pon-
tificale], f. 210v–222r
Manuscrits contrôlés, non utilisés par Saffrey :
– Paris, BnF, lat. 16607 [xiiie siècle ex., legs de Godefroid de Fontaines, Sor-
bonne], f. 2ra–26va : ⟨8v⟩ Dicit enim quod animae scilicet superiores sicut
sunt ⟨add. : super⟩ caelestium corporum quae sequuntur intelligentiam quasi
⟨immediate⟩ ; ⟨15va⟩ sed hoc quod ponitur in loco huius in hoc libro videtur
esse corruptum etmalum intellectumhabere. Sequitur enim: verumptamen
esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae intelligentiae ; debet enim intelligi quod
ista duo, scilicet esse et vita, sunt in intelligentia ⟨om. (saut du même au
même) : intellectualiter et esse et intelligentia⟩ in vita sunt duae vitae
– London, Lambeth Palace 97 [xiiie siècle ex., couvent OP de Lauthony],
f. 145ra–161va
– Firenze, Bibl. Laur., Plut XXIX dext. cod. 10 [xiiie siècle ex., origine pari-
sienne, couvent OFM Santa Croce], f. 93ra–107rb
– Bruges, Bibl. du Séminaire, 106 (145) [xiiie siècle, Abbaye des Dunes],
f. 93ra–104vb (consulté par Saffrey)
Conclusion : Ces manuscrits présentent des variantes, dont certaines ne sont
pas signalées par l’édition Saffrey. Mais aucune ne restitue achili ou alachili.
Ce terme, par ailleurs, ne figure pas dans l’ Index thomisticus du P. Roberto
Busa.
3.3 Deuxième enquête : L’absence d’achili / alachili dans certains
manuscrits du Liber de causis
Thomas n’écrit jamais achili / alachili. Deux hypothèses peuvent expliquer ce
fait. Soit l’omission est volontaire, et pourrait s’expliquer, par exemple, par la
volonté d’éliminer les apports arabes au profit de la philosophie grecque. La
tentative de Thomas de substituer les Éléments de Proclus au Liber de causis
et l’étymologie grecque qu’ il donne, après d’autres, à yliathim, iraient dans ce
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sens. Soit l’omission d’achili / alachili est involontaire et s’explique parce que
Thomas d’Aquin n’a pas achili dans ses manuscrits du Liber de causis.
Or il existe des manuscrits du Liber de causis qui n’ont pas achili / alachili.
Dans l’apparat critique de l’édition Pattin, huit des dixmanuscrits entièrement
collationnés n’ont pas achili / alachili. Plus exactement, lesmanuscrits du Liber
de causis utilisés par A. Pattin qui omettent dans les trois cas alachili sont au
nombre de six, sur dix utilisés, plus deux qui l’omettent dans deux cas sur trois.
Parmi ces manuscrits, le fameux manuscrit Oxford, Bodl. Selden sup. 24 [xiiie
siècle in.], peut-être le plus ancien, portant l’ex-libris de Saint-Alban, contient
à un autre endroit, en III §32 (éd. Pattin, p. 52, l. 14), alachhir, au lieu de intelli-
gentia.
A. Pattin affirme en outre qu’ il a consulté trente-cinq autres manuscrits :
«L’apparat critique indique toutes les variantes des dix manuscrits entière-
ment collationnés, et de plus, en de nombreux endroits offrant des cruces, les
variantes les plus intéressantes des autres témoins consultés»30. Si Pattin ne dit
rien concernant les manuscrits consultés aux endroits où apparaît achili, son
silence signifie-t-il que tous ces manuscrits ont achili / alachili?
Pour répondre à cette question, voici le résultat de quelques sondages effectués
parmi les manuscrits simplement consultés par Pattin :
Paris, BnF, lat. 16082 [xiiie siècle], f. 312r : Prima rerum etc. […] est aclili id
est intelligencia completa ; f. 312v [Propositions IV-V] animae igitur quae
sequuntur ilachili id est intelligentiam.
Paris, BnF, lat. 16084 [xiiie siècle (Pattin) ; xive siècle in. (BnF)], f. 199ra :
Quod est quia causa quod ex eo sequitur causamprimamest intelligencia
prima [exp.] quia… ⟨om. alachili ; cette omission n’est pas signalée dans
l’apparat de Pattin⟩ ; 199rb anime igitur que sequuntur intelligenciamper-
fecte sunt et complete ⟨om. alachili ; cette omission n’est pas signalée
dans l’apparat de Pattin⟩ .
Paris, BnF, latin 6322 [xiiie siècle (Pattin) ; xive siècle (BnF)], f. 183v : quod
est quia omne quod sequitur causam primam est intelligentia completa
⟨om. achili⟩.
30 Liber de causis, éd. Pattin, p. 132.
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Ce test laisse penser qu’une forte proportion demanuscrits du Liber de cau-
sis n’a pas achili / alachili. On peut donc raisonnablement suggérer que le
silence de Thomas provient du fait que lui et son entourage disposent d’un
manuscrit ou de plusieurs manuscrits qui n’ont pas achili / alachili. Il faudrait
donc réexaminer s’ il convient d’ imprimer ce terme dans le lemme de la pro-
position IV, comme le fait le P. Saffrey, p. 26, col. 1, de son édition.
3.4 Troisième enquête : Les graphies de yliathim dans les manuscrits du
commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin
Une troisième enquête a consisté à chercher les graphies de yliathim dans les
manuscrits du commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin.
J’ai effectué des vérifications sur les passages suivants :
Liber de causis, Proposition VIII(IX) :
et intelligentia est habens yliatim quoniam est esse et forma et similiter
anima est habens yliatim et natura est habens yliatim. Et causae quidem
primae non est yliatim quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. Quod si dixerit ali-
quis : necesse est ut sit ⟨habens⟩ yliatim, dicemus : yliatim id est suumesse
infinitum, et individuum suum est bonitas pura, effluens [etc.]
Saffrey, p. 5731
et intelligentia est habens helyatin et formam et similiter anima est
habens helyatin et natura est habens helyatin. et causae quidem primae
non est helyatin quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. quod si dixerit aliquis :
necesse est ut sit helyatin, dicemus : helyatine id est suum est infinitum,
et individuum suum est bonitas pura, effluens [etc.]
Bardenhewer, p. 173, l. 9-14
et intelligentia est habens yliathim quoniam est esse et forma et simili-
ter anima est habens yliathim et natura est habens yliathim. Et causae
quidem primae non est yliathim, quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. Quod si
dixerit aliquis : necesse est ut sit yliathim, dicemus : yliathim suumest infi-
nitum et individuum suum est bonitas pura, influens [etc.].
Pattin, p. 69, l. 98-70, l. 5
31 Saffrey ne signale pas les nombreuses différences qui existent entre son texte et celui de
Bardenhewer.
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Thomas d’Aquin, Super librum de causis, Proposition VIII(IX) :
Similiter etiam prosequitur quantum ad esse […] Nam intelligentia habet
yliatim id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens ; dici-
tur enim yliatim ab yle quod est materia. Et quodomo hoc sit exponit
subdens : Quoniam est esse et forma. Quidditas enim et substantia ipsius
intelligentiae est quaedam forma subsistens immaterialis sed quia ipsa
non est suum esse sed est subsistens in esse participato comparatur ipsa
forma subsistens ad esse participatum sicut potentia ad actum aut mate-
ria ad formam. Et similiter etiam anima est habens yliatim […]. Similiter
etiamnatura est habens yliatim […]Causa autem primanullomodohabet
yliatim quia non habet esse participatum sed ipsa est esse purum et per
consequens bonitas pura.
Saffrey, p. 64, l. 4-19
Les manuscrits contrôlés, dont ceux de la tradition universitaire :
– Bologna, Univ. 861 (1655/6), f. 128vb–145 (n’a pas pu être collationné par
Saffrey) : Et similiter etiam anima est habens yliathim […] natura est habens
yliachim […] Causa autem prima nullo modo habet yliathim quia non habet
esse participatum ⟨sed] verum⟩ ipsa est esse purum.
Les manuscrits contrôlés de tradition indépendante :
– (Ω) Toledo, Bibl. Capitular 47.12, f. 75ra–100va : ⟨86⟩ Nam intelligentia habet
yliatim id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens ; dicitur
enim yliatim ab yle quod est materia. Et quodomo hoc est exponit subdens :
Quoniam est esse et forma. […] Et similiter etiam anima est habens yliatim
[…] natura est habens yliachim […] Causa autem prima nullo modo habet
yliachim quia non habet esse participatum sed ipsa est esse purum et per
consequens bonitas pura.
Manuscrits non utilisés par Saffrey :
– Paris, BnF, lat. 16607 [xiiie siècle ex., legs de Godefroid de Fontaines, Sor-
bonne], f. 2ra–26va : ⟨12vb⟩ Nam intelligentia habet yliatim id est aliquid
materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens ; dicitur enim yliacym ab yle
quod est materia. Et quodomo hoc sit exponit subdens : Quoniam est esse et
forma. […] Et similiter etiam anima est habens yliatim […] natura est habens
yliachi⟨ ei a. c. ⟩m […] Causa autem prima nullo modo habet yliachim quia
nonhabet esse participatum sed ipsa est essepurumet per consequens boni-
tas pura.
– Firenze, Bibl. Laur., Plut XXIX dext. cod. 10 [xiiie siècle ex., origine pari-
sienne, couvent OFM Santa Croce], f. 93ra–107rb : ⟨100va⟩ : Nam intelligentia
habet yliatim id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens ;
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dicitur enim yliatim ab yle quod est materia … Et similiter etiam anima est
habens yliachim non solum… natura est habens yliachim […] Causa autem
prima nullo modo habet yliachim […].
On en déduit queThomas d’Aquin n’a, semble-t-il, que deux graphies : yliatim*
la première fois (le signe * signifiant que cette graphie n’est pas répertoriée par
Pattin, voir infra) ; yliathim ou yliachim* les deux fois suivantes. Ceci est assez
régulier dans les manuscrits que nous avons consultés, même s’ il se rencontre
aussi d’autres graphies, par exemple dans le manuscrit Paris, BnF, lat. 16607 :
yliacym*.
3.5 Les différentes graphies de yliatim/yliathim
A. Pattin imprime en 1966 yliathim et donne seize graphies variantes dans son
apparat :
eliachim, eliathim, elyathim, elyatim, elyatin, heilateia, heilatin, heiletue,
helecine, helyatim, helyatine, heylatin, heylatine, heylatym, latine, yatine,
yliathim. D’autres graphies existent, non répertoriées par Pattin, signa-
lées ici par une *. En 1976, Pattin affirmait que la graphie yliathim devrait
être changée en hyliathim*32.
Richard Taylor considère pour sa part que «le mot yliatim* que saint Thomas
trouva dans son texte du De causis est une corruption tardive de la translitté-
ration originelle de Gérard de Crémone, helyatin*»33. Saffrey donne yliatim*,
Bardenhewer helyatin*, Fauser (pour le texte d’Albert le Grand) hyliatin*34.
Autres graphies rencontrées :
– Paris, BnF, lat. 16082 [xiiie siècle], f. 314v : intelligentia est habens heliatin*
et formam ⟨sic⟩ quia similiter anima habens heliatin* et formam nam est
habens esse tantum quod si dixerit aliquis necesse est ut si ⟨sic⟩ heliatim*
dicamus heliatim* i. suum est infinitum quia individuum suum est bonitas
pura et fluens […]
– Paris, BnF, lat. 16084 [xiiie siècle (Pattin) ; BnF (xive siècle in.)], f. 199vb:
habens heliathim* quoniam esse est et forma et similiter est anima habens
heliathim* et natura est habens helyathim* et cause quidem prime non est
eliathim. quia ipsa est causatum (sic !) esse quod si dixerit aliquis necesse est
32 Pattin 1976, p. 471.
33 Taylor 1979, p. 510.
34 Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis a Prima Causa, c. 18, p. 110.
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esse ut sit ei ⟨add. OPS⟩ heliachim* dicemus eliathim i. suum est infinitum
et individuum suum est bonitas pura…
3.6 La corruption du §90 du Liber de causis
La Proposition VIII(IX), §90 a un texte qui paraît très corrompu dans les
manuscrits du Liber de causis. Voici notamment une corruption du texte qui
pourrait soit expliquer l’étymologie yliathim/ ulè soit en dériver (sachant que
Thomas, lui, a un texte correct) :
Paris, BnF, lat. 16082 [xiiie siècle], f. 314v : intelligentia est habens heliatin
et formam ⟨sic⟩ quia similiter anima habens heliatin et formam.
Liber de causis éd. Pattin, manuscrits BCTb: et intelligentia est habens
yliathim […] et formam35.
Qu’hyliatin soit un terme des traductions arabes de Plotin (R. Taylor) ou qu’ il
puisse même remonter à la traduction des Éléments de théologie (E. Wakel-
nig), la présence de la formule helyatin et forma pourrait avoir conduit ceux
qui ne comprenaient pas la valeur épexégétique du et, à l’ équivalence helyatin
= matière.
4 Le texte du Liber de causis dont disposait Thomas
Pour résumer, les caractéristiques des lemmes étudiés de Thomas sont les sui-
vantes :
– Proposition IV : tous les manuscrits portent esse au lieu de omne et absence
de achili/alachili
– Proposition V : absence de achili / alachili
– Proposition XI(XII) : absence de achili / alachili : verumtamen esse et vita in
intelligentia sunt duae ⟨om. : alachili, id est⟩ intelligentiae. Omission de in
esse : et esse et intelligentia in vita sunt due vite et intelligentia et vita ⟨om.
in esse⟩ sunt duo esse. Le P. Saffrey explique cette omission par une «faute
de Thomas», ou un «oubli du copiste dans la rapidité de la dictée»36.
– Proposition VIII(IX) : graphie : yliatim/yliathim
Thomas n’a pas la corruption yliathim et formam.
35 Autre corruption du texte à cet endroit (éd. Pattin, manuscrit L) : et intelligentia est habens
yliathim […] et natura est habens yliathim.
36 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. LXVII.
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Ces caractéristiques contribuent à dresser un portrait robot de son texte (ou
de ses textes : car il connaissait la version à trente et une propositions et celle à
trente-deux propositions), qui ne correspond pas à celui édité par Pattin.
Le texte deThomas se rapprochede la traditionqui ometachili/alachilidans les
trois occurrences et qui est signalée ainsi dans les apparats de l’édition Pattin :
achili : om. BCLOPSUV
alachili : sic habet ACs ; achili T ; om. B sed add. in mg a.m. alachilim B. ;
om. LOPSUVb
alachili : alachih A; om BCLOPSUV
Il faut en ôter les manuscrits B et C qui, eux, portent la corruption yliathim et
formam37.
37 Et intelligentia est habens yliathim ⟨quoniamest esse] om. BCTb⟩ et forma ⟨m: BCTb⟩ et simi-
liter anima est habens yliathim.
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La graphie yliatim ne se retrouve dans aucun des manuscrits LOPSUV38. Ylia-
thim est la graphie du manuscrit V. On peut en conclure, sous réserve de plus
ample informé, queThomas a unmanuscrit dont le texte a des caractéristiques
communes avec celui de V (Vat. lat. 2089), queMarie-Thérèse d’Alverny date de




Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 861 (1655/6)
Bruges, Bibliothèque du Séminaire, 106 (145)
Firenze, Bibl. Laur., Plut XXIX dext. cod. 10
London, British Library
Royal 12 D XIV





Oxford, Bodleian Library, Selden sup. 24
Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485







Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular 47-12
38 Graphies de B et C d’après l’éd. Pattin : 98 : helyatim BC; 99 : elyatim B helyatim C; 103 : B
helyatim.
39 D’Alverny 1963, p. 256-258 : codex ab uno librario gallico, forsan parisino exaratus ; repris
dans D’Alverny 1994, p. 89-91. Pattin 1966, p. 103, date quant à lui ce manuscrit de la fin
du xiiie siècle et renvoie également à Aristoteles Latinus. Codices 1955, vol. II, p. 1221,
n. 1846. Carmody 2003, p. 31*, utilise ce manuscrit pour son édition du grand commen-
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The scholar who, in sooth, does little else than handle books—with the
philologist of average attainments their numbermay amount to two hun-
dred a day—ultimately forgets entirely and completely the capacity of
thinking for himself
F. Nietzsche, Ecce homo, New York, 2004 p. 48
∵
1 Introduction
An author cannot be reduced to his library. Like any other “fact”, an interpret-
ation is necessary, by means of which the meaning and context of a quotation
can be determined. I therefore agree with Dragos Calma1 when he denounces
“les démarches cabalistiques de certaines études qui se contentent des
nombres et des statistiques”, because “une citation n’est jamais gratuite puis-
qu’elle présuppose un choix, une claire intentionnalité de la part de celui
qui l’utilise. Savoir la faire résonner tient de la virtuosité interprétative de
l’historien”.
It is not easy to evaluate the importance of a source by taking into account
one or more of these aspects: implicit, explicit, literal, non-literal, ad sensum,
false attribution.2 The mere statistical data does not reveal the importance
of a source. A single implicit quotation, even a non-literal one, can be at
the heart of an original interpretation, and the historian must take this into
account.
1 Calma 2010, p. XV.
2 Bertolacci 1998, p. 261–339.
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On the other hand, the frequent use of “formulas” quoted literally and with
mention of the author or work, may indicate the use of florilegia, whichmakes
a quotation less significant than the simple statistical data may lead one to
believe. A good exemple of this is Aristotle, and one of his works most quoted
by Eckhart: De anima. According to the statistics,3 Eckhart cites this treatise
about 300 times. Of these occurrences, however, more than half are reduced
to brief sentences, not always literal, despite the mention of the author and
the work. Yet if we relate this abstract statistical datum with the immediate
context in which the quotation appears, and if we take into account the Eck-
hartian theory of the intellect, the interpretationmight verywell change. As far
as philosophical interpretation is concerned, scholars admit a general distance
of the Eckhartian doctrine from the Aristotelian one.4 Indeed, Eckhart, follow-
ing the doctrine of Maimonides, recognizesAristotle as der hoechste undernder
meistern5 but only in the domain of the natural sciences, not in that of divine
science.6
As far asworks inMiddleHighGermanare concerned, things are remarkably
complicated, for at least two reasons. The first is textual: quotations are often
implicit, or explicitly indeterminate (to use Bertolacci’s category7) or usually
introduced by expressions such as ein meister, ein alter meister or ein heidnis-
cher meister. Ein meister can refer to both a biblical authority or to a pagan
master.8 The second reason is a linguistic one: the difference between citation
ad litteram and citation ad sensum cannot be applied.
3 Calma 2009, p. 526; Beccarisi 2008, p. 11–12.
4 Beccarisi 2016, p. 223–240, with cited bibliographical references; see also Retucci 2012, p. 11–
37.
5 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 15 Q, DW I, p. 249,1 sgg.
6 Meister Eckhart, In Sap., n. 208, LW II, p. 542: Praedictis concordat quod Rabbi Moyses l. II
c. 2, quod incipit ‘Aristotele’, sic ait: ‘quidquid dixit Aristoteles in omnibus entibus, quae sunt a
sphaera lunae usque ad centrum terrae, verum est sine dubio, nec repellit illud’, ‘nisi qui non
intelligit’. ‘Quidquid vero locutus est Aristoteles de his, quae sunt a sphaera lunae superius,
est verisimile’. Et infra c. 25 dicit: ‘Abubacer dubitat de verbis Aristotelis’, ‘et eius dubitatio est,
utrum scivit Aristoteles egressionem centri sphaerae solis’. Et infra: ‘quidquid dixit Aristoteles
in omnibus, quae sunt sub sphaera lunae, procedit secundum ordinem sensus, et verba ipsius
sequuntur ex ratione, et causa naturalis est manifesta in eis. Quidquid autem est in caelis, non
est homo consecutus, ut sciret ea quae ibi sunt’, adducens illud Psalmi: caelum caeli domino,
terram autem dedit filiis hominum. ‘Quod est dicere quod creator solus scit veritatem’ eorum,
quae in caelis sunt, ‘in fine perfectionis. Super his autem, quae sunt sub caelis, dedit pote-
statem homini, ut sciret ea’. On Meister Eckhart and Maimonides cf. Di Segni 2012, p. 103–
140.
7 Bertolacci 1998, p. 261–339.
8 OnMeister Eckhart’s use of source cf. Vinzent 2014, p. 105–122; Sturlese 2008, p. 7–9.
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This is a good starting point formy contribution, concerning the influence of
Liberde causis andProclus onMeisterEckhart’s thought. Since it is anargument
alreadywidely discussed in excellent studies, Iwill concentratemyattentionon
four examples.
2 Daz Lieht der Lieht
The sermon 809 is one of the few documents to explicitly quote Albert the
Great. It represents the only occurrence within the context of Eckhart’s entire
production, in which he refers to the Liber de causis under the title Licht der
Lichte, Lumen Luminum.
Eckhart aims at interpreting the passage “There was a rich man who was
dressed in purple and fine linen and lived in luxury every day” (Luke 16:19). The
parable of the rich man and Lazarus tells of the relationship between a rich
man and a poor beggar named Lazarus. Their destinies are opposite as between
them “stands a great abyss”.
The rich man and Lazarus lead two totally opposite forms of existence. The
goods of the rich man contrast with Lazarus’s sufferings, but after death, their
conditions are totally reversed. Indeed, Lazarus is released from the sufferings
of his terrestrial existence, while the rich man is condemned to some sort of
torment in Hades.
However, Eckhart seems almost uninterested in the content, as he only
focuses on the opening line of the parable: “There was a rich man”.
Eckhart seeks to comment on theworddives, which refers inparticular to the
reign of God, and which is manifested through five characteristics or aspects:10
The man was also ‘rich’. So God is rich in Himself and in all things. Now
note! The richness of God consists in five things.
The first: because He is the first cause; therefore He is pouring Himself
into all things.
The second: because He is simple in His being; therefore He is the
inwardness of all things.
9 On this Sermon cf. Geyer 1964, p. 121–126; Ruh 1996, p. 126–129; Retucci 2008, p. 135–166, in
particular p. 139–140; Goris 2009, p. 151–159, in particular p. 157; Bauchwitz 2016, p. 291–298;
Beccarisi 2019, p. 38–41.
10 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 80Q, DW III, p. 381,1 sgg.; English version byVinzent 2019, p. 729–
733. I would like thank him for having made available unedited material.
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The third: because He is originating; therefore He is communicating
Himself to all things.
The fourth: because He is unchangeable; therefore He is the most
stable.
The fifth: because He is perfect; therefore He is the most desirable.
He is the first cause; therefore He is pouring Himself into all things. Of
this a paganmaster says that the primary cause pours itself out more into
all causes than secondary causes pour themselves into their works.
He is also simple in His being. What is ‘simple’? Bishop Albert says:
Simple is the thing that is in itself one without a second, that is God, and
all united things are by the fact that He is. There the creatures are one in
the one and are God in God; by themselves they are nothing.
Third: because He is the originating [power], therefore He is flowing
into all things. About thisBishopAlbert says: In threeways he commonly
flows into all things: with being, life and light, and especially into the
intellectual soul by the potentiality of all things, and by a return of the
creatures into their first origin: this is the light of lights, because ‘every
gift and perfection flow from the father of lights’, as Saint James says.
Fourth: because He is unchangeable; therefore He is the most stable.
Now note, how God unites Himself to things. He unites Himself with
things and yet retains Himself as one in Himself, and makes all things
one in Him. Of this Christ says: You shall be transformed into me, but not
me into you. This derives fromHis immutability, His incommensurability
and the smallness of things. About this a prophet says that all things com-
pared to God are as small as a drop before the wild ocean.Whoever threw
a drop into the ocean, the drop would transform itself into the ocean, but
not the ocean into the drop. So it happens to the soul when she draws
God into herself, she is transformed into God, so that the soul becomes
divine, but God does not become the soul. Then the soul loses her name
and her powers, but not herwill and not her being. Then, the soul remains
in God, as God remains in Himself. Of this BishopAlbert says: In the will,
wherein a man dies, he will remain eternally.
Fifth, because He is perfect; therefore He is the most desirable. God
is perfect with regard to Himself and to all things. What is perfection in
God? It is that He is the good of Himself and of all things. Therefore, all
things desire Him, because He is their good.
Sermon80,Homoquidamerat dives, exhibits three explicit references toAlbert,
the first twoof which are significantly related to eachother. BernardGeyer, Kurt
Ruh, Fiorella Retucci and Wouter Goris proposed that, in the Sermon Homo
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Quidam Dives, the Liber de causis plays a crucial role, albeit through the medi-
ation of Albert’s De causis et processu universitatis. In fact, in this work, Albert
evaluates the different titles under which the Liber de causis circulated and
offers a possible attribution.
The School of Avicenna—writes Albert—referred to it as the De lumine
luminum (On the Light of Lights). In order to provide an explanation for this
title, Albert affirms that the first cause flows into things in a threefold way:
first there is an influence constitutive of being; then, there is an influence that
produces virtue, and finally, a third type of influence that he calls influentia
reductionis ad primum fontem. The second reference would also be, according
to the interpreters, a quotation fromAlbert’s De causis et processu universitatis.
In this case, it is an explanation of the term einvaltic (simplex), which is one
of the five characteristics of the Divine.11
The exegetical tradition that claims that Eckhart was deeply influenced
by the Neoplatonic tradition through Albert’s mediation, seems hereby con-
firmed: the neoplatonic tradition that fromAlbert reachedBertothold of Moos-
burg via Eckhart, has at the same time established the importance of the Liber
de causis in Meister Eckhart’s work.
However, as I had the opportunity to demonstrate recently at the Lectio Alb-
ertina held at the Albertus Magnus Institut in Bonn, this is not the case.12
The source of Eckhart, in fact, is not Albert’s Liber de causis et processu uni-
versitatis but rather Albert’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, as demon-
strated by the following synopsis.
Albert the Great, SuperMatth. c. 6,
p. 181,81–182,8.21–29
Meister Eckhart, Pr. 80, p. 382,9–
384,5.6–386,3; p. 388,1–4
Et secundum hunc intellectum in eo
quod dicit: qui es, quinque notantur,
ens videlicet primum, simplex, fontale,
immutabile, perfectissimum.
Ex primitate est influentissimum,
Diu rîcheit gotes diu liget an vünf din-
gen.
Daz êrste: daz er diu êrste sache ist, her
umbe ist er ûzgiezende sich in alliu dinc.
11 Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, l. 1 tr. 1 c. 1, p. 61,16–22.
12 Beccarisi 2019.
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Daz ander: daz er einvaltic ist an sînem
wesene, her umbe ist er diu innerkeit
aller dinge.
Daz dritte: daz er ursprunclich ist, her
umbe ist er gemeinende sich allen din-
gen.
Daz vierde: daz er unwandelhaftic ist, her
umbe ist er daz behaldelîcheste.
Daz vünfte: daz er volkomen ist, her
umbe ist er daz begerlîcheste.
Primum enim influit omnibus, et a nullo
influitur ei, et est liberalitatis et mag-
nificentiae profusae. Influit enim nullo
indigens, et nullum aliorum aliquid alicui
influere potest nisi per hoc quod accipit
et habet ab ipso. Et hic pater sic influ-
ens merito est orandus. Iac. I (17): ‘Omne
datum optimum et omne donum per-
fectum desursum est, descendens a patre
luminum, apud quem non est transmuta-
tio neque vicissitudinis obumbratio’. (…)
Primum enim est, ut dicit Philosophus,
quod influit, non supposito quodam
alio, quod sibi det influere. Aristoteles:
‘Causa primaria plus est influens quam
secundaria’.
Er ist diu êrste sache, her umbe ist er
îngiezende sich in alliu dinc. Dâ von
sprichet ein heidenischer meister, daz
sich diu êrste sache mê gieze in alle die
sache, dan die andern sache sich in ir
werk giezen.
Per simplicitatem autem est commun-
issimum et intimum, quia, sicut dicit
Philosophus, quanto aliquid simplicius
est, tanto in pluribus invenitur et sui ad
plura indigetur.
Er ist ouch einvaltic an sînemwesene.
Waz ist einvaltic? Daz sprichet bischof
Albreht: daz dinc ist einvaltic, daz an im
selber ein ist âne ander, daz ist got, und
alliu vereintiu dinc haltent sich in daz,
daz er ist. Dâ sint die crêatûren ein in
dem einem und sint got in gote; an in
selben sint sie niht.
[ex fontalitate causalissimum] Daz dritte: daz er ursprunclich ist, dar
umbe ist er ûzvliezende in alliu dinc.
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(cont.)
Albert the Great, De caus. et proc. univ.
l. 2 tr. 1 c. 1, p. 61,16–22
Lumen primae causae tripliciter influat
rebus, scilicet influentia constitutionis
ad esse et influentia irradiationis ad per-
fectionem virtutis et operis et influentia
reductionis ad primum fontem ut ad
boni principium, et huius influentia
luminis omnis illuminationis principium
sit et lumen, erit ipsum lumen luminum.
Hie von sprichet bischof Albreht: drîer-
hande wîs vliuzet er ûz in alliu dinc
gemeinlîche: mit wesene und mit lebene
und mit liehte und sunderlîche in die
vernünftigen sêle an mügentheit aller
dinge und an einemwiderrucke der
crêatûren in irn êrsten ursprunc:
Albert the Great, SuperMatth. c. 6,
p. 182,4–10.75–76; 183,6–10
Et hic pater sic influens merito est
orandus. iac. i (17): ‘Omne datum
optimum et omne donum perfectum
desursum est, descendens a patre
luminum, apud quem non est transmu-
tatio neque vicissitudinis obumbratio’.
Non enimmutatur, ut quandoque fluat
et quandoque non, neque vicissitudinem
donorum recipit.
diz ist lieht der liehte, wan alle gâbe
und volkomenheit vliezent von dem
vater der liehte, als sant Jâcobus
sprichet.
ex immutabilitate conservantissimum
(…) Immutabilitate fundat et continet et
conservat ea quibus se influit.
Daz vierde: daz er unwandelhaftic ist,
dar umbe ist er daz behaldelîcheste.
Nû merket, wie sich got vereinet mit den
dingen. Er vereinet sich mit den dingen
und beheltet sich doch ein an im sel-
ben, und alliu dinc an im ein. Hie von
sprichet Kristus: ir sult gewandelt werden
in mich und ich niht in iuch. Daz kumet
von sîner unwandelhafticheit und von
sîner unmæzlicheit und von der dinge
kleinheit.
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Perfectissimum autem est hoc esse
et ideo desideratissimum. Unde dicit
Philosophus, quod ‘omnia appetunt esse
divinum et propter illud agunt, quidquid
agunt’. Agg. II (8): ‘Veniet desideratus
cunctis gentibus’.Omnia enim istius
patris desiderant superadventum. Sap.
IX: ‘Omnia desiderabilia huic non valent
comparari’. Esse enim datur ab eo, quo
accepto nihil desideratur amplius, eo
quod hoc est omnis naturae bonum
et optimum. Exod. XXXIII (19.17): ‘Ego
ostendam tibi omne bonum; invenisti
enim gratiam coramme’. In hoc est gaud-
ium plenum, ut hoc comprehendamus,
ut possumus. Ioh. XVI (24): ‘Petite, ut
gaudium vestrum sit plenum’. Matth. V
(48): ‘Pater vester caelestis perfectus
est’.
Daz vünfte: daz er volkomen ist, dar
umbe ist er daz begerlîcheste. Got ist sîn
selbes volkomen und aller dinge. Waz ist
volkomenheit an gote? Daz ist, daz er sîn
selbes guot ist und aller dinge guot. Her
umbe begernt sîn alliu dinc, wan er ir
guot ist.
The evidence supporting this are: the five-part structure, the literal quotations
of the five features of God, and the accuracy with which Eckhart translates the
Albertinian text, going so far as to reproduce the superlative conservantissimum
with behaldelîcheste and desideratissimumwith begerlîcheste.
A closer look reveals evenmore. In Sermon 80, the quotation from the Liber
de causis, attributed by Eckhart to a paganmaster, corresponds in Albert’s com-
mentary to the same quotation attributed to the Philosophus (Aristotle), and in
both cases it is used to comment on God’s quality of ‘firstness’.
Moreover, the famous licht der lichte would assume a completely different
significance in this context when compared to Albert’s text. Indeed, Eckhart
says, I quote: “This is the light of light, because (wan in Middle High German)
all gifts and perfection flow from the Father of light, as the Apostle James says”.
Hence, the First Cause is not (or not only) the “light of light”, because Eckhart
read Albert’s commentary on the Liber de causis, but rather because he had in
mind Albert’s commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, in which the verse of St.
James is quoted to express the fontalitas of God.
The discovery of this important new source from the Albert’s commentary
on the Gospel of Matthew reduces Kurt Ruh’s claim that Eckhart “changed” his
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sources and rephrased them into his own words.13 In the German Sermons,
Eckhart does not modify his sources, but he rather seeks to translate them as
faithfully as possible.
That’s why I am not convinced that two other quotations in the Sermon 80,
allegedly attributed to the Liber de causis, come in fact from this work:
Liber de causis prop. V n. 60,
p. 60,35–40
Meister Eckhart, Pr.
80, DW III, 380, p. 2.
Meister Eckhart, Pr.
80, DW III, 382, p. 5.
Cum ergo res est causa tantum et
non est causatum, non scitur per
causam primam neque narratur quo-
niam est superior narratione, neque
consequitur eam loquela. Quod est
narratio non fit nisi per loquelam, et
loquela per intelligentiam, et intelli-
gentia per cogitationem, et cogitatio
per meditationem, et meditatio per
sensum. Causa autem prima est
supra res omnes quoniam est causa
eis; propter illud ergo fit quod ipsa
non cadit sub sensu etmeditatione
et cogitatione et intelligentia et











Of the attributes describing God (überwesenlich, überredelich, überverstent-
lich), only überredelich shows a vague correspondence with the expression
superior narratione. Thus it seems that Eckhart summarizes and rewrites pro-
position VI of the Liber de causis, to such an extent that we can say, as Dagmar
Gottschall claims,14 that it is more a passage inspired by the Liber de causis
rather than a quotation as such.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find this same quotation in another text, but
with a different attribution. A pseudo-Eckhartian work, edited by Franz Pfeif-
fer, cites Dionysius instead of the Liber de causis:15
13 Ruh 1996, p. 127.
14 Gottschall 2015, p. 96.
15 Ps.-Eckhart, Tr. XI.2, 508,6 f. cited in Gottschall 2015, p. 97.
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Dionysius sprichet: diu êrste sache ist ob allen namen si ist überminnic,
überweselich, überverstentlich, überredelich und übernâtûrelich.
The list of attributes is repeated almost identically to that found in Eckhart’s
Sermon 80: the differences are the addition of überminnic and übernâtûre-
lich, and the definition preceding those attributes (diu êrste sache ist ob allen
namen), which is an important clue for the identification of Eckhart’s source.
Thedefinitiondiu êrste sache ist oballennamen couldbeboth aquotationad lit-
teram of the proposition XXI of the Liber de causis (causa prima est super omne
nomen quo nominatur), but also a quotation ad litteram from the second Letter
from Saint Paul to the Philippians (Philipp. 2 (9) quod est super omne nomen)
cited by Thomas Aquinas in the first chapter of his commentary to Pseudo-
Dionysius’De divinis nominibus.
Sowhichone is Eckhart’s source? I claim that neitherDionysius nor the Liber
de causis, but rather Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Divine Names, as the
following passage suggests:16
Deus, qui ipsa Unitas quasi existens unus per suam essentiam, quae est
supersubstantialis (überwesenlich), superponitur substantiis et quae est
super mentem superponitur mentibus, id est intellectualibus spiritibus;
et ipsum Bonum, scilicet Deus, quod est super deliberationem, id est
super omnem rationem, est indeliberabilis omnibus deliberationibus, id
est non investigabile aliqua ratione creata (überverstentlich, daz natiur-
lich verstân ist) et quod est super verbum, id est super omnem locutionem
creaturae (überredelich), est ineffabile, id est indicibile, omni verbo cre-
ato.
In this commentary to De divinis nominibus. Thomas Aquinas explains what
super deliberationem means, i.e., “not susceptible of inquiry by any created
reason” (non investigabile aliqua ratione creata)which corresponds, inmyopin-
ion, to daz natiurlich verstân ist in the German sermon.
Could the reference to the Liber de causis in German Sermon 80 be a “faux
renvoi”, to use Dragos Calma’s definition?17 Hardly, it seems. The attribution
to the Liber de causis is not entirely false, since the quotation seems in fact
indebted to proposition XXI n. 166: “The First Cause is above every name by
which it is named” (Causa prima est super omne nomen quo nominatur).18 The
16 Thomas Aquinas, Super div. nom. I 1 24.
17 Calma 2010, p. 8.
18 Liber de causis XXI n. 166, p. 93, 68–69. English translation by Brand 1984, p. 49.
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double attribution, and the fact that this quotation is documented three times
in two different works, with the same phrasing, implies two hypotheses: the
intermediate Eckhart’s source is Thomas and Tr. XI.2 is a Eckhartian work.
In my opinion, the example confirms the observation from which we started,
that is to say, the extreme fragility of statistical data alone, which must be con-
sidered with great caution, especially with regard to works in the vernacular.
I turnnow to theheart of mycontribution, basedon the statistical data of Mario
Meliadò,19 which corrects Fiorella Retucci’s:20 the Liber de causis is cited 120
times, only ten of which appear in sermons in German. Proclus, on the other
hand, is cited only twenty times.
Meliadò reports21 that of these 120 occurrences, Eckhart combines the
authority of the Liber with that of Proclus in only five places. This approach
distinguishes Eckhart from Dietrich of Freiberg, who frequently emphasizes
the connection between the two authorities and underlines the dependence
of the Liber on the Elementatio. On the contrary, Eckhart seems to prefer the
Liber de causis to Proclus’ authority, as I will try to demostrate. In particular I
would like to show the great importance of proposition XV of the Liber de causis
in Meister Eckhart’s work.22
Despite its importance for Eckhartian speculation, the presence of proposi-
tion XV of the Liber de causis in his work does not seem to have aroused much
interest among scholars. Its analysis is simply absent from the works of Kurt
Ruh, Beierwaltes and Retucci, whileMeliadò devotes to it only a note, in which
he traces back the Eckhartian use of this proposition to Thomistic influence.23
Alain de Libera has studied abundantly the influence of proposition XV on Eck-
hart’s thought, but by limiting it to the metaphysics of Exodus, that is, to the
context of the Eckhartian interpretation of the first and only name of God: Ego
sum qui sum.24
And yet proposition XV of the Liber de causis is one of the most quoted
and, frommy point of view, one of the most important. To the six occurrences
recorded by Retucci and Meliadò, I would add two other quotations from the
19 Meliadò 2013, p. 506–507.
20 Retucci 2008, p. 155.
21 Meliadò 2013, p. 507.
22 On the influence of proposition XV on Thomas Aquinas see Corrigan, Still 2004, p. 1–15;
Putallaz 1991, p. 168–172; Baumgarten 2014, p. 23–47; Scarpelli Cory 2017, p. 185–229.
23 Meliadò 2013, p. 549, n. 178.
24 Libera 1996, p. 127–162, esp. p. 151–162.
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commentary on Exodus, and one another from the German Sermon 15, that I
am going to discuss later (see below, p. 363):
1. Tertio notandum quod repetitio, quod bis ait: ‘sum qui sum’, puritatem
affirmationis excluso omni negativo ab ipso deo indicat; rursus ipsius esse
quandam in se ipsum et super se ipsum reflexivam conversionem et in se
ipso mansionem sive fixionem.25
2. Sic ergo ‘bonum bonum’ significat bonum impermixtum et summum
bonum in se ipso fixum, nulli innitens, super se ipsum ‘rediens reditione
completa’. Sic li ‘sum qui sum’ impermixtionem esse et eius plenitudinem
indicat, ut dictum est supra.26
Eckhart quotes proposition XV in full and literally only once, in the comment-
ary on the Gospel of St. John:27
Ergo et deus nusquam proprius, sed nec proprie invenitur aut noscitur
nisi in se ipso. Hinc est quod oculus non videt nec noscit se, quia non
potest redire supra se. Et in De causis dicitur quod ‘omnis sciens, qui scit
essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa’.
As Therese Scarpelli recently showed, this proposition is known in two vari-
ants, both documented by Thomas Aquinas. The first variant (“Every knower
who knows his essence returns to his essence with a complete return”—Omnis
sciens qui scit essentiam suamest rediens ad essentiam suamreditione completa)
appears in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences and in his Summa,
while the second Variant B (“Every knower knows his essence, therefore he
returns to his essence with a complete return”—Omnis sciens scit essentiam
suam, ergo est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa) appears for the
first time in Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Liber de causis.28
As the passage from the commentary on theGospel of St. John clearly shows,
Eckhart uses only the first variant (Omnis sciens qui scit essentiamsuamest redi-
ens ad essentiam suam reditione completa), suggesting that his source is not
Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Liber de causis. I will return to this point
after.
In the other seven instances, Eckhart quotes literally only the formula redi-
tione completa, within the account of the features of the substance reverting
upon its own essence: “that it is subsistent, stable in itself, not in need of a
25 Meister Eckhart, In Ex. n. 16, LW II, p. 21,7.
26 Meister Eckhart, In Ex. n. 17, LW II, p. 23,5.
27 Meister Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 222, LEW III, p. 186,9–13.
28 Scarpelli Cory 2017, p. 207–214.
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support for its stability and its essence, because it is a simple, self-sufficient
substance”29 (quia es stans, fixa per se, non indigens in sua fixione et sui essentia
re alia rigente ipsam, quoniam est substantia simplex, sufficiens per se ipsam).
As for the contexts in which it is used by Eckhart, proposition XV is cited
when dealing with three main subjects: 1) to describe the internal dynamics
of the One—mostly in the commentary to Exodus—associated to the concept
of negatio negationis (self-identity); 2) when introducing one of his most well-
knownneologisms in vernacular, namely the adjective istic and the substantive
Isticheit, the basis forwhich seems to be, in fact, the concept of reditio completa;
3) with reference to the metaphysics of the intellect (self-determination)
3 Negatio negationis and Isticheit
There is no mention of Proclus in Eckhart’s German Sermons. I do not agree
with Retucci, who assumed that the negatio negationis (the Latin version of
versagens des versaggenes), which appears in German Sermon 21, derives from
Proclus’ commentary on Parmenides,30 translated by Moerbeke. This is quite
unlikely for three reasons.
First of all, in his Prologue to the Opus Tripartitum, when explaining the
verse Deus unus est, Eckhart affirms that this is supported by the authority of
Proclus and the Liber de causis. Furthermore (Preterea)–Eckhart adds—God
is negatio negationis. Evidently Eckhart doesn’t link the negatio negationis to
Proclus:31
Rursus eodemmodo se habet de uno, scilicet quod solus deus proprie aut
unum aut unus est, Deut. 6: ‘deus unus est’. Ad hoc facit quod Proclus
et Liber de causis frequenter nomine unius aut unitatis deum exprimunt.
Praeterea li unumest negatio negationis. Propter quod soli primo et pleno
esse, quale est deus, competit, de quo nihil negari potest, eo quod esse
omnia simul praehabeat et includat.
Secondly, the expression negatio negationis never appears in Proclus’ com-
mentary. Moreover, the expression circulated before Moerbeke’s translation,
for instance in the works of Henry of Ghent.32 As Wouter Goris has shown,
29 Liber de causis, prop. XV, n. 128, p. 79,65–80, 67–69. English translation by Brand 1984, p. 48.
30 See Retucci 2008, p. 151–154.
31 Meister Eckhart, Prol. Op. Trip. n. 6, p. 44.
32 Henricus de Gandavo, Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, a. 25, q. 1, fol. 148rE. The influ-
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according to Henry of Ghent the negatio negationis serves to admit unity as
something posited in the divine. The attribution of unity to God is conceived
in terms of something which is added to the existent. The negatio negationis
forms the explication of an indivisio that is predicated of the One as an addi-
tional modus significandi. In his Summa, in response to the objection that ‘the
One’ is employed not as a positive but as a private designation in the Godhead,
Henry of Ghent replies by stating that the negatio negationis is a verissima posi-
tio, in a sense very near to the Eckhartian position on the negatio negationis.
The third reason is based on the refutation of Retucci’s argument, according
to which, there are different uses of the notion of negatio negationis between
Eckhart’s Latin and German works:33
In Eckhart vi sono due impieghi ben differenti e circostanziati della neg-
azione della negazione, come già de Libera aveva notato. Fino ad un
certo punto, infatti, l’attribuzione negativa dell’uno rimane in Eckhart
una teoria dell’uno trascendentale in cui non si possono non ravvisare
gli echi della speculazione metafisica di Enrico di Gand, come già Goris
ha sottolineato. In tutte le sue esposizioni enologiche, essenzialmente
concentrate nella predicazione tedesca, Eckhart supera la prospettiva
ontologico-trascendentale dell’opera latina. E ciò avviene, a mio avviso,
proprio nella direzione della prima ipotesi del commento al Parmenide
di Proclo. Nella predicazione in volgare Dio è negazione della negazione,
in quanto Uno trascendente e non in quanto essere.
I do not believe that Eckhart’s German output presents a different perspective
than his Latin work. Nor do I believe that in his Latin work Eckhart speaks of
the One in an ontological-transcendental perspective, whereas in the German
work he speaks of the One as transcendent beyond Being.
I start my analysis with a passage from German Sermon 21,34 in which the
expression versagenes des versaggenes is presented:
Saint Paul says: ‘One God’. One is somehowmore pure than goodness and
truth. Goodness and truth do not add anything, they add in a thought;
when something is thought, it is added. One does not add anything, as He
ence of Henry is noted by Goris 1997, p. 197–206, esp. p. 200; on the provenance of negatio
negationis see also Hedwig 1980, p. 7–33; Steel 1999, p. 351–368; Beierwaltes 1972, p. 42; Id.
1998, p. 100–129, esp. p. 112–119; Tsopurashvili 2012, p. 200; Enders 2012, p. 366–369.
33 Retucci 2008, p. 155.
34 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 21, DW I, 363, 7–8. English version by Vinzent 2019, p. 791–793.
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is in Himself, before He emanates into the Son and the Holy Spirit. So He
said: ‘Friend, lift yourself up.’ Amaster says: One is a negation of negation.
If I said: God is good, it would be adding something. One is a negation of
negation and adenial of denial.What is themeaning of ‘one’? ‘One’means
that nothing is added to it. The soul takes theGodhead as it is purified in
her, where nothing is added, where nothing is thought about. One is a
negation of negation. All creatures have a negation in them; ‘one’ negates
being the other. ‘One’ angel negates being another. ButGodhas a negation
of negation;He is one, andnegates anything else, because there is nothing
exceptGod. All creatures are inGod and are of His ownGodhead; and this
means fullness, as I have already said.He is a Father of thewhole godhead.
For this reason, I say ‘one’ Godhead, where no emanation has taken place
and nowhere is anything touched or thought about. By denying anything
to God—I deny the goodness of God, even though I cannot deny God—,
by denying to God, I grasp something of Him that He is not; this must go.
God is one, He is a negation of negation.
For it to be correctly understood, this passage needs to be placed in its proper
context. Eckhart quotes, as was stated, the words of a master, who declares
that the One is negation of negation. Eckhart then explains what he under-
stands by this expression: God is One, and he denies everything else because
nothing is outside of God, whereas all things created are in God, and are His
very Godhead. Thus, it is not possible to say of God that He is ‘not something’,
as if He were any other creature. God, insomuch as He is One, contains in
Him everything and this “means plenitude” (meinet ein vüllede), as he has
already stated (als ich ê sprach). Sturlese claims35 that this self-reference refers
to another passage of Sermon 21, in which Eckhart is in fact speaking about
God in terms of plenitude. The passage identified by Sturlese is the follow-
ing:36
God has all things in Himself in fullness; for that reason, He does not seek
anything outside of Himself, if not in fullness as it is in God. As God bears
it within Himself, no creature can grasp.
As is clear, however, this passage pointed out by Sturlese does not include any
reference to the negatio negationis as the sign of this plenitude.
35 Sturlese 2014, p. 832, note 13.
36 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 21, DW I. English version by Vinzent 2019, p. 789.
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But Eckhart has in fact proposed elsewhere the idea that the concept of neg-
atio negationis means (meinet) a plenitudo. I refer to the Commentary on St.
John’s Gospel:37
In ea, scilicet divina natura, est omnis negationis negatio, consequenter
nulla prorsus imperfectio, defectus, sed plenitudo esse, veritas et bonitas.
In the Latin commentary we find then the same concept expressed in Ser-
mon 21: the One is the negation of every negation, because in itself it already
has everything. There is nothing outside of Him: it is not possible to say that
the One, or rather God, is not Goodness, because there is nothing that can be
denied of God, insofar as He is One, because He contains already everything
in His self. This is then the true sense of the passage in the German Sermon 21:
when I deny something of God (for instance, I deny of HimGoodness), I under-
stand something about Him, namely, that He is not a determined Goodness.
But this (the negation that God is something) must be eliminated. That which
must be eliminated, then, is not simply the fact that I understand something
(dâ begrîfe ich etwaz von im) as Retucci argues,38 but rather the grasping “at
something in Him that He is not”. How can I in fact grasp divine plenitude by
simply denying attributes? What Eckhart says is that a simple negation must
be avoided: insofar as He is One, insofar as He is plenitude, God denies (for-
bids) negation.39 If God is plenitude, it is possible neither to deny nor to add
anything to Him. It is not possible to deny Him anything because He is, in fact,
plenitude.
In Sermon 21, then, Eckhart does not present a sense of a transcendent One
that is different from that in his Latin work, but simply repeats what was stated
many times: regarding God and the divine it is not true, as Pseudo-Dionysius
says, that negationes sunt verae, affirmationes incompactae:40
‘Omnipotens nomen eius’.
Ibi habes primo breviter et luculenter quae deus possit et quae aut qualia
non possit vel potius dicatur non posse a vulgaribus. Habes etiam ibidem
plura de nominibus, quibus deus nominatur in scriptura, a philosophis,
a sanctis et doctoribus, et quomodo sola substantia et relatio secun-
dum genus suum admittuntur in divinis, et quomodo affirmationes sunt
37 Meister Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 692–693, LW III, p. 608, 10–p. 609, 1.
38 Retucci 2008, p. 151.
39 On this passage see also the interpretation of Beierwaltes 1998, p. 112–113.
40 Meister Eckhart, In Ex. Tabula Auctoritatum, DW II, p. 3,1–8.
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propriae in divinis, negationes autem impropriae. Nec obstat verbum
Dionysii dicentis quod negationes in divinis sunt verae, affirmationes
autem incompactae.
There does not seem then to be any difference between what Eckhart affirms
in his Latin and German works. A comparison between Sermon 21 and Latin
works in fact shows a substantial uniformity (similar notions in bold):
In Sap. n. 148, 486,2–3 Sermon 21Q
Iterum etiam li unum nihil addit super
esse, nec secundum rationem quidem,
sed secundum solam negationem; non
sic verum et bonum. (…)
Significat enim li unum ipsum esse
insuper in se ipso cum negatione et
exclusione omnis nihili, quod, inquam,
nihil omnis negatio sapit
Ein ist etwaz lûterz dan güete und wâr-
heit. Güete und wârheit enlegent niht
zuo, sie legent zuo in einem gedanke; dâ
ez bedâht wirt, dâ leget ez zuo.
Ein enleget niht zuo, dâ er in im selber
ist, ê er ûzvlieze in sun und heiligen geist.
In Sap. n. 148, 486, Sermon 21Q
Omne citra deum, utpote citra esse, est
ens et non ens, et negatur sibi aliquod
esse cum sit sub esse et citra esse, et ideo
ipsi congruit negatio.
Alle crêatûren hânt ein versagen an in
selben; einiu versaget, daz si diu ander
niht ensî (…)
In Ioh. n. 208, 176,1–5 Sermon 21Q
‘Deus enim unus est’: in uno autem non
est magis et minus, sed nec distinctio nec
creatum ens hoc et hoc. Rursus nec pro-
prium; unum enim sicut ens commune
est omnibus. Adhuc autem in uno, ut
unum est, non cadit malum, defectus,
deformitas, privatio, sed neque negatio
nisi negationis; unum enim negat divi-
sionem et numerum et esse multum.
Aber got hât ein versagen des versa-
gennes; er ist ein und versaget alle ander,
wan niht ûzer gote enist.
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(cont.)
In Ioh. n. 692–693, 608–609 Sermon 21Q
Proprietas divinae naturae increatae
est unitas et per consequens immob-
ilitas, immutabilitas et quies; nulla ibi
negatio nec per consequens multitudo,
quin immo est in ea omnis negationis
negatio, consequenter nulla prorsus
imperfectio, defectus, sed plenitudo
esse, veritatis et bonitatis.
Alle crêatûren sint in gote und sint sîn
selbes gotheit und meinet ein vüllede,
als ich ê sprach.
In Ioh. n. 562, 489,8–10 Sermon 21Q
Propter quod sancti unum sive unitatem
in divinis attribuunt primo supposito
sive personae, patri scilicet.
Er ist ein vater aller gotheit.
In Ex. n. 77, 80,9–11 Sermon 21Q
Negationes ergo dictae de deo hoc
solum ostendunt quod nihil istorum,
quae in rebus extra sunt et quae sensibus
apprehenduntur, in deo est. Patet igitur
quod affirmatio, utopote ad esse per-
tinens, propria est Deo et divinorum, in
quantum divina sunt. Negatio autem
non est propria, sed aliena a Deo (…)
quia affirmatio esse habet et includit
In dem daz ich gote versage etwaz,
versage ich gote güete, ich enmac gote
niht versagen—in dem daz ich gote
versage, dâ begrîfe ich etwaz von im,
daz er niht enist; daz selbe muoz
abe. Got ist ein, er ist ein versagen des
versagennes.
According to Eckhart, ‘One’ means ‘pure Being’ insofar as the One is the neg-
ation and exclusion of any ‘nothing’ that implies a negation. The One is then
the highest negation, because it is the Being without negations, or rather Being
itself: as Eckhart states in his Sermon 21, da er in im selber ist. Every negation,
in fact, denies any being, and this lack of being is expressed by the word neg-
atio. The negation of the negation, then, which is the meaning of the One,
tells us that such a concept includes in itself everything that belongs to it
and excludes on the other hand that which does not belong to it, namely
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non-being. The One to which Eckhart refers is not then the One defined by
Proclus, at least not in the sense found in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmen-
ides.41 Eckhart connects in fact the negatio negationis with the self-revelation
ego sum qui sum as a specific representation of the ‘One’ as purum esse in
se ipso (which corresponds to the expression er in im selber ist in German
Sermon 21) and as pure self-affirmation on the basis of the authority of the
Liber de causis as the following passage of the Commentary on Exodus sug-
gests:42
Nulla enim propositio propter hoc est verior illa, in qua idem praedicatur
de se ipso. Omne citra deum, utpote citra esse, est ens et non ens, et
negatur sibi aliquod esse cum sit sub esse et citra esse, et ideo ipsi con-
gruit negatio. Ipsi autem esse non negatur aliquod esse, sicut animali non
negatur hoc animal, puta leo. Nulla ergo negatio, nihil negativum deo
competit, nisi negatio negationis, quam significat unumnegative dictum:
“deus unus est,” Deut. 6; Gal. 3. Negatio vero negationis purissima et ple-
nissima est affirmatio: “ego sum qui sum.” Super se ipsum “redit reditione
completa”, sibi ipsi innititur, se ipso est, ipsum esse est. Nulla ergo negatio
deo congruit: “se ipsum negare non potest,” Tim. 2.
Eckhart also calls the intellectual self-positing and self-affirmation of God “neg-
ation of the negation,” since it is a pure and utterly complete self-affirmation
that abolishes all the limitations, and thus every negativity, of the creaturely
existent: “I amwho I am.” Since the truth of an affirmative proposition consists
in general in the identity of its terms, the self-affirmation that is the plenitude
of pure Being itself is characteristic of God; it is this self-affirmation that utters
itself in His name “I am who am”. This is why this tautological sentence is the
truest of all sentences.
41 I subscribe therefore to Beierwaltes’s position, who claims (Beierwaltes 1965, p. 396):
“Während bei Proklos die Negation der Negation in die Aufhebung affirmativer und neg-
ativer Dialektik in Glauben und Schweigen führt, ist die negatio negationis bei Eckhart
Ursprung reiner Affirmation negatio vero negationis purissima et plenissima est affirmatio:
ego sum qui sum. Negatio negationis ist also nicht wie bei Proklos der äußerste Akt des
sich selbst übersteigenden Denkens, das den nicht-denkenden und nicht zu denkenden
Ursprung zu berühren versucht, sondern der Selbstvollzug des reinen Seins als Denken”.
Vinzent subscribed to the same position in Vinzent 2012, p. 43, n. 139: “Proclos is not
affirmative, however, when he writes about the ‘indistinctness’ of the One or the nega-
tion of negation, whereas for Eckhart life, affirmation, creativity and God’s ‘outgoing’ are
key”.
42 Meister Eckhart, In Ex. n. 74, 77,9–78,2.
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This self-revelation is therefore not static, but dynamic. For, in this self-
reflexive act, God returns with a perfect act of returning to His own self, as
Eckhart states in agreement with proposition XV of the Liber de causis.
This means that Eckhart uses proposition XV of Liber de causis in order
to explain the meaning of negatio negationis: God, insofar as He is One, is a
dynamic identity reverting upon himself, which excludes every negation of
himself.
Now, in his German output, Eckhart has coined a specific terminology for
indicating this property of the One eternally converted upon itself, that is
Isticheit, a self-reflecting identity in himself. This neologism appears mostly
in contexts in which Eckhart deepens the theory of union between God and
human soul and of the intellectual ground of this union as the following two
passages document.43
The first is a passage in German Sermon 12, in which Eckhart describes the
rapture of St. Paul in terms of a renunciation of the greatest good, that is God
itself (“I renounce God for God’s sake”). But at the same moment that Paul
renounces to God as a subject opposed to him, he properly remains in God,
who is istic sîn selbes, that is identical reflection on Himself of Himself. At
this level, all determinations must necessarily disappear, even the most gen-
eral ones. Here, in this state, it is not possible to distinguish between creature
and Godwhom one has already renounced. There is only immutable unity and
perfect identity, the One:44
St. Paul left God for God: he left everything that he could get fromGod, he
left everything that God could give him and everything he might receive
fromGod. In leaving these, he leftGod forGod, and thenGodwas leftwith
him, as God ‘is an identical reflection on Himself of Himself ’ (dâ got istic
ist sîn selbes), not by way of a reception or a gaining of Himself, but rather
in an ‘identity reverting upon ist own essence’ (denne in einer isticheit),
‘that is where He is in Himself ’, (daz got in im selber ist). He never gave
God anything, nor did he receive anything fromGod: it is a single oneness
and a pure union (…) It is one, it has nothing in common with anything,
and nothing created has anything in common with it.
43 On this neologism see Beccarisi 2003, p. 328–358.
44 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 12 Q, DW I, p. 197, 2–6. English version by Walshe in Walshe,
McGinn 2007, p. 296–297. I’ve changed the translation slightly by highlighting it with Eng-
lish quotationmarks. See also the Foreword toWalshe’s translation byMcGinn inWalshe,
McGinn 2007, p. XVIII.
360 beccarisi
The second passage is taken from the German Sermon 77, in which Eck-
hart comments on the pronoun “I” (ich): God as One, that is as the absolute
unity itself, excludes fromHimself anynegative, that is every non-being accord-
ing to the form of otherness, He affirms Himself as pure being in itself. Self-
affirmation as self-proclamation of the pure being-one must be understood as
a self-identity (isticheit):45
As regards the other sense: where the text says, ‘I’, that means in the first
place God’s self-identity (isticheit) the fact that God alone is, for all things
are in God and from Him, since outside of Him and without Him noth-
ing truly is: all creatures are worthless and amere nothing comparedwith
God.Therefore,what they are in truth they are inGod, and thusGod alone
is in truth. And therefore the word ‘I’ means the self-identity of divine
truth, for it is the proof of one is. It thus testifies that He alone is.
This passage matches almost literally the text from the Exodus commentary,
analysed above, where we find a clear connection between the One as negatio
negationis, the metaphysics of Ego sum qui sum understood as the purest repe-
tition and affirmation, and proposition XV of the Liber de causis expressed in
the German output with the term isticheit.
In the next part of my contribution I will show how the concept of conversio
or reditio affects Eckhart’s thought on self-knowledge and self-determination.
4 The reditio completa as Foundation of Self-Determination
I will begin with German Sermon 9 Q,46 Quasi stella matutina, a very famous
sermon in which Eckhart establishes the superiority of the intellect over will
and esse. The composition of this sermon should be dated to the period of
the first Parisian magisterium (1301–1302). At the same time, three questions,
together with the so-called Rationes Equardi held by Eckhart against the Fran-
ciscan Gonsalvus of Spain, have been devoted to the subject of the superiority
of the intellect. The German sermon takes up several arguments that Eckhart
had used in both the questions and the dispute against Gonsalvus. One of them
considers the intellect’s ability to convert upon itself and to act inwardly:47
45 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 77 Q, DW III, p. 339, 1–6. English version by Walshe in Walshe,
McGinn 2007, p. 263.
46 This sermon has recently been commented upon by Flasch 2017, p. 1–28.
47 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 9Q, DW I, p. 157, 8–158, 5. English version byWalshe 2007, p. 345.
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Intellect always works inward. The subtler and more spiritual a thing is,
the more strongly it works inwardly; and the stronger and finer the intel-
lect is, themore is thatwhich it knows unitedwith it, themore it becomes
one with it. It is not thus with physical things: the stronger they are, the
more they work outward. God’s blessedness lies in the inward-working of
the intellect in which theWord is immanent.
We find the same argument, with almost the same words, in the so-called
Rationes Equardi:48
Sed intellectus et intelligere maxime est immune a materia, quia tanto
aliquid est minus reflexivum quanto materialius. Reflexio autem non est
in essendo, sed in intelligendo.
In both texts Eckhart demonstrates the superiority of the intellect as such, not
only over the will but also over determinate being. The reason for this superi-
ority is its capacity to “work inwardly,” in the Latin text indicated by the term
reflexio and in the German sermon by the expression inwert würkende. The dif-
ference between spiritual substance, which can convert to itself, and material
substance, which, on the contrary, cannot convert to itself, finds its origin, as
we know, in Proclus.49
Eckhart’s intermediate source, however, is not Proclus, but rather Thomas
Aquinas, who in his Summa contra gentiles states:50 Intellectus autem supra se
ipsum agendo (würkende) reflectitur; intelligit enim seipsum.
Furthermore inhis commentary to the Liber de causis, analyzing proposition
VII n. 68 (Et significatio quidem illius est reditio sui super essentiam suam, scilicet
quia non exenditur cum re extens),51 Thomas mentions two propositions from
Proclus in order to describe the reversion of the intellectual substance upon its
own essence:52
Et primo prosequitur de incorporeitate sic dicens: ‘quod quidem igitur
incorporeus sit Intellectus, quae ad se ipsum conversio manifestat’, est
autem conversio intellectus ad se ipsum in hoc quod seipsum intelli-
git; ‘corporum enim nullum ad se ipsum convertitur’. Et hoc quidem
48 Rationes Equardi in Bibliotheca Eckhardiana Manuscripta p. 50, 35–37.
49 On this topic see Steel 2006, p. 230–255.
50 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles II 49 8.
51 Liber de causis, prop. VII n. 68, p. 62,81–83.
52 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 51, 23–29.
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supra probaverat praemittens XV propositionem talem: ‘Omne quod ad
se ipsum conversivum est, incorporeum est’.
Thomas explicitly links the conversio described by Proclus to the reditio of the
Liber de causis, thus establishing a terminological indetermination which we
then find in the works of Meister Eckhart. Eckhart himself speaks primarily of
reditio and reflexio, and much less frequently of conversio, even in cases where
he explicitly quotes Proclus, as the following examples make clear:53
Cum enim videat, est in se tamen invisibilis, utpote non coloratus; item
quia alio oculo indigeret; item, quia, cum sit corpus, super se redire non
potest, ut Proclus docet.
Though Eckhart mentions Proclus explicitly, the expression super se redire
derives from the Liber de causis, as documented by an analogous passage from
the commentary to the Gospel of John:54
Ergo et deus nusquam proprius, sed nec proprie invenitur aut noscitur
nisi in se ipso. Hinc est quod oculus non videt nec noscit se, quia non
potest redire supra se. Et in De causis dicitur quod ‘omnis sciens, qui scit
essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa’.
Those two examples show that Eckhart, although he explicitly cites Proclus, is
implicitly referring to the Liber de causis (especially proposition XV), in order
to describe the dynamics of the intellect reverting onto itself. From this we can
draw two provisional conclusions:
1) The explicit mention of Proclus in the Latin works is not an indication of
a direct influence. At least in the cases discussed above, Proclus is always
read through the lens of the Liber de causis and Thomas Aquinas.
2) This is particulary true for the question concerning the reversion of the
intellectual substances onto themselves, a key theme in Eckhartian spec-
ulation. As I show presently, a particularly important role is played in this
context by proposition XV of the Liber de causis, which Eckhart interprets
in a very different way than Thomas Aquinas.
In the German Sermon 15, Homo quidamnobilis abijt in regione longiquam, Eck-
hart presents, in a rather faithful manner, the Aristotelian theory of the human
53 Meister Eckhart, Sermo LIV,2 n. 531, LW IV, p. 448,2.
54 Meister Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 222, LW III, p. 186,9.
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soul comparing it with his own opinion.55 Meanwhile, he describes the move-
ment of separate intelligences fromand towardsGod; a theorywhich, although
attributed to Aristotle, shows rather elements of Neoplatonism:56
Now attend carefully to what Aristotle says about the detached spirits in
the book called Metaphysics. The highest of the masters who ever dealt
with natural science speaks of these detached spirits, and says that they
are not the formof anything, and that they derive their being by an imme-
diate outpouring from God, and then they flow back in and receive the
outpouring immediately fromGod, above the angels, and they gaze on the
naked being of God without distinction. This pure naked being is called
by Aristotle a ‘something.’ That is the highest that Aristotle ever declared
concerning natural science, and no master can say greater things unless
prompted by the Holy Ghost.
Niklaus Largier explains this passage as follows:57
Das Konzept der reinen abgeschiedenen Geister, d.h. der substantiae sep-
aratae von denen hier die Rede ist, geht auf neuplatonische Vorstel-
lungen zurück, die an die aristotelische Annahme einer Vielzahl die Him-
melkörper bewegender ‘Beweger’ anschließen, dieses Denkbild aber
ontologisch neu formulieren (…). Eckhart identifiziert in den folgen Zei-
len die reinen Geister mit den Engeln und folgt damit einer üblichen
Tendenz der Scholastik.
Certainly, Largier is right when he explains that the separate spirits of which
Eckhart speaks are the intelligences of Neoplatonism, who are often identified
with the angels. He is wrong, however, when he claims that in this passage Eck-
hart equates the intelligences with the angels.
On the contrary, Eckhart explicitly says that these separated spirits are
‘above the angels’ (obewendic den engeln). In consequence, Eckhart is obviously
referring to a theory that distinguishes angels from separate substances. I do
not claim that this is Eckhart’s personal opinion. I merely say that in this pas-
sage he describes a very precise cosmological system of intelligences whose
being is determined by the movement of flowing out and returning to God.
55 See Beccarisi 2008, p. 15–16.
56 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 15 Q, DW I. English version byWalshe 2007, p. 272.
57 Largier 1993, I, p. 902.
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Propositions 31 and 32 of Proclus’Elementswould be two likely candidates.58
But, as we have seen previously, Proclus does not seem to be a direct source
for Eckhart. In this case, the reference to God and to the angels suggests that
the direct source might be Dietrich of Freiberg.59 In his work De intellectu et
intellegibili Dietrich clearly establishes a fourfold order in which intellectual
reality stands: at the top of this order is found what Dietrich calls intellects
existing through their essence, followed by intelligent spiritual substances that
are called angels, then species and finally the individual realities included in
species that are known to the mind.60 Therefore, according to Dietrich intel-
ligences are not angels: angels are created immediately by God (productio),
whereas intelligences flow from and return essentially to God (emanatio).61
Dietrich attributes the origin of this doctrine to Proclus, whohadposited a rela-
tion of essential emanation or causation exercised by a prior upon its effect,
which “converts in its essence toward that from which it proceeded”:62
Proclus etiam dicit 31 propositione libri sui: ‘Omne procedens ab aliquo
secundum essentiam convertitur ad illud, a quo procedit.’ Ubi dicitur in
commento 4: ‘Ad quod enim primo appetitus, ad hoc et conversio’. Et in
commento 32 propositionis dicit: ‘Quod enim convertitur omne ad omne
copulari festinat et appetit communionem ad ipsum et colligationem
ad ipsum.’ (…) Secundum hoc igitur substantia, quae est intellectus per
essentiam semper in actu, qualis est intellectus, de quo agitur, quia per
essentiam intellectualiter procedit a Deo, etiam sua intellectuali opera-
tione, quae est essentia eius, semper convertitur in Deum ita, ut eius
emanatio, qua intellectualiter emanat per essentiam a suo principio, sit
ipsius in ipsum principium intellectualis conversio. Non enim primo ab
ipso procedit et postea alio respectu seu operatione in ipsum converti-
tur, sed eadem simplici intellectione, quae est essentia eius. In quo etiam
differt ipsius talis emanatio et conversio ab emanatione et conversione
aliarum rerum, quae secundum unummodum, scilicet quantum ad con-
stitutionem suae substantiae, emanant a suo principio tamquam a causa
58 Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 31, p. 278 and prop. 32, p. 278.
59 See Flasch 1986, p. 125–134, and especially p. 125–127.
60 See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dietrich‑freiberg/#8.
61 Dietrich von Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili I 12, 144,60–145,62: Est autem et hoc circa
iam dicta tenendum, quod dicti philosophi loquentes de intelligentiis non loquebantur de
angelis, de quibus scriptura sacra loquitur, quae loquitur mysteria abscondita a sapientibus
et prudentibus et revelat ea parvulis, de angelis, inquam, quorummulta milia omnipotentia
creatoris Dei immediate produxit, id est non secundum ordinem emanationis.
62 Dietrich von Freiberg, De visione beatifica I 5 (1). (4), p. 62, 41–45.63,58.
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efficiente, convertuntur autem in idem suum principium tamquam in
finem per suas proprias operationes differentes a substantia sua.63
In Sermon 15 we find then a typical exemple of an Eckhartian mosaic, consist-
ing of more or less explicit references. In the passage analyzed above we can
trace references to Aristotle, Proclus, Dietrich, with which Eckhart presents
precise cosmological and gnoseological doctrines: (1) the quidditative know-
ledge of the angels; (2) the Aristotelian system of separated substances; (3)
Proclus’ hierarchy of intelligences above the angels, which is also shared by
Dietrich of Freiberg in his De visione beatifica and De intellectu et intelligibili.
Against this complex of doctrines attributed in Sermon 15 to the authority
of Aristotle, Eckhart opposed his own theory of knowledge, exemplified by the
metaphor of the noble man.
The noble man is not contented with quidditative knowledge, just as the
angels: only the ‘One’ satisfies him:64
I say, however, that this noble man is not satisfied with the being that the
angels cognize without form and depend on without means—he is satis-
fied with nothing less than the solitary One.
But who is this noble man and what are his characteristics? Eckhart claims:65
A rational man is one who understands himself rationally, and is, in him-
self, detached from all matter and form. Themore he is detached from all
things and turned in on himself, themore clearly and rationally he knows
all things within himself without turning outward, the more he is a man.
The intellectual experience which man makes of himself, the knowledge of
himself and of all things around him, also determine his humanity. It is there-
fore a self-determination based on an intellectual experience that man makes
of himself. It is not determined by external things, but by himself. It is a self-
determination as “self-knowledge”.
In this inner way, however, man does not discover himself as an individual,
but rather asmankind per se: for in God he recognizes not only his own belong-
63 Dietrich von Freiberg, De visione beatifica 1.5. 4.6, p. 62,41–63,56.
64 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 15, DW I, p. 251, 13–15. English version by Walshe in Walshe,
McGinn 2007, p. 272–273.
65 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 15, DW I, p. 250, 6–10. English version by Walshe in Walshe,
McGinn 2007, p.
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ing to mankind, but humanity itself, as it really is, beyond its individual and
particular phenomena.
In Sermon 15, therefore, we find the dynamics described in Sermon 9: as a
non-material and intellectual substance, humanmind returnuponhimself and
find in himself the knowledge of himself and all things, just like God.66
The autority (the source) is not Proclus, which Eckhart tacitly criticizes, but
rather the Liber de causis, as one of the characteristics of the nobleman demon-
strates, namely ‘simplicity’, the indivisible, uncompounded and unfragmented
wholeness of the Divine:67
Now I say, How can it be that detachment of the understanding com-
prehends all things within itself without form or image, without turning
outwardor transforming itself? I say it comes fromsimplicity, for themore
pure and simple a man is of himself in himself, the more simply he will
understand all multiplicity in himself, while himself remaining immut-
able.
Although it was not recognized by the editor Joseph Quint, it seems to me that
here Eckhart is referring, in an implicit but clear way, to propositions XV of the
Liber de causis:68
Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam
reditione completa (…) Et non significo per reditionem substantiae ad
essentiam suam, nisi quia est stans fixa per se (belibt unwandelber in im
selber) (…) quoniam est substantia simplex (ainvaltikait) sufficiens per
seipsam.
66 Unlike Eckhart for Thomas Aquinas “human self-knowledge is neither perfect nor direct
(…) For embodied souls, it would appear from De veritate 10.0 and Summa theologiae 1.87
that there is no such thing a direct, intuitive self-knowledge. Instead, themindmy be said
to know it self in particular by virtue of its self-presence, since the mind is its own prin-
ciple; but universally, self-knowledge—in the sense of a scientia of the soul—requires a
‘careful and suble’ enquiry”. See Corrigan, Still 2004, p. 4. Scarpelli Cory instead claims
that “in choosing V2 in Super Librum 15, Aquinas has deliberately chosen a variant of prop.
15 that is at odds with his own theory of self-knowledge”. Cf. Scarpelli Cory 2017, p. 218.
However, as I previously have shown, Eckhart includes rather variant 1 of proposition 15. I
argue that this implies two alternatives: either Eckhart was not aware of other variants for
this proposition, or he deliberately chose variant 1. On the ground of the first variant, only
the knower, who knows himself, has the property to return to himself and this is precisely
the meaning of Sermon 15.
67 Meister Eckhart, Sermon 15 Q, DW I. English version by Walshe in Walshe, McGinn 2007,
p. 272.
68 Liber de causis, prop. XV 124 and 128, p. 79,50–51. p. 79,65–80,69.
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In the Liber de causis, “every knower” who knows its own nature, returns
upon itself. This reditio is possible because the intellectual substance is simplex
and sufficiens per se ipsam. It determines itself by virtue of this reditio, which is
a fundamental knowledge of itself.
So it seems to me that there can be no doubt that proposition XV of the
Liber de causis is the implicit source of this important passage from German
Sermon 15, in which Eckhart states his anthropology as self-determination and
self-knowing. For this, however, a much more accurate and literal source can
be found.
Commenting the verse In simplicitate cordis quaerite illum (Sap. 1,1), Eckhart
affirms that the root and the foundation of the intellect is simplicity.69 The
editor notes that Eckhart uses the noun simplicitas as a synonym for immateri-
alitas, a term that never appears in the Latin works. The editor thus recognizes
the intention of the Dominican master, who, according to the law of reditio
described in the Liber de causis, maintains that only the spiritual, immaterial
substances have the property of returning to themselves.
But even more clearly than in both Sermons 9 and 15, Eckhart quotes the
authority of the Liber de causis in the Sapientia commentary, in order to affirm
that the intellect, thanks to its simplicity, redit super se reditione completa, and
that thanks to this reditio the intellect knows itself and all things. The intellect
as an intellect has the property of knowing itself through a dynamic of conver-
sion. These dynamics are characteristic of all intellectual substances, God as
well as men, and they are described in the terms of the reditio completa in con-
nection with the Liber de causis. If one compares the two passages—the first
from the Sermon 15, the second from the Sapientia Commentary—it appears
that the direct source of the passage of the sermon is the one from the com-
mentary:
In Sap. In simplicitate cordis quaerite illum
Ubi notandum quod sicut unum et ens convertibiliter se habent, sic sim-
plicitas et intellectualitas. Radix enim prima et ratio intellectualitatis est
simplicitas (Ich sprich es kum von siner ainvaltikait). Argumentum huius
est: Primo quia ‘simplex’ et ipsum solum redit se toto super se totum (sin
selbes in imselber ist) ‘reditione completa’, et propter hoc—exDecausis—
est sciens se ipsumet omniaper essentiam(allemanigvaltikait in imselber
verstat)
69 Meister Eckhart, In Sap., LW II, n. 5, p. 327,1.
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That means that only what is simple redit super se reditione completa and
therefore knows itself and everything “by its essence” (per essentiam). Hence,
what is not simple does not know itself and therefore does not return upon
itself. This reading of prop. 15 is quite different from that of Thomas Aqui-
nas. Eckhart stresses the importance of simplicity, that is, immateriality, not
to demonstrate the ability of the human soul to separate from the body, but as
a necessary condition for self-knowledge.
I would like to take this opportunity to mention another case from a text to
which recently Markus Vinzent has drawn the attention of researchers. But I
will limit myself to one aspect, namely the simplicity of the intellect as a con-
dition for self-knowledge and self-determination.
As iswell known, FranzPfeiffer haspublishednot onlyEckhart’sGerman ser-
mons and treatises, but also proverbs attributed toMeister Eckhart, which form
the third part of his edition.70 Pfeiffer printed Spr. 31–48 from a manuscript in
Giessen, supposedly lost; it came from the convent of the Premonstratensian
nuns at Altenberg, and Pfeiffer dated it to the 14th century (Anonymus Alten-
bergensis). Denifle already saw that this is in part a free translation from Eck-
hart’s Expositio libri Sapientiae. Josef Quint discovered almost the same stock
of aphorisms in a latermanuscript of the 15th century from the former Charter-
house of Buxheim near Memmingen (Anonymus Buxheimensis) (Berlin, Ms.
germ. fol. 986),71 an important document, attributed by Loris Sturlese to the
circle of the so-called ‘Cologne Eckhartists’, that is to say, the circle of dis-
ciples of Meister Eckhart who put his texts in circulation to defend his image
and his philosophy.72 Studying this manuscript, Josef Koch, one of the edit-
ors of Eckhart’s Latin works, realized that this collection was, in fact, a fairly
accurate and literal translation of parts of the Sapientia commentary. Con-
sequently, he incorporated them in the critical apparatus of his edition of the
Latin text.
In the meantime, the manuscript used by Pfeiffer reappeared (Wartburg-
Stiftung, Ms. 1361–50) and was presented at a symposium held in Erfurt.73
Markus Vinzent, who is currently studying this supposedly lost witness, has
advanced the hypothesis that behind this anonymous compilator not an Eck-
hartist is hiding, but rather Eckhart himself, who translated and diffused large
70 Meister Eckhart. PredigtenundTraktate, ed. FranzPfeiffer (Leipzig: 1857; repr. Aalen: 1962).
71 See Gottschall 2012, p. 535.
72 Sturlese 2007, p. 119–136, esp. p. 132.
73 See Vinzent 2017, p. 109–134; further fragments are preserved in a Munich manuscript
(Cgm 5235).
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passages of hisWisdom commentary. I will not go into the details of this ques-
tion, which is still under examination by the specialists.
I would like, however, to comment on a particular passage of this text that
supports Vinzent’s hypothesis. One of the rare sources that the anonymous
translates and cites explicitly, although under the usual formula die heiden-
schenmeister, is the Liber de causis and,more precisely, proposition XVII. I here
compare the text of Wisdom with that of the anonymous, as transcribed by
Pfeiffer. The passages in common are set in bold:
ed. Pfeiffer, III, n. 45 In Sap., LW II, n. 156, p. 492
In der wîsheit buoche sô sprichet der
wîse man alsô die êwige wîsheit ver-
mac alliu dinc, dar umbe, wan si einic
ist. Hier über so gît meister Eckhart eine
rede unde sprichet sô ein dinc je ein-
veltiger ist, ie kreftiger unde ie sterker
ist. Unde diz brüeven wir dabî: wan
ein dinc von vil stücken ist ze samene
gemachet, des dinges kraft lît alzemale
an der stücken. Als daz hûs gemachet
ist von den wenden unde dem funda-
mente unde von dem dache, hier umbe
sô lît alles des hûses kraft an den selben
teilen; mer: möhte daz hûs von siner ein-
erkeit haben die kraft, die ez hat von den
wenden, so bedörfte ez der wende niht.
Wan nu got ist daz einveltigste guot,
daz sin mac und in dem alliu dinc ein
sint, hierumbe sô vermac er alliu dinc,
wan er ein ist. Unde sprechent ouch
die heidenschenmeister, daz ein ieg-
lichiu kraft swenne si sich wite zerteilet,
so wir si deste bloeder. Reht also ist ez
ouch umbe die vernunft: swenne si sich
zerteilet in manicvaldekeit der kreature,
so wirt si deste bloeder unde deste kren-
ker gegen gote. Mer: swenne diu vernunft
sich lediget von den kreaturen und alle
Sequitur secundum principale, scilicet
quomodo ex hoc ipso, quod est una,
‘omnia potest’. Nec enim posset, nisi
esset una, multo minus posset omnia.
Sciendum ergo quod quanto quid
est simplicius et unitius, tanto est
potentius et virtuosius, plura potens.
Ratio est: omne enim compositum
posse suum et virtutem trahit ab aliis
ipsum componentibus. Patet igitur
quod posse et virtus sunt composito,
inquantum compositum, aliena, ipsis
autem simplicibus sunt propria. Et hoc
est quod volumus, quod quant quid sim-
plicius, tanto potentius et virtuosius,
potens in plura et super plura. Quod
autem apud nos compositiora sunt
perfectiora, non est contra nos, sed pro
nobis. Hoc enim accidit ex eo, non quia
compositiora—sic enim sunt posteriora
et dependentia—, sed hoc accidit, quia
plura sunt simplicia quae ipsum com-
ponunt. Quanto autem a pluribus virtus
descendit in aliquid, tanto est ipsum vir-
tuosius, plura potens. Resumendo ergo
formetur ratio sic breviter: quanto quid
unitius, tanto potentius, ut dictum est.
Ergo quod est simpliciter unum—et
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(cont.)
sinne zesamen loufent in die vernunft
unde da diu vernunft und ouch die sinne
sich mit einander vereinent, so wirt di
vernunft also kreftic, daz si überwindet
got swes si von im begert. Wan swenne
der mensche tuot, daz an im ist, sô mac
sich got nihtes erwern.
ipsum solum—potest omnia. Topicum
est enim: si magis ad magis, et simpliciter
ad simpliciter. Sed sapientia est una sim-
pliciter, ut hic dicitur; ergo ipsa potest
omnia. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur:
‘cum sit una, omnia potest’. Praeterea
secundo sic ex De causis: ‘omnis virtus
unita infinitior est’, plura et in plura
potens. Sed sapientia, quae deus est, est
maxime una, utpote prima. Igitur ipsa
est simpliciter infinita et omnia potens.
In this example too, both in the Latin version and in the text in German, simpli-
city is at the center of thediscourse, this timeas a conditionof theomnipotence
of Wisdom,which by virtue of its unity can do everything. Indeed, by implicitly
citing proposition XVII, Eckhart affirms that the simpler the thing, the more
powerful it is. Therefore, the One, that is, God, which is absolutely simple, can
perform all things. Eckhart gives three demonstrations: one comes from Aris-
totle’s Topics, the second from the Liber de causis and the last one is based on
the dynamics of the pair form / act.
Compared to the Latin text, however, the German version adds two import-
ant elements. The first is precisely a citation from the Liber de causis. While
the Latin text relates only the main proposition, the German text cites also the
commentary:
Et illius quidem significatio est virtus divisa et quod ipsa, quanto magis
agregatur et unitur, magnificatur et vehementior fit et efficit operationes
mirabiles; et quanto magis partitur et dividitur minoratur et debilitatur
et efficit operationes viles.
The second element to be noted is a reference to the activity of the intellect,
described, as in the German Sermon 15, in its double attitude towards things: it
is sometimes dispersed inmultiplicity, sometimes turned towards itself, united
and unique in itself, as God.
The Altenbergensis thus shows three facts. (1) It is the intellect as such, both
divine and human, which, thanks to its simplicity, determines itself without
any orientation to external things. The anonymous explicitly expresses this
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idea: if the intellect is united in itself and is separated from the diversity of the
creatures, then it is so powerful that he even surpasses God in his action and
forces God who cannot withhold himself (überwindet got swes is von im begert.
Wan swenne der mensche tuot, daz an im ist, sô mac sich got nihtes erwern). (2)
The interpretation of the Liber de causis which translates the Wisdom Com-
mentary while at the same time taking it further by being close to German
Sermon 15 is hardly a work of an Eckhartist, but displays the systematic think-
ing of Eckhart himself. (3) That is why we can speak of Eckhart’s own theory
of self-determination which is developed here, clearly influenced by the Liber
de causis, especially by the propositions in which the reditio of the intellect is
described.
5 Conclusions
We can thus draw the following conclusions:
1) Proclus had, for Eckhart, an importance certainly inferior to that which
some scholars have attributed to him. In any case, this importance is
inferior to that which Proclus has had for Tauler or Berthold von Moos-
burg. Alain de Libera74 seems right when he affirms that we read Eckhart
after equations and identifications produced not by him, but by Tauler or
Berthold von Moosburg. We are asking Eckhart the very same questions
already posed to him by Tauler and Berthold.
2) A second conclusion concerns the difference between Scholasticism and
mysticism, between the ontology of Latin texts and the Henology of the
texts in the vernacular. The cases that I have presented as examples tend
to show an influence not only thematically, but also textuallly, between
Eckhart’s academic, homiletic and lecturing outputs. The difference is not
in their content, but rather in tone, in the use of examples, in the freedom
with which Eckhart handles his sources.
3) This in turn leads us to the third conclusion: we should not exclude, as
certain examples already pointed out show, that Eckhart himself trans-
lated part of his Latin work into German, reshaping, broadening or spe-
cifying some sources used in his academic output. The case of Sermon 15
might confirm Markus Vinzent’s thesis, according to which the author of
the translation of passages from the Sapientia commentary (the so called
Anonymus Altenbergensis) was Eckhart himself.
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chapter 16
The Liber de causis and the potentia sive virtus
intellectiva Formula in Dante’s Political Philosophy
Victoria Arroche
Universidad de Buenos Aires
In the Monarchia and the Convivio, Dante explains that human beings are the
only entity situated between corruptibility and incorruptibility. Created as a
union of soul and body, human beings are, in fact, endowedwith a dual nature.
With respect to the human condition, i.e. their bipartite essence, each person
may be conceived of as both perishable and, on the count of the soul, not
perishable, at the same time.1 Parting from this dual nature, the Italian poet
establishes how humanity as a whole could achieve its proper and distinctive
end: earthly happiness. This ethical aim hinges on a specific and higher capa-
city, which Dante describes as a potentia or virtus intellectiva. In fact, humanity
as a whole could achieve its end by exercising its proper function, which is
to actualize the potentia intellectiva entirely, simultaneously, and continually
(actuetur vis ultima tota simul semper).2 According to him, this would be pos-
sible if humanity correctly ordered temporal affairs under a soleMonarch. And
this is, clearly, the political aspect of Dante’s thought. Dante presupposes a par-
ticular connection between the people and the government—one that differs
from other social interrelations.
The subject of this study is to analyze some of the passages of Dante’s polit-
ical work in the Convivio and the Monarchia, taking detailed account of the
notions of potentia and virtus and the way they operate in these political treat-
ises. Because the author uses the ultima potentia formula to characterize the
specific human virtus, and because this formula also appears in the Liber de
causis, I will consider how this anonymous text was received in the LatinWest
and influenced the rise of political theories in theMiddle Ages. In fact, I believe
that Dante’s quotations of the Liber resulted fromnewphilosophical andmeta-
physical instruments that allowed him to construct a rational argument and
1 Cfr. Monarchia L. III, c. 15, 3–6; Convivio L. III, c. 7, 5 and L. IV, c. 21, 4–6.
2 For the formula tota simul cfr. Monarchia L. I, c. 3, 8–10 and in Monarchia L. I, c. 4, 1–2 the
expression semper is used.
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thus to develop his political thought.3 In this respect, the meaning and con-
notation of the concepts of potentia and virtus must be clarified. This is so
because, on the one hand, these concepts signify an intellectual capacity or
strength which is distinctive of human beings. Dante claims that there is a
proper capacity of the human soul intended as an immanent strength, there-
fore, there is a connection with the rise of political theory in the Middle Ages.
Certainly, as politics would ultimately concern the development of a specific
human capacity, Dante’s claim is part of the construction of a “new” scientific
field, the object of which are temporal and humanmatters. On the other hand,
Dante’s use of these concepts expresses the potentia or virtus as a power that
flows through the gradual structure of reality formed by primary and second-
ary causes. In this sense, the idea of potentiality and its metaphysical richness
seems to be the theoretical support of a political application in the temporal
andhuman field. In fact, under theNeoplatonic philosophical tradition, repres-
ented by Proclus and the Liber de causis, causes are conceived of as substances
that have the capacity to shape reality and to trickle their power or strength
down to the lower levels of reality.
As previouslymentioned, thenotionof potentiality inDante’s politicalworks
signifies a capacity or strength that represents human perfection. Thus, it has
active meaning because it indicates the exercise of a specific capacity. In this
respect, it is worth noting that Aristotle used the concept of δύναμις to explain
the state of a substance that is not actuality, i.e. a state which has not reached
its perfection. To become what it really is, it needs the agency of a substance,
which is already actuality. Therefore, according to Aristotle, the perfection of a
substance is connected to its actualization.4 On the contrary, according to Pro-
clus’Elements of Theology, the potentiality of a substance is a power; thus, it is a
capacity and a perfection. Proclus reversed Aristotle’s doctrine because, in his
view, the related concepts are potentiality and perfection.5 As this last meaning
3 Cfr. Monarchia L. I, c. 3, 1–3 where the concept of inquisitio describes an investigation based
on rational principles.
4 Proclus reworkedAristotle’s distinction between an active and passive potentiality. Cfr.Meta-
physics IX 1046a 5, 10–15: “We have made it plain elsewhere that ‘potentiality’ and ‘can’ have
several senses […] One kind of potentiality is the power of being affected; the principle in
the patient itself which initiates a passive change in it by the action of some other thing, or
of itself qua other. Another is a positive state of impassivity in respect of deterioration or
destruction by something else or by itself qua something else […].” (all English translations
are mine, unless otherwise stated) Cfr. also Aristotle, Metaphysics V 1019a. See Gersh 1978,
p. 27–45.
5 Moerbeke translated the Greek term δύναμις for the Latin potentia and ἐνέργεια for actus or
operatio. He chose the word perfectio for the Proclean expression τὸ τέλειον which is clearly
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of potentiality subsists in the Liber de causis, which is a source of Dante’s polit-
ical work, the notions of potentia or virtus in his political theory is one, albeit
indirect, reception of Proclus’ heritage in the 13th and 14th centuries.
1 Potentia sive virtus intellectiva as an Ultimate Capacity of the
Human Soul in the Convivio and the Monarchia
During the second half of the 20th century, scholars debated the impact of the
Aristotelian concept of nature on the development of political thought in the
Late Middle Ages. Somemedieval scholars deemed the reception of Aristotle’s
philosophical work as the main and practically sole reason for the production
of political textbooks in the West between the 13th and 14th centuries. Oth-
ers, instead, noted that there was a previous philosophical ground on which
Aristotle’s texts were received. Thus, according to them, the influence of differ-
ent philosophical traditionsmust be taken into account, such as Neoplatonism
or Ciceronian thought, in the rise of Politics as a science.6 Still, it was widely
assumed that political thought in the Middle Ages parts from new considera-
tions of human nature that are offered by an anthropological model that puts
forth a particular metaphysics of the soul and the human mind. To be pre-
cise, according to Dante, humanity can be differentiated from other species by
means of an intellectual capacity or strength. Since the expression potentia sive
virtus intellectiva concerns an essential characteristic of human nature, even if
related to the Aristotle’s notion of entelechy. Since Proclus conceived the capacity to produce
or cause an effect in connectionwith the potentiality of a substance, the schema acquires the
following gradual structure: the first principle possesses a perfect and complete potentiality
(plenum et perfectum) and produces by superfluity or surplus of potentiality. The Henads are
characterized as autopotentia and that means that their power coincides with their actuality
or perfection. Their action takes place from themselves to themselves and they don’t need to
act on a substrate (causa causatum). Next, following that grade, there are different groups or
totalities that may be caused by a) causes anterior or preexisting to the parts of a substance
(ante partes), b) causes that exist simultaneously in all the substance’s parts (ex partibus) or
c) causes that exist in each part of the substance (in parte). Cfr. Boese 1987. Dodds speaks
of “superfluity of potency,” cfr. Dodds 1963, p. 31. Also Gersh 1978, p. 50–51. For the formula
“sovrabbondanza di potenza,” cfr. D’Ancona 1986, p. 23.
6 A description of the debate in Bertelloni, Francisco 2000, p. 9–39. Walter Ullmann argued
for Aristotle’s libri morales as the principal explanation of the rise of politics during the 13th
and 14th centuries in theWest. Cfr. Ullmann 1961. On the contrary, Cary Nederman emphas-
ized the role of the Ciceronian philosophical tradition. Cfr. Nederman 1996, p. 563–585. On
p. 571 he claimed that the use of Aristotelianism was as a language and not as a doctrine and
quoted Black 1992. See also Nederman 1991, p. 179–195, particularly p. 179 where he discussed
Ullmann’s, Kristeller’s andWilks’ considerations. Cfr. also Nederman 1988, p. 3–26.
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the concept of nature refers to a physical domain, it also denotes a specific and
immutable essence that operates and gravitates toward its own proper good. In
fact, in Dante’s political work that operation is possible because an “ultimate
capacity” exists. In the Monarchia, Book I, chapter 3, the Italian poet says:
Que autem sit illa [operatio], manifestum fiet si ultimum de potentia
totius humanitatis appareat.7
The distinctive capacity that may be exercised by humanity entirely, simultan-
eously and continually, is an intellectual strength:
Patet igitur quodultimumdepotentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive
virtus intellectiva.8
In the second chapter, third treatise of the Convivio, Dante also asserts that the
“place” of the potenza ultima is the human soul; thus, he is clearly speaking
about a rational capacity:
E quella anima che tutte queste potenze comprende, e perfettissima di
tutte l’altre, è l’anima umana, la quale con la nobilitade de la potenza
ultima, cioè ragione, participa de la divina natura a guisa di sempiterna
intelligenzia.9
On the one hand, some of the translations of the ultimum de potentia formula
refer to a specific capacity. For example, the word ultimum, in relation to an
“intellectual potentiality,” was translated by Vinay from Latin into Italian as
specifica and Bertelloni translated the term into Spanish as propia. In English,
Aurelia Henry uses the expression distinctive in her 1904 translation, and more
recently Richard Kay used the term highest in his version.10 Both Vinay and
7 Monarchia L. I, c. 3, 4–5: “What this function is, will be evident if we point out the dis-
tinctive capacity of humanity as a whole.” Richard Kay translates ultimum de potentia as
“highest power.” (transl. Henry) See infra, footnote 11.
8 Monarchia L. I, c. 3, 6–7: “It is evident, therefore, that the differentiating characteristic of
humanity is a distinctive capacity or power of intellect.” (transl. Henry) Cfr. also Monar-
chia I, 3, 8–9; Monarchia, I, 4, 1–2.
9 Convivio III, c. 2: “The soul that comprehends all these powers, and the one that is the
most perfect of them all, is the human soul, which by the nobility of its highest power
(that is, reason) participates in the divine nature as an everlasting intelligence.” (transl.
Lansing)
10 Cfr. supra the passage in which the expression ultimumde potentia is found, Monarchia L.
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Bertelloni’s translations of potentia indicate that it is an active function of the
humanmind. For his part, Vinay translated potentia into Italian as capacità and
Bertelloni chose operación for the Spanish version. Like scholars from Italy and
Argentina, A. Henry and R. Kay also stressed the active sense of the notion
of potentia, the former translating it as capacity and the latter as power. On
the other hand, Pier Giorgio Ricci, who published the critical edition of the
Monarchia, remained silent regarding the term ultimum in connection with
potentia. Nevertheless, he certainly provided remarks for the concept of fine
ultimo that appears in the Monarchia I, 3 just before the ultimum de potentia
formula. In fact, he explains that fineultimomeans “amaximumgood”.Vianello
equally proposed a translation that emphasizes the same aspects of the words
ultimum and potentia, indicating that their meaning is l’estremo limite della
potenza dell’umanità stessa, which points to the idea of maximum or super-
ior. Furthermore, Vianello justified his translation with a quote from Albert
the Great’s De celo et mundo on the meaning of the term virtus. Additionally,
Albert’s definition of virtus is noteworthy in that it includes the expressions
ultimum and potentia:
Si ergo volumus diffinire virtutem, cum sciamus virtutem consistere in
ultimo etmaximo, ad quod se extendit virtus activa, dicemus, quod virtus
est ultimum, quod est in re potente de potentia sua activa, sicut ultimum
potentiae fortitudinis Herculis diximus esse vincere triginta. Quantitas
ergo potentiae extensa ad triginta erit virtus Herculis.11
Virtus as the ultimate limit of the capacity or strength of an entity can surely
be connected to those passages of the Monarchia and the Convivio in which
Dante used the notions of potentia, virtus and ultimum to express the intel-
lectual capacity that has to be exercised by humanity as a totalitas. Indeed,
Dante equates the concepts of potentia and virtus (potentia sive virtus) because
he can define potentia as an active power, which is the proper capacity of
I, c. 3. Translations: Vinay 1950; Bertelloni 1984; Ricci 1965; Vianello 1921; Henry 1904; Kay
1998. Kay’s version offers other possible English translations andmeanings of the formula
ultimum de potentia on p. 14, n. 10.
11 Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, I, tr. 4, c. 5, p. 88: “Thus, if we wish to define ‘virtue’,
knowing that it consists of the ultimate and highest peak an active potentiality can reach,
we would say that, like active potentiality, virtue is the ultimate limit of a thing’s capa-
city. As we have said, the ultimate limit of the capacity of Hercules’ strength is to defeat
thirty men. Consequently, Hercules’ virtue is the quantity of potency extended to defeat-
ing thirty men.”
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human beings and which can shape reality.12 In addition, since that capacity
is ultimum, it represents the ultimate limit of the human mind.
2 The ultima potentia Formula in the Liber de causis
Although the author of the Liber de causis redefined some crucial ideas from
his Proclean source Stoikheíosis theologiké, the anonymous treatise holds that
an indivisible and eternal substancemust possess an active potentiality, mean-
ing a certain capacity or power to produce an effect.13 As stated in proposition
V (VI), 64–65 of the Liber de causis, Intelligence is an indivisible and immutable
substance.14 In proposition IV, 37 the author also affirms that the first of things
created is being; and then he holds that all that follows the First Cause is intelli-
gentia, completa et ultima in potentia et reliquis bonitatibus.15 The First Cause is,
strictly speaking, the only hypostasis that can create (bymodus creationis) and
Intelligence is the first thing that is created.16 The author of the treatise estab-
lishes that the latter obtains its esse from the former, meaning that it depends
ontologically on the First Cause. In that sense, Intelligence is determined by a
limit, which is its form,17 but it is also self-sufficient in relation to its capacity
or productive strength, that is, its potentia or virtus. In the Liber de causis, Intel-
ligence is considered as ultima potentia because it is sufficiens per se ipsam.18
12 Moerbeke expressed the idea of a virtus factiva in his translation of the Stoikheíosis theo-
logiké, Cfr. prop. 7: Si autem ipsumproductivuum est potentie omnis ei quod post ipsum, et si
se ipso possit facere tale quale illud: si autem hoc, et facere utique se ipsum potentius. Neque
enim id quod est non posse prohibet, presente factiva virtute. Cfr. Boese 1987, prop. 7.
13 This termcanbe found in the Liber de causis fromproposition I, 14with the verb efficit. The
term always implies an action, an operation or an influence upon an effect. Specifically,
from proposition III and on, the expression efficiens is always related to the idea of a pro-
ductive capacity. The virtus efficiens formula is in proposition XII (XIII), 121. Cfr. Pattin 1966.
Recent philological and historical findings as well as important philosophical analyses in
Calma 2016, p. 11–51.
14 Liberde causis, prop. VI (VII), 64: Intelligence is an indivisible substance. 65:This is because
if it is without magnitude and is not a body and does not move, then without doubt it is
indivisible.
15 Liber de causis, prop. IV (43): “Intelligence, complete and ultimate in power and the other
perfections”. (transl. Brand)
16 Propositions in which Intelligence is identified with the first of the things created: Prop.
XV (130) ens primum creatum, scilicet intelligentia. See also prop. VI (70) and prop. XXII
(173).
17 Cfr. Liber de causis, prop. VIII (90).
18 Liberde causis, prop. XXI (167). See also prop. XIV (124–128).Thepotentiality of Intelligence
(as the other perfections) comes from the First Cause but its operation, that is its capacity
for causing, belongs to Intelligence properly.
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Therefore, it constitutes a superior principle of a range of effects that descend
from themoreuniversal to themoreparticular.The author of the Liberde causis
also claims that Intelligence is the complete / perfect reality apud nos;19 and,
because of its similarity with the First Cause, it is also described as a prince.
This hypostasis, indeed, operates as an intermediary because it connects two
spheres: on one side, thatwhich contains things that are inferior to Intelligence
and, on the other side, the First Cause:
Intelligentia est princeps rerum quae sunt sub ea et retinens eas et regens
eas, sicut natura regit res quae sunt sub ea per virtutem intelligentiae. Et
similiter intelligentia regit naturam per virtutem divinam.20
Like its Proclean source, the propositions of the Liber de causis do not simply
represent a logical sequence, but also stand for an ontological order that is
gradually structured. Through the expression ultimumdepotentia, Dante indic-
ates a superior capacity of the soul.21 In the Convivio III, he quotes the Liber de
causis to explain the ontological hierarchy not only in respect to universe, but
also in connection with the human soul:
E però chenel’ordine intellettuale de l’universo si sale e discendeper gradi
quasi continui da la infima forma a l’altissima [e da l’altissima] a la infima,
sì come vedemo nel’ordine sensibile. […] E avvegna che posti siano qui
gradi generali [i.e. related to the order of reality], non dimeno si possono
porre gradi singulari; cioè che quella [i.e. Divine Goodness / the influence
of theFirstCause] riceve, de l’animeumane, altrimenti una cheun’altra.22
As Dante expressed in the Convivio, even if God, i.e. an absolute simple prin-
ciple, influences the whole of creation, not all things created can receive His
19 Liber de causis, prop. XXI (167).
20 Liber de causis, prop. VIII (82): “Therefore, Intelligence is the sovereign over the things that
are under it; and it maintains them and governs them, just as Nature governs the things
that are under it by virtue of the power of Intelligence. And similarly, Intelligence governs
Nature by virtue of the divine power.” (transl. Brand)
21 The rational capacity which is superior to the vegetative and sensitive potencies.
22 Convivio III, cap. 7: “Although only the general gradations are set downhere, we could nev-
ertheless set down the particular gradations: that is, that among human souls one receives
goodness differently from another. And, because in the intellectual order of the universe,
one ascends and descends throught continuous gradations from the lowest form to the
highest and from the highest to the lowest, as it happens in the sensible order”. (transl.
Lansing) Cfr. also Nardi 1949, p. 187–188; Raffi 2004, p. 30–48.
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goodness equally. In other words, even if the First Cause created the totality
of humanity with a unique influx, each entity receives that influence accord-
ing to itsmodus suae potentiae. That is the formula that the author of the Liber
de causis uses to explain the existing diversity with respect to the capacity or
strength of different entities.
3 From the Capacity or Strength of the Human Soul to the Power of
the Monarchy
I’ve attempted to present the functionality of the concepts of potentia and
virtus according to what may be called “the metaphysics of the human soul
and mind”. These notions express, in Dante’s works, the highest peak that the
capacity or strength of the human intellect can reach. To do so is to achieve
humanity’s proper end, that is, to actualize the potentiality of the human race.
In this sense, it is clear that politics, intended as a specific relation between the
community and theMonarch—who guides humanity toward the achievement
of that end—stems from the exercise of that intellectual capacity.
To further develop this political aspect of the notion of potentiality, two con-
cepts are worth noting in Books I and III of the Monarchia. Those concepts are
ordinatio and reductio. Dante uses them to describe some specific modes of
causality. On the one hand, since the Monarch “is the most universal cause of
men living well”,23 the idea of ordinatio in Book I indicates that there exists an
alignment of the effects towards the cause ratione finis. This order of gradation
results from the capacity or strength of the effect, that is, its modus potentiae.
On the other hand, the idea of reductio, developed in Book III, shows that the
emperor’s authority depends directly onGod,who, strictly speaking, is the only
cause that can create. As we have seen in the passage of the Convivio III, Dante
describes the gradual ontological order of reality. This overview may also illu-
minate the passage of Book I, chapter 11 of theMonarchia inwhich the distance
that the Monarch and the other princes keep from subjects differs:
Sed homines propinquius Monarche sunt quam aliis principibus […]
principibus aliis homines non appropinquant nisi in parte, Monarche
vero secundum totum. Et rursus: principibus aliis appropinquant per
Monarcham et non e converso.24
23 Monarchia, L. I, c. 11, 18.
24 Monarchia, L. I, c. 11, 15–17: “Men are closer to the Monarch than they are to other princes
[…] men are closer to other princes in part, but to the monarch in full. And again, men
approach other princes through the Monarch, and not conversely.” (transl. Henry)
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In the Monarchia, the idea of proximity shows the real distance between
the grades of an ordered reality. To function, causation requires, as an essential
characteristic of the system, this stated distance between causes and effects
because that also concerns the higher or lesser similarity between them. In
addition, according to this Neoplatonic model of causality, the universality of
a cause implies a greater capacity for generating effects.
In Book I, chapter 11, Dante quotes the Liber de causis to provide ametaphys-
ical legitimation of a political order in which the emperor is identified with a
First Cause that acts in the realm of time:
Quanto causa est universalior, tanto magis habet rationem cause, quia
inferior non est causa nisi per superiores, ut patet ex hiis que De causis
[…] Cum ergo Monarca sit universalissima causa inter mortalis ut hom-
ines bene vivant quia principes alii per illum, ut dictum est, consequens
est quod bonum hominum ab eo maxime diligatur.25
The ontological support of the political bond between the princes and the
people is based on the existence of theMonarch, who is characterized as a First
Cause in the domain of temporal and human matters. Therefore, according to
Dante, themonarchymaybe conceive as an autonomouspolitical institution.26
Certainly, it is not a a sum of individualities as a progression from the smaller
communities towards the empire.27 On the contrary, it is the monarchy that
orders all the levels of reality to the ultimate end and assures the causal con-
nection between intermediaries and effects. To be precise, if somehowpeople’s
well-being depends on princes, it is because the emperor transmits to them his
potentia or virtus, that is to say, that the power and the authority of princes
derives from the Monarch’s capacity and strength.
Et sic per prius et inmediateMonarche inest cura de omnibus, aliis autem
principibus per Monarcham, eo quod cura ipsorum a cura illa suprema
descendit.28
25 Monarchia L. I, 11, 17–18: “Moreover, the more universal thecause, the more it possess the
nature of a cause, for the lower cause is somerely by virtue of the higher, as can be inferred
from the treatise onCauses […]. Aswe have said, other princes are causesmerely by virtue
of the Monarch; then, among mortals, he is the most universal cause of man’s well-being,
and it is he who loves mankind’s well-being above all others.” (transl. Henry)
26 Cfr. Liber de causis, prop. XXI (167) the concept is sufficiens per se ipsam.
27 Empire and Monarchy are synonyms. Cfr. Monarchia L. I, 2, 3: Est ergo temporalis Monar-
chia, quam dicunt Imperium.
28 Cfr. Monarchia, L. I, 11, 16–17: “Thus the Monarch is the direct and primary guardian of it
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The quote from Liber de causis in chapter 11 clearly indicates that the causal
model is taken from proposition 1 of the anonymous treatise. Dante assigns to
God the characteristics of the remote cause and to the Monarch those of the
proximate cause. Thus, he argues in favor of an ontological distance. In thatway,
he can articulate his argument showing the similarity betweenhumankind and
God if the former is united as whole, that is, if monarchy exists to govern on
temporal matters, so that the Monarch can guide the people to their proper
end.
Et omne illud bene se habet et optime quod se habet secundum inten-
tionem primi agentis, qui Deus est […] De intentione Dei est ut omne
causatum divinam similitudinem representet in quantum propria natura
recipere potest […] Ergo humanum genus bene se habet et optime
quando secundum quod potest Deo assimilatur. Sed genus humanum
maximeDeo assimilatur quandomaxime est unum, vera enim ratio unius
in solo illo est.29
The order ratione finis grounded on the Monarchy is necessarily also the start-
ing point of reality. This is so because the Emperor—who is one—constitutes
the cause of humanity’s unity inasmuch as the latter resembles the former.
Indeed, Dante claims that:
Genus humanum maxime est unum quando totum unitur in uno, quod
esse non potest nisi quando uni principi totaliter subiacet.30
Thus, similarity, unity and proximity render the theoretical support for Dante’s
political position, that is, that humanity may be ordered to unity, converting
all, while the other princes operate through him because the monarch’s supreme interest
descends through them.” (transl. Henry)
29 Monarchia L. I, c. 8, 1–4: “And everything is well, nay, best disposed which acts in accord-
ance with the intention of the first agent, who is God. […] It is of the intention of God
that all things should represent the divine likeness insofar as their peculiar nature is able
to recieve it. The human race, therefore, is ordered well, nay is ordered for the best, when
according to the utmost of its power it becomes like untoGod. But the human race ismost
like unto God when it is most one, for the principle of unity dwells in Him alone.” (transl.
Henry)
30 Monarchia L. I, 8, 4–5: “The human race is most one when all are united together, a state
which ismanifestly impossible unless humanity as awhole becomes subject to one Prince
[and consequently comes most into accordance with that divine intention which we
showed at the beginning of this chapter is the good].” (transl. Henry)
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towards a totalitas, to attain its distinctive end. That is only attainable with
the Monarch as guide.31 God is a remote cause of humanity considered as a
whole, because he created it directly, endows it with being (esse), and governs
it through the Monarch who received its authority from Him inmediate.32 In
thatway, the causal chain in the temporal sphere beginswith theMonarch. The
Monarch is a cause possessing a kind of autonomy to exercise his own function
(operatio), for he receives that capacity or strength (virtus) by the influence
of the First Cause directly. Therefore, he governs that which is beneath him.
Indeed, certain propositions of the Liber de causis stress the function of Intel-
ligence as an intermediary between God and what follows Intelligence.
At this point, there is another aspect that concerns the political projection
of the potentia sive virtus intellective formula. All the argumentation of the first
Book of the Monarchia concerns an active aspect of intellectual capacity or
strength. Consequently, it allowsDante to pass over the fallennature of human-
ity and avoid the use of the rationepeccati formula to legitimate themonarchy’s
existence.33 Certainly, for Dante, the potentia intellectiva is themaximum of an
intrinsic capacity. It is distinctive of human nature and conformed to attain
earthly happiness, understood as the perfection of men in temporal life. Thus,
the need of the Monarchy or Empire is clearly not justified by the infirmitas of
human nature.
Nevertheless, in the third Book of the Monarchia, Dante endorsed the
ratione peccati in the allegory of the sun and themoon, awell-known argument
used also by the defenders of the papal supremacy over the temporal govern-
ment. According to this allegory, the two celestial bodies represent two differ-
ent powers, the temporal and the spiritual. The correct interpretation of the
allegory is that, just as themoon receives its light from the sun, so also the tem-
31 According to “political Augustinianism” the temporal government is legitimated on an
anthropological view that considers human nature as fallen (genus origine depravata,
velut radice corrupta). According to Dante, the emergence of the Monarchy is not due to
the fallen nature of the human being. Instead, Monarchy is the institution that allows
humanity to reach its proper end (beatitudo) because it is the condition for the develop-
ment of the ultima potentia tota, simul, semper. For “political Augustinianism” see Arquil-
lière 1934.
32 Dante poses the problem at the beginning of Book I: Monarchia L. I, 2, 3–4: tria dubitata
queruntur […] tertio anauctoritasMonarchedependeat aDeo inmediate vel abalio,Deimin-
istro seu vicario and he gives an answer in Monarchia L. III, 15, 15–16: Sic ergo patet quod
auctoritas temporalis Monarche sine ullo medio in ipsum de Fonte universalis auctoritatis
descendit.
33 Cfr. Augustine, Contra Iulianum L. III, 12. 24: Natura vero humana secundum catholicam
fidembona instituta, sedvitiatapeccatomeritoquedamnataest. L. IV, 2.11 Sic virtus in infirm-
itate perficitur: quia et pugnare infirmitatis est.
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poral government obtains its authority from the spiritual. To refute this inter-
pretation, Dante held that the Church and the Empire are two remedia contra
infirmitatem peccati.34 However, his understanding has an opposite starting
point. As Dante explains regarding the moon:
Dico ergo quod licet luna non habeat lucem abundanter nisi ut a sole
recipit, nonpropter hoc sequitur quod ipsa luna sit a sole. Unde sciendum
quodaliud est esse ipsius lune, aliud virtus eius, et aliudoperari.Quantum
est ad esse, nullo modo luna dependet a sole, necetiam quantum ad vir-
tutem, nec quantum ad operationem simpliciter.35
However, the moon does not depend on the sun for its being (esse) or its capa-
city (virtus). Nor does it depend absolutely on the sun for its operation because
the cause of itsmovement and the influence that it exercises over things belong
to it properly. Dante replaces themoon and the sunwith the temporal and spir-
itual rulers and establishes that:
Sic ergo dico quod regnum temporale non recipit esse a spirituali, nec vir-
tutem que est eius auctoritas, nec etiam operationem simpliciter.36
Temporal power, indeed, does not receive its being and authority from spiritual
power but instead obtains it directly from God, i.e. without intermediaries. In
fact, according to Dante, the expression virtus applies to the temporal govern-
ment and to theMonarch’s auctoritas. Hence, it refers to the power or capacity
of the Monarch to act independently or autonomously from the authority of
the spiritual ruler.
In short, Dante’s ratione peccati argument does not affirm an intrinsic cor-
ruption of human nature which would entail a reductio of one power into
another, that is, a subordination of the temporal government to the spiritual.
34 Cfr. Monarchia L. III, c. 4, 14–15.
35 Monarchia L. III, 4, 18–19: “I say, then, that although the Moon may have abundant light
only as she receives it from the Sun, it does not follow on that account that theMoon her-
self owes her existence to the Sun. Itmust be recognized that the essence of theMoon, her
strength, and her function are not one and the same. Neither in her essence, her strength,
nor her function taken absolutely, does the Moon owe her existence to the sun, [for her
movement is impelled by her own motor and her influence by her own rays].” (transl.
Henry)
36 Monarchia L. III, 4, 20–21: “In like manner, I say, the temporal power receives from the
spiritual neither its existence, nor its strength, which is its authority, nor even its function
taken absolutely.” (transl. Henry)
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On the contrary, the argument instead relies on the fact that both powers are
created by God and, consequently, have proper authority and a distinctive end
from each other.
4 Some Conclusions
In connection with the potentia sive virtus intellectiva formula used by Dante in
his political treatises, several remarks are in order. First, in Book I, these notions
are employed to affirm the entity of temporal government as it is based on
the existence of an ultimate end. This end can be reached by exercising a dis-
tinctive capacity or strength. This capacity or strength, though unique to each
individual human being, has to be actualized by humanity as a whole. That is
only possible under the guidance of the Monarch.
Second, in Book III, these concepts enabledDante to use philosophical argu-
ments to defend the autonomy of the temporal government in relation to the
spiritual. In other words, it enabled him to stand for a relative independence of
the monarchy regarding the papacy. Thus, I sustain that the indirect influence
of Proclean philosophy through the Liber de causis is manifested in some parts
of Dante’s political work that may be assigned to the relations between cause
and effects as they are established under the Neoplatonic model. Notably: a)
that the ontological order has a gradual structure according to which reality
proceeds from the absolute simple towards the complex and returns through
the same instances or levels; b) given this order between those instances,
named causes and effects, there is an ontological distance that allows a greater
or lesser similarity of the effect to its cause; c) on the basis of that distance, it
is also possible to describe reality in terms of remote or proximate causes; d)
participation by similarity and ontological distance are concepts also related to
the capacity of a cause (potentia or virtus factiva).
In addition, according to the author of the Liber de causis, the concept of
potency acquires a particular meaning when applied to Intelligence. In fact, in
that text, it is described as ultima potentia, expressing its condition as an inter-
mediary between the First Cause and the created order as well as its relative
autonomyandconsequently its causal capacity or power in the temporal realm.
In light of Dante’sConvivio andMonarchia, the potentia sive virtus intellectiva
formula indicates human perfection as the ultimate limit of the intellectual
capacity of the soul. Thus, humanity can be differentiated from other creatures
by its nature.
Likewise, I have attempted to examine how the causal model from the Liber
de causis applies to Dante’s political treatises. This is evident in the identifica-
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tion of God with the First Cause (which is also conceived of as a paradigmatic
cause) that creates all entities and preserves them in a state of being. Because
humanity is created directly by God, the Monarchy occupies an intermediate
space between the First Cause and humanity. Therefore, the Monarch may
play the role of Intelligence, since his function is to rule over the things that
are beneath him. It is in this respect that Dante describes the Emperor as the
universal cause of the right political order. When humanity is guided by the
Monarch and becomes a unitedwhole, it may resemble its cause, which is God.
The notions of potentia and virtus apply to the constitution of the human
soul’s nature. Thus, they form the basis of Dante’s argument to construct and
consolidate the identity of temporal government in Book I. In Book III, these
concepts affirm a relative autonomy of monarchy as a political institution in
relation to the authority and power of the papacy.
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chapter 17
Notes on the Presence of the Elements of Theology




This short essay is intended to partly discuss how Proclus’Elements of Theology
radically shaped Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on the Philebus. Without enter-
ing into the debate about the latter’s significant influence over Ficino’s ‘original’
philosophical works,1 it shall present certain corresponding passages between
the Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus. Moreover, apart
from the effort to unearth philological or doctrinal affinities between these
texts, there is an ongoing scholarly discussion, on which I shall not focus here,
about Ficino’s translation of the Elements of Theology.2 Although it does not
aspire to be exhaustive, this essay serves, however, three objectives: first, it
startswith certain introductory remarks that bring out Ficino’s reception of the
Philebus and the context of his preoccupation with this late platonic dialogue;
second, it proceeds with a comparison of selected passages of the Elements of
Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus on a purely textual and philolo-
gical basis, henceMoerbeke’s Latin translation was preferred to Proclus’ Greek
text; finally, it attempts to concisely offer some suggestions concerning the
philosophical significance of some of the affinities and discrepancies between
the excerpts under comparison.
* This text has been written within the framework of the project Axiomatic-deductive method
and more geometrico presentation in Proclus, which is carried out by Jan Opsomer and Pieter
d’Hoine and funded by KU Leuven, Internal Research Funds. I wish to express my most sin-
cere thanks to Professor Dragos Calma for his unsurpassed support and guidance, to my PhD
supervisors, Pieter d’Hoine and Jan Opsomer, for their trust and encouragement, as well as
to deeply thank for their incessant help and valuable feedback Professors George Steiris,
Thomas Leinkauf, Jacomien Prins, Denis Robichaud, Valery Rees, Paul Kalligas, Voula Tsouna,
Ineke Sluiter and Bert van den Berg.
1 See Allen’s crucial remarks in Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 2, 11–12.
2 Robichaud 2016, p. 50, 54.
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2 The Philebus’ Significance for Ficino
Except for translating and successively commenting on the Philebus (in 1466–
1467 according to Steel3 or in 14694 according to Allen, and also in 1491 and
1492 for its second and third version respectively), Ficino also lectured on it
publicly, these lectures providing the basis for the Commentary on the Phile-
bus,5 serving as an introduction to Platonism6 and even aiming to uplift the
moral and political status of his fellow Florentines. The fact that Ficino resorts
to the Philebus (a radically unpolitical dialogue) for ‘political’ purposes allows
us to better conceive of the intellectual and philosophical challenges he faced,
since it sheds further light on his endorsement of a ‘medical model’ for philo-
sophy and provides us with a fuller picture of how the enterprise of reviving
Platonism came to be the historical role and task Ficino invented for himself.7
However, all this vivid interest in an unquestionably abstruse dialogue is not
understandable by itself, but if one considers the continuous commentary tra-
dition preceding it. Contrary to what is currently the case, since the Philebus “if
it is studied at all, it is reserved for the arcane discussions of graduate seminars
or for specialists in late Platonic philosophy”,8 the Neoplatonic tradition held it
in high esteem. One may discern here two fundamental aspects.
a) Given that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics enjoyed wide acceptance and
dominated the philosophical milieu, in his Commentary on the Philebus,
Ficino made good use of Damascius’ In Philebum9 and explicitly argued
for a pleasure in ipso cognitionis actu,10 whereby he enriched Plato’s
replenishment model11 and gave a thorough account of the way in which
the reversion towards theOne (that is, theGood andGod), which satisfies
our God-oriented appetitus, can be fully rewarding and pleasurable.
b) While in the RepublicPlato hesitantly offered his readers a rather reserved
account of the Good and Socrates restricted himself to certain cryptic
and insufficiently illuminating formulations, the Philebuswas thought by
Neoplatonism as much more promising in this respect.12 The three ‘fea-
3 Steel 2013, p. 69.
4 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 52.
5 Hankins 1990, p. 484.
6 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p 1.
7 Hankins 1990, p. 288.
8 Frede 1993, p. xiii.
9 In Damascius, Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon, p. clxxxvi.
10 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 327.
11 Gerd Van Riel 2000, p. 2, 7–42.
12 Gerd Van Riel 1997, p. 31–32.
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tures’ of the Good, introduced in 20d (translated by Ficino as sufficiens,
expetendeum, perfectum) along with the unity of beauty, proportion and
truth (65a) that secures the stability of the final mixture of the good life
are all interpreted in connectionwith theChristianGod.13 Ficinowas thus
in position to reconstruct a robust platonic theory of the Good, much
more convincing and detailed than that in the Republic,14 and then subtly
Christianize it in order to publicly argue for it in Florence. On top of that,
he sawadecisive complementarity between the Philebus and the Parmen-
ides, for the identification of the human good in the former15 depends,
according to him, on the specification of the One or the Absolute Good
in the latter.16
3 Elements of Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus: Existing
Evidence and New Suggestions
In one of his impressive contributions, Carlos Steelmasterfully established that
in articulating this metaphysical system, Ficino systematically draws from Pro-
clus’ Elements of Theology (and from his Parmenides Commentary, to which I
shall not focus here).The evidencehe adduces is overwhelming andproves that
Ficino literally uses numerous and lengthy passages from the Elements of Theo-
logy.17 The following annexes include some passages that seem to have been
equally inspired by the Elements of Theology. That their degree of correspond-
ence with the latter significantly varies (from passages taken almost literally to
freely adapted or slightly modified ones) shall not make us underestimate the
extent to which the most principal philosophical starting points of the Com-
mentary on the Philebus are of a Proclian origin.
13 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 283–297, l. 355–369.
14 The idea that the Philebus adduces further arguments concerning the nature of the Good
and thereby continues the relevant discussion of the Republicmay also explain why Plato
reintroduces Socrates in the Philebus; it seemsmoreplausible that Socrates is back inorder
to accompany us ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις (64c) and not just because of the
dialogue’s moral character. Cf. Delcomminette 2006, p. 12–13.
15 Robichaud 2018, p. 170.
16 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, ch. VI (p. 113), ch. I of the second book (p. 387–
389).
17 Steel 2013, p. 73–74, 95–97. Explicitmention ismade of prop. 1–4, 5, 20 for chapter IV, prop.




Proclus, Elements of Theology (ed.
H. Boese)
Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on the
Philebus (ed. Allen)
80. Omne corpus pati secundum se
natum est, omne autem incorporeum
agere, hoc quidem operosum ens secun-
dum se, hoc autem passionale; patitur
autem et incorporeum propter commu-
nionem ad corpus, ut possunt agere et
corpora propter incorporeorum coexist-
entiam.
Corpus quidem enim divisibile est solum
et hac passibile, omniquaque ens part-
ibile et omniquaque in infinitum. Incor-
poreum autem, simplex ens, impassibile
est. Neque dividi potest quod impartibile
neque alterari quod non compositum.
Aut igitur nihil erit activum aut incor-
poreum, siquidem corpus secundum
quod corpus non agit, ad dividi solum et
pati expositum. Quoniam et omne agens
potentiam habet activam, quare non
secundum quod corpus aget, sed secun-
dum potentiam agendi in ipso; inefficax
autem et impotens corpus secundum
se: participatione ergo potentie aget
quando agit. Quin immo et incorporea
passionibus participant in corporibus
facta, condivisa corporibus et assumentia
partibilem illorum naturam, impartibilia
existentia secundum sui ipsorum sub-
stantiam.
43. Omne quod ad se ipsum conversivum
est authypostatum est.
IV, p. 101. Id totum sic ab initio con-
firmatur. Cum corpus ex materia constet
et quantitatem ratione materiae solum
capiat, et ratione quantitatis solum
dividatur, sequitur ut per haec pati possit
non agere. Siquidem ergo agere viden-
tur corpora, per aliud agunt, forte per
qualitatem quae ex se est incorporea,
cum plurimae sint eodem in corpore
qualitates. Sed neque qualitas est per se
principium actionis; quod enim non est
per se, per se non agit.
Eundum igitur est ad incorporale aliquid
quod per se subsistat neque cum corpore
sit divisum, talisque erit anima, quae quia
ad se convertitur per se subsistit. Ab ea
the elements of theology in ficino’s commentary 395
(cont.)
Proclus, Elements of Theology (ed.
H. Boese)
Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on the
Philebus (ed. Allen)
186. Omnis anima est incorporea sub-
stantia et separabilis a corpore.
(…) Anima ergo neque corporea est sub-
stantia neque a corpore inseparabilis.
191. Omnis anima participabilis sub-
stantiam quidem eternalem habet,
operationem autem secundum tempus.
(…) Relinquitur ergo sic quidem etern-
alem esse animam omnem, sic autem
tempore participantem (…) Omnis ergo
anima substantiam quidem eternalem
habet, operationem autem secundum
tempus.
199. Omnis anima mundana periodis
utitur proprie vite et restitutionibus.
Si enim a tempore mensuratur et trans-
itive operatur et est hic proprius motus,
omne autem quod movetur et tempore
mensuratur, perpetuum ens, utitur peri-
odis et periodice revolvitur et restituitur
ab eisdem ad eadem, palam quod et
omnis anima mundana, motum habems
et operans secundum tempus, periodos
motuum habebit et restitutiones; (…)
inerit vis agendi corporibus, ergo et vis
movendi.
Omnis ergo actus et motus corporum
est ab anima, quae essentia incorpor-
alis est, unita corpori non commixta,
coniuncta non dispersa. Supra quam
est et mens, et essentia incorporalis et
a corpore penitus separata. Ideo nihil
habet commune cum corpore. Illa stat
essentia et operatione; corpus utroque
fluit; anima essentia stat, operatione
fluit. Illa omnino in aeternitate; cor-
pus in tempore; anima in utroque. Illa
movet non movetur; materia movetur
non movet; corpus movet ab alio motum;
anima movet a se mota. Ergo et mens et
materia sunt extrema; media vero cor-
pus et anima. Hoc ad materiam declinat
magis; anima magis ad mentem. Cum
dicimus animam se ipsa moveri, absolute
non transitive verbum illud proferimus,
ut cum stare mentem, lucere solem,
calere ignem. Non enim pars animae
movet pars movetur, sed tota ex se ipsa
movetur, id est, discurrit, transigit per
temporum intervalla nutritionis aug-
menti generationis opera, rationis et
cogitationis discursiones. Agit mens sed
cum aeternitate; agit anima sed cum
tempore. Quid motus animae? Actio cum
tempore, et quia prima actio cum tem-
pore est in anima, ideo primus motus in
anima et est in ea ratione sui in quantum
iam a statu mentis degenerat.
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Ficino’s digression (id totum … mentis degenerat) interrupts the direct quo-
tation of prop. 20 of the Elements of Theology (on p. 99 of the edition).18 Here,
as we can see, he implements another strategy, gathering and unifyingmaterial
and insights from scatteredProclian passages in the Elements of Theology. Thus,
he restates the successive ontological levels explaining how passivity, matter,
corporeality, divisibility and quantity impede action. Though his exposition is
compatible with the Elements of Theology, we should note Ficino’s high sens-
itivity and accuracy when describing the connection of the incorporeal soul
with the body. So as not to jeopardize the former’s superiority, he cautiously
avoids Proclus’ risky formulation, according to which an incorporeal being can
assume partibilem naturam (prop. 80) but also remain impartibile secundum
sui substantiam. From a doctrinal point of view, his argument is much more
safeguarded and moderate: the soul’s essence is not threatened as long as the
soul is not mixed with or dispersed through the body. In fact, it runs counter
to Proclus’ term condivisa (συνδιαιρούμενα), which implies that the incorporeal
and the corporeal are unified and forma certain kind of ‘mixture’. Ficino argues
here for a more clear-cut distinction and his very emphasis on the fact that the
soul is non commixtawith and non dispersa through the body reveals his alert-
ness to properly modify and even reject Proclus’ formulations.
II)
8. (…) Quod enim appetit aliquid indi-
gens est eo quod appetit et alterum ab
appetibili (…)
9. (…) Si enim omnia entia bonum
appetunt secundum naturam, et hoc
quidem se ipso exhibitiuum est eius
quod bene, hoc autem indigens alio, hoc
quidem presentem habet boni causam,
hoc autem seorsum existentem, quanto
igitur propinquius hoc largienti appet-
ibile, tanto melius utique erit eo quod
est indigens separata causa et aliunde
suscipiente perfectionem existentie aut
operationis.
II, p. 83. Appetitus enim naturalis
est necessaria naturae inclinatio ab
indigentia quadam adnitens ad plen-
itudinem. Plenitudo ac finis ultimus
idem (…) [p. 85] Adde quod appetitio
finis cuiusdam in rebus aut casu est aut
usu aut natura (…) Ergo natura; etenim
quod inest omnibus et semper a specie
est atque natura, ergo ab eo quod est
naturae et speciei principium, id est
Deus. (…) Ergo [appetitus] ultimum
consequitur finem. Non enim frustra
praecipit et movet rex sapiens atque
bonus, Deus autem per appetitum
18 Steel 2013, p. 95–97. He continues the quotation of prop. 20 on p. 103 until the end of the
chapter.
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35. (…) Si autemmaneat quidem et pro-
cedat, non convertatur autem, quomodo
qui secundum naturam appetitus unius-
cuiusque ad id quod bene et ad bonum et
que ad generans extensio?
134. (…) Et enim ad que intellectuale
idioma (vel proprietas) non procedit, ad
hec preattingit quod divinum. Et enim
non intelligentia provideri volunt et
boni alicuius sortiri; hoc autem quia
intellectum quidem non omnia appet-
unt neque quibus participare possibile,
bonum autem omnia appetunt et festin-
ant sortiri.
31. Omne procedens ab aliquo secun-
dum essentiam convertitur ad illud a quo
procedit.
Si enim proveniat quidem, non conver-
tatur autem ad causam processus huius,
non utique appetet causam; omne enim
appetens conversum est ad appetibile. At
vero omne appetit bonum, et illius ordo
per proximam causam singulis; appet-
unt ergo et suam causam singula. Per
quod enim esse unicuique, per hoc et
ipsum bene; per quod autem ipsum bene,
ad hoc appetitus primo; ad quod autem
primo appetitus, ad hoc conversio.
concitat omnia. [XXXI, p. 311] Sic vol-
untas necessario vult bonum agendi
principium instinctu superiori. Trahit
enim ad se omnia principium rerum;
id autem bonum est. Necessario igitur
omnia bonum appetunt.
XXXIII, p. 333.Quia omnia bonum appe-
tunt, mentem vero non omnia. Neque
enim assequi mentem et sapientiam
omnia possunt. Ideo multa eam frustra
appeterent. Et ea quae mente carent non
omnia mentem adipisci [p. 335] student.
Quae vero mentem habent nondum cess-
ant, sed adhuc bonum quaerunt (…)
Primo sic omnia appetendo convertun-
tur ad bonum, non admentem omnia
(…) Secundo sic appetitus hominum
naturalis omnis et semper ad bonum,
non omnis et semper admentem; pluris
ergo facit bonum quammentem.
XXX, p. 295. Deinde ratione sic, quia con-
vertit [bonum] in se statim nascentium
appetitus. Unumquodque enim bene
esse desiderat. Bene esse habet unde
et esse. Ad causam ergo convertitur.
Etenim suo in esse servari quodcum-
que appetit. Conservat esse quod esse
dat. (…) Eiusdem igitur conservare
est, cuius et generare. Effectus igitur
causam appetit conservantem. Ipsum
ergo bonum, cum sit omnium causa, est
omnibus expetendum.
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“From God to God”—here is how one could summarize the philosophical
core of the above passages. Indeed, the appetitus, which impels us to turn back
to our cause and thus finally gain felicity and pleasure, is described by Ficino as
totally manipulated by God, that is, the principle of nature.19 ‘Preprogrammed’,
as it were, this reversion shall culminate in our possession of Him, which sig-
nifies the accomplishment of a circular movement on our part as well as three
interwoven kinds of perfection: our ontological perfection, forwenow ‘possess’
or are identified with the highest possible ontological level; our ethical perfec-
tion, for it would be inconsistent to ‘possess’ the absolute Good without being
in an ethically equally good state; our epistemological perfection, since God or
the absolute Good is the highest possible object of cognition, the limit, as it
were, of what we may aspire to know. The above excerpts could also be taken
to constitute a brief summary of the whole Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on
the Philebus in that they include all its crucial conceptual tools and anticipate
Ficino’s conceptualizationof felicity and, by extension, of pleasure.He suggests
a worldview, wherein felicity is somehow ‘obligatory’ and ‘imposed’ by our very
nature, since the latter represents and executes a divine plan that excludes no
one. Additionally, one can easily discern how skillfully Ficino blends ethics and
metaphysics. Since “natura” is informed by God’s will, the modern distinction
between a normatively neutral and merely descriptive realm that belongs to
nature and another that includesmoral and value considerations is still unten-
able. The Commentary on the Philebus exemplifies the idea that the way things
“are” is already instilled with the seed of how they “ought to be”. In this respect,
the attainment of felicity is dependent onour eagerness to facilitate thedeploy-
ment of our nature.
III)
21. (…) Quod enim in omni multitudine
idem non ab uno eorum que in multi-
tudine processum habet. Quod enim ab
uno solo multorum non est commune
omnium, sed solius proprietatis illius
singulare. (…) Est ergo unitas una ante
multitudinem secundum unum-
IV, p. 95.Omnia corpora ad unum
mundi corpus; omnes naturae ad nat-
uram unam; omnes animae ad unam
animam; omnes mentes ad unam
mentem. Bonum vero et unum unum-
quodque istorum est, ergo omnia bona et
una ad unum bonum, sicut numeri
19 Marsilio Ficino, The Philebus Commentary, p. 85.
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quemque ordinem, unam rationem et
connexionem exhibens hiis que in ipso
ordinantur ad invicem et ad totum. (…)
Ex hiis itaque manifestum, quod nature
corporis inest unum et multitudo, et
una natura multas habet copulatas, et
multe nature ex una sunt totius natura;
et ordini animarum adest ordiri ex una
anima prima et in multitudinem ani-
marum devenire et multitudinem in
unam reducere; et intellectuali essentie
monadem esse intellectualem et intel-
lectuummultitudo ex uno intellectu
procedens et in illam conversa; et uni
ei quod ante omnia multitudinem unit-
atum, et unitatibus eam que ad unum
extensionem.
omnes ad unitatem. Unum ergo omnium
est principium.
Omnis enim ordo quia in se habet uni-
onem in quantum singula eiusdem sunt
ordinis ab uno est supra ordinem. Nam
unio ordinis non ab uno quodam ordinis
est, esset enim illius proprium neque
omnibus conveniret. Ergo ab uno supra
ordinem quod est primo tale, ideo [p. 97]
nihil aliud est quam tale, ut bonorum
principium sit solum bonum;
IV)
143. Omnia deteriora presentia deorum
subsistunt; et si idoneum sit participans,
omne quidem quod alienum a divino
lumine fit, illustratur autem omne subito
a diis.
Semper quidem enim divina magis com-
prehensiva et potentiora sunt proceden-
tibus ab ipsis, participantium autem
idoneitas illustrationis divini luminis
causa fit; obscurat enim illam sua imbe-
cillitate. Illa autem obscurata aliud
aliquid videtur preeminentiam tran-
sumere, non secundum ipsius potentiam,
sed secundum participantis impoten-
tiam diffugere putantis speciem divinam
illustrationis.
IV, p. 111. Praeparata autem esse opor-
tet omnia ad gratiam divini fulgoris
excipiendam.
XXXI, p. 299. Quid ergo in rebus aliis
bonum? Huius, inquam, pro captu
cuiusque imago. Omnia sequentia
lumina primi luminis imagines sunt, a
primo lumine dependentes.
See also: Ideo corpora in quibus terrea
conditio praevalet, tanquam ineptis-
sima luci, lumen nullum intus accipiunt.
Non quia sit impotens lumen ad pen-
etrandum. (De sole, ch. 9).
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1) One pinpoints here: a) the idea that the divine light stems from a caring,
ontologically superior, principle spreading itself top-down, in order to
illuminate what stands in a lower level of reality and is in need of illumin-
ation. In order to Christianize this picture, Ficino intentionally complic-
ates this procedure by arguingnot just for the divine light, but for its grace,
through which he underlines the ‘personal’ commitment of the higher
principle to the salvationof the lower levels of reality, b) the responsibility
of the ontologically inferior beings to be light-friendly and vigilant, that
is, to develop a certain readiness and prepare themselves for its reception.
As for the latter, it depends on a robust sense of potency, while an equally
uncompromising disapproval of impotence is advocated in both texts.
2) The relation between the higher level, wherein God and the divine light
are to be situated, and the various lower ones, is depicted by Proclus in
terms of participation, while Ficino resorts rather to the notions of imago
and dependence; what is needed is the highest possible light receptivity,
which varies pro captu of each being to attain the image of the Good.
However differentmetaphors theymayuse, bothProclus andFicinomake
the case for a transformation ad optimum.
3) The verbs subsisto and excipiobear a remarkable expressive potential. The
first emphatically brings out how deteriora experience the gripping influ-
ence of the presence of gods, while the second underlines the challenge
confronted by the recipient when receiving the divine light. Both of them
can be taken to depict a certain backward movement, a subtle retreat.
In the first case, this movement underlines the ‘ethical distance’ or the
gap separating deteriora from gods. In the second case, it serves to bridge
the gap and is made only to facilitate the light’s reception; the recipient,
‘aware’, as it were, of the ontological superiority of what is going to be
provided with, subtly retreats in order to fully embrace the gift coming
from above.
4) One should not overlook here a crucial difference between Dodd’s and
Moerbeke’s text. The former’s accusative δοκοῦν (line 18) has as its sub-
ject the ἄλλο τι (line 15), while the latter’s genitive putantis (line 9) the
participantis (line 8). At first sight, this divergence does not touch upon
the light reception procedure, since regardless of whether the ἄλλο τι or
the participans (if we follow Moerbeke’s choice) has the appearance of
“revolting against the divine form of illumination”, as Dodds translates,
the result remains the same: the divine light does not “assume domin-
ion”. These alternatives, however, do result in a radically different philo-
sophical picture. If it is this ἄλλο τι that has the appearance of “revolt-
ing against the divine form of illumination”, then the emphasis is put
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rather on the obstacles and the external enemies confronted by the parti-
cipant;what is underlined in this case is that a certain seemingly powerful
being or entity, an anonymous factor, impedes the divine light’s down-
wardmovement,while in reality theproblem lies in the recipient’s incom-
petence and overall ontological disablement. If, on the other hand, it is
the participant that has the appearance of “revolting against the divine
form of illumination”, as Moerbeke’s translation indicates, then the over-
all impression bears certain quasi-religious and sin-related connotations
in that the resistance to the divine light implies that the recipient of the
divine gift forcefully rejects it. Our attention is thus turned from its defi-
ciency to a certain sense of distorted conversion, since the participant
turns towards its cause not in order to thankfully embrace it, but aim-
ing only to reject it. In this case, therefore, the participant is described
not only as predominantly responsible for its overall condition, but is also
charged for light-resistance and an ‘intentional’ ontological stagnation.
V)
26. (…) At vero ipsum unum immobiliter
substituit. Si enim per motum, motus in
ipso esset et motum neque unum adhuc
erit, transmutatum ex eo quod unum.
Aut si post ipsum sit motus, et ex uno
erit et aut in infinitum aut immobiliter
producet ipsum unum. (…)
27 (…)Manet enim quale est, et quod
producitur aliud penes ipsum est. Inal-
teratum ergo generans consistit et
inminoratum, fecunda potentia se
ipsummultiplicans et a se ipso secun-
das ypostases exhibens.
XXX, p. 293. Primum sic ostenditur
[sufficiens], quod scilicet immobile per-
manens creat. Nam si per motum, aut
motus ille in eo est, aut extra. Si in eo,
ipsummutatum esset ab uno et bono,
ergo quodammodo ab uno et bono
discederet, debilitaretur igitur. Maxime
vero potens apparet aliquid, cum aliud
efficit (…) Sin extra sit, ergo motus ab
eo productus utrum per motum an sine
motu? Si primum, in infinitum ibitur.
Si secundum, constat quodmanens
immobilis generat. Immo vero cum
omnis motus impetus sit ad aliquid quod
deest, deest aliquid primo si movetur.
(…) Quare cum nulla sui transmutatione
producat, stans in se ipso creat. Non
ergo defectu proprio extrinsecus aliquid
quaerens ad agendum exit, [p. 295] sed
exuberante foecunditate se propagat.
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The terminological and philosophical continuity between the Elements of
Theology and the Commentary on the Philebus is again easily identifiable.
Ficino’s philosophical intention is to show that the deployment of God’s cre-
ative potential does not require any kind of movement. Since the adjective
sufficiens comes from Plato’s Philebus (ἱκανὸν in 20d), where it is attributed
to the good within a radically different context, Proclus is probably the pagan
mediator and authority that facilitates this (unacknowledged) transition. Also,
it is noteworthy that Ficino’s scope is, as usually, much more restricted than
that of Proclus. The former argues for certain ‘features’ of one specific entity,
that is, the Christian God, while the latter aims for universality, for the relevant
propositions start with omnis causa productiva and omne producens respect-
ively.
4 Conclusion
Dedicated to the relation between the Elements of Theology and the Comment-
ary on the Philebus, this short essay suggested some similarities and parallel
motifs between these texts. The above annexes suffice to prove Ficino’s peculiar
creativity; they indicate that he does not simply reproduce ideas and texts, but
takes pains to substantially rephrase (and even contradict) his sources or, when
borrowing a whole proposition or a lengthy passage, to reorder the structure of
the argument.They alsobringout the fact that almost all of the crucial concepts
grounding the Commentary on the Philebus are expounded in Proclian terms.
What is most important, however, is to acknowledge how skillfully he exploits
the potential of pagan arguments in order to promote Christian insights and
ponder over Ficino’s reasons for resorting so systematically to Proclus. Part of
the answer may reside in his understanding that Proclus’ writing, with all its
impressive sense of impersonal authority and irrefutability resulting from its
geometric model of presentation, accorded his Commentary on the Philebus
the majestic and persuasive tone that was indispensable for his philosophical
endeavor. In grounding the whole commentary on Proclus’ axiomatic formu-
lations (and not so much as one might expect on Dionysius’ attractive, but
suspicion-arousing, eloquence), Ficino provided his audiencewith a seemingly
unquestionable and solid system of thought that, despite its pagan character,
could easily be presented as the basis of a Christian worldview.
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chapter 18
Hillel de Vérone, traducteur et annotateur du Livre
des causes en hébreu, en Italie à la fin du xiiie
siècle
Jean-Pierre Rothschild
cnrs, irht-PSL, École pratique des hautes études, Paris
Le Liberde causis connut unnotable succès enhébreu, en Italie, entre le dernier
quart du xiiie siècle et le premier quart du xive siècle. Sur la base de la traduc-
tion de l’arabe en latin par Gérard de Crémone (entre 1167 et 1187) il fut traduit
1) parHillel deVérone, après 1272 ; 2) par JudaRomanopendant le premier quart
du xive siècle ; 3) par ‘Eli Ḥabilio ( fl. ca. 1470) ; en outre il l’ avait été, à partir de
l’arabe, par l’Espagnol Zeraḥiyah Ḥen, en Italie encore, dans les années 1280 ;
enfin, le manuscrit de Paris, BN(F), hébreu 706 contient une autre traduction,
anonyme, indépendante des précédentes, limitée aux «théorèmes» sans les
«démonstrations» ou développements.
Les raisons de ce succès sont malaisées à assigner au-delà de la simple vrai-
semblance : l’ existence de quelques cercles désireux et en mesure d’accéder
à des textes scolastiques latins ; l’ intérêt privilégié, dans ces cercles, pour la
traduction de textes à succès de la scolastique chrétienne, surtout lorsqu’ ils
étaient brefs et pouvaient prendre la forme d’un catéchisme; l’émulation à
l’ intérieur d’un même milieu puis, peut-être, dans le cas de Ḥabilio, le désir
de se poser comme le spécialiste du domaine en substituant ses traductions à
celles qui existaient, ou de se faire leur réviseur puriste à la manière des nou-
veaux traducteurs humanistes ; l’ intérêt particulier de disposer d’un cadre de
pensée ou d’une autorité pour se représenter les relations des hautes entités de
lamétaphysique, comblant ainsi un vide laissé par Aristote, et en accord avec le
monothéisme1 ; l’ intérêt pour une doctrine qui pouvait résonner à la fois avec
1 Cf. D’Ancona 1992a [D’Ancona 1995, p. 217] : « les thèses incontestablement néoplatoniciennes
des lemmes ont été conçues par ces auteurs comme étant le véritable sommet de lamétaphy-
sique d’Aristote […] une continuité réelle subsiste [à leurs yeux] entre la métaphysique aris-
totélicienne et ce qui était envisagé comme sondernier achèvement : la doctrine des premiers
principes et des substances séparées présentée dans le De causis […] On a déjà remarqué que
le sujet lui-même du traité De causis a été soudé au principe fondamental de l’épistémologie
aristotélicienne, la définition de la connaissance véritable comme connaissance des causes» ;
et toute la suite de l’article montre comment les premiers commentateurs latins ont iden-
tifié dans la doctrine des éléments aristotéliciens. D’Ancona 1992b [D’Ancona 1995, p. 239] :
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les formules et les représentations spontanées de la piété la plus traditionnelle
(la Cause première plus présente et agissante que les causes prochaines de la
proposition 1 évoque irrésistiblement le «Notre Père, notre Roi», très proche et
très lointain tout ensemble, de la liturgie des Jours redoutables aussi bien que
toute la problématique de la providence générale ou particulière) et s’accorder,
dans des milieux plus savants, avec les métaphores de l’épanchement dont
Maïmonide, fort cultivé dans le premier milieu italien de ces traductions2, est
prodigue ; ces métaphores sont familières aussi aux auteurs kabbalistes (l’un
d’eux, AbrahamAbulafia, fut un élève de Hillel de Vérone) et le Liber de causis,
enmême temps que cette convergence, pouvait apporter de quoi échapper aux
risques de polythéisme ou dumoins d’atteinte à l’unité et à la toute-puissance
divine que pouvait comporter leur doctrine aumoins aux yeux des philosophes
de formation3. Un annotateur critique des extraits traduits par Juda Romano
du commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin au Liber de causis, Moïse b. Sabbataï (fl.
v. 1340), utilise d’abondance le Liber pour combattre la théorie des sefirot, tant
dans sa version ancienne que dans la nouvelle, introduite par Menahem de
Recanati4.
Ces motifs de vraisemblance ou ces justifications a posteriori gagneront à
être éclairés par les éléments de commentaire, gloses et notes, introduits selon
toute vraisemblance par l’un des traducteurs, Hillel de Vérone, dans l’unique
manuscrit de sa propre traduction partielle. Déjà partiellement éditées5, ces
notes n’ont jamais été analysées. Nous les (ré)éditons en fin d’article, à partir
dumanuscrit unique, et nous en donnons pour la première fois une traduction
et un commentaire.
«Les progrès des recherches démontrent en effet que, lorsque des interprètes médiévaux,
tels Albert le Grand ou Gilles de Rome, conçoivent ce traité comme un «quinzième livre» à
rattacher à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, ils sont moins naïfs qu’on pourrait le croire sans une
analyse détaillée de la doctrine du Liber de causis. Résultat du projet entamé par l’hellénisme
arabe naissant, cet ouvrage se présente en effet aux lecteurs du xiiie siècle comme un traité
de théologie philosophique admentemAristotelis, qui reconnaît un seul Dieu créateur et pro-
vident, et présente une version de la doctrine néoplatonicienne du premier principe qui était
déjà familière, dès la tradition des œuvres de Denys».
2 Sur lequel voir l’article toujours fondamental de Sermoneta (1965).
3 Ces motivations possibles ont déjà été énumérées dans Rothschild 2013b ; Rothschild 2015,
p. 29-30.
4 V. Rothschild 2018, p. 10-15, p. 136-163 et, pour le texte hébreu correspondant, p. 199-221.
5 Par Moritz Steinschneider dans Hillel de Vérone, Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš, éd. S.Z.H. Halbers-
tamm, f. אמ rv, qui indique en tête qu’ il ne s’agit que de notes prises autrefois en vue de son
ouvrage sur les traducteurs, qu’ il n’avait pas l’ intention de publier et qui auraient mérité
d’être vérifiées sur le manuscrit.
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1) Le ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Michael 335 [(olim 82) = catalogue Neu-
bauer 13186, f. 75-81v (le commentaire s’étend jusqu’au f. 827) (I.M.M.H. 22132)]
est l’unique témoin d’une traduction en hébreu, partielle et commentée, du
Livre des causes. L’écriture, de style ashkenaze, serait datable au milieu du xve
s.8, mais l’attribution des notes critiques à un certain Hillel a fait attribuer le
tout à Hillel de Vérone, actif en Italie vers la fin du xiiie s. : ainsi, en dépit du
caractère de copie de travail de ce manuscrit à la présentation très modeste et
peu soignée, est-on loin d’avoir affaire à un autographe. Le recueil, dû à diffé-
rentesmains dumilieu du xve s.9, se caractérise par la forte présence d’écrits de
logique (f. 1-35, 43-45, 55-62) ou de recueils de définitions (Livre des définitions
d’ Isaac Israéli, f. 45v-54 ; lexique, f. 63-66 ; à partir du Liber de causis, il s’agit
davantage d’ouvrages philosophiques ou exégétiques (f. 82-85v : petit traité de
l’âme, anonyme, et notes de psychologie discontinues ; f. 87-101, Kalonymos b.
Kalonymos, Le Serviteur deMoïse (MešarethMošeh), défense de la théorie maï-
monidienne de la providence ; f. 102-107, Abraham bar Hiyya, Pensée de l’âme
(Higgayon ha-nefeš), traité de morale philosophique ; f. 108-122, Abraham Ibn
Ezra, Livre du Nom (Sefer ha-Šem) et commentaire du même).
2) La structure du texte est la suivante : le traducteur distingue, dans son pro-
logue, puis le copiste sépare physiquement dans la copie, les propositions (haq-
damot) et leur «commentaire» (peyruš), distingué des propositions par un
passage à la ligne et la mention : « le commentateur dit» (amar ha-mefareš). La
traduction est incomplète car il manque certains «commentaires», ou déve-
loppements10, omis ou abrégés, explicitement ou non, presque systématique-
ment à partir de la prop. 2011. Les propositions, initialement non numérotées,
sont au nombre de trente et une. Une main moderne les a numérotées en
chiffres hébreux, jusqu’à trente-deux, en comptant pour deux (4-5) la qua-
trième proposition, non scindée dans le texte, et en comptant la proposition
8(9) bien qu’elle soit réduite à presque rien (§80 de l’éd. Pattin) et ajoutée sans
6 Neubauer 1886, col. 465-467 ; description du contenu plus complète dans le catalogue en
ligne de l’ Institute of Microfilms of HebrewManuscripts de Jérusalem.
7 D’après Zonta 1996, p. 228, n. 12, le texte se termine à 85v,mais il semble bien s’agir d’autre
chose dès le f. 82 ; nous suivons la foliotation inscrite sur le manuscrit.
8 May, Beit-Arié 1994, p. 219.
9 May, Beit-Arié 1994, p. 219.
10 Que nous appellerons désormais «développements», pour éviter la confusion avec les
commentaires latins allégués et les commentaires mêmes de Hillel, que nous nomme-
rons, pour la même raison, de préférence, «notes».
11 Manquent les développements des prop. 9, 12, 16, 20-23, 28-31, ceux des prop. 25-27 et 32
sont fortement abrégés.
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solution de continuité à la fin de la proposition 7(8) (en l’absence de proximité
particulière entre elles, cette réduction de la prop. 8(9) ne paraît pas résulter
d’un principe délibéré [comme il arrive pour l’omission de développements
que Hillel déclare oiseux] mais de quelque accident textuel) ; les prop. 9(10) à
13(14) ont reçu les numéros 10, 12, 24, 11 et 13, le nº 24 étant placé entre les numé-
ros 23 et 25. Le traducteur ou quelque intervenant insère des gloses copiées
à l’ intérieur du texte sans discontinuité12 ; des notes critiques figurent à par-
tir de la prop. 6(7), introduites par les mots : «Hillel dit» (amar Hillel), dans
l’espace du texte copié. Il n’est pas sûr qu’on doive attribuer aumême interve-
nant deux notes critiques regardant la prop. 1 et deux notes explicatives portant
respectivement sur des points du texte des propositions 2 et 3 : elles se trouvent
en effet en marge, quoique d’une main qui ne distingue pas à première vue
de celle du copiste principal, et elles ne sont pas introduites par amar Hillel
mais par des formules courantes pour des interventions de cette nature, tey-
mah («c’est étonnant») et qašiyah (« il y a là une difficulté») pour les deux
objections, peyruš («explication») pour les deux explications. En outre, à la
prop. 4, trois fois (§§45, 49, 53) et à la prop. 6(7), §70, la mention dans le texte
ou enmarge d’autres leçons ( א׳׳ג , ׳יג = ]תרחא[הסריג , ou en araméen ארחאאסרג ,
«[autre] leçon») suppose une révision, apparemment limitée à cette proposi-
tion, qu’on n’a pas de raison d’attribuer à un autre que le premier traducteur.
Enfin il fautnoter que le texteprend fin, aprèsune longuenote sur la prop. 32, au
milieu du f. 82r, immédiatement suivi d’un petit traité de l’âme ou d’une suite
de notes discontinues à dominante psychologique dont la première a trait à la
perfection de l’âme13, qui s’étendent jusqu’au f. 85, où apparaissent les noms
de Maïmonide et d’Aristote et, cités par «Hillel», des titres de recueils midra-
12 Elles figurent entre accolades dans l’édition de la traduction elle-même, Rothschild 2013c.
13 Inc. רמאנהחכהומכוניאןאכבחכההזו,חכבוהמכחב:םינינעינשבהלועשפנהתומלש
ןיחבתו׳תיהארובתאריכת]…[המכחה,תובוטתודמחכאוהלבאעבטהותואופרהירפסב
רקשהותמאהןיב , «La perfection de l’âme consiste en deux choses : la science et la puis-
sance ; mais la puissance dont on parle ici n’est pas comme celle dont il est question dans
les livres de médecine et de [science] naturelle», etc. ; ce début paraît sur quelques lignes
comme une paraphrase de la Logique d’al-Ghazzâlî (nous citons la traduction latine de
Dominicus Gundissalinus : Logica et philosophia, f. a2v : Perfectio anime constat in duo-
bus :munditia scilicet et ornatu.Munditia vero anime est vt expurgetur a sordidibusmoribus
et suspendatur a phantasiis turpibus. Ornatus vero eius est ut depingatur in ea certitudo
veritatis ita ut reuelentur ei veritates diuine […] in qua non fit error nec occultatio) mais la
suite diverge. – L’ensemble de ce texte a été publié sans annotation par Steinschneider
dans Halberstamm, éd. cit., à la suite immédiate de ses notes sur la traduction anno-
tée du Liber de causis, f. אמ v- במ v, à partir, semble-t-il, d’une transcription faite par un
autre.
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chiques, avec une note Amar R. Ellul (f. 83v) dans laquelle Steinschneider a cru
voir une confusion italienne avec le nom de Hillel et une note Amar Hillel au
f. 84.
3) Il est temps de considérer de plus près la question de l’auteur de la tra-
duction, des gloses et des notes : c’est Moritz Steinschneider qui paraît avoir
posé, sans s’en expliquer, l’ identité du traducteur, du commentateur et de Hil-
lel deVérone14, suivi sur ce point par Adolf Neubauer, l’ auteur du catalogue des
manuscrits hébreux de la Bibliothèque Bodléienne.
Il peut être utile d’argumenter quelque peu cette attribution. Le nom de Hillel
(une fois,Hillel b. Samuel, identité dupatronymequi a sans doute servi à fonder
l’attribution) n’apparaît qu’en tête du commentaire critique des propositions,
à partir de la prop. 7, f. 77r jusqu’à la fin. Le début des notes qui suivent les
prop. 715, 15 (numérotée 1416), 16 (nº 1517) renforce la probabilité que le glossa-
teur (en tout cas celui qui s’exprime sous le nom de Hillel) soit le même que
le traducteur : il indique n’avoir pas «écrit» (lo’ kathabhti) certains éléments
du développement originel des propositions qui lui semblaient inutiles ; tou-
tefois il reste possible que le glossateur n’ait seulement pas «copié», à partir
de la traduction hébraïque déjà existante et plus complète, les éléments dont
il parle. Nulle citation du De causis, explicite ou non, n’a été relevée par les
éditeurs du grand ouvrage de Hillel de Vérone, écrit à la fin de sa vie, les Rétri-
butions de l’âme (Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš)18 ; du moins peut-on faire valoir que
leur auteur utilise l’assez rare Sefer ha-hatḥalothd’al-Fārābī19, référence de pré-
dilection duHillel, glossateur duDe causis ; ensuite, que le glossateurmanifeste
un intérêt pour des implications doctrinales regardant la médecine, et que Hil-
lel est médecin (mais c’est le cas de bien des philosophes juifs). Au total, une
14 Steinschneider 1863, p. 110-114 (111), puis Steinschneider 1893 [1956] p. 262-263, renvoyant
à l’éd. Halberstamm, introd., p. 10 et extraits, f. אמ .
15 ןכלוםיכירציתלבםירתיםירבדבהנהךיראהשרפמהל׳׳קוצזלאומש׳רדיסחהןבללהרמא
םיתבתכאל . C’est la seule fois où apparaît le patronyme de ben Samuel, qui ne fournit
qu’une probabilité d’ identification avec l’auteur des Tagmuley ha-nefeš, une homonymie
étant toujours possible et ces noms, très courants.
16 ׳וכוםיתבתכאלןכלוםיבברועמםהשםירתיםירבדבהנהךיראהשרפמהללהרמא .
17 םיתבתכאלןכלוךרוצילבלךובנ]![אוההזבשוריפהירבדללהרמא .
18 Steinschneider en relevait une, qui militait selon lui en sens inverse, trouvant invraisem-
blable que Hillel ne se soit pas servi de sa propre traduction, si elle avait déjà été écrite ;
mais les éditeurs suivants, Sermoneta et Schwartz, n’ont dit mot de cette référence.
19 Hillel de Vérone, Sefer Tagmulé ha-nefesh (éd. Sermoneta), p. 240 et index des textes
allégués dans le commentaire, p. 268 ; Über die Vollendung der Seele, p. 301.
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constellation d’arguments faibles, pour et contre, mais en voici un bien plus
fort : l’ identité du traducteur avecHillel deVérone semble garantie par l’emploi
(prop. 1) d’un mot très rare, ṣidduq20, plusieurs fois employé dans les Rétribu-
tions de l’âme ; or si le traducteur lui-même est Hillel de Vérone, il n’est pas
raisonnable de supposer que leHillel glossateur soit un autre que lui ; d’ailleurs,
sans noter lemot ṣidduq, Steinschneider avait déjà relevé trois autres formes ou
acceptions rares, communes à la traduction ou aux gloses du De causis et aux
Tagmuley ha-nefeš21.
Récapitulation des arguments : pour l’attribution à Hillel de Vérone, 1) le fait
que très peu d’auteurs et moins encore de traducteurs se nomment Hillel et
sont médecins ; 2) l’usage, commun aux Tagmuley ha-nefeš de Hillel de Vérone
et aux gloses dont nous parlons, d’un texte rarement cité d’al-Fārābī ; 3) sur-
tout, des éléments caractéristiques de vocabulaire, en particulier lemot ṣidduq
que seul Hillel deVérone est connu pour employer ; contre cette attribution, un
argument unique, le fait que la traduction en question ne soit citée ni implici-
tement, ni explicitement, dans les tardives Rétributions (Tagmuley ha-nefeš),
mais cela peut s’expliquer de diverses façons, y compris par une traduction
encore plus tardive.
La question de l’attribution des notes peut cependant être posée à un autre
niveau : étant admis que Hillel de Vérone soit le plus vraisemblable rédacteur
des notes en hébreu qui accompagnent probablement sa propre traduction du
Liber de causis, a-t-il fait preuve d’originalité dans ces notes ou a-t-il seulement
traduit des éléments d’un commentaire latin? Steinschneider estimait qu’ il
s’agissait d’une traduction22. Notons seulement que nous verrons plus loin (5)
20 Le terme, rare, a quasiment la valeur d’une signature. Il se trouve quatre fois dans la
traduction anonyme de la prop. 1 (une fois glosé en marge רטילנוא]יטר[ , rationaliter),
Yosef Sermoneta l’a relevé deux fois dans les Tagmuley ha-nefeš et il se trouve encore,
dans le manuscrit d’Oxford (f. 82v), dans le texte Šelemuth ha-nefeš qui suit le De causis :
Rothschild 1994, p. 411 ; Hillel de Vérone, Sefer Tagmulé ha-nefesh (éd. Sermoneta), p. 248 ;
Steinschneider dans Hillel de Vérone, Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš (éd. Halberstamm), p. 23 et
f. בי , בכ et במ , l. 19 et 24.
21 Dans Hillel de Vérone, Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš (éd. Halberstamm), f. אמ , note : il s’agit de
selah employé comme adverbe signifiant l’éternité (glose de la prop. 11[12]), de eyneymo,
« ils ne sont pas» [avec suffixe archaïsant] (prop. 4) et de nolad pris au sens d’un «engen-
drement» de nature logique (longue note à la prop. 16(17), f. 79v, 80).
22 Hillel de Vérone, Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš (éd. Halberstamm), f. :אמ we-ʿad ha-yom loʾ
edaʿ mi huʾ ha-mefareš (ha-noṣri) ašer debarayw neʿetequ mi-R. Hillel, « jusqu’aujourd’hui
j’ ignore quel est le commentateur (chrétien) dont les propos ont été traduits par Hillel» ;
noter que le même (1893 ; 19562), p. 262, ne parle plus de traduction strictement dite : «Ich
glaube, Hillel hatte einen anonymen christlichen Commentar vor sich, und wahrschein-
lich den des Thomas d’Aquino, aus dem er eine frappante Parallele giebt» (donc, deux
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que la recherche, à laquelle Steinschneider lui-même avait déjà dû procéder,
de sources latines parmi les commentaires les plus répandus et à portée d’être
connus, en Italie, de juifs extérieurs à l’université donne des résultats très par-
tiels, pas assez pour parler d’une traduction,mais suffisamment pour supposer
que le reste a pu être apporté par Hillel lui-même, qui de toute façon intervient
lorsqu’ il se réfère à Maïmonide ou à un Livre des principes qui n’est pas celui
que les Latins connaissent.
Hillel b. Samuel b. Éliézer de Vérone était né en Italie entre 1220 et 123023,
peut-être à Forlì24, où il passa ses dernières années et écrivit les Rétributions de
l’âme25. Son grand-père, R. Éliézer b. Samuel, était un talmudiste renommé26.
Il affirme avoir été étudiant, sans doute en médecine, dans les universités de
Barcelone puis de Montpellier27. Dans la première de ces villes, il aurait été
le disciple, entre 1259 et 1262, de Jonas de Gérone (R. Yonah Girondi). C’est
peut-être celui-ci qui aurait fait naître chez Hillel une sorte de vénération pour
Maïmonide. De retour en Italie, il exerça lamédecine ; il séjourna à Rome avant
de se fixer à Capoue commemédecin28 tout en donnant des cours sur le Guide
des égarés ; le kabbaliste Abraham Abulafia y fut son élève. La fin de sa vie se
passa à Forlì. On lui doit, selon Steinschneider29, d’avoir, le premier des phi-
losophes juifs, utilisé systématiquement les sources latines30 et on pourrait
voir en lui, toutes proportions gardées, une sorte d’Albert le Grand juif, dans
la mesure où il est le premier à mettre en présence les sources de deux tradi-
tions qui s’ ignoraient avant lui (la tradition latine et la tradition gréco-arabe
en ce qui concerne Albert, la tradition grecque-arabe-hébraïque et la tradition
commentaires chrétiens ; le parallèle avec Thomas, pour lequel il est renvoyé àHebräische
Bibliographie 6, 1863, p. 111, n. 2, est celui de la prop. 10(11)/12, note b ; l’argument de Bar-
denhewer 1882 [v. infra, n. 46], que le recours à Thomas aurait empêché l’attribution
qu’a donnée Hillel, est jugé faible : «Hillel konnte ein Exemplar ohne Prooemium vor sich
haben, oder hatte einen Grund, Thomas’ Ansicht nicht zu berichten»).
23 La plus récentemise au point est fournie par l’ introduction de Schwartz, Fidora 2009, p. 9-
48.
24 Vogelstein, Rieger, 1896, p. 260, n. 2.
25 Hillel de Vérone, Sefer Tagmulé ha-Nefesh (éd. Sermoneta), p. IV.
26 Vogelstein, Rieger, 1896, p. 400.
27 Vogelstein, Rieger, 1896, p. 272. Selon Sermoneta (1972 ; 2007), p. 113-115, nous n’avons
aucune preuve de son séjour à Montpellier.
28 Dans une lettre qu’ il lui adresse, un correspondant lui écrit : «ou il te suffit de visiter tes
malades et d’examiner les urines», etc. (Oṣar neḥmad 2, p. 142). R. Qalonymos b. Qalony-
mos, un contemporain, mentionne dans sa Masekhet Purim un «médecin Hillel».
29 Steinschneider 1874, p. 91.
30 Relevé des gloses latines des Tagmuley ha-nefeš, éd. Sermoneta, p. 250-253.
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latine, en l’occurrence, elle-même déjà enrichie par l’apport arabe, chez Hil-
lel), sans parvenir à les rendre entièrement compatibles.
Son œuvre31, bien moindre cependant que celle d’Albert le Grand, com-
prend des traductions médicales et des œuvres philosophiques personnelles.
Il a traduit la Chirurgiamagna de Bruno di Lungoburgo32 ; la Tégnè (Ars parva)
de Galien33 ; une traduction des Aphorismes d’Hippocrate (Paris, BN, hébr.
1111) portant des notes marginales dont une au nom de «Hillel» peut-elle lui
être attribuée sans autre preuve34? Ses œuvres personnelles sont un commen-
taire des vingt-cinq premières propositions du Guide des égarés35 ; trois ques-
tions sur l’exercice par l’homme du libre arbitre, sur le châtiment d’Adam
exercé aux dépens de l’humanité entière et sur les anges déchus36 ; unMaʾamar
ha-darban (Livre de l’aiguillon) dont subsiste un fragment37 ; deux lettres au
médecin Isaac b. Mardochée (Maestro Gaio)38 ; il correspondit aussi avec Zera-
ḥiyah Ḥen (autre traducteur du Liber de causis) et deux lettres conservées de
celui-ci permettent de reconstituer la doctrine de son correspondant sur les
points de l’origine du langage et sur la réalité historique des miracles bibliques
(un position conservatrice dont se gausse Zeraḥiyah)39 ; peut-être écrivit-il un
31 Récapitulée récemment par Leicht 2013, p. 592-598, avec indication des manuscrits et des
éditions.
32 Ms. Paris, BN, hébreu 972, f. 22v, titre : haʿataqat Galiʾanus we-Aleqsander. Sefer ha-keritut
haʿataqat R. Hillel be-Rabbeynu Šemueʾl z”l kefi hagadat Ma’ešṭro Bruno bi-lešon ha-noṣri
ha-maʿatiqo hu’ me-hagadah (sic?) Galiʾanus u-me-Abiṣino we-Almansor we-ʿAli u-sheʾar
ḥakhamim qadmonim. – Il existe une dizaine d’autres témoins.
33 Avec le commentaire d’ ‘Ali b. Ridhwan, traduit du latin de Gérard de Crémone. Deuxmss,
semble-t-il : Paris, BN, hébreu 1111, f. 32-45v et Rome, Bibl. Casanatense 2834 (Sacerdote
201), f. 187-228v (édité par A. Berliner).
34 Comme se le demande Steinschneider dans Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš (éd. Halberstamm),
p. 9.
35 Éd. Halberstamm, à la suite des Tagmuley ha-nefeš, f. 32v–40. Postérieur aux Tagmuley,
qu’ il cite.
36 Ms. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibl., hebr. 120, f. 54-66v ; v. éd. Sermoneta, p. xv et n. 15 ;
éd. par Steinschneider dans Sefer tagmuley ha-nefeš (éd. Halberstamm), f. 45-55. V. sur
la première Sadik 2013, p. 292-314 (selon cet interprète, l’homme ayant été créé d’après
R. Hillel pour choisir le bien, le choix du mal résulte d’un défaut «accidentel» d’exercice
des facultés de l’âme et en particulier de l’ intellect) ; sur la troisième, Sermoneta 1974.
37 Ms. BN, hébreu 704, f. 83v–86v ; un ouvrage de ce titre est mentionné dans les Tagmuley ;
éd. I. Goldblum,Mi-ginezeyYiśra eʾl be-Faʾriz. S’agirait-il d’un autre ouvragedemême titre?
Sermoneta n’en dit rien dans sa propre édition et ne se prononce pas sur l’attribution du
texte de Paris.
38 Futur médecin du pape Nicolas IV (Sermoneta, 1972 ; 2007) ; Vogelstein, Rieger, 1896, pas-
sages notés dans l’ index.
39 Sermoneta 1965, p. 11 et n. 18, renvoyant à l’éd. des lettres de Zeraḥiyah par R. Kirchheim
dans Oṣar neḥmad 2, 1857, p. 124-143 et à son propre travail Sermoneta 1962.
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ouvrage sur l’examen des urines (ms. Rome, Bibl. Casanatense 200) et, avant
tout, les Rétributions de l’âme (Tagmuley ha-nefeš), qui cherchent à concilier
les notions rationalistes relatives à l’âme et les textes rabbiniques concer-
nant sa rétribution, qu’ il juxtapose en deux parties. Son redécouvreur au xxe
siècle, Giuseppe Sermoneta, discernait chez lui, en dépit de son rationalisme
et de son dévouement à la pensée de Maïmonide, une authentique sensibi-
lité aux dangers pour la foi que comportait la spéculation philosophique40 ;
il estimait que, dans une crise qui selon lui (Sermoneta) faisait écho à celles
de l’Université de Paris en 1270 et 1277, à l’occasion de la condamnation des
thèses dites «averroïstes», la position de Hillel correspond à celle des aris-
totéliciens modérés de Paris, aussi éloignés des averroïstes radicaux que des
anti-aristotéliciens «obscurantistes»41.
L’enseignement dispensé à Abraham Abulafia pose la question d’une éven-
tuelle étape kabbalistique dans son évolution. M. Yossef Schwartz, qui a intro-
duit et traduit en allemand une partie des Tagmuley ha-nefeš, ne tranche pas
mais note que les oppositions courantes entre philosophie d’une part, kabbale
ou mystique d’autre part, ne valent pas dans son cas.
Confrontant les épistémologies juive, arabe et latine, Hillel, médecin,
s’ intéresse particulièrement dans les Rétributions à l’articulation de l’ontologie
et de la psychologie : immatérielle, l’ âme n’a plus, après la séparation d’avec le
corps, moyen de s’ individuer, et l’on rejoint la théorie averroïste de l’unicité
de l’âme; Hillel l’ évite par une solution de type néoplatonicien qui mêle des
éléments avicenniens et gabiroliens : si l’ intellect est la forme de l’âme, celle-
ci acquiert le statut de principe matériel et devient principe d’ individuation
de l’ intellect. En même temps, il refuse l’hylémorphisme aristotélicien au pro-
fit d’un cosmos néoplatonicien dans lequel les forces immatérielles peuvent se
substituer à la causalité physique. Cette association du physique et de l’épisté-
mologique est, selonM. Schwartz, caractéristique de la tradition tolédane de la
réception d’Avicenne.
Le caractère «séparé» de l’âme, supposé rendre compte d’une capacité
du mental à agir dans l’ordre physique42, s’entend en divers sens : à la fois
40 Sermoneta, 1972 ; 2007. Dans la première partie des Rétributions, R. Hillel traite le pro-
blèmed’actualité de savoir si les âmes survivent individuellement ou si, comme lepensent
les averroïstes, elles ne forment qu’une seule âme immortelle. Il se rallie à la première opi-
nion, seule conciliable avec les données religieuses traditionnelles.
41 Sermoneta, éd. cit., p. iv-v.
42 C’est une doctrine qui reçoit à la même époque ses lettres de noblesse avec le com-
mentaire du Canon d’Avicenne donné par le professeur de médecine Taddeo Alderotti
à Bologne vers 1289, quoiqu’elle suscite l’opposition de certains de ses élèves, tel Gentile
da Cingoli : Robert 2014, p. 152-167.
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l’ incorporéité de l’âme et la différence ontologique de l’ intellect qui l’ informe,
en tant que substance céleste, par quoi s’établit une continuité ontologique
entre les entités célestes (appelées «corps» de manière homonymique) et
l’ intellect humain ; en un troisième sens, thomiste, le composé humain d’ intel-
lect, âme et corps est unique en son genre, par là séparé à la fois des règnes
angélique et animal. Hillel est plus proche de l’émanatisme d’Avicenne et de
Maïmonide tel qu’ il le comprend que de l’aristotélisme d’Averroès ou de Tho-
mas. Encore l’émanation ne doit-elle pas être pensée comme un mouvement
physique, l’absence demouvement propre de l’âme expliquant à la fois, si nous
comprenons bien les analyses de M. Schwartz, sa persistance dans un corps et
son éternité. La capacité d’ interférence des forces spirituelles dans le monde
physique est probablement aussi en jeu dans les miracles et a permis à Hillel,
d’une manière jugée paradoxale par M. Reimund Leicht qui en a traité récem-
ment43, de défendre l’autorité deMaïmonide,maître à penser des rationalistes,
en recourant à des récits miraculeux. Tel est le fond sur lequel vient s’ inscrire
l’ intérêt, lui-même ambivalent, deHillel, à la fois traducteur et critique du Livre
des causes.
Un autre point de l’ introduction de M. Schwartz aux Rétributions de l’âme
est à rappeler ici : chez Hillel, un triple substrat, fait de textes hébreux origi-
naux, de traductions hébraïques à partir de l’arabe, antérieures à Hillel, et de
ses paraphrases personnelles de textes latins, a pour conséquences une syntaxe
parfois obscure, une logique différente d’une source à l’autre et un vocabulaire
novateur, non-tibbonide, changeant lui aussi selon les sources, par là également
difficile en l’absence d’autres textes formant avec celui-ci une Diskursgemein-
schaft qui aiderait à restituer à sa langue un sens suffisamment univoque.
4) La datation : Hillel deVérone aurait écrit à Forlì, à la fin de sa vie, après 128744,
les Rétributions, selon Steinschneider en 1291. Steinschneider, sur la base d’une
citation du De causis dans les Tagmuley ha-nefeš dans laquelle le mot-clef de
«cause» n’est pas traduit de la même manière que dans sa traduction du De
causis, estime celle-ci postérieure, jugeant invraisemblable que Hillel se soit
écarté de son propre choix, s’ il avait été antérieur45. En revanche, Bardenhe-
wer croit que la citation de la prop. 5 rapportée à un ouvrage sur les substances
supérieures en trente-deux chapitres sous le nomde Platon, dans les Imrei šefer
(«Paroles de beauté») d’AbrahamAbulafia, ouvrage de 1291, ne peut avoir pour
43 Leicht 2013.
44 Voir supra, n. 25.
45 Steinschneider 1852-1860, col. 742 (eodem fere tempore [que la traduction de Zeraḥiyah
Ḥen (1284)]) ; id., dans Halberstamm, éd. cit., p. 10 ; puis id. 1893 ; 19562, p. 267.
hillel de vérone, traducteur du livre des causes 417
source que Hillel (cette désignation et cette attribution lui font évidemment
écho), ce qui suppose sa traduction antérieure ou remontant au plus tard à
129146 ; d’un autre côté, il la pense peu postérieure à celle de Zeraḥyah Ḥen
(1284)47. Une datation approximative de la traduction du Liber de causis circule
depuis les années 1980, apparemment sans fondement ; elle place l’ouvrage
entre 1250 et 129048, soit indifféremment de part et d’autre d’unmoment pour-
tant décisif de la réception latine du De causis, l’ identification par Thomas de
sa source principale.
La proposition initiale d’attribution des théorèmes à Platon et la note cri-
tique de la proposition 16(17) permettent pourtant de préciser quelque peu:
a) en l’absence de source connue comportant cette attribution à Platon,
on est tenté d’y voir une transposition de l’attribution à Proclus, qui ne
se rencontre qu’après la découverte par Thomas d’Aquin de la relation
étroite entre le Liber de causis et l’Elementatio theologica, exposée dans
son commentaire en 1272, à la suite de la traduction de l’Elementatio par
Guillaume deMoerbeke en 126849. Le traducteur hébreu continue cepen-
dant d’attribuer les développements à al-Fārābī, ce qui pourrait relever
du régime, antérieur, des premiers commentateurs latins qui attribuaient
les théorèmes à Aristote et les développements à al-Fārābī50. Toutefois,
Gilles de Rome lui aussi, bien qu’au courant de la découverte faite par
46 Bardenhewer 1882, p. 318-320. C’est qu’Abulafia fasse état de trente-deux propositions
qui fait supposer à Bardenhewer que sa source est Hillel plutôt que la traduction anté-
rieure (1284) de Zeraḥiyah b. Šeʾaltiʾel Ḥen, qu’ il connaît (p. 305-308) ; il pense en effet que
l’attribution à Platon n’était pas rare, pourrait donc avoir eu une autre source.
47 Bardenhewer 1882, p. 308, n. 1 : «Nicht viel später anzusetzen als die Übersetzung Sera-
chja’s».
48 Rothschild 1994, p. 405 : «xiiie [3/4] s.» ; Zonta 1996, p. 228 : «probabilmente verso il 1290»,
sans doute à la suite de Sermoneta 1965, p. 34, n. 70 : «nel 1290 o nel 1291, forse a Forlì») ;
Über die Vollendung der Seele, p. 11, «gegen Ende seines Lebens in Forlì […] während der
späten 1280er Jahre» ; Zonta 2011, p. 32 : «ca. 1260?» (renvoyant à Halberstamm et à Roth-
schild, déjà cités), suivi par Rothschild 2013a, p. 394 : «vers 1260». Aucune de ces datations
n’est motivée.
49 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. xxxiv-xxxv pour les deux dates.
50 Cf. D’Ancona 1992a, p. 215-216 : dans la «première réception latine du De causis», les
lemmes sont attribués à Aristote et les explications à d’autres auteurs ; huit manuscrits
parmi les quatre-vingt-douze examinés par Pattin ainsi que les commentaires duPs.-Henri
de Gand et du Ps.-Adam de Bocfeld attribuent ces explications à al-Fārābī ; Albert y voit
l’un des auteurs mis à contribution, avec Aristote, Avicenne et Algazel, par l’auteur. – La
double attribution initiale «s’explique comme une réaction à l’apparition d’un ouvrage
qui devait appartenir à Aristote, mais qui, en même temps, était tellement différent des
autres ouvrages aristotéliciens connus» (ibid., p. 217). Bardenhewer 1882, p. 56, proposait
que cette attribution eût sa source dans une confusion avec le Liber de principiis d’al-
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Thomas, maintient l’attribution, peut-être, des développements, assuré-
ment au moins de leur choix et de leur arrangement, à al-Fārābī51.
b) La critique de la prop. 16(17) comporte une référence au «l. XI de la Méta-
physique» dont il serait raisonnable de penser, en contexte fortement
théologique, qu’ il s’agit du Livre Λ ; ce qui théoriquement placerait ce
texte avant la numérotation en quatorze livres, inconnue auparavant des
Latins (et de la tradition arabe à laquelle Hillel aurait pu avoir quelque
autre accès) opérée par Guillaume de Moerbeke dans sa traduction dont
la première rédaction serait datable fin 1260-1261 et la seconde entre 1266
et 1268, au plus tard 127052 ; et qui, pratiquement, ne nous apprendrait
rien, la rapidité avec laquelle une découverte textuelle de cette nature
aurait pu arriver à la connaissance d’un juif étant tout à fait inconnue.
Toutefois, la référence paraît plutôt être au Livre K, ce qui fournit un ter-
minus post quem effectif.
c) L’élément le plus sûr tient dans la référence au De ente et essentia de Tho-
mas d’Aquin, à propos de la prop. 31(32), puisque cet ouvrage a été écrit
entre 1252 et 125653.
d) Ensuite, on pourrait, à la suite de Steinschneider, tirer argument de
l’absence déjàmentionnée de référence à la traduction du De causis dans
les Rétributions de l’âme pour proposer que Hillel ne l’eût connu et à plus
forte raison traduit qu’après avoir écrit ce traité. Mais cet argument a la
fragilité des preuves a silentio54.
e) Enfin, nous croyons percevoir quelques affinités avec le commentaire de
Thomas d’Aquin (1272), et même quelques signes de proximité avec le
commentaire deGilles de Rome (v. 1290). Nous croyons, quoi qu’ il en soit,
pouvoir nous fier au critère de l’attribution au courant platonicien pour
proposer comme la plus vraisemblable une date en tout cas postérieure à
1272.
Fārābī, texte que Hillel, précisément, rapproche du De causis ; cependant, ce De principiis
ne semble pas connu en latin.
51 Gilles de Rome, Expositio super auctorem De causis, n.p., division M: Causa vero efficiens
ignoratur, sed creditur a multis fuisse Alpharabium […] in greco autem habentur proposi-
tiones Procli, a quibus hae propositiones emanauerunt.
52 Aristote, Metaphysica, transl. G. de Moerbeka, p. 249-268 (en part. 249, 253).
53 Thomas d’Aquin, De ente et essentia, éd. Leonina, p. 319-320.
54 Steinschneider estime (éd. Halberstamm, p. 10) qu’ il y a dans Tagmuley ha-nefeš des cita-
tions du Liber de causis, selon une autre traduction ; mais les éditeurs postérieurs (Sermo-
neta, Schwartz) ne les y ont pas trouvées ; de plus, rien n’empêcherait que Hillel n’ait plus
disposé de son texte et ait dû citer d’après une autre traduction, ou de mémoire, ou ait
retraduit.
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5) Affinités, donc, avec les commentateurs latins : elles semblent assez minces.
On relève quelques traces littérales qui font penser à un accès aumoins partiel
au commentaire de Thomas : dans la note à la prop. 1, que si la cause première
agissait directement dans le causé, la cause seconde serait inutile, s’appuie
peut-être sur Thomas citant Proclus, Elementatio theologica, 56 : «Omne quod
a secundis producitur, et a prioribus et causalioribus producitur eminentius, a
quibus et secunda producebantur» (Saffrey, p. 5, l. 18-20), ce qui donnerait à
penser que la cause seconde soit seulement plus faible que la cause première ;
toutefois, l’objection suppose d’ ignorer la suite du commentaire de Thomas
aussi bien que l’exemple cité par le développement de la proposition (Pattin,
§§6-11), figurant pourtant peu après le lieu de cette intervention dans le texte
hébreu. De plus, il n’est pas impossible de retrouver le germe d’une autre ques-
tion chez Thomas (Saffrey, p. 9, l. 10-11).
La critique de la prop. 10(11) présente des points communs de forme55 et de
fond avec le commentaire de Thomas, lequel d’ailleurs lui restitue son intelli-
gibilité (v. infra la traduction commentée des notes).
Dans la note à la prop. 11(12), en insistant en termes d’ influx sur la particu-
larité de chaque mode de présence d’une substance en l’autre, et en écartant
l’hypothèse d’un influx, Hillel pourrait faire écho à la fin du commentaire de
Thomas (Saffrey p. 81, l. 10-12, mais en termes de similitudines et species).
En 16(17), Hillel paraît emprunter deux éléments au commentaire des pro-
positions voisines par Thomas : 15(16) (Saffrey, p. 93, l. 20-21) sur ce que le texte
doit être corrompu, et 17(18) (Saffrey, p. 102, l. 7-8) pour l’exemple du feu et de
la chaleur.
En 29(30), on trouve trace d’une distinction de Thomas (Saffrey, p. 134, l. 8-
10), citant Proclus, entre secundum suam substantiam et le per substantiam du
De causis ; Hillel opère comme Thomas le rapprochement avec la proposition
précédente (ibid., l. 1 :Hicponitur propositio conversa [cf.mithafekhoth] prioris).
Toutefois, alors que Thomas oppose des substances dépendantes du temps et
d’autres, subsistantes par soi, Hillel s’en tient à l’opposition plus générale entre
substances par soi et substances dépendantes d’autre chose.
En 30(31), on est proche de Thomas (Saffrey, p. 141, l. 10–p. 142, l. 3) qui envi-
sage successivement cette position intermédiaire entre le temps et l’éternité
pour le corpus caeleste et pour l’âme; toutefois, Thomas conclut à propos du
premier qu’ il ne relève que du temps ; et, quant à la seconde, il ne formule pas
comme Hillel de restriction à «certains degrés».
55 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librumde causis expositio, p. 74, l. 25-26 :Hac enim probatione sus-
cepta, multa fundamenta catholicae fidei tollerentur.
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En 31(32), le lien établi avec la proposition précédente est analogue à celui
qu’opère Thomas (Saffrey, p. 143, l. 1–p. 144, l. 3), par l’ intermédiaire de la prop.
107 de Proclus, quoique la présence du temps dans l’éternité et de l’éternité
dans le temps soit peut-être mal comprise. Le long développement sur le Pre-
mier participé et non participant est parallèle à celui deThomas (Saffrey, p. 144,
l. 28–p. 145, l. 14). Ajoutons pour mémoire que cette dernière intervention se
termine par la traduction d’un bref extrait du De ente et essentia de Thomas.
Quelque connaissance du commentaire de Gilles de Rome paraît cependant
aussi56 : d’abord, l’attribution à Platon et à al-Fārābī, figurant au prologue.
Ensuite, les objections posées contre la prop. 1 sont explicitement formulées
chez Gilles57 ; l’ étonnant, cependant, est qu’ il n’en paraît que la formulation,
sans les solutions qu’ il apporte lui-même; aussi pourrait-on supposer qu’elles
se sont présentées spontanément à l’esprit de Hillel, ou qu’ il a suivi quelque
autre source (ou entendu quelque dispute) qui posait les mêmes questions58
mais n’apportait pas de solutions, ou encore que ces dernières ne lui ont pas
convenu.
En 10(11)b : «Cependant le commentaire de cette proposition est contraire à
la foi et il n’y a pas à s’appuyer sur lui». Ce jugement porte logiquement sur la
partie omise du développement, dont n’a été expressément rapportée que la
56 Steinschneider 1863, p. 212, en doutait : «Die Übersetzung des Jehuda hat sowenig als die
des Hillel etwas mit Aegidius zu thun» (il est vrai qu’ il parle plutôt de la traduction elle-
même) ; dans Steinschneider 1893, p. 262-263, il fait état d’un commentateur chrétien
anonyme et de Thomas, sans nommer Gilles.
57 Gilles de Rome, Expositio super auctorem De causis, f. 2vM: Dubitaret forte aliquis, quia
videtur falsum […] quod causa prima prius attingat causatumquam causa secunda, et quod
ultimo recedat ab eo […]. Non ergo plus influit causa prima, nec eius influentia ultimo rece-
dit, sed videnter haec omnia simul esse ; f. 4rY : quomodo causa prima adiuuet operationem
causae secundae, et det ei quod agat ; f. 4vAA utrum omne illud quod efficit causa secunda
efficiat causa prima ; f. 5rEE: Cum ergo quaeritur utrum aliquo modo producatur effectus a
causa secunda, quo (scil. : quod) non producatur a causa prima, vel econverso ; f. 5vGG: quo-
modo causa prima vehementius et fortius agit in re, et quomodo est maioris adhaerentiae
cum re quam causa secunda ; ibid. II : quomodo causa prima conseruat causam secundam
in actione sua ; f. 6r : si res procedit a causa prima sub esse magis universali a causa vero
secunda sub esse magis speciali […] causa secunda magis faciet ad esse rei quam causa
prima.
58 L’arsenal n’en est pas illimité et nous trouvons aussi dans le Ps.-Henri de Gand, Quaes-
tiones in Librum de causis, q. 5 (p. 27-28), peut-être, le même problème que dans la q. 1a/ii
dus ms. hébreu; aux q. 9-13 (p. 33-39), assurément, ceux des qq. 1a/iii et 1b de l’hébreu). Il
nous a paru cependant moins vraisemblable que Hillel ou son annotateur ait eu connais-
sance d’un auteur sans rapport avec l’ Italie.
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fin («Le commentateur dit à la fin de l’explication, avec force»). Cette dernière
glose reprend sans doute à peu de chose près la formulation de Thomas, mais
renvoie par là non, comme lui, à la fin du théorème (Saffrey, éd. cit., p. 73, l. 4-5 :
«signanter autem dicit quae non destruuntur neque cadunt sub tempore», où
il s’agit de la fin de la proposition proprement dite59), mais à la démonstration,
dont il supprime le début à cause de l’ incompatibilité doctrinale. On pourrait
supposer dès lors un recours parallèle à Gilles, qui conteste le même point que
Thomas, mais à propos du début du «commentaire» (f. 39v).
Puis, en 11(12), Hillel, dont nous avons dit qu’ il pourrait faire écho à la fin du
commentaire deThomas (Saffrey p. 81, l. 10-12, en termes de similitudines et spe-
cies), est plus proche de Gilles (f. 41v), qui marque plus nettement la hiérarchie
descendante que suppose l’«épanchement d’épanchement» dont parle Hillel
et qui emploie fluunt, comme Hillel le terme d’«épanchement».
À la différence de la légère présence deThomas, qui semanifestait par quelques
similitudes littérales, celle de Gilles est à la fois rare et plus abstraite : on
pourrait imaginer que Hillel, plutôt que de lire le commentaire même de
Gilles, ait pu en percevoir quelque écho dans un échange informel avec des
savants chrétiens ou en assistant à quelque controverse publique. Une telle
hypothèse présente l’ inconvénient de dispenser à peu de frais de rechercher
des sources précises mais c’est peut-être à elle que conduisent des tentatives
infructueuses du passé pour identifier des références chrétiennes, chez Gerso-
nide par exemple60, aussi bien que la vraisemblance des réalités sociales.
6) La doctrine des notes : sous réserve de ce que le traducteur anonyme et
l’ intervenant Hillel (b. Samuel) soient bien tous deux Hillel de Vérone (ce qui
est apparu plus haut comme très probable), nous disposons du cas privilégié
d’un traducteur qui réagit lui-même au texte qu’ il traduit, à ses contradictions
internes, obscurités ou redondances et, ce qui nous intéresse davantage, aux
contradictions dans lesquelles ce texte nouveau peut entrer par rapport aux
doctrines tenues, ou au moins déjà connues, par lui, traducteur. Si le com-
mentateur n’était pas le célèbre Hillel de Vérone et n’était pas le même que
le traducteur (ce qui, nous l’avons vu, est le moins probable), nous aurions
tout de même affaire à la seule critique interne et externe portée, à notre
59 Ce n’est pas, cependant, que signanter veuille dire «comme à titre de signature», ce mot,
qui figure à diverses reprises dans le commentaire deThomas, signifiant en latinmédiéval
«de manière signalée, expressément».
60 Voir Pinès 1967 ; Möbuß 1991 ; Sirat, Klein-Braslavy, Weijers 2003.
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connaissance, par un lecteur juif, sous la forme d’un commentaire suivi, sur
l’ensemble du Liber de causis61.
Si le métalangage de Hillel est rigoureux, il faut distinguer chez lui deux
types d’ interventions : le type introduit par le mot peyruš («explication») qui
est anonyme et au service du texte (voire, résume le développement originel
de la proposition lorsqu’ il est omis, comme il arrive fréquemment dans la troi-
sième dizaine de propositions), et les interventions introduites par AmarHillel,
qui introduisent des objections ou remarques de son propre chef. Avant de
présenter la partie critique des notes, il convient de dire un mot de la brève
introduction que le traducteur donne au texte : Tout en proposant la double
attribution des théorèmes à Aristote (et plus probablement à Platon) et celle
des commentaires à al-Fārābī, ce qui est courant, Hillel est à notre connais-
sance le seul à faire état d’un rapport privilégié avec ce qu’ il nomme le Livre
des principes de ce dernier, plus connu comme traité de philosophie politique,
le Livre du gouvernement62, mais qui existe en hébreu sous ce titre de Livre
des principes63 et qui semble inconnu en latin64. En vérité, la première moitié
61 La traduction d’une partie du commentaire de saint Thomas par Juda Romano, l’usage
tacite et partiel qu’ il peut avoir fait du Liber de causis dans ses ouvrages personnels, celui,
explicite mais tout aussi partiel, qu’en a fait Moïse b. Sabbataï en annotant sporadique-
ment la traduction de Juda Romano et en employant certaines propositions duDe causis à
l’appui dans sa polémique contre les kabbalistes (v. supra, n. 4), n’ont pas lamême impor-
tance à cet égard.
62 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb as-suyāsa al-madaniyya, éd. Najjar ; éd. et trad. espagnole R. RamónGuer-
rero 1992, p. 1-70, analysé par Munk 1859, p. 344-347 (p. 344-345 : « les six principes des
choses sont : 1° le principe divin, ou la cause première, qui est unique ; 2° les causes secon-
daires ou les Intelligences des sphères célestes ; 3° l’ intellect actif ; 4° l’âme; 5° la forme;
6° la matière abstraite (hylè). Le premier de ces principes est l’unité absolue, tandis que
tous les autres représentent le multiple. Les trois premiers ne sont ni des corps, ni en rap-
port direct avec les corps ; les trois derniers ne sont pas en eux-mêmes des corps, mais
sont unis aux corps. Les genres des corps sont au nombre de six, savoir : les corps des
sphères célestes, l’ animal raisonnable, l’ animal irraisonnable, les végétaux, les minéraux
et les quatre éléments. L’ensemble composé de ces six genres forme l’univers. – Après
qu’ il a parlé de tout ce qui dérive des six principes et qu’ il est arrivé à l’homme, il exa-
mine l’organisation de la société», etc.).
63 Al-Fārābī, Sefer ha-asif, 1849 (réimpr. en Israël, [5]730-[1969/70]), p. 1-64. Voir Steinschnei-
der, Steinschneider 1893, p. 290-292, signalant l’attribution probablement erronée de la
traduction hébraïque dans le manuscrit qu’ il a utilisé à Samuel Ibn Tibbon plutôt qu’à
son fils Moïse, faisant état de plusieurs autres manuscrits et notant l’obscurité du style
ainsi que le manque de correction de l’édition.
64 Il paraît sans rapport avec le Liber sex principiorum mis à partir d’Albert le Grand sous le
nom de Gilbert de la Porrée ((Ps.-)Gilbert de la Porrée, Liber sex principiorum ; éd. d’un
texte récrit par Hermolaus Barbarus dans la PL 188, col. 1257-1270) mais donné comme
anonyme par Roger Bacon (Minio-Paluello, p. xlvii) et Thomas d’Aquin (Minio-Paluello,
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y est consacrée successivement aux principes métaphysiques (éd. Filipowski,
p. 1-17), puis à une description de l’agencement des «choses secondes» qu’on
peut regarder comme une cosmologie (p. 18-31), avant que ne soient introduits
l’homme et la société. Hillel s’y référera deux fois dans ses notes sur le texte.
La critique doctrinale, telle qu’elle ressort des interventions sous le nom de
Hillel inscrites dans la justification du texte, peut se répartir en trois blocs :
pour procéder du plus simple au plus complexe, les interrogations d’un méde-
cin, probablement ; une défense théologique de l’unité et de la transcendance
divines ; diverses questions métaphysiques dans lesquelles la doctrine du Liber
de causis paraît en contradiction avec des autorités, voire, si l’on voulait attri-
buer aussi à Hillel les notes anonymes et marginales à la prop. 1, radicalement
discutable dès son début.
Deux questions touchent l’épistémologie médicale : la première n’est pas
sous le nom de Hillel : en 1b il est observé que les processus physiologiques ne
vérifient pas la célèbre thèse initiale, que la causepremière agit dans le causé en
l’absence de la cause seconde : à défaut du sang et des humeurs, les causes plus
lointaines, les éléments et les végétaux sous forme alimentaire, n’agiraient pas
sur le corps. Le second point touchant à la médecine est bien sous le nom de
Hillel, en 10(11)a : si, comme l’énonce le Liber de causis, il n’est de science que
de ce qui n’est pas soumis à la corruption, quel est le statut de la médecine?
Ici, le lecteur critique paraît consentir à cette thèse, puisqu’ il commente en
disant que c’est ce qui a obligé Avicenne à relativiser le statut scientifique de la
discipline en question en la définissant comme une science pratique ; il ajoute
cependant qu’ il y aurait «d’autres réponses», mais sans en dire plus. On peut
ajouter à cesmarques avérées d’un intérêtmédical le choix d’un exemple suffi-
samment usuel en physique et en métaphysique pour ne pas faire preuve à lui
seul : dans la critique de la proposition 16(17), l’ illustration de divers niveaux de
causalité (au moins deux, essentielle et accidentelle) par l’exemple d’un corps
p. xlviii) ; ce livre est pourtant cité occasionnellement dans les commentaires au De
causis, à propos de la forme qui est le premier principe dont il traite (ainsi par le Ps.-
Henri de Gand, Quaestiones in Librum de causis, p. 105, et par le Ps.-Adam de Bocfeld,
cf. D’Ancona 1992a, p. 207, n. 70). Davantage, le commentant, Antoine André (ca 1280-
1320) note qu’«Alii dicunt quod fuit Alpharabius commentator libri De Causis», d’autres,
que c’estGilbert (Minio-Paluello, p. xlviii) : la communautéde titre est-elle le simple effet
d’un caractère commun de «principes» (ceux du Liber sex étant forme, action, passion,
temps, lieu, position, habitus, plus ou moins, avec d’ inévitables recoupements) ou bien
existe-t-il une affinité quelconque entre les deux ouvrages? Hillel aurait-il été aiguillé vers
ce texte à la lecture d’un commentaire latin qui se référait au Ps.-Gilbert de la Porrée, de
manière plutôt circulaire si, comme l’ indiquait Bardenhewer, l’ attribution du De causis à
al-Fārābī venait elle-même de son De principiis?
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humain échauffé, du feu (cause essentielle) et des modalités accidentelles du
rapprochement des deux (proximité d’un feu, mouvement, nourriture et bois-
son chauds, air chaud).
Sur le plan théologique, des défenses des doctrines de la création et de
l’unité et de la transcendance divines s’expriment à trois reprises. Le second
commentaire (b) de la prop. 10(11) (à vrai dire, une seule phrase de celui-ci,
qui n’en compte que deux dans l’édition Pattin) est purement et simplement
déclaré omis comme «contraire à la foi», tel qu’on «ne doit pas prendre appui
sur lui». Il serait malaisé de dire ce qui a indisposé Hillel s’ il n’apparaissait pas
qu’ il utilise ici le commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin, dont la critique est expli-
cite. Le passage omis est le §101 de l’édition Pattin :
Quod est quoniam si intelligentia est semper quae non movetur, tunc
ipsa est causa rebus sempiternis quae non destruuntur [nec permutan-
tur] neque cadunt subgenerationeet corruptione. Et intelligentia quidem
non est ita, nisi quia intelligit rem per esse suum, et esse suum est sempi-
ternum quod non corrumpitur ⟨…⟩.
Telle est la critique deThomas : si un intellect immuable ne crée que des choses
éternelles, alors ni les anges ni Dieu ne peuvent intervenir dans le cours des
choses et, davantage, le monde lui-même sera éternel.
On croit aussi trouver, dans les mises en garde de Hillel, l’ écho de la critique
par Maïmonide des attributs divins (Guide des égarés, I, 51-60)65. La discussion
de la prop. 16(17) est longue et assez peu claire dans le détail. Elle comporte,
comme on l’a déjà indiqué, une distinction entre cause essentielle et cause
d’un degré inférieur (celle-ci, qui prend l’exemple du feu, pourrait dévelop-
per une brève notation de Thomas d’Aquin à la prop. 17(18), p. 102, l. 4-8 : « in
unoquoque genere est causa illud quod est primum in genere illo […] ignis est
primum calidum a quo omnia caliditatem sortiuntur»). Cette distinction vise
à relativiser le sens dans lequel la proposition semble énoncer que l’unité soit
la cause de l’ infinité. Hillel élargit la discussion à deux autres propriétés qui
65 Cf. MoïseMaïmonide, Le guide des égarés, I, 53, t. I, p. 205-216 (ch. 51-60, p. 182-266), sur ce
que les attributs ne sont pas séparés en Dieu mais ne font que décrire pour les hommes
les actions diverses procédant d’une vertu unique. Il en résulte évidemment l’absence de
dépendance de l’un par rapport aux autres. C’est peut-être de ce même refus de distin-
guer en Dieu des attributs essentiels que Hillel tire l’objection rapportée ensuite au nom
de Maïmonide contre la métaphore du feu et du chaud qui, comme il le dit, ne regarde
pas la présente question d’une éventuelle hiérarchie des attributs.
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accompagnent celles-ci, le fait d’être premier et le fait d’être une forme sépa-
rée ; il insiste beaucoup, en terminant, sur ce que ces propriétés sont toujours
simultanément présentes (c’est peut-être en ce sens seulement, selon lui, que
l’on peut dire que l’une est «cause» des autres). S’ il est vrai qu’ il s’agit, tant
dans la proposition et dans son développement que dans la note de Hillel, de
tous les existants supérieurs, on est tenté d’assigner à cette note, la plus longue
de toutes, l’ enjeudenepas réduireDieu, demême, àunde ses attributs, et dene
pas le subordonner à celui de l’unité. Hillel se réclame ici du Livre des Principes
d’al-Fārābī66, cite également la Métaphysique, XI (apparemment, non le Livre
Λ, mais le Livre K, sur la non-divisibilité de l’ infini en acte), peut-être aussi le
lib. III à proposdu caractère premier de l’un, si notre correctiondu textehébreu
est justifiée.
À l’occasion de la proposition 17(18), Hillel met en garde contre le risque
d’attribuer à Dieu la vie, comme s’ il en participait à la manière des existants
créés. Elle ne s’applique à lui que de façon figurée (ou faut-il dire : équivoque?),
pour deux raisons : loin d’en être pourvu, il en est le principe même, ce que
marque en hébreu l’adjectif (au singulier) qui lui est pour ainsi dire réservé
(ḥay), alors que le nom de la vie (à laquelle participent les existants créés),
ḥayyim, est morphologiquement un pluriel ; seconde raison, la définition de la
vie suppose un corps animé, ce qui ne sied évidemment pas à Dieu. La notion
d’usage figuré des mots vient sans doute encore de la critique des attributs
divins parMaïmonide, quoique, peut-être, l’ annotateur se souvienne ici à nou-
veau du commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin, p. 102, l. 4-24 sur la différence entre
une qualité telle qu’elle se trouve dans son principe et telle qu’elle se rencontre
par participation dans des existants d’un degré inférieur.
Cette insistance répétée sur la transcendance absolue serait bien dans
l’esprit de l’attachement farouche à une doctrinemaïmonidienne sans conces-
sions de l’unité divine que Sermoneta attribuait à Hillel de Vérone.
Quelques autres résistances doctrinales peuvent se ramener à des questions
de vocabulaire ou, en d’autres termes, d’harmonisation de sources. Ainsi, la
note sur la proposition 14(15) reconnaît la thèse célèbre de la coïncidence de
l’ intellect, de l’ intelligent et de l’ intelligible à propos de laquelle Hillel renvoie
sans plus aux Six Principes d’al-Fārābī et à Maïmonide (Guide, I, 68).
La note sur la proposition 30(31) se borne à traduire l’ontologie abstraite du
De causis dans les termes de la plus familière cosmologie aristotélicienne.
66 Éd. cit., p. 1, mais qui formule l’ implication inverse : «ce qui est premier ne peut être plu-
riel, mais seulement un et simple» ( אלאהברההיהישרשפאיאהנושארההגירדמבשהמו
דבלטושפדחא ).
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Singulière apparaît la note à la prop. 11(12) [24 dans le ms.] qui, sans objec-
tion ni référence à quelque autre manière de formuler les choses, se borne à
éclairer un point de doctrine à vrai dire très spécifique, peut-être en s’aidant
de Gilles de Rome.
Plus difficiles, et sans doute en correspondance souterraine l’une avec
l’autre, les interventions des propositions 28(29) et 31(32).
À la proposition 28(29), il semble que pour Hillel, une essence puisse être
soit auto-suffisante, soit engendrée par autre chose, contrairement à ce que
lui paraît vouloir dire ici le De causis, que toute essence serait inengendrée. Il
paraît, d’après quelques éléments formels, avoir sous les yeux le commentaire
de Thomas d’Aquin, quoiqu’ il soit très éloigné de le suivre dans le détail.
À la proposition 31(32), il prend expressément dans le De ente et essentia de
Thomas d’Aquin, dont il traduit une phrase, une distinction entre existence
absolue et participée. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit d’ introduire une précision qui
manque sinon aux notions mises en œuvre dans le Liber de causis, du moins à
son vocabulaire.
Enfin, c’est la célèbre thèse initiale de la proposition 1 (avec sa reformulation
à la proposition 11(12)/24) qui est l’objet d’une pluralité de critiques (rappelons
que les notes à la prop. 1 sont anonymes et que leur attribution àHillel n’est pas
sûre) : l’ intervention 1a en comporte trois :
i) si la cause première agissait directement dans le causé, la cause seconde
serait inutile (peut-être d’après Thomas citant Proclus, Elementatio theo-
logica, 56, qui énonce que ce qui est produit par les causes secondes
l’est de façon plus éminente par les causes premières, mais à condition
d’ ignorer la suite et l’exemple de l’existant, de l’animal et de l’homme).
ii) On ne voit pas, dans cette succession de causes, la place de la disposition
virtuelle que comporte la chose (est-ce la «puissance passive» de Méta-
physique IX, 1, 1046a 10sqq. et 6, 1048a 30sqq.?).
iii) La cause première, générale, ne rend pas compte des particularités indivi-
duelles (question formulée aumoins chez Siger de Brabant et chez Gilles
de Rome, problème abordé, quoique sans la forme de question, par Tho-
mas) ; l’ intervention 1b ajoute un autre motif (que nous avons déjà men-
tionné à propos du point de vue médical porté sur le texte), à savoir :
iv) la cause seconde est indispensable à la transmission de l’action de la
cause première.
Les arguments (i) et (iii) pourraient procéderd’unemécompréhensiondu texte
critiqué (celui-ci n’a jamais dit que la cause première suffisait à faire exister
la chose) ; à moins qu’au contraire ils ne feignent d’accepter ses présupposés
implicites pour en montrer l’ impossibilité : la cause seconde ne saurait pou-
voir ce que la cause première ne peut pas, car elle serait alors plus puissante
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qu’elle : donc la cause seconde ne sert à rien ; donc, aussi, existant seule la cause
première, générale, les particularités individuelles ne s’expliquent pas : double
conséquence absurde ; l’argument (ii) possède une source philosophique res-
pectable dans la Métaphysique ; l’ argument iv où se pose, nous l’avons vu, la
difficulté d’articuler discoursmétaphysiqueet discoursnaturaliste, lui nonplus
n’est pas sans valeur.
Il est cependant possible de retrouver ces questions sinon, demanière expli-
cite, chez Thomas d’Aquin lui-même, du moins chez Gilles de Rome, et au
moins deux d’entre elles, bien plus tôt, chez le Ps.-Henri de Gand; cependant,
le parallèle n’est que d’argument, sans que nous ayons identifié un exemple
ou une forme de raisonnement communs ; or les objections élevées par l’un et
l’autre paraissent de celles que tout étudiant en philosophie est en mesure de
formuler spontanément au vu de ce théorème.
Traducteur critique, Hillel de Vérone (si c’est bien lui) témoigne ici, comme
dans son ouvrage personnel des Rétributions de l’âme, d’une volonté de synthé-
tiser une source néoplatonicienne reconnue comme telle (ou plutôt deux : le
Liber de causis et le Traité du gouvernement ou Traité des principes d’al-Fārābī)
avec la métaphysique d’Aristote et avec la théologie de Maïmonide exposée
dans leGuide des égarés ; ou, mieux, il les confronte sans dissimuler la difficulté
de les accorder. Son originalité en tant que commentateur du De causis tient
sans doute aux critiques qu’ il lui adresse : son désaccord avec la célèbre pre-
mière proposition apparaît radicale (si les notes marginales sont de lui) ; aux
propositions 16(17) et 17(18) en revanche, il s’agit surtout de mettre en garde
contre des suites possibles du réaménagement du schéma de Proclus dans un
système qui place Dieu au sommet, qui aboutiraient à un discours impropre
tenu par rapport aux attributs divins. Enfin, tel le peintre qui se représente
parmi les personnages de son tableau, le médecin traducteur a fait part des
questions spécifiques que le Liberde causisposait à sa discipline. Ce traducteur-
critique, encore une fois, tient dans l’histoire du Liber de causis une position
singulière. Pour revenir ànotrepoint dedépart, il est loinde clarifier demanière
irrésistible lesmotifs pour lesquels toute une famille de pensée du judaïsme ita-
lien a manifesté pour ce livre un intérêt exceptionnel.
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Ce livre s’ intitule Écrit des trente-deux propositions. Certains l’ont rat-
taché à Aristote mais la plupart disent que Platon l’a rédigé, et c’est
ce qu’ il semble davantage, et qu’al-Fārābī l’a commenté, et cela paraît
vraisemblable car la plus grande partie du commentaire est conforme à
l’orientationd’al-Fārābī dans son livredes SixPrincipes. Quoi qu’ il en soit,
c’est un écrit très important, [au-dessus] de tout ce qui a été écrit à propos
de l’existence des intellects [séparés] en dehors des textes d’Aristote.
Hillel cite l’attributionàAristote68 ennotant plusprobabled’attribuer les théo-
rèmes à Platon, avec le plus grand nombre. Cette affirmation ne laisse pas de
surprendre, n’ayant de précédent ni chez les commentateurs latins fondamen-
taux69, ni semble-t-il dans les manuscrits latins70. Que les «commentaires»71
doivent être d’al-Fārābī est plus attendu: la division d’attribution des théo-
rèmes et de leurs développements est constante chez les commentateurs latins
jusqu’à ce que saint Thomas ait identifié le modèle fourni par Proclus72, la
67 Les numéros sont ceux des 31(32) propositions selon la numérotation habituelle (éd. Pat-
tin, La deumeure de l’ être etc.), suivis pour plus de clarté par le numéro d’ordre, parfois
divergent, dans lemanuscrit (ex. : 10(11)/12). La position des notes est repérée plus précisé-
ment, s’ il y a lieu, en italiques, par notre traduction française de la traductionhébraïquede
Hillel ou, pour des partiesmanquant dans celle-ci, par la traduction française, La demeure
de l’ être, et par les numéros des divisions du texte selon l’éd. Pattin.
68 Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, l. II, p. 59a, 61b.
69 Indirectement Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 3.
70 À en juger par le Liber de causis, éd. A. Pattin, 1966, p. 13-32 [2000, p. 85-104], qui décrit
sommairement quatre-vingt-douze manuscrits (deux cent trente-sept étaient connus de
Richard Taylor en 1983) dont aucun ne comporte une telle attribution. Il relève cinq fois
l’attribution à Proclus : la proximité des doctrines et des noms aidant, est-ce de là que le
traducteur hébreu tire cette attribution? Son travail serait alors postérieur à la découverte
de la source proclusienne par saint Thomas (1272).
71 V. supra, n. 10.
72 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 3, l. 3-10 ; Cf. D’Ancona 1992a, p. 215 :
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plus complexe ayant été celle d’Albert le Grand73 ; cependant, Hillel se réfère,
dans cette présentation et à deux autres reprises dans ses notes sur le texte,
à un livre des Six Principes74 qui existe en hébreu75 mais non, semble-t-il, en
latin76. Le traducteur partage en tout cas avec les Latins l’attribution plurielle,
signe du sentiment de se trouver en présence d’un écrit de synthèse doctri-
nale.
1/1a et b. Il n’est pas sûr que ces deux premières notes, disposées dans la
marge dumanuscrit, à la différence des suivantes, bien que, semble-t-il, copiées










C’est surprenant : comment se peut-il que l’action de la cause première
précède dans le causé avant que ne l’atteigne l’action de la cause
seconde? N’est-il pas connu que la première n’opère que par l’ intermé-
diaire de la seconde, car si l’on ne dit pas cela, alors l’existence de la
seconde est inutile? Et si l’on dit que la puissance est ce qui vient en pre-
mier, on est encore plus en difficulté, parce que la puissance est le début
de l’action ou le commencement du changement, et si l’on dit qu’elle
vient en dernier, c’est encore plus difficile, et il faut faire grande atten-
«Dans les premiers ouvrages consacrés au De Causis, la distinction entre l’auteur des
lemmes et leur Commentator est constante».
73 Albert le Grand, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, l. II, c. 1, p. 59-61 : un
ensemble d’énoncés d’Aristote (ou une lettre d’Aristote De principio universi esse) mêlés
de matériaux puisés chez Avicenne, Algazel et al-Fārābī, arrangés en théorèmes par le
juif David. Les enjeux philosophiques en ont été analysés en profondeur par Libera 1990,
p. 354-364.
74 V. supra, présentation, n. 62.
75 V. supra, présentation, n. 63.
76 V. supra, présentation, n. 64.
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tion. En outre, toute cause lointaine est générale, universelle, et le général
n’est pas cause du particulier en tant que particulier, c’est-à-dire indivi-
duel […?]77, comme a dit Aristote dans la Physique.
L’argument allégué se trouve en plus d’un passage de la Physique : I,9,12 :
«Quand un animal doit devenir animal autrement que par accident, ce n’est
pas de l’animal en général qu’ il vient» ; II,3 est le chapitre des causes ; II,3,12 :
« les causes et leurs différents genres peuvent être considérés aussi comme
agissant indirectement et par accident. Ainsi c’est autrement que Polyclète est
cause de la statue, et autrement que le statuaire en est cause (…) Par exemple,
on pourrait dire que c’est l’homme qui est cause de la statue, ou même d’une
manière encore plus générale que c’est l’être vivant.» ; 18 : «ce médecin parti-
culier qui guérit existe enmême temps que lemalade particulier qu’ il soigne» ;
II,7,6 : «Il y a deux principes qui, dans la nature, peuvent mouvoir les choses ;
l’un n’est pas du domaine de la Physique, attendu qu’ il n’a pas en lui-même
l’origine du mouvement ; et tel est l’être, s’ il en est un, qui peut mouvoir sans
être mu, comme le ferait l’ être absolument immobile, et antérieur à tous les
êtres ; l’ autre principe, c’est l’essence et la forme, parce que la forme est la fin
en vuede laquelle est fait tout le reste.» (trad. J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire).Mais
il se trouve surtout en Métaph., Λ, 5, 1071a : « l’homme a d’abord pour cause ses
éléments, savoir le Feu et la Terre, comme matière, et sa forme propre, – puis
une autre cause, cause externe, c’est-à-dire le père (…) les causes universelles
dont nous parlions n’existent donc pas. Le principe des individus, en effet, c’est
l’ individu ; de l’homme en général ne sortirait que l’homme en général, mais
l’homme en général n’est pas ; c’est Pélée qui est le principe d’Achille» (trad.
J. Tricot).
Cette note réunit trois arguments : 1) si la cause première agissait directe-
ment dans le causé, la cause seconde serait inutile, ce qui ressemble à première
vue à un paralogisme (car la cause seconde pourrait avoir un effet différent de
celui de la cause première) mais qui s’appuie peut-être sur Thomas citant Pro-
clus, Elementatio theologica, 56 :Omne quod a secundis producitur, et a prioribus
et causalioribus producitur eminentius, a quibus et secunda producebantur, Saf-
frey, p. 5, l. 18-20, ce qui donnerait à penser que la cause seconde soit seulement
plus faible que la cause première ; toutefois, l’objection suppose d’ ignorer la
suite du commentaire de Thomas aussi bien que l’exemple cité par le dévelop-
pement de la proposition (Pattin, §§6-11), pourtant figurant peu après le lieu de
77 Trois lettres au bord de la marge, peut-être exponctuées, illisibles.
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cette intervention dans le texte hébreu; 2) la puissance que possède la matière
de la chose, sa prédisposition78, n’a pas de place dans le schéma proposé : on
ne peut dire qu’elle est première, car elle est le début plutôt que la cause, et
l’on ne peut dire qu’elle est dernière (puisque préexistante)79 ; 3) l’action loin-
tainene rendpas comptedesparticuliers. Il n’est pas impossible de la retrouver,
comme les précédentes, parmi les questions que posent Gilles de Rome80 ou
Siger de Brabant81 et, hors la forme de question, chez Thomas82, deux d’entre






Objection : le sang et les humeurs sont la cause prochaine et lamatière, la
lointaine84, des membres, et les aliments cause des humeurs, et les élé-
ments cause des aliments, c’est-à-dire des végétaux. Supposons que le
sang et les humeurs soient absents des membres, quel sera l’épanche-
ment ou la puissance qui épanchera sur eux à partir des éléments, quelle
cause s’exercera sur eux?
78 Aristote, Métaphysique, Θ (IX), 1, 1046a, 10-15, puissance passive ; 6, 1048a, 25-35.
79 Aristote, Métaphysique, Θ (IX), 8, 1049b, 3-5 : «De nos considérations (Δ, 11, 1018b 9-1019a
14) sur les différentes acceptions de l’antérieur, il résulte clairement que l’acte est anté-
rieur à la puissance» (trad. J. Tricot).
80 V. supra, n. 57.
81 Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones super in Librum de causis, p. 36-41, q. 1, Vtrum causa prima-
ria plus influat et magis sit causa effectus causae secundariae quam ipsa causa secundaria,
et q. 2,Vtrum causa primaria naturaliter possit producere effectum causae secundariae sine
causa secundaria (qui reçoit une réponse négative) ; p. 51-55, q. 5, Vtrum forma commu-
nior sit prior et formaminus communis sit posterior ; q. 6, Vtrum formamagis communis sit
magis causa quam forma minus communis ; peut-être q. 7, Vtrum cum aliquod individuum
hominis non est remaneat animal.
82 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 9, l. 10-11.
83 (Ps.-)Henri de Gand, Quaestiones in Librum de causis, q. 9 et 10, à propos du déficit de la
cause première par rapport à la seconde, éd. Zwaenepoel, p. 33-36 ; q. 11, que la première
ne saurait opérer sans la seconde, p. 37. L’édition date ce commentaire entre 1245 et 1255
(p. 15).
84 L’hébreu porte par erreur : « la prochaine» ; ce qui est ici nommé «lamatière» correspond
à ce qui est appelé «les éléments» dans la suite de cette note.
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Onmontre ici, sur un exemple médical, la nécessité des causes secondes en
tant qu’ intermédiaires ; cette objection s’ajoute aux trois précédentes.
2. Une note marginale, f. 75v, explique le mot «horizon» translittéré dans le
corps du texte (§22 : L’existence qui est après l’ éternité et au-dessus du temps est
l’âme, parce qu’elle est plus bas que l’horizon de l’ éternité et au-dessus du temps)
en lettres hébraïques :
ןוימדומכהזו.תוארללכונשהמלכמוניטבמתאת]ב[בוסההל]ו[געהומכ:שוריפ
.דבל
Explication : comme le cercle qui circonscrit notre vuede tout ce quenous
pouvons discerner, et c’est seulement à titre de comparaison.
3. Une note marginale, f. 76, après les mots : et ainsi elle [l’âme supérieure] pro-
duira une action divine (§32) :
ילכהתויהםעו,יהלאהחכהןוימד,הענההלשהלועפהוזב,הלשישרובעב:שוריפ
.]תיהלאל׳׳צ,הארנכ![תילכשהלועפהשעת,לכשה
«Explication : parce qu’ il y a dans cette action de motion une ressem-
blance avec la puissance divine, bien qu’elle ne soit qu’un instrument de
l’ intellect, elle opère une action divine», où le copiste, peut-être choqué
par l’ idée, en tout cas à la faveur d’une ressemblance paléographique
entre les deux mots hébreux, a écrit «une action intellectuelle», ce qui
ne serait qu’une lapalissade. Cette note ne fait guère plus que répéter le
texte ; peut-être voudrait-elle résoudre la difficulté due au glissement de
la notion d’action «divine» à celle d’action «intellectuelle», éventuel-
lement due à une erreur dans la tradition latine (l’éd. Pattin [§§32-33]
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Hillel a dit : de cette proposition [Tout intellect pense les chosesperpétuelles
qui ne périssent ni ne tombent sous le temps] et de son explication on a tiré
qu’ il n’y a de science que de ce qui ne se corrompt pas et de là on a voulu
faire une distinction et montrer que la médecine n’est pas une science. Il
n’y a pas là de difficulté car, en vérité, elle n’est pas une science au sens
absolu (stam= simpliciter?),mais science en ce qu’elle donne à connaître
quelque chose, et qu’ il conviendrait mieux de la qualifier du terme de
connaissance. C’est pourquoi Avicenne a dit85 qu’elle était une science
pratique et dans son grand livre (le Canon) il a déclaré qu’elle «était la
science grâce à laquelle on connaissait la disposition du corps humain»,
etc.86, mais non une science tout court ; et cela peut se résoudre encore
autrement, voir ce [qu’ il en a écrit].
Lui-même médecin, Hillel note immédiatement une conséquence bien éloi-
gnée du mouvement métaphysique du texte qu’ il traduit et étudie.
10(11)/12/b.
.וילעךומסלןיאוהנומאהדגנאוההמדקההוזשוריפםנמא
Cependant l’explication de cette proposition est contraire à la foi et il n’y
a pas à s’appuyer sur elle87.
Ce jugement porte logiquement sur la partie omise du développement (début
du §101), dont n’a été expressément rapportée que la fin («Le commenta-
teur dit à la fin de l’explication, avec force»). Cette dernière glose reprend
sans doute Thomas d’Aquin, mais renvoie par là non, comme lui, au théorème
(§100 : Tout intellect pense les choses éternelles qui ne sont pas détruites ni ne
tombent sous le temps)88, mais au développement omis (Solère : si l’ intelligence
85 Avicenne,Urjûzat fî t-tibb («Poème sur lamédecine») : «Lamédecine est [l’art de] conser-
ver la santé et éventuellement de guérir les maladies survenues dans le corps» : Medicina
est conservatio sanitatis et curatioaegritudinis…cuiusprimadivisio est, in theoricametprac-
ticam (Avicenne, Poème sur la médecine, éd. G. Rhau,Wittenberg, 1562, f. A5v).
86 Avicenne,Canon, 1.1.1.1 : «Lamédecine est une sciencepar laquelle on connaît lesmanières
dont le corps humain se comporte et évolue, du point de vue de ce qui est en bonne santé
ou de ce qui altère sa santé, en vue de préserver intégralement la santé et de la restaurer,
le cas échéant, lorsqu’elle est déficiente».
87 Cette note est inscrite dans le texte (f. 78r) parallèlement à la précédente ; il se peut que le
Amar Hillel qui les précède vaille pour l’une et l’autre.
88 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 73, l. 4-5 : signanter autem dicit ‘quae
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est toujours ce qui n’est pas mû, elle est alors cause pour les choses perpétuelles,
qui ne sont pas détruites ni changées et ne tombent pas sous la génération et la
corruption). On pourrait donc supposer un recours au commentaire de Gilles
de Rome, qui conteste le même point que Thomas mais à propos du début du
développement (f. 39v) et non du théorème. Contrairement à ce que donne à
penser la formule, la partie omise est très brève : «en effet, si l’ intellect est ce qui
ne semeut pas, il est la cause de choses éternelles qui nepérissent pas et ne sont
pas soumises à la génération et à la corruption» ; il s’agit peut-être de refuser
que l’ intellect, et non Dieu même, soit la cause des choses éternelles, autre-
ment dit de refuser une thèse de la création «par l’ intermédiaire de l’ intellect»,
d’origine plotinienne, queCristinaD’Ancona a jugée caractéristique duDe cau-
sis et qui permettait de concilier la causalité par création et la causalité par
information89. Mais la difficulté s’éclaire autrement par le biais du commen-
taire de Thomas, auquel la formule de condamnation doit être empruntée90, et
qui explicite les conséquences ruineuses de cette position : si les productions de
l’ intellect étaient éternelles, les anges ne pourraient causer d’ innovation dans






La note suit ce passage du Liber de causis92 : [§124. Tout connaissant connaît
son existence ; aussi fait-il retour vers elle d’un retour total. § 125. (trad. Solère) :
La raison en est que la connaissance n’est rien d’autre qu’une action intelligible.
Lors donc que l’ être connaissant connaît sa propre essence, il revient à elle par son
non destruuntur neque cadunt sub tempore’, où il s’agit de la fin de la proposition propre-
ment dite ; à propos de signanter v. supra, n. 59.
89 Cf. D’Ancona 1995, p. 73-95.
90 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 74, l. 25-26 : Hac enim probatione
suscepta, multa fundamenta catholicae fidei tollerentur. Ce parallèle et celui du signanter
précédent avaient été signalés par Steinschneider 1863, p. 111, n. 2.
91 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 74, l. 7–p. 75, l. 2 : sequeretur enim
quod angeli nihil de novo in his inferioribus immediate facere possent, et multo minus Deus
qui non solum est aeternus, sed ante aeternitatem, ut supra dictum est, et sequeretur ulterius
mundum semper fuisse.
92 Sont rayées les phrases du texte latin courant omises par le traducteur hébreu.
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opération intelligible. §126. Et cela ne peut être, sinon parce que le connaissant et
le connu sont chose une […] sa substance fait donc retour à son essence. §§127–
128. La raison en est la suivante : étant donné que la connaissance est science du
connaissant […] substance simple et se suffisant à soi]. (Ces deux derniers §§
ainsi remplacés dans la traduction hébraïque de Hillel, où se reconnaît encore
l’essentiel du §127 : Ainsi il le connaît parce qu’ il est connaissant et qu’ainsi sa
substance revient sur sa propre substance. Et cela advient parce que la connais-
sance n’est pas autre chose qu’une action intelligente). – «Hillel a dit : le com-
mentateur s’est étendu ici en choses superflues et confuses, c’est pourquoi je
ne les ai pas écrites ; elles relèvent toutes de la connaissance de l’ intellect, de
l’ intelligent et de l’ intelligible qui sont substantiellement une seule chose et
c’est bien expliqué dans le livre des Six Principes d’al-Fārābī qui donne à ce
propos l’exemple de la lumière, de la vue et du soleil, qu’on s’y reporte93 ; notre
maître Moïse [Maïmonide] l’a aussi bien exposé à propos de l’ intellection de
ces choses94».
L’annotateur ramène ici de manière expéditive l’ inconnu au connu sans
s’arrêter aux «choses superflues et confuses» qui témoignent peut-être d’une
doctrine quelque peu différente de celle de Maïmonide et de ces sources, à en
juger par la pluralité de propositions des Éléments de théologie de Proclus que
saint Thomas cite ici dans son propre commentaire.
15(16)/15 (après le §129 : Toutes les puissances qui sont infinies dépendent du
premier infini qui est la puissance des puissances. Nonparce qu’elles sont [au plu-
riel, selon une variante attestée chez Pattin et notée par Solère] fixées dans les
choses existantes, mais elles sont dans les choses existantes qui possèdent [de ce
fait?] la fixité).
.םיתבתכאלןכלו,ךרוצילבלךובנאוההזבשוריפהירבד:ללהרמא
Hillel a dit : le propos de l’explication ici s’égare sans nécessité, c’est pour-
quoi je ne l’ai pas rapporté.
93 Al-Fārābī, Sefer ha-hatḥalot (éd. Filipowski), p. 4-5 : où la métaphore évoquée par Hil-
lel (il s’agit de la manière dont l’ intellect agent rend l’homme capable de comprendre
à la manière dont le soleil, par sa lumière, rend la vue capable de voir cette lumière
même et sa source) est la fin d’un long développement sur la manière dont chaque degré
d’ intelligence est capable d’ intelliger ce qui est au-dessus de lui, par le fait même que
celui-ci l’ intellige, et les autres intelligibles.
94 Moïse Maïmonide, Le guide des égarés, I, 68, trad. Munk, t. I, p. 301-312.
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Cette note encore confirme l’ identité du traducteur et de l’annotateur.
Quant à ce qui a pu l’ indisposer dans le développement de cette proposition,
ce pourrait être cette notion très néoplatonicienne des puissances créées mais
infinies : aux §§130-136, il n’est encore question que de l’ intellect premier créé,
mais au §137 s’affirme à plein, et comme nulle part ailleurs dans l’opuscule, le
statut similaire des «bontés simples telles que la vie et la lumière», intermé-
diaires de l’effusion à partir de la Cause première qui portent atteinte à l’ idée
de la création une et directement opérée par Dieu seul.


















































Hillel a dit : cette version de la proposition ainsi que son commentaire
ne sont pas justes. Il ( !) donne en effet comme cause de l’ infinité [d’une
puissance] son unité et ce n’est pas une preuve nécessaire, car une chose
qui a des causes multiples ne prend pas corps nécessairement à cause
d’une seule, à moins qu’elle ne soit essentielle et cause très proche de
cette chose. Et la cause substantielle de la chose, [et] qui [lui] est for-
melle, est unique. L’exemple, à cet égard, de la pluralité des causes est
si l’on dit que tel homme a très chaud en n’attribuant cette chaleur qu’à
sa proximité du feu95, disant que s’ il a chaud, c’est qu’ il est près du feu ;
or, il se peut qu’ il ait chaud pour d’autres causes échauffantes comme
un mouvement exagéré, une nourriture chaude, un breuvage chaud, un
air chaud. Il en va de même de cette causalité posée par la proposition,
à savoir que la chose soit infinie par suite de son unité, alors que ce n’en
est que [ ! scil. : ce n’en est pas] la cause essentielle, car il se peut qu’elle
soit infinie parce qu’elle est première de tous les existants, car tout ce
qui est premier en cela est infini, car on ne s’en figure pas la fin dans le
95 Élaboration à partir de l’exemple du feu, source de toute chaleur, donné dans le commen-
taire de saint Thomas à la prop. 17(18), éd. Saffrey, p. 102, l. 7-8.
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temps ni dans l’espace ; de même ce qui est forme entièrement séparée
de toute matière est infini nécessairement ; de même encore ce qui est
cause première de toutes les causes est nécessairement infini ; de même
l’éternité (f. 79v) implique que la chose soit infinie. Ainsi, l’unité n’est pas
cause essentielle de l’ infinité de la chose. Et si l’on dit que l’unité est jus-
tement ce qui a causé tout cela, c’est-à-dire que la chose soit première,
qu’elle soit une forme séparée et qu’elle soit cause première, je refuse
[en répondant] à cela que l’unité ne sont (sic) pas cause essentielle et
formelle pour la primauté, parce que l’unité et la primauté et l’un et le
premier sont substituables (mithafekhim) dans un sujet l’un à l’autre ; car
tout ce qui est un [et] simple d’une unité et d’une simplicité absolues est
nécessairement premier, et tout ce qui est absolument premier est néces-
sairement un, ce qui est très bien expliqué au l. III de la Métaphysique96 ;
al-Fārābī, dans son livre des Principes, l’ a montré clairement, qu’on s’y
reporte97. Dans ces conditions, aucun d’entre ces [principes] n’est cause
première ou essentielle-formelle d’un autre ; car tout ce qui est de la sorte,
on ne dira pas qu’ il est cause essentielle de l’autre, car tout ce qui est
cause essentielle-formelle d’une chose est une cause particulière, propre
à elle seule, associée avec rien d’autre de sorte que cette cause serait aussi
sa cause particulière, car alors une seule cause formelle en acte en serait
deux pour une seule chose en acte. Et si l’on dit qu’ il y a deux choses en
acte mais qu’elles ont aussi deux causes formelles en acte, chaque cause
[étant] propre et particulière à son causé, ou si l’on nie cette [dernière
proposition] et que l’on affirme l’autre, il en résultera que nous dirons
qu’ il sera possible qu’une seule substance en acte comporte deux sub-
stances en acte et qu’une droite en acte comporte deux demi-droites en
acte, et tout cela est impossible, comme il est dit au l. XI de la Métaphy-
sique98. Dès lors, l’unité n’est pas plus la cause particulière et formelle
de la primauté d’une chose que sa primauté n’est elle-même cause de
96 Si notre correction de la leçon pourtant plausible elle-même du ms., šoršey (« les prin-
cipes»), en šeliši (« le [l.] III») est justifiée. La référence pourrait être alors à B (III) 999ab
ou 1001ab où il est question plusieurs fois du caractère premier de l’un.
97 Éd. cit., p. 1, mais qui formule l’ implication inverse : «ce qui est premier ne peut être plu-
riel, mais seulement un et simple» ( אלאהברההיהישרשפאיאהנושארההגירדמבשהמו
דבלטושפדחא ).
98 Aristote, Métaphysique, K(XI), 2, 1060b 5sqq., sur la critique de ceux qui identifient le pre-
mierprincipe à l’un ; 10,1066b 10sqq., sur lanon-divisibilité de l’ infini enacte (muettement
informé par la demi-droite en puissance dans la droite entière, Métaphysique, Θ(VIII),
1048a 30-35 et peut-être par l’exemple des deux demi-droites en Aristote, Physique, VIII,
12, 10sqq., en part. 25).
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[son] unité, mais c’est la présence de l’une qui rend l’autre nécessaire ;
pour ainsi dire, l’unité implique la primauté et la primauté, l’unité, et que
[celui qui les possède] soit séparé, subsistant par lui-même, éternel, sans
corps, sans limite, et tous [ces attributs] sont substituables l’un à l’autre
selon le mode de la nécessité que l’un (f. 80r) accompagne l’autre, et non
selon celui de la causalité de l’un par rapport à un autre. Et l’un n’est
pas antérieur à l’autre dans le temps ni dans l’existence ; quelquefois une
chose sera cause d’une autre, sans pour autant que l’une soit antérieure à
l’autre, à l’exemple de la chaleur avec le feu, de l’ombre avec le corps et du
jour avec la lumière du soleil : bien que l’on dise que l’un est la cause de
l’autre, néanmoins l’un n’est pas antérieur à l’autre et tous deux existent
ensemble99. Et pour ce qu’on a dit100 que notre maître Moïse (Maïmo-
nide) avait refusé la comparaison101 de la chaleur avec le feu et de l’ombre
avec le corps, ce n’est pas ce dont nous [traitons] à présent et il n’y a pas
lieu de le commenter ; qui réfléchit le reconnaîtra. De tout cela résulte
que l’unité n’est pas cause particulière de l’ infinité et qu’on n’en tire pas
non plus une preuve [de celle-ci] comme l’ont pensé l’auteur et le com-
mentateur ; mais le reste du commentaire est juste en disant que l’unité
nécessite la primauté et la primauté, l’unité. Qu’on n’objecte pas à partir
de l’existenced’unepluralité d’ intellects séparés, parce que chacund’eux
est premier et simple en sa substance et un et simple en son existence
essentielle ; qu’on sache qu’à partir de l’un simple véritable rien n’existe
que de simple et un, et le premier intellect seul à partir du Premier, rien
99 Cf. MoïseMaïmonide, Le guide des égarés, I, 53, t. I, p. 205-216 (ch. 51-60, p. 182-266), sur ce
que les attributs ne sont pas séparés en Dieu mais ne font que décrire pour les hommes
les actions diverses procédant d’une vertu unique. Il en résulte évidemment l’absence de
dépendance de l’un par rapport aux autres. C’est peut-être de ce même refus de distin-
guer en Dieu des attributs essentiels que Hillel tire l’objection rapportée ensuite au nom
de Maïmonide contre la métaphore du feu et du chaud qui, comme il le dit, ne regarde
pas la présente question d’une éventuelle hiérarchie des attributs.
100 Nous traduisons comme si Hillel évoquait, en employant un hendiadys, une position de
Maïmonide qui pourrait sembler une objection ; il ne paraît pourtant pas entièrement
exclu que le texte, qui dit littéralement «pour ce qu’ ils ont dit que Maïmonide avait
refusé», réponde ici à un adversaire invisible, un autre expositeur juif du Liber de cau-
sis (Maïmonide ne se réfère évidemment pas au Liber) ou quelque contradicteur déjà
affronté sur le même sujet hors référence au De causis. – L’objection contre ces méta-
phores au nom de Maïmonide peut provenir soit de son refus de distinguer des attributs
d’essence enDieu (v. note précédente), soit de son refus de toute ressemblance entre lui et
les choses (I, 55, t. I, p. 225-226) au profit des seuls attributs négatifs (I, 58, t. I, p. 240-247) ;
mais Maïmonide n’a pas lui-même employé ces comparaisons.
101 Ce terme fait difficulté : il désigne d’habitude le terme comparé, non la comparaison.
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de plus ; et que du premier intellect suit nécessairement le second, et tous
de même [jusqu’à la sphère inférieure]102.
Cette note a été suffisamment commentée dans la présentation générale et
dans les notes de bas de page précédentes.
17(18)/17a. Résume les §§144 et 148, premier et dernier, du développement de
la proposition (qui énonce, au §143 : Toutes les choses ont une existence, c’ est-à-
dire une essence, du fait de l’ existant premier, et toutes les choses sont vivantes et
se meuvent du fait de son existence et de sa vie103, et toutes les choses intellectives





Le commentateur [des théorèmes] a dit : ici, il a donné comme une défi-
nition unique à notre vie, en disant que la vie est la multiplication d’un
bien qui se multiplie à partir du Bien premier qui est fixe et perpétuel à
tout jamais et qui par son existence dispense tout ce qui dépend du bien,
à titre de cause ou de cause de cause ; cependant, il donne la vie première
à ce qui est en-dessous de lui non seulement de manière causale mais
[aussi] de manière formelle.
Nous voyons ici un indice de ce que ce type d’ intervention est le fait de l’auteur
des notes critiques : en effet, ce résumé évite avec soin les formules que la note
suivante va mettre en question et insiste d’avance sur la distinction qu’elle
va avancer, en énonçant que d’un Bien premier immuable procèdent tous les
biens, parmi lesquels la vie, dont le nom (un pluriel, en hébreu) indique lui-
même le processus de dispensation par l’Un parmi la multiplicité des choses
créées.
102 Lecture conjecturale et peu sûre : «et tous de même» est suivi d’un acronyme g.l.h. qui
peut se lire galgal ha-taḥaton, « la sphère inférieure», mais la préposition alors nécessaire
(‘ad, « jusqu’à») ne figure pas.
103 Semble supposer dans le modèle latin, au lieu de «et res vivae omnes sunt motae per
essentiam suam propter vitam primam», «et res vivae omnes et motae per essentiam
suam propter vitam suam», variantes non signalées par Pattin et par Magnard et alii.
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Hillel a dit : lorsque [le commentateur] énonce «à cause de (baʿad) sa
vie», c’est une façon de parler en parabole et en figure, en un sens large,
car il n’y a pas lieu de dire, à propos de Dieu, qu’ il possède une vie, car
il est la source de la vie et il est [le] vivant (ḥay)104 et non dans la vie ; il
est lui-même la vie. La vraie définition de la vie est d’être une action per-
manente (80v) d’une âme sur un corps animé105 ; la vie a encore d’autres
définitions.
Hillel introduit une distinction entre vie divine et vie humaine, la première
étant ainsi nommée de manière figurée, conformément à la distinction et à la
formulation maïmonidiennes106, mais peut-être, ici, réactivées à la lecture du
commentaire de saint Thomas107. À cela il oppose la définition «vraie», c’est-
à-dire au sens propre, de la vie, qui suppose la présence d’un corps (d’après le
Deanima?), ajoutant qu’ il en est d’autres (médicales?). Il identifie décidément
la Cause première à Dieu108.
104 Cet adjectif a la particularité d’avoir par rapport au nom de la vie l’apparence morpholo-
gique d’un singulier par rapport à un pluriel ; ainsi il apparaît plutôt comme son principe
unitaire que comme son dérivé. Hillel se souvient sans doute aussi de la mise en garde de
Maïmonide contre l’ idée d’attributs de Dieu (v. supra, prop. 16 [17]), répétée par lui préci-
sément à propos de son caractère de «vivant» (par essence), et non «doué de vie», Moïse
Maïmonide, Le guide des égarés, I, 68, t. I, p. 302-303.
105 Cf. Aristote, De anima, II, 1, 412a12-412b, 413a10?
106 Moïse Maïmonide, Le guide des égarés, I, 57, t. I, p. 232, à propos des supposés attri-
buts d’essence : « il est toujours d’une existence nécessaire […] il existe, mais non par
l’existence, et de même il vit, mais non par la vie, il peut, mais non par la puissance, et
il sait, mais non par la science».
107 Thomas d’Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio, p. 102, l. 4-24, en part. 16-17, citant Pro-
clus (Elementatio theologica, 102) : Omnia viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam
primam.
108 Se conformant en cela au Livre des principes d’al-Fārābī, éd. cit., p. 1 : «du premier, il
convient de croire qu’ il est Dieu, et il est la cause première, [cause] prochaine de l’exis-
tence des seconds [existants] et de celle de l’ intellect agent» ( יואררשאאוהןושארהו
לעופהלכשהתואיצמוםיינשהתואיצמלהבורקההנושארההבסהאוהולאהאוהשובןמאיש ).
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18(19)/18 (après le §149 : Parmi les intellects, il y a l’ intellect divin, ceux qui
reçoi[ven]t des biens premiers divins qui proviennent de la Cause première, d’une
réception abondante ; et les intellects simples, etc.).
.שוריפהכירצאלתאזההמדקהה:ללהרמא
Hillel a dit : cette proposition ne requiert pas d’explication.
Aussi en a-t-il omis le développement (§§150-154).
19(20)/19 (après le §155 : La Cause première régit toutes les choses créées sans se
mêler aucunement à elles).
.שוריפהכירצהניאוז:ללהרמא
Hillel a dit : celle-ci ne requiert pas d’explication.
Et il a omis les §§156-161.
20(21)/20 (après le §162 : Le Premier est pour ainsi dire riche par lui-même et il
n’est pas de richesse supérieure à la sienne).
.עפשעיפשמובהצרי׳׳רשועורישע׳׳ורמואב:ילשמרובידההזםג:ללהרמא
Hillel a dit : c’est là encore une expression figurée : par ‘riche’ et ‘richesse’
on veut dire ‘celui qui épanche’ [et] ‘épanchement’.




Hillel a dit : celle-ci non plus ne requiert pas d’explication.
Il a amalgamé, pour formuler la proposition, le §166 et le début du §167 en
ajoutant encore la notion de cause qui ne figure pas (La cause première est plus
haute que toutes les causes et que tous les discours et ne connaît ni augmentation
ni diminution) ; il omet la suite du développement jusqu’au §171 inclus.
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22(23)/22 (après le §172 : Tout intellect divin connaît les choses parce qu’ il est un
intellect et les dirige parce qu’ il est divin).
.גיהנמאוההזיאבוליכשמ)א81(אוהןפואהזיאבעידוהלהבהצר.עודיתאזםג
Cela aussi est connu. Il a voulu faire connaître de quelle façon [l’ intellect
divin] intellige et régit.
Omission des §§173-175.




Explication : selon [sa] disposition, donne et épanche tout l’existant. De
la sorte, sa puissance se trouve en toutes choses selon une disposition
unique.




«Explication : [les existants] semaintiennent à cause d’elle, [mais] seule-
ment selon la capacité de traiter ce qu’ il reçoit qui se trouve dans le rece-
veur, et non selon le donateur, car alors tous seraient semblables à elle [la
Cause première] quant à leurs biens.» – Les §§177-180 ne sont pas tra-
duits.
23(24)/23c. Remarque sur la plus grande appropriation à celle-ci du développe-
ment d’une autre proposition, non précisée. Il pourrait s’agir de la prop. 19(20),
dont le développement avait été jugé superflu par l’annotateur : «La cause pre-
mière dirige toutes les choses créées sans aucunement se mêler à elles» ; le
développement visé serait alors celui des §§156-161.
.וזבשרופישיואררתויהיה]![תמדקהבשרפמהשריפששוריפהותואשילהארנו
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Il me semble que l’explication donnée par le commentateur à la pro-
position [l’ incipit ou un numéro sont omis] aurait été plus appropriée à
celle-ci.
11(12)/24 (après le §103 : De tous les premiers, certains sont en d’autres de la




Hillel a dit : il semble qu’on doive expliquer ici les puissances en disant
que certaines puissances premières entrent dans certaines autres puis-
sances qui sont aussi premières ; à la façon dont, [pour] une puissance
quelconque d’un degré intelligible, il s’en trouvera aussi une autre, [éga-
lement] intelligible, sur lemoded’un épanchement supplémentaire [spé-
cifique?] et non simplement d’un épanchement d’un épanchement.
Onpeut se demander dans ce cas particulier si Hillel remplace ici délibérément
le texte du développement (§§104-108) ou s’ il n’en disposait pas (la proposi-
tion, déplacée, ayantpuêtre copiée sans lui enmarged’unmodèle ouêtre saisie
à la hâte à partir d’un autre manuscrit). Qu’ il n’en dise mot et se montre hési-
tant sur l’objet de la proposition («il semble») irait dans le sens de la deuxième
hypothèse. Cependant, le déplacement de cette proposition ici ne doit rien au
hasard, comme il ressort des notes de Hillel lui-même à propos de celle-ci et
de la suivante ; mais il n’est pas possible de déterminer si le réarrangement
est de son fait ou avait déjà été opéré dans son modèle latin. D’un autre côté,
il est notable qu’alors que l’énoncé seul de la proposition (qu’une faculté est
dans une autre selon le mode de celle-ci) n’évoquait qu’une sorte de conver-
tibilité mutuelle, Hillel introduise l’ idée de hiérarchie qui figurait bien dans
le développement originel, comme s’ il avait eu accès bel et bien à celui-ci. –
En insistant en termes d’ influx sur la particularité de chaque mode de pré-
sence d’une puissance en l’autre et en écartant l’explication par le seul influx
d’ influx, Hillel pourrait cependant faire écho à la fin du commentaire de Tho-
mas (Saffrey p. 81, l. 10-12, mais en termes de similitudines et species), soit plus
sûrement à Gilles de Rome (f. 41v, qui marque plus nettement la hiérarchie
descendante que suppose l’«épanchement d’épanchement» dont parle Hil-
lel et qui emploie fluunt). Le terme de «puissances» lui est propre, Thomas et
Gilles parlant ici d’« intelligences». Il prendrait position personnellement sur
un caractère de cette hiérarchie : elle ne serait pas dégressive par déperdition
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à partir d’un épanchement unique, mais progressive, par enrichissement de
l’ influx premier par un apport propre des causes secondes. Ce pourrait être la
continuation de la critique de la proposition 1 : le particulier ne serait pas plus
pauvre que le général, mais plus riche que lui.




C’est-à-dire d’autre chose qu’un[e substance] intellect[ive] ou le dona-
teur d’un surplus d’ intelligence dans cette substance [intellective]. Cette
proposition ressemble à l’autre [sic, scil. la précédente], [formule]
presque comme une différence [= exception?] par rapport à ce principe,
et l’explique.
Noter la continuité avec la note de la proposition précédente. – L’«autre sub-
stance intellective» et le «donateur d’ intelligence» (Dieu?) se reconnaissent
dans la «cause» évoquée par le développement originel (§185 : Et non fit causa
formationis suae et sui complementi nisi propter relationem suam ad causam
suam semper), comme l’exprimait plus clairement le développement de la
prop. 11(12)/24 faisant référence à la hiérarchie des intelligences dont on parle.
L’ idée de la proposition et de son développement serait selon Hillel qu’une
substance intelligible, quoiqu’ indépendante de tout ce qui est à son niveau et
inférieur à lui, est dans un rapport de dépendance causale vis-à-vis d’un autre
intellect et, au-delà, de la source des intellects, et que cela mérite explicitation.
25(26)/26 (après le §187 : Aucune substance qui subsiste par elle-même ne tombe
sous la corruption).
.תרחאהלאהמיתחומכאיהוזו.רבדמהווהנוניא,ןכםאו:שוריפ
Commentaire : ainsi, elle n’advient pas [non plus] à partir d’autre chose.
C’est comme une conclusion de l’autre [sic ; scil., la proposition précé-
dente].
Manque à nouveau le développement (§§188-190). Il n’est peut-être pas néces-
saire d’assigner à une référence précise et tacite (Aristote, De generatione et
corruptione, I, 3?) la notion philosophique banale qu’une chose naît du dépé-
446 rothschild
rissement d’une autre, et réciproquement, qui autorise l’annotateur à renvoyer
de la non-corruption à la non-génération et retrouve l’énoncé de la proposition
24(25)/25.
26(27)/27 (après le §191 : Toute substance périssable et non éternelle est soit com-
posée soit portée par autre chose).
רמאשהזיכ:הווהנוניאשרבדהןמרמולכ,תרחאהלאלדבהומכאיהןכםגוז:שוריפ
.ומצעבדמועוניאורבדלעאושנואבכרומאוהןכלו,יחצנוניא,הווהנאוהוזב
Commentaire : ceci aussi est comme une différence par rapport à l’autre
[la proposition précédente], c’est-à-dire [le cas de] la chose [substance]
non engendrée, car celle dont il parle dans celle-ci est engendrée et non
éternelle, elle est donc composée ouportée par quelque chose et non sub-
sistante par soi.
Omet et résume le développement (§§192-193) en reprenant les deux formes
de dépendance que celui-ci évoque (§192 : aut est indigens rebus ex quibus est
et est composita ex eis, aut est indigens in fixione sua et sua essentia deferente.
Cum ergo separatur deferens eam, corrumpitur et destruitur) et en précisant la
différence ainsi marquée par rapport aux substances éternelles dont il a été
question plus haut.








Hillel a dit : il me semble que ces deux [dernières] propositions ne sont
qu’une, étant l’ inverse l’une de l’autre, c’est-à-dire que toute substance
qui subsiste à cause de (baʿad) l’essence109 de sa substance est simple
et que toute substance simple subsiste à cause de l’essence de sa sub-
109 Hawwayah, qui traduisait plus haut generatio, traduit cette fois, dans le texte même de la
proposition, essentia.
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stance. [Le texte] a dit «selon (lefi) son essence» parce que les essences
des substances simples ne sont pas toutes d’un même mode, à égalité, et
que l’essence de la substance qui subsiste par sa propre essence simple,
c’est bien connu, subsistant d’elle-même, ne comporte ni composition ni
dépendance d’autre chose qui la fasse subsister.
Hillel semble forcer le sens de la proposition, qui portait per essentiam suam,
«par» son essence, et non, «selon», c’est-à-dire en fonction des différences
entre les essences. Il le fait dans l’esprit du corps du développement, qu’ il n’a
pas traduit (§§200-202) ; non plus que celui (§§195-198) de la prop. précédente
(§194 : Toute substance qui subsiste par son essence est simple et non divisée),
lequel oppose en effet, à nouveau, les substances subsistantes par leur essence
à celles qui sont generatae ex aliquo (§201), mais contre le sens de la proposi-
tion et de la conclusion du développement, qui n’ introduisent nulle division
parmi les substances subsistantes par leur essence. Cette différence s’éclaire
au vu du commentaire de Thomas, p. 134, l. 8-10, citant Proclus (où l’on trouve
secundum suam substantiam, au lieu du per substantiam du De causis) ; Tho-
mas opère aussi le rapprochement avec la proposition précédente (ibid., l. 1 :
Hic ponitur propositio conversa [= mithafekhoth] prioris). Toutefois, alors que
Thomas oppose des substances dépendantes du temps et d’autres, subsistantes
par soi, Hillel s’en tient à l’opposition plus générale entre substances par soi et
substances dépendantes d’autre chose.
29(30)/31 (après le §203 : Toute substance créée dans le temps ou est toujours
dans le temps et le temps ne l’ excède pas, ou n’est pas toujours dans le temps et le
temps l’ excède parce qu’elle est créée dans certains moments du temps).
.ראובמהז:ללהרמא
Hillel a dit : c’est évident.
Le substantiel développement (§§204-209) est omis.
30(31)/31 (après le §210 : Entre la chose dont la substance est dans un instant de
l’ éternité et la chose dont la substance et l’action sont dans un instant du temps
il y a un intermédiaire : celle dont la substance est dans un instant de l’ éternité et





Hillel a dit : cet intermédiaire, ce sont (sic) ceux qui se trouvent entre le
monde éternel et celui de la génération et de la corruption, comme les
sphères et certains des degrés des âmes. J’y ai fait allusion dans les [scil. à
propos des] deux propositions qui commencent par ‘Parmi les intellects’,
etc.110.
Cela peut faire écho au commentaire de Thomas (p. 141, l. 10–p. 142, l. 3) qui
envisage successivement cette position intermédiaire pour le corpus caeleste
et pour l’âme; toutefois, Thomas conclut à propos du premier qu’ il ne relève
quedu temps ; et, quant à la seconde, il ne formule pas de restriction à «certains
degrés».
31(32)/32a (après le début du §214 : Il y a une substance qui tombe selon certaines
de [ses] dispositions et qui est (sic) sous l’ éternité et il y a une substance qui tombe




Celui qui tombe sous l’éternité est celui dont on dit qu’ il est existant,
(c’est-à-dire), permanence, véritable et celui qui tombe sous le temps est
celui qui est existence véritable ; et la permanence et le devenir sont en
même temps dans sa (sic) substance.
Hillel, sans le dire, ou peut-être son modèle latin, résume lui-même le long
développement de la proposition 32 en quelques mots qui identifient bien
l’objet de la proposition, à savoir la co-existence de l’existence absolue, éter-
nelle, et de l’existence en devenir, dans le temps, que l’énoncé de la propo-
sition même, dans sa traduction ou dans le modèle de celle-ci, avait rendu
inintelligible111 ; le rétablissement se fait au prix d’une rupture dans la phrase
110 Il y en a trois : prop. 9(10), numérotée 14 dans lems. deHillel (f. 77v), et prop. 10(11) (num. 12 ;
f. 78r), entre lesquelles s’ insère la prop. 12(13), bien que numérotée 11 dans le ms. (f. 77v–
78r). 9(10) seulement présente un commentaire (supra) en rapport allusif avec le point
considéré,Hillel ajoutant que les intellects reçoivent l’épanchementde laCausepremière,
chacun selon ses capacités ; 10(11) ne comporte pas de commentaire ni de glose, 12(13) pré-
sente, on l’a vu, une brève notation sans rapport.
111 תחתאוהותונוכתתצקבלפונשםצעשיו,תוחצנהתחתאוהותונוכתהתצקבלפונשםצעשי
ןמזה ; v. supra la traduction du §214.
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de commentaire, qui semble parler d’abord de deux choses distinctes puis de la
substance unique qui porte les deuxmodalités de l’existence, éternelle et dans
le temps. Une intervention personnelle, comme d’habitude plus critique, fait














Hillel a dit : on peut dire que cette dernière [proposition] est comme une
explication de celle qui se trouve supra, venant expliquer ce que sont ces
substances qu’ il a dites plus haut ; pourtant elle requiert une explication
de l’explication et une attention précise. Quand il dit que l’existant [en
soi ; autrement dit : l’ essence] et la génération [l’engendré] sont dans un
seul temps [cf. §214 : est ens et generatio simul], [c’est] quand ils sont réu-
nis en un seul composé, c’est-à-dire que l’essence vient dans le temps ;
tout devenir est essence par quelque côté ; cependant la réciproque n’est
pas vraie, car toute essence n’est pas existence (yešuth) (dans la marge :
c’est-à-dire existence [meṣiʾuth]) ou devenir, parce que l’essence est sépa-
rée et l’existence est subordonnée [= accidentelle], comme lorsqu’on dit
le blanc et la blancheur. Et la différence qu’ il y a entre l’existant et la
génération se trouve dans le texte écrit à ce sujet qu’a écrit un philo-
sophe, intitulé De l’existence et de l’ existant. J’ en ai traduit quelque chose
et il débute ainsi : «Parce que, selon le Philosophe au premier livre du
Ciel et du monde, d’une (sic) erreur petite au début, elle s’agrandit et se
trouve grande à la fin, et encore parce que nous savons que l’existence et
l’existant sont les deux choses reçues d’abord dans l’ intelligence, comme
l’a dit Avicenne au l. I de sa Métaphysique, pour cela, afin qu’on ne
se trompe pas à leur sujet, nous exposerons ce qui s’ infère (nolad) du
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nom d’existence et [de celui] d’existant et nous expliquerons comment
se trouvent ces deux entités, simples et composées [avec d’autres]»112,
etc.
Le lien établi avec la proposition précédente est analogue à celui qu’opèreTho-
mas, p. 143, l. 1–p. 144, l. 3, par l’ intermédiaire de la prop. 107 de Proclus. Le long
développement sur le Premier participé et non participant est parallèle à celui
deThomas, p. 144, l. 28–p. 145, l. 14. La traduction duDe ente et essentia citée à la
fin, d’abord littérale puis éloignée, dont il n’est pas clair si Hillel ne traduit que
ce passage pour l’occasion ou veut dire qu’ il en a traduit plus long113, diffère de
la traduction complète que Juda de Rome a donnée plus tard114 de l’opuscule
thomiste115. Il s’agit de préciser la relation asymétrique de l’existence véritable
(absolue) et du devenir (ou existence par participation) : s’ il est vrai que toute
existence (en devenir dans le temps) tient de l’existant (absolu), il ne l’est pas
que ce dernier tienne du devenir.
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chapter 19
Receptum est in recipiente permodum recipientis:





Shem Tov Ibn Gaon, Keter ShemTov1
∵
The study of the reception of the Liber de causis in Jewish thought could not be
separated, as Jean-Pierre Rothschild aptly put it, “from a more comprehensive
enquiry on the diffusion of Neoplatonism inMediaeval Jewish Thought.”2 Even
if I had the required encyclopaedic competence to realize this inquiry, which
is unfortunately far from being the case, I would lack the time and space for
drawing a sketch of this vast phenomenon. Moreover, following Rothschild’s
assessment, it would be necessary to take into account possible influences of
theArabic Liber de causis for the epochs preceding its translations intoHebrew,
alternative, now lost, translations intoHebrew (be it fromArabic or fromLatin)
and the practically endless field of the “tacit and widespread” presence of the
book in Jewish thought. Nevertheless, well aware of the dimensions assigned
to the present contribution, I should prefer to focus on a smaller chapter of the
reception of the Liber de causis in the kabbalistic literature of the origins, with
some prospective views on later developments. Rather than delusional com-
pleteness, I would like to propose a reflection, on the sound basis of selected
case studies, on the significance and the function of the Liber de causis, in its
various forms, for the beginnings of kabbalistic literature. At the same time,
1 Coriat 1839, f. 26a: “(…) evenmore so concerning the Cause of causes, that is En Sof, to which
the sages of blessed memory alluded, saying that one should not inquire into what is above.”
2 Rothschild 2013a, p. 81. On the necessity of a renewed study of the influence of the Liber de
causis on early Kabbalah see the most recent intervention by Idel 2016, p. 157.
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as it will become clear in the end of my contribution, I will hint to a possible,
albeit paradoxical, effect of the Kabbalah upon the Liber de causis, examining
how this text is transformed by its very adoption by the kabbalists.
The best-known case of reception of a sentence from the Liber de causis in
kabbalistic literature iswithout doubt thepassagequotedbyAbrahamAbulafia




















In this sort of matter the philosophers ( רקחמהילעב ) are not in disagree-
ment with us: the wise Plato, teacher of the philosopher Aristotle, in the
book of the Highest Substances in a paragraph spoke about the matter,
and here are his words:4 The first cause is above any description (narra-
tion). Tongues fail to describe it due to its unity since it is above every
unity. What can be told are the causes deriving their splendour from the
light of the first cause. This is because the first cause illuminates the
effect but it itself is not illuminated by any other light since it is an abso-
lutely perfect light above which there is no light. Therefore, the first light
defies description. This is due to the fact that it has no cause through
3 Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia, Imre shefer, p. 193–194.
4 Here follows V(VI) of the Liber de causis.
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which it may be known. For everything is known and described through
its cause. Therefore, if something is a cause only and not an effect, it
is not known. If so, the first cause is not described since it is above
description and no discourse can reach it, since every description is a dis-
course, and every discourse derives from intelligence, intelligence in turn
derives from thought, thought from imagination and imagination from
the senses. The first cause, however, is above all these things, since it is
their cause, and for this reason it does not fall under the senses, imagin-
ation, thought, intelligence or discourse: therefore, it is beyond descrip-
tion. It is said furthermore that a thing is either sensible and falls under
the senses or imaginable, falling under the imagination; either it is stable
maintaining the same disposition and it is intelligible, or it is mutable
und accidental, falling under the domain of thought, but the first cause
is above the intelligible and the transitory, thus it does not fall under
the senses, imagination, thought or intelligence. Thus, it can only be the
object of an intuition through the second cause,which is intelligence.The
latter is called first effect but in a higher andmore elevatedmanner, as we
have explained and revealed. These are the words of the venerable sage
Plato.
It is interesting to observe, though, that the discovery of this quotation in sec-
ondary literature, proceeded backwards, that is to say that the first mentions
of this passage which fell under the magnifier of philologists or bibliographers
in the XIX century were indirect andmuch later ones. This path, from the estu-
ary to the source, is not only typical, and understandably so, of philology, but it
characterizes already the kabbalistic reception of the Liber de causis, in a way
that cannot be the mere effect of chance.
The first hint towards an independent tradition of the Liber de causis, even
before it was recognized as mediated by Abulafia, was detected by Moritz
Steinschneider in 1863,5 in a passage of Joseph Del Medigo’s kabbalistic work
bearing the title SeferNovelot Chokmah, printed in Basel in 1631.6 Right from the
beginning Steinschneider recognized that the passage quoted by Del Medigo
was taken verbatim (with onlyminor cuts) from IsaacAbravanel’s commentary
5 Steinschneider 1863, p. 114, n. 8.






on the Pentateuch, and more precisely on the book of Exodus (40,34), writ-
ten in Venice about 1506 and printed for the first time there, in 1579.7 At first,
however, Steinschneider wondered whether the source of this “Platonic” quo-
tation might derive from a Christian author. Some years later, Steinschneider
noticed that Abravanel must have derived his quotation from a contemporary
kabbalist, JochananAlemanno,who, inhis Shaʿarha-chesheq, a large comment-
ary on the Canticle, had quoted the V(VI) of the Liber de causis attributing the
quotation to a certain “Zacharias”, who had cited in his Imre shefer, that is to say
“beautiful sayings,” Plato’s treatise “On the Highest Substances” (ha-ʿatzamim
ha-ʿelyonim).8 Three elements of this bibliographic reference are actually lead-
ing astray: Plato is not Plato, Zacharias is not the real name of the author, the
book “On the Highest Substances” is not otherwise known by this name, but
the book Imre shefer does exist.
In 1869 Steinschneider, in his book on al-Fārābī,9 referred the aforemen-
tioned passage from Alemanno, not from the published part of the book
Chesheq Shelomoh, since it is not comprised in the excerpted edition available
in print,10 but fromamanuscript, which had beenpart of the collection of Isaac
Samuel Reggio and had been subsequently purchased by Osias Heschel Schorr
in 1847. The latter sold in 1869 many of his manuscripts to the Bodleian Lib-
rary of Oxford with the help of Steinschneider, who received (in payment?)
four manuscripts.11 One of them, as he states in his catalogue of the Royal
Library of Berlin,12 was in Steinschneider’s possession until he sold it to the
Königliche Preussische Bibliothek, where it is still preserved.13 In a footnote
of his book on al-Fārābī, Steinschneider copied Alemmano’s quotation14 and






ןאכ . The passage had been noted and translated into Latin by J. Buxtorf jr., Exercitationes
variae, Basel 1659, p. 121–122.
8 See also Scholem 1928–1929, then in Scholem 1931, p. 58.
9 Steinschneider 1869, p. 114–115.
10 First published in Leghorn 1790 and then in Halberstadt 1862.
11 Cfr. Richler 2012, p. 301–318.
12 Steinschneider 1897, p. 5–6.
13 Sign. Qu. 832, Steinschneider’s catalogue n. 143.
14 Steinschneider 1869, p. 114–115, n. 49: ואיבהשיפכםינוילעהםימצעהרפסבןוטלפאבתכ
תונושלהואלנםנמאו.רופסהןמהלתונוילערתויהנושארההלעהל׳׳זורפשירמארפסבהירכז
ןרוארשאתולעהורפוסיםנמאו.תודחאלכלעהלעמלאיהשיפלהתודחארובעבהרפסלמ
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described the manuscript as still belonging to the collection of O.H. Schorr.15
At that point in time, Steinschneider expressed his hope to be able to check
the quotation from the alleged author of the Imre Shefer, “Secharia,” whom
he recognized without hesitation as the Spanish Kabbalist Abraham Abulafia,
author of a treatise bearing the same name and who used, among many other
pseudonyms, also Zekariah, numerical equivalent of his first name.16 During
the same 1869 Steinschneider traveled to Munich in order to, as he believed,
put an end to his growing catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts of the Staats-
bibliothek (since his cataloguewas too voluminous, he had toworkmany years
in order to squeeze it to the desired amplitude: the first edition appeared in
1875,17 the second twenty years later18). And indeed, as he remarked in the Cor-
rections and additions (Berichtigungen und Zusätze) at the end of the book on
al-Fārābī,19 he found the quotation in a Munich manuscript, containing the
Imre Shefer by Abraham Abulafia.20 Right from the start, Steinschneider had
recognized that the passage quoted, which seems to be the source of all the
later authors we have mentioned, derives from the Liber de causis, bearing, in
Abulafia’s words, the unusual title of “Book of the Highest Substances.” This
awakened, in turn, the interest of Otto Bardenhewer, who studied the Hebrew
translations of the Liber de causis in the end of his edition of the book,21 and












ל׳׳כע.ונראבשומכאשנודבכנןימבאוהשאלאןכםגהלעלאוהלולעלאוהש . I have enhanced
in boldtypemyown readings, based on themanuscript, where they diverge fromSteinsch-
neider’s.
15 Steinschneider 1869, ibid.: “Hs. Reggio’s (jetzt Schorr’s)”.
16 In fact the numerical value of the letters forming the name והירכז , that is 248, coincides
with the one resulting from םהרבא ; cfr. already Landauer 1845, col. 510.
17 Steinschneider 1875.
18 Steinschneider 1895.
19 Steinschneider 1869, p. 249.
20 In the MS Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Hebr. 285, f. 114r–v.
21 Cfr. Bardenhewer 1882, p. 305–323.
22 Bardenhewer 1882, p. 319–320.
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Among the five known Hebrew versions of the Liber de causis, conscien-
tiously studied by Jean-Pierre Rothschild, none could be said to be the source
of Abulafia. It is evident that Abulafia depended from the Latin tradition of the
work: in fact, he speaks of 32 propositions, a subdivision of the text material
which is not found in the Arabic mediated “original” of the Liber de causis and
therefore he could not depend from the Hebrew translation (made approxim-
ately in the 80s of the 13th century) by Zerachia Chen.23 The shorter version
contained in the ms. 706 of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, independ-
ently from any question of dating, could not be Abulafia’s source since it only
translates the propositions and not the commentary, which forms part of Abu-
lafia’s quotation. The two later Hebrew translations (made, respectively, by
Judah Romano and Eli Chabillo), are out of the question since they have been
completed after Abulafia’s death. Only one Hebrew translation, attributed in
all likeliness to Hillel of Verona’s, could be Abulafia’s source. There are two
facts which are of peculiar interest in this context: Abulafia reports that he
has been a pupil of Hillel, in Capua, about 1260 and Hillel is the only one who
attributes the propositions to Plato, as Abulafia does, although he suggests that
Plato was the author of the propositions and “Abunasr” that is to say al-Fārābī,
was the author of the commentary. Nevertheless, a quick comparison of the
two translations shows that, against Bardenhewer’s hypothesis, Abulafia did
not use, if he ever knew it, Hillel’s version.24 In other words, the most import-
ant fragment of the Liber de causis in kabbalistic literature, used many times
over to justify the central doctrine of the sefirot and the negative theology of
the first kabbalists down to the XVII century is independent from the philo-
sophical reception of the same booklet. This does not mean that, in order to
explain the vast receptionof the Liberde causiswithin Jewish thought, its adop-
tion in kabbalistic circles did not play a substantial role: quite the contrary
23 See Pseudo-Aristoteles Liber de causis (ed. Schreiber).
24 Hillel’s version is attested in only one manuscript preserved at the Bodleian Library of
Oxford, sign. Mich. 335 (olim 82), cfr. Neubauer 1886, col. 465–466, n. 1318. The text is
published in Rothschild 2013b. To ease the comparison, I quote here the relevant passage,
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is the case, as it is shown, among other things, by the extant manuscripts of
the Hebrew translations of the booklet, in which one of its versions is copied
within kabbalistic miscellanies, and by the fact that at least for Hillel of Ver-
ona the contraposition between philosophy and Kabbalah was not a relevant
one.25 As J.-P. Rothschild has recommended, it would certainly be worthwhile
to investigate in which measure Kabbalah influenced the direct and indirect
reception of the Liber de causis in Jewish thought, but I would prefer, on this
occasion, to follow a different path which, if I am not mistaken, should never-
theless contribute to understand the ways of the Liber de causis within Jewish
medieval literature. What I suggest to investigate is the function of explicit or
implicit reference to the Liber de causis, be it understood as the work of Plato,
of Aristotle, of Proclus or of al-Fārābī, within the emerging literature of Kabba-
lah.
Nevertheless, before studying one case in point, represented by an impli-
cit quotation of the Liber de causis in a short kabbalistic treatise of ‘Azri’el
of Gerona, it seems appropriate to focus briefly on two important features
of the text26 we have followed backwards to the “source” which is not older
than the first Hebrew translations of the book, but certainly independent from
them. The first point is of rather philological nature, and concerns the fact
that Jochanan Alemanno demonstrably knew from other sources the Liber de
causis, which he quotes repeatedly in his unpublished works and notebooks,27
and was even aware that this metaphysical treatise represented the thought of
theNeoplatonic philosopher Proclus.28This did not prevent him, out of respect
for his source, Abulafia, to maintain the attribution to Plato in more than one
circumstance. The second point deserving to be underlined is that the function
of this relatively short quotation varies from author to author and, less surpris-
ingly, from an epoch to the next. Themost interesting “context” is undoubtedly
the original one, offered by Abraham Abulafia. Immediately after the passage
from the Liber de causis quoted above, and copied so many times afterwards,
he writes:
25 Cfr. Hillel von Verona, Über die Vollendung der Seele.
26 Liber de causis, V(VI).
27 Cfr. Idel 1982, p. 60–112; Idel 1983, p. 186–242. The same passage from the Liber de causis
is quoted, with only minor textual variations, in Alemanno’s Collectanea: Paris, BnF, hébr.
849, f. 91r (here, instead of Plato, the author of the passage is identified as “one of the sons
of Yaphet”, that is to say, a Greek) and f. 123r; Oxford, Bodleian Library, Neubauer n. 2234
(old sign. Reggio 23), f. 21r. See also Ogren 2016, p. 31.
28 See for example, Alemanno’s work Chay ha-ʿolamim, ms. Mantua, Biblioteca Comunale,







I have copied the entire contents of the paragraph concerning this sub-
ject in order to let you knowwhat the philosophers think about the Lord,
blessed be He, how deep they researched about the Creator, may He be
exalted, with all their might, according to their wisdom, and how they
proclaimedHis perfect unity, according to the reach of their intellect. The
author [Plato] wrote many books concerning the intellects and related
subjects, and the onewehave just quoted is among them: in it he gathered
32 truly excellent paragraphs, all of them containing wonderful treasures
of wisdom, so that they are worth knowing for every kabbalist.
Abulafia states here openly that what “Plato” and the philosophers have to say
about the ineffable “First Cause” isworth considering, since it confirms the doc-
trines of Kabbalah. In a different historical and cultural context, at the end of
the XV century, JochananAlemannobends the very samewords quotedbyAbu-
lafia, as the proof that the sefirot (interpreted here as “narrations”) one of the
central tenets of Kabbalah, are to be considered in perfect accordance with
“Plato,” since he stated that the First Cause only is unspeakable (above any
“narration”), implying that immediately after the First, the secondary causes,
or the intelligences, or rather the Platonic Ideas, are to be closely identified
with the sefirot. Abravanel, as Alemanno before him, pointed out the perfect
compatibility with the doctrine of “Plato” with the teachings of Al-Ghazālī,
against the doctrine of Averroes, but Abravanel underlines also that the very
same doctrines are found in the Pardes rimmonim of Moses Cordovero, a clas-
sic of XVI century Kabbalah. In the XVII century AbrahamYagel, in his BetYaʿar
ha-Levanon, quotes the very same text pointing out that its negative theology
coincides largely with the kabbalistic doctrine and linking it also to Hermetic
doctrines.30 The largest apologetical syncretism is undoubtedly to be found in
Joseph Del Medigo, who recognized easily that the “Platonic” doctrine of the
Liber de causis was in perfect harmony with Proclus, Plotinus, Al-Ghazālī, the
kabbalists, but also, in describing the Ein sof as pure light, in accordance with
29 Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia, Imre shefer, p. 195.
30 Cfr. Idel 1983, p. 240, n. 206. See also Ruderman 1988, p. 130.
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the Bible, the Jewish exegetes (he names Rambam, Ibn Ezra and Ramban) and
the most divine among the Christian sages. This universal concordance seems
to go too far, but it defines perfectly, although through an exaggeration, the
whole point of my present argument: the reception of the Liber de causis in
this context, undoubtedly of kabbalistic origin, is always functional to some
project of harmonistic, more than syncretistic nature. One cannot overlook
the fact that the Liber de causis, as elsewhere the Theologia Aristotelis, serve
the general purpose of reinforcing the legitimacy of kabbalistic innovations
ad intra, and, ad extra, of integrating the authentic core of Jewish revelation
in the language (be it cataphatic or, such as in this case, apophatic) of the
other.31
1 A Renaissance Intermezzo
Before going back to early Kabbalah, a short intermission seems desirable at
this point, in order to follow a trace of the Liber de causis, which becomes
identified with Kabbalah in a thinker who was rather afraid of the confusion
between Jewish tradition and Platonism, but had nomajor objection to articu-
late his thought in rigorousAristotelic-Averroistic terms. I am referring to Elijah
DelMedigo, who in 1486, commenting upon Averroes’De substantia orbis adds,
as Idel already pointed out,32 a passage in which an allusion to the Liber de










31 For a further interesting chapter of the history of the reception of prop. V(VI) of the Liber
de causis in Kabbalistic literature, see Scholem 1964, p. 46; then in Scholem 1970a, p. 50
quoting Vajda 1954, p. 64.
32 Idel 1983, p. 219.




For they believe that thought and mental conception do not properly
apply to En sof, neither does any definition, not even the one of intellect.
Concerning it, neither volition, intention, thought nor, in general, may
any attribute be said. Furthermore, it is impossible that this world be, at
the outset, that which derives from it, since its perfection would thereby
be rendered deficient. Instead, what emanates from it at the outset are
those Existents which they term sefirot in accordance with their rank.
These act by virtue of the force of the tenth onewhich they call En sof and
by virtue of the emanating flux deriving from it. Consequently, everything
exists by virtue of its force, since they all are contingent upon it and are
emanated from it. Hence, according to their statements, the order of this
world is either constituted by the sefirot or is derived from them. These
notions are taken from the statements of the ancient philosophers, espe-
cially the Platonists. In their books, you will find these statements being
expatiated. They construct proofs upon their basis, in accordance with
their fashion. They asserted that one may not apply even the epithet of
intellect to the En sof, asAverroesmentioned in their name in the Incoher-
ence of the Incoherence35 and as it is known towhoever has seen the books
of these Platonists, as well as the statements of the ancient philosophers.
You will also find in them the doctrines of cosmic aeons—the destruc-
tion of the world and its restoration—as well as the doctrine of metem-
psychosis. And in general, you will find almost no difference between
them and the kabbalists except for the divine epithets and cryptic allu-
sions.36
DelMedigo,whowas no fan of theKabbalah and certainly noPlatonist, accuses
the Kabbalists of having derived their idea of En sof and of the emanation of
the sefirot from Plato and the ancient philosophers. Elijah del Medigo trans-
lated his commentary on the De substantia orbis also in Latin37 but the passage
34 Ms. Paris, BnF hébr. 968, f. 41r–v. The passage had been partly quoted in Idel 1982, p. 99,
but the text contains several mistakes, which affect, as a consequence, also M. Gavarin’s
translation (in Idel 1983, p. 219). For a superior version, see Bland 1991, p. 52.
35 Cfr. Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut, p. 186.
36 I quote here the translation of Bland 1991, p. 31–32.
37 His Latin version of the commentary is preserved in the ms. Vat. Lat. 4553 of the Vatican
Library.
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quoted above is not yet present there.38 In any event, upon Pico’s insistence
on having Elia’s opinion on Kabbalah, he translated the passage in the famous
letter written between 1485 and 148639 to his patron preserved in the ms. 6508
of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. There (f. 75r–v), the missing passage is
found:
Ipsi enim opinantur, quod sunt hic quedam entia, quorum gradus est
inferior gradu dei gloriosi, quem vocant infinitum, que sunt fluxa, non
dico facta neque producta, ab illo, quod vocant infinitum, et ipsa habent
gradus diversos, et gradus horum superior est motoribus celorum, et cor-
poribus celestibus sensibilibus. Et ordo, per quemproducuntur entia pro-
ducta et conservantur secundum ordinem, est per ista, scilicet çephiroth,
idest numerationes, / sic enim vocant illa fluxa ab infinito. Ipsi nam-
que credunt, quod in infinito nulla cadit cogitatio, neque aprehensio,
neque terminus sive determinatio aliqua, vel dispositio etiam intellec-
tualis, neque dicitur de ipso voluntas, neque intentio, neque cogitatio,
et universaliter nulla dispositio, et impossibile est, ut sit res proveniens,
seu fluxa ab ipso, scilicet infinito.40 Iste mundus nam esset diminutus
secundum hoc, seu deficeret ab eo perfectio sua, sed primum fluxum ab
ipso sunt ista entia, que diximus, secundum gradus eorum, que vocant
çephiroth, ut diximus, et ipsa sunt agentia per virtutem dei, quem ipsi
vocant infinitum, et per fluxum, qui provenit eis ab ipso, et ideo omnia
sunt per virtutem illius. Nam ipsa, scilicet çephiroth,41 dependent ab ipso,
et fluxa sunt ab ipso, scilicet infinito. Unde, secundum hos, ordo iste
inventus in mundum est per illa çephiroth. Primum autem simpliciter
quem vocant infinitum nulla dispositio, seu attributio positiva, dicitur de
eo, ymmo neque ipsum volunt vocare intellectum, ut dicit etiamAverrois
in libro Destructio destructionum, loquendo de attributis, seu propri-
etatibus, quod Plato seu quidam Platonici nolunt42 vocare deum intel-
lectum, seu affirmare de ipso, quod est intellectus. Ipsis autem çephiroth
posuerunt nomina propria, et motum fluxus seu dependentie, et deder-
38 Iwish to expressmy gratitude toGiovanni Licata, who is preparing a critical edition of Del
Medigo’s Commentary on the De substantia orbis, for checking the Latin manuscript.
39 On the date of this latter and the complex problem of which of the two versions of the
Commentary on the De substantia orbis has been composed first, see Busi 2006, p. 167–
196; Italian translation in Busi 2007, p. 25–45.
40 The words scilicet infinito are added on the margin.
41 The words scilicet çephiroth are added on the margin.
42 Here the word dicere is erased.
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unt secundum opinionem eorum causam, quare ista debent esse [X43],
neque plura, neque pauciora, et in his fecerunt libros et volumina.44
From the vantage point of an adversary of Kabbalah, as Elia del Medigo most
probably was,45 it is easy to see the danger implicit in utilizing such material
as the “Platonic” Liber de causis: it could lead to the venomous accusation of
depending from “foreign wisdom”, thus contaminating the purity of Biblical
revelation. This explains perhaps the prudence with which the kabbalists, for
enthusiastic theymight be concerning the analogies of their doctrineswith the
Platonic ones, in endorsing explicitly the teachings of Arabic or, even worse,
Pagan Neoplatonism.46 It might be perhaps more than a curiosity to add that
a Kabbalist with Platonic sympathies, one of the teachers of Giles of Viterbo,47
a famous Jewish convert, Felix Pratensis (Felice da Prato), obtained from the
authorities in Venice in 1515 the permission of printing two Latin translations
of kabbalistical works: the alreadymentioned Imre shefer of AbrahamAbulafia
and the Sefer ha-temunah, where the doctrine of the shemittot (world cycles)
and of the periodical apocatastasis is overtly taught, exactly the doctrinal ten-
ets against which Del Medigo was battling.
It is perhaps interesting to note that Pico himself commented upon the Liber
de causis in his 900 theses, attributing them, uniquely, to the Arab “Abucaten
Avenan”, identified by Mauro Zonta as the Christian translator of the Theolo-
gia Aristotelis into Arabic, Abu-Katm ibn-Naʾima al-Ḥimṣi,48 and in one of his
theses, he expanded precisely about the proposition on the ineffability of the
first Cause.49 But Pico was certainly aware that Plato (or Aristotle) was not the
43 A blank space is left in place of the expected number of the sefirot.
44 A first partial edition of the letter has been published by Dukas 1876; see also Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola, De dignitate hominis, p. 67–72; the letter has been edited integrally
by Kieszkowski 1964, p. 63–75. As it is well known, Kieszkowski’s edition is not com-
pletely reliable, I have therefore based the excerpt quoted above on a direct reading of
themanuscript, underlining the words which differ from his edition. See now Licata 2017,
p. 122.
45 Pace Bland.
46 Cfr. Idel 1992.
47 Cfr. Kahle 1954, p. 50–74. See also Stern 2011, p. 76–108.
48 Zonta 1998, p. 323–330.
49 In the fifth thesis according to the Liber de causis, he writes: Cum dicit Abucaten causam
primam superiorem esse omni narratione, non tam propter id habet veritatem quod primo
affert, quia scilicet causam ante se non habet, quam propter id quod secundario innuit, quia
omne intelligibile unialiter antecedit. I quote here the translation by Farmer 1998, p. 463:
“When Abucaten said that the first cause is superior to all speech, this is not true somuch
because of what he affirms first, namely since it has no cause before itself, but because of
what he suggests second, because it is unially antecedent to everything intelligible”.
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author of the Liber de causis. Moreover, as I have pointed out elsewhere,50 also
his translator, the Jewish convert Flavius Mithridates, responsible for the Latin
version of a large kabbalistic library, seems to recur to the language of the Liber
de causis for interpreting kabbalistic language, for instance in rendering the
Hebrew הבושת , one of the names of the last sefirah (Malkut) not, as usual, with
conversio, but with the Latin reiteratio, an expression, and a concept behind it,
which is tightly related to §14 (15) of the Liber de causis.51 This kind of impli-
cit quotation, however, is highly problematic since Mitrhidates, defined once
a legitimus Platonis amicus by Ficino,52 was versed in Neoplatonic philosophy.
The contamination of sourcesmakes often the quest for authentic traces of the
Liber de causis in Humanistic philosophy, no less than in Christian Kabbalah a
desperate enterprise. As it will become clear in the next chapter, readingMedi-
evalmetaphysicswithRenaissance glasses is a constant temptation, sometimes
even a necessity, but it implies quite remarkable philological costs.
2 Back to the Beginning
Ironically, there seems to be few ways of reading Medieval kabbalistic texts
without recurring to their Humanistic reception. Among Mithridates’ transla-
tions for Giovanni Pico della Mirandola one finds53 a treatise bearing the Latin
title Questiones super decem sefirot cum responsionibus suis, which is the inter-
pretation of one of the titles with which this fortunate booklet is known in
Hebrew manuscripts תוריפסרשעלעתובושתותולאש (Sheelot u-teshuvot ʿal ʿeser
sefirot) by the Geronese Kabbalist ‘Azri’el of Gerona (1160–1238), who wrote his
foundational commentaries and tracts before the first (known) Hebrew trans-
lationof the Liberde causiswas accomplished. In this “catechism,” an imaginary
dialogue is depicted between a Kabbalist and a “questioner,” someone who is
in search of truth, a philosopher in the most basic sense. The questions and
the answers proceed from the existence of God to the explanation of the single
sefirot, having recourse not primarily to the authority of the Bible or to some
secret revelation, but to allegedly stringent rational arguments. The first two
50 Cfr. Campanini 2005, p. 76; see alsoMenahemRecanati, Commentary on the Daily Prayers,
p. 123–124.
51 Liberde causis, XIV(XV):Omnis sciensqui scit essentiamsuamest rediensadessentiamsuam
reditione completa.
52 Cfr. Kristeller 1937, p. 35.
53 In the ms. Vat. Ebr. 190 of the Vatican Library, f. 165r–173v; cfr. Campanini 2002, p. 90–96
and Campanini 2020.
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of these questions, before delving into the technicalities of kabbalistic lore,
contain very general statements on the nature of God, and repeatedly ‘Azri’el
quotes the רקחמהימכח (chakme ha-mechqar), the “Philosophers”54 or the wise
inquirers, as opposed to the ל׳׳זונימכח , “our sages of blessedmemory,” referring
to the rabbinic tradition.What is attributed to the “philosophers” comes invari-
ably to confirm the kabbalistic doctrine presented by ‘Azri’el. For example, in
the answer to the first question, concerning the existence of God, we read:
הזבםידומרקחמהימכחו.ונממץוחןיאורקחולןיאותילכתוץקןיאםלענאוהשהמו
.55תובסהתבסותוליעהלכתליעללובגןיאורקחןיאוףוסןיאשרבדה
[That which is hidden is without end and limit; it is unfathomable and
nothing exists outside it. The philosophers admit to this fact that the
Cause of all causes and the Origin of origins is infinite, unfathomable,
and without limit.56]
It seems apt to quote, here and in the following instances, Flavius Mithridates’
translation as well:
… quod autem ocultatur neque habet finem neque terminumneque con-
sumationem neque investigationem, nec est extra se. Sapientes autem
inquisitores concedunt hoc scilicet in re non habente finem nec ter-
minum nec investigationem et vocant eum causam causarum seu adin-
ventionem adinventionum.57
Again, in the answer to the second question, a statement concerning negative
theology is attributed to the ‘philosophers’:
58אלךרדלעםאיכוניתגשהןיאיכרמואהירבדלםידומרקחמהימכחו
[Furthermore, the philosophers are in agreement that our perception of
Him cannot be except by way of negative attribution.59]
54 According to the translation of Ronald C. Kiener, in Dan 1986, p. 89–96.
55 ‘Azri’el of Gerona, Perush ʿeser sefirot, in Ibn Gabbay 1850, f. 2r.
56 Dan 1986, p. 89.
57 MS Vat. Ebr. 190, f. 165r.
58 ‘Azri’el, Perush, f. 2r.
59 Dan 1986, p. 90.
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Et sapientes inquisitores concedunt verba dicentis quod non est com-
prehensio nostra nisi per viam non.60
A third instance, found in the answer to the seventh question, is less specific,
but still deserves some consideration:
רבדלכיכםיאורונאג]י[הנמהךרדמולובגולשיםדאהלכשיכורמארקחמהימכחו
.61הדמורועשולובגולשי
[Finally, the philosophers stated that man’s intellect is finite, and that
from the way of the Ruler we see that everything has limitation, mag-
nitude, and measure.62]
Sapientes autem inquisitores dixerunt quod intellectus hominis habet
terminum, de more autem consuetudinis est dicere quod videmus quod
omnis63 res habet terminum quantitatem discretam et mensuram.64
One could point to several analogies with the style of thought of the Liber de
causis, but, admittedly, these are too generic elements for building on their
basis a philological argument in order to state without doubts that ‘Azri’el
read approvingly the Liber de causis, or, for that matter, that he was indir-
ectly influenced by that booklet. That a certain familiar similarity is recog-
nizable between the Liber de causis and these texts is rather undeniable, but
it is quite a modest result. More interesting for our purpose is the carefully
chosen terminology of our kabbalist, who, in two out of three references to
the “wise men” or “the philosophers” uses the verb םידומ (modim), that is
“they admit,” or “confess,” a rather polemical, or rhetorically astute, lexical
choice, in order to prevent any possible confessional or theological objec-
tion, both from the interlocutor, who seems to be rather inclined to dialectical
argumentation than to ex auctoritate tirades and, even more, from the read-
ers.
Thepeculiar character of these passages is quite different from, to nameonly
one example, a well-known explicit quotation of the Liber de causis (called in
this instance Sefer ha-ʿillot), attributed to Aristotle, and inserted in a pseudo-
60 MS Vat. Ebr. 190, f. 165v.
61 ‘Azri’el, Perush, f. 3r.
62 Dan 1986, p. 93.
63 The word omnis is written twice in the ms.
64 MS Vat. Ebr. 190, f. 167v.
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epigraphic text, the notorious Kevod ha-Shem attributed to El ʿazar ha-Qallir
and cited in his Commentary to the Sefer yetzirah by Moshe Botarel, who wrote
for a Christian patron at the end of the 14th century.65 The supposed author
of the fictitious Kevod ha-Shem, Ha-Qallir, who lived in the 6th–7th century,
should have quoted, according to Botarel, with absolute exactitude, the pro-




[The Lord], blessed beHe, does not need anything. Therefore, Aristotle in
the Book of Causes, in the proposition 21, says: “The first is rich in himself”
absolutely, since his reality is perfect at the extreme degree of complete-
ness, devoid and deprived of any need. Therefore [Aristotle] says “rich in
himself.” End of the quotation from R. Elʿazar ha-Qallir.
It seems that Botarel, who used to legitimize his own ideas attributing them
pseudo-epigraphically to prestigious authors of the past, utilized the same
technique also in order to quote his “Aristotelic” source, preventing thus any
possible criticism for utilizing external sources and, at the same time, inwriting
for his Christian patron, “master John”, he could point to a common source.67
Be it as it may, as Gershom Scholem has noted,68 a more subtle influence of
the Liber de causis can be detected in another short treatise by ‘Azri’el of Ger-
ona, bearing the title Derek ha-emunah we-derek ha-kefirah (The way of Faith
and of Disbelief ), published by Scholem himself,69 after he had discovered it in
1938 in a manuscript70 at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York.
The radical thought of ‘Azri’el, imbibed with Neoplatonism, has fascinated
many scholars since Scholem’s publication but, as wewill see, even before him.
A systematic study of the influence of the Liber de causis and of Neoplatonic
thought on this treatise is still to be done, but here I will limit myself to a quite
65 Cfr. Bardenhewer 1882, p. 321. Concerning the status quaestionis of Moshe Botarel’s falsi-
fications, cfr. Campanini 2012a.
66 Cfr. Sefer yetzirah (ed. Mantua 1562), f. 82r.
67 Provided that his Christian patron, as Botarel himself, was not aware of the fact that
already Thomas Aquinas refuted Aristotle’s authorship of the Liber de causis.
68 Scholem 1948, p. 140.
69 Scholem 1942, p. 207–213.
70 Bearing the signature JTS Mic. 1889 (Halberstam 444).
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short passage, already object of the attention of Scholem,71 Daniel Matt,72 Elli-
ott Wolfson,73 Karl Grözinger,74 Sandra Valabrègue,75 to name only a few.76
Right at the beginning of his short treatise the Catalan kabbalist explains
why the opposite ways of faith and disbelief have a common root: the believer
believes in God and the denier denies God, thus in God there is the root of faith





And if [the questioner] asks you: How could He draw being from nought?
Is it not a great distance between the two? Answer him: I have already
told you that the One who drew Being from nought does not lack any-
thing and that Being is in Nought, according to the modality of Nought,
and Nought is Being, according to the modality of Being. Concerning this
it has been said: “He made his Being out of his Nought”78 and it was not
said “He made Being ex Nihilo,” in order to let you know that nought is
Being and Being is Nought.
The point of interest, among many, in our context is the observation made by
Scholem that the expression “Being is in Nought according to the modality
of Nought, and Nought is Being according to the modality of Being” reminds
strongly of the proposition 11 of the Liber de causis.79 Scholem deems that
‘Azri’elmust havehad at his disposal aHebrew translation of the Liber de causis,
but the usage he made of it is quite different from the one he made of gen-
71 See Scholem 1956, p. 109; then in Scholem 1970, p. 78; moreover, see Scholem 1962, p. 375;
English translation Scholem 1987, p. 423.
72 Matt 1990, subsequently in Fine 1995, p. 67–109.
73 Wolfson 1994.
74 Grözinger 2005, p. 243–302; see also Grötzinger 1986.
75 Valabrègue 2010.
76 One could also point to Ciucu 2010 as a good example of a research in which not the dir-
ect influence is sought, but rather the striking affinity between two ways of thinking the
abysmal nature of “Nought”. For the most recent edition of ‘Azri’el’s works, see Porat 2019.
77 Scholem 1942, p. 207.
78 Sefer yetzirah 2,4.
79 In Judah Romano’s translation: לולעךרדבלולעבהלעהוהלעהךרדבהלעבאוהלולעהןכםא
(Rothschild 2013b, p. 321).
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eric Neoplatonic theologoumena, since in this case he reworks the language of
his source, i.e. the terminology of the Liber de causis, in his own metaphysical
reflection.
It seems appropriate at this point to ask: can the formulation used by ‘Azri’el,
strongly reminding the reader of the Liber de causis, be considered a full-blown
quotation? Certainly not, but one could add, howwould ‘Azri’el quote the Liber
de causis? Probably, as it was his custom, by introducing it with the expression
רקחמהימכח , which constitutes in his parlance a perfect synonym for “Plato”, as
the following example demonstrates. In a short commentary on the prayer of
the Kaddish80 the following sentence, once again a re-writing of key principles





My son, you should know that the philosophers81 have said: the one who
descends from theRoot of the roots to the Formof formsneeds to proceed
by multiplying whereas the one who ascends from the Form of forms to
the Root of roots needs to gather plurality [into unity], since their super-
ior portion unites them. The root, in fact, is in every form deriving from it
at any time and if you suppress the forms you do not suppress the root.
These same words appear also in ‘Azri’el’s commentary on the Aggadot, pub-
lished, partly, by Scholem in 193082 and more completely by Tishby.83 What is
remarkable in this instance is the fact that the samequotation is nowattributed




80 Published first by Scholem 1942, p. 214–216. French translation in the appendix of Séd-
Rajna 1974, p. 142–145.
81 Or ‘wise inquirers’.
82 Scholem 1930, p. 4.
83 ‘Azri’el, Perush ha-aggadot, ed. 1945, p. 82–83; new ed. 1983, p. 144–145.
84 Actually, the quotation, well known in Jewish medieval literature, is from the so-called
Theology of Aristotle, see Vajda 1956, p. 138–142.
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הרובגהיפמולבקשםיאיבנהיפמולבקשםיאיבנהןמםילבוקמהתמאהימכחוקלחו
85.ותלעפווחכיפלוליוארהםשברבדורבדלכתורקלוםירבדהיקלחקלחלםיעדוי
The words of theWisdom of the Law and the words of the philosophers I
have recalled converge, they follow the same path and there is no differ-
ence between them except for terminology only since the philosophers
do not know how to name the single parts, whereas the wise men of
truth who received (ha-mequbbalim) [their wisdom] from the prophets,
who received [their inspiration] from the Almighty are knowledgeable
about every single component of reality and can name exactly everything
according to its virtue and its action.
The difference between philosophers and kabbalists is in the names, albeit not
a nominalistic one: they differ rather in the very essence, which is, for Judaism,
an ineffableName. In this differenceone shouldperhaps search for traces of the
Liber de causis in early kabbalistic literature, without forgetting that the short
treatises of ‘Azri’el do not form the core of kabbalistic literature “per se”. They
are a prominent example of a quite different literary genre, verymuch inspired
by philosophical style, that is kabbalistic apologetics. Within its boundaries,
and only there, as it has been shown, an explicit or even implicit reference to
the breviary of Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages makes sense. In other words:
allusions or quotations of the Liberde causis are easily retrievablewhenever the
kabbalists recur to the apologeticmode, but in the core of their literary produc-
tion these traces are virtually absent or they are not clearly recognizable.
It is not by mere chance, thus, that the subsequent approaches to Kabbalah
from an external point of viewwere particularly interested in Neoplatonic ana-
logies, and found a special interest precisely in passages where the kabbalists
did paraphrase the Liber de causis. A particularly relevant case in point is of
course the German humanist Johannes Reuchlin, who in his De arte cabalistica
(1517), copied the aforementioned passage of ‘Azri’el about Being and Nought,
enhancing that he was strikingly reminded of the De docta ignorantia of Cus-
anus, which for him meant the most enthusiastic approval.86 The discovery of
the same in the other, the pleasant effect of finding out that the kabbalist had
read the samebooks as his own intellectual references is a beautiful demonstra-
tion of the potential and of the limits of any cultural encounter. As it is known,
Scholem was thinking of Reuchlin when he found in New York the kabbalistic
85 Scholem 1930, p. 4–5; ‘Azri’el, Perush ha-aggadot, ed. 1945, p. 83; new ed. 1983, p. 145.
86 I have expanded on this subject in Campanini 2012b.
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source he was quoting, to his philological satisfaction.87 The Liber de causis
represents, in this exemplary case, the connecting source (the root) explain-
ing analogies between heterogeneous textual traditions. On the other hand, its
pervasive character runs the risk of impoverishing the significance of its very
presence.
Philosophy and philology follow two diametrically opposed vectors: philo-
logy, especially in the case of the Liber de causis is in search of an archetype
(be it Proclus, Plotinus or even Plato himself, but nothing forbids to tend to
evenhigher points in time),whereas history of philosophy, commenting a com-
mentary, proceeds towards the latest manifestation of an idea, the function
and understanding of a concept. Reading the Liber de causis inmedieval Jewish
mysticism, or rather in its apologetical dimension, seems possible only through
the prism of the Renaissance.
To study the reception of a Pagan work within a religious current such as
Kabbalah implies two different aspects: an apologetic bent, which provides the
suitable context for any explicit reference to the Liber de causis, otherwise dis-
guised to the point of being unrecognizable, and a philosophical-philological
endeavour. The latter, as I have tried to show, bears in itself the seed of contra-
diction, as Kabbalah as a religious doctrine implies in itself. Kabbalah is taken
tomean “reception” and the kabbalists purport to unearth the authenticmean-
ing of tradition but, fatally, as the newest commentary, ontologically belated,
as it were. Philology attempts, at times with remarkable success, to reconstruct
the “original” source of the Liber de causis, whereas the kabbalists are rather
interested in the result, themouth of the river, in keepingwith the fluvialmeta-
phor. Ideologically, Kabbalah does not need the Liber de causis, and not even
negative theology, but is ready to use it for apologetic purposes, to defend ad
extra its ineffable contents.
As Franz Rosenzweig,88 who reflected with lucidity on Jewish apologetics,89
in his metaphysics once remarked: “About God we know nothing. But this
not-knowing is a not-knowing about God”.90 The analogy with ‘Azrie’l’s way of
speaking, if not of thinking, becomes clear a few sentences further: “God could
no longer be defined, therefore, other than by his totally undefinable nature.
This way that leads from a found something to the nothing at the end of which
87 Cfr. Scholem 1970b.
88 Concerning the hypothetical role of Kabbalah in Rosenzweig’s thought, see Idel 1988,
updated in Idel 2010, p. 159–167; Harvey 1987; Lucca 2012, p. 1–6 (text), 7–19 (introduction).
89 Rosenzweig 1923.
90 Rosenzweig 1921, p. 32: “Von Gott wissen wir nichts. Aber dieses Nichtwissen ist Nichtwis-
sen von Gott”; English translation (by Barbara E. Galli) in Rosenzweig 2005, p. 32.
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atheism and mysticism can shake hands is not the way we are taking; we are
instead taking the way leading from the nothing to the something”.91 But even
if one is firmly decided to take the descending path, from Nought to Being, the
Nought, as its cause, pervades Being. The authentic reception of the Liber de
causis in Kabbalah seems to escape philological examination, since Kabbalah,
by its very nature, could only quote it as a convenient analogy found in external,
i.e. non Jewish, thought but, in a constructive way, would absorb its aphorisms
only by effacing their traces and effectively dissolving them.
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